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Studies in Applied Tactics 



BY 

Lieutenant-General Georg von Alten. 



Anthorized Translation 
(with Bnbstitution of American Army Organization) 

BY 

Major C. H. Barth, 

I2th U. S. Infantry. 



PART I. 
Reconnaissance. 

PART II. 

Cavalry Outposts. 
March and Combined Outposts. 




1908. 

Fbanklin Hudson FiiBLisBnio Comfant, 

KAK8A.S City, Mo. 



nX^^"^ 



Two Cooies R'-n.eived 

OCT 2ii,^oH 

Ceoyrifflit tntrv 







'SJ 



Transferred from the L.ibrai3r 
ef Congress under Sec. 59, 
OopyriKbt A.ct of Mch. 4, 1»0». 



TRANSLATOR'S PREFACE. 



Since the applicatory system of instruction in the art of 
war has come into such favor, and justly so, a great many books 
have appeared based on this system. All those producing these 
books are disciples of General von Verdy, and have imitated 
him more or less successfully. The more nearly they have suc- 
ceeded, the better their results have been. It is believed that 
the following pages devoted to research in this field will be 
foimd both valuable and interesting. The first part will appeal 
particularly to cavalry officers, as it deals with cavalry recon- 
naissance, especially that of smaller bodies. The second part 
will appeal to all ofi&cers studying troop-leading of the divis- 
ion and army corps. 

The author kindly consented to his work being translated 
and changed in so far as found desirable in adapting it to our 
own Army organization. Therefore it must be remembered, 
for example, that a troop of cavalry is assumed to contain loo 
men, divided into 4 platoons. These changes were made to 
facilitate a study of the problems. 

Whenever practicable, our own Field Service Regulations 
are quoted and referred to by foot-note. This happens quite 
frequently, the similarity between the German and our own 
doubtless being due to the former having been freely con- 
sulted in formulating the latter. 



PREFACE. 



To "know how" is the principal thing in every art, and 
in the art of war nothing fosters this so much as individual effort 
and determination to succeed. The following pages were writ- 
ten with this in view; it being intended to offer material in as 
varied a form as my imagination could produce. The discus- 
sion of the problems and the narrative of events are intended 
to smooth the reader's way in arriving at his own decisions. 
But I protest against my work being considered as model solu- 
tions. Good will come only from testing its correctness, not 
from accepting it on faith. I would also caution, against any 
attempt to deduce general rules from any single solution as they 
might fail in the first attempt to apply them. It is very seldom 
that a situation in war is repeated, and it would be impossible 
to rely on memory to assist in arriving at a decision. The leader 
must not allow any vain endeavor to recall something he has 
learned interfere with his exercising his common sense and cre- 
ative energy. He even must be cautious about making use of 
his own past experience. Still less can the form of my studies 
serve as a model. The form is of so little value compared with 
the substance that it is not worth while to imitate. 

The German Service Regulations form the basis for the 
work, although considerable discretion was exercised in their 
application. Exceptions prove the rule, and an individual case 
all the more justifies a deviation from a rule because the Regu- 
lations are the work of man. Before the tribunal of history, 
reference to a regulation will not be accepted as an excuse for 
a neglect ; and in all ages new and startling thoughts and meas- 
ures have triumphed over routine. 



6 PRllIfACE. 

To carry out the idea of the following studies, the problems 
in the text are separated from my solutions which follow, so 
that the reader is able to write down his own unbiased solution 
before taking cognizance of mine. 

At first considerable time should be taken to think about 
each problem. Mature reflection, covering every detail, is the 
best preparation for quick decision. Work should continue on 
a problem until the reader is personally satisfied with the 
solution. 

By using a continuation of the same "situation," higher 
and lower commanders in turn have a chance to be heard. It 
can only be an advantage for a junior officer occasionally to 
solve problems carrying him beyond his actual rank and com- 
mand ; and a senior may improve his capacity as instructor by 
occupying himself with problems that on service would devolve 
on juniors. 

The first part of this book deals with cavalry reconnais- 
sance, and especially {hat of smaller bodies. This branch of 
the military service is discussed first because it usually initiates 
operations of war, and because the principles involved should 
be familiar to the commanders of all branches of the service if 
they wish to correctly employ and energetically support the 
advance cavalry. Even the junior officers of infantry and 
artillery employed in the service of security and information 
require a knowledge of the powers and limitations of the sister 
arm in advance of the army if the cogs of the machine are to 
work smoothly. 

The second part of the book deals with cavalry outposts, 
and the service of security of the dififerent arms combined. In 
this way an insight will be obtained into the command of larger 
bodies of troops, which will be discussed later if I may hope for 
a favorable hearing. 

Georg von AIvTEN. 

Berlin, October, 1902. 



i^l/ 



TABLE OF CONTENTS. 



Part I. 

Page 
Introduction — "General Situation" and "Special Situation" of the 

Blue Army 9 

Estimate of the situation formed by Colonel A ,ist Cavalry- 
Arrangements made by him on the evening of May 4th 12 

Arrangements of Captain E , Troop A, ist Cavaky, and in- 
structions given by him after receiving Colonel A 's orders 

the evening of May 4th 21 

Lieutenant F ^"s patrol 32 

Lieutenant C 's patrol early on May 5th 57 

Decision and arrangements of Captain E the morning of May 

5th, after arriving at Reichenthal 72 

Instructions issued by Colonel A at 5 a. m., May 5th 92 

Arrangements made by Major W , commanding ist Squad- 
ron ist Cavalry 99 

Colonel A 's further intentions 105 

Progress of Lieutenant C 's patrol from 9 a. m. to 3.50 p. m. . . 115 

Conduct of Lieutenant D 's "strategical" patrol from p. m., 

May 3d, to a. m., May 5th 132 

The hostile officer's patrol at Wormditt 155 

Retrospect 162 

Part II. 
I. Cavalry Outposts. Page 

Selection of the Night Position. 

Events occuring in the ist Cavalry until 5 p. m. ; reflections and 

arrangements of its commander at this hour 177 

Arrangements of the Lieutenant-Colonel and squadron 
commander 213 

Protection. 

Troop B on outpost. Surprise of a cavalry picket 220 

Outpost of Troop C 248 

Detached Posts. 

Post at Altkirch 256 

Lieutenant L , at Regerteln 273 

Modern Methods of Forwarding Information and Orders 278 

7 



Tablb; of Contents. 

The Army Corps on the March. Page 

Dispositions for the March. 

Orders of the Commanding General, ist Division, issued 4th May, 

p. m 293 

Arrangements of the advance-guard commander 307 

Arrangements of the captain of Troop C, 3d Cavalry, to estab- 
lish communication with the advance cavalry 314 

Mounted orderlies 318 

Changes in arrangement of units during the march 319 

A Temporary Halt 329 

Halt for the Night. — Combined Outposts. 

Quarters and Supplies 341 

Security and Information. 

Arrangements of the Commanding Officer, Advance Guard, ist 

Division, 5th May, i p. m 347 

Arrangements of outpost commanders and their subordinates. . 351 

Conclusion 361 

Message Blank 363 

Vocabulary of German Names and English Equivalents 364 



Studies in Applied Tactics. 



PART I. 



RECONNAISSANCE. 

A blue army in friendly territory is moving from the Vis- 
tula (Weichsel)* on the front Gilgenburg-Saalfeld, against a 
hostile red army coming from the east.f The two cavalry 
divisions (ist and 2d) of the blue army are united on the right 
flank of the army. The left wing of this army consists of the 
First Army Corps, t to which the First Cavalry from the First 
Cavalry Division has been attached. The fortress of Konigs- 
berg has its full armament and is garrisoned by (blue) organized 
militia. 

May 4, 1904, the ist Division,§ ist Army Corps, is in and 
near Saalfeld, with its advance troops at Barten, The 2d Divi- 

*Much time will be saved the reader, subsequently, if he will under- 
score in red the names of places the first time he locates them on the map. 
— Translator. 

It is recommended that the following "situation" be carefully read, 
and re-read if necessary, with maps before you, so that a clear idea can be 
obtained of all details of the situation. — Translator. 

fSee accompanying maps. In consulting these — particularly the one 
drawn to a scale of i : 300,000 — it is urgently recommended that a read- 
ing-glass be used. — Translator. 

JFor organization of an army corps, a division, and cavalry division, 
see par. 4, F. S. R. (" F. S. R. " refers to our own Field Service Regulations.) 
— Translator. 

§The term "division" means division of infantry; whenever a cavalry 
division is meant, it is so stated in the text. 



—2— 



lo Studies in Applied Tactics. 

sion, I St Army Corps, is in rear of the ist and extends as far as 
Gerswalde. The ist Cavalry (1,200 strong), which detrained 
at Marienburg on May 3d, is in and near Maldeuten. 

The orders issued the evening of May 4th from head- 
quarters ist Army Corps direct, that on the following day the 
corps continue its march via Maldeuten towards Mohrungen, 
while the ist Cavalry reconnoiters to the front and the left flank. 
The van guard of the ist Division leaves Barten at 6 a. m. The 
neighboring 2d Army Corps marches via Liebemiihl with the in- 
tention of having its advance troops reach Locken on May 5th. 

By II p. m.. May 4th, Colonel A , commanding the 

ist Cavalry, has the following information: Traffic has been 
suspended on the railways east of the line Liebemiihl-Saal- 
feld-Elbing, the rolling-stock having been withdrawn. The 
railway between Maldeuten, Pr.* Holland, and Miihlhausen is 
guarded by (blue) organized militia. The railway telegraph 
line as far as Horn railway station,! south of Narien-see (lake), 
is still in working order. Nothing has been seen or heard of 
the enemy at this station. But the operator at Ziegenberg 
reported at 9 p. m. that he would discontinue, after having 
failed for some time to get any reply from Briickendorf 
railway station. J 

A telegram was received from Liebstadt that no communi- 
cation had been had with Guttstadt since 5 p. m., nor with 
Wormditt since 8 p. m. 

Colonel A had sent out two patrols of i officer, i non- 
commissioned officer, and 12 troopers each. Lieutenant B , 

commanding one of these patrols, had wired from Liebstadt 
that the enemy had not been seen at Wormditt as late as 6 p. m. ; 
that until the same hour the enemy had not been seen on the 



*Abbreviation for "Preussische" (Prussian). — Translator. 

tMarked " H. St., " due north of Horn, on map. Consult the i : 
) to find small towns. — Translator. 

{Marked "H. St.," near Briickendorf, on map. — Translator. 



Reconnaissance. ii 

Liebstadt-Guttstadt highway as far east as Wolfsdorf; and 
that the patrol would remain at Liebstadt over night. Lieu- 
tenant C , commanding the other patrol, had wired from 

Horn railway station, where he expected to spend the night, 
that at 7 p. m. the enemy had not yet appeared at Kallisten 
or Briickendorf. 

As early as the afternoon of May 3d, Lieutenant D , 

with 10 troopers on selected horses, had been sent from Marien- 
burg with orders from the commanding general of the ist 
Corps to reconnoiter in the general direction of Heilsberg and 
Bartenstein. 

Lieutenant D spent the night of May 3d-4th with the 

organized militia at Pr. Holland, and reported at 8 a. m. May 
4th, from Wormditt, that so far he had seen nothing of the 
enemy; that he had learned on telegraphic inquiry that noth- 
ing had been seen of the enemy at Landsberg, Mehlsack, or 
Guttstadt, but that since 7 a. m. telegraphic communication 
had been interrupted with Landsberg and Heilsberg. Just 
before 11 p. m. a telegram was received from Zinten, indicating 

that Lieutenant D had encountered hostile patrols at Rau- 

nau, Neuendorf, and Groszendorf, and that apparently Heils- 
berg, Landsburg, and Bartenstein were occupied by the enemy. 

The weather is cool, and some rain has fallen the last few 
days. The ground is favorable for cavalry, and horsemen can 
go almost anywhere on the roads. 

Required :* 

1. What is Colonel A — — 's estimate of the 

situation ? 

2. What arrangements does he make after 

IIP. m., May 4TH? 



*Before reading the author's solution to these and all succeeding 
problems, it is recommended that the reader work out his own solution 
in full. — Translator. . , , , -vJ 



12 Studies in Applied Tactics. 

The following is offered in answer to " i " : 

From the messages announcing interruption of telegraphic 

communication and from Lieutenant D 's last message, it 

is apparent that the enemy is approaching. Lieutenant 

D 's message from Wormditt, stating that the enemy had 

not been seen at Landsberg, Mehlsack, or Guttstadt, cannot 
mislead anyone if it is remembered that this was sent at 8 a. m. 

A collision of the main opposing forces is not to be ex- 
pected on May 5th; the intervening distance is too great. 
This day, therefore, is still at the disposal of the cavalry to se- 
cure further information of the enemy. However, such infor- 
mation must not arrive too late, if to be of service to the army 
during its march on May 6th. 

Narien-see blocks the direct advance towards the east 
and against the enemy. It would be precarious to divide 
the I St Cavalry so as to have it advance both north and south 
of the lake (Narien-see), and it is unnecessary to do so, because 
the divisional cavalry* of the ist Division, reinforced if neces- 
sary by that of the 2d Division, probably will advance to the 
south of the lake. Besides, the protection of the left flank and 
the appearance of the enemy at Wormditt and Heilsberg de- 
mand increased vigilance towards the north. Therefore it is 
advisable to have the entire regiment march via Mohrungen 
and the north end of the lake. It does not yet appear what 
course to follow later. 

The following is offered in answer to "2": 

The arrangements called for by the development of the 
situation will be^noted in the following paragraphs (from "a" 
to "g")' 

(a) Orders from Headquarters ist Cavalry: 

♦Cavalry attached to a division of infantry, and therefore different 
from that of cavalry^divisions. — Translator 



Reconnaissance. 13 

Headquarters ist Cavalry, Maldeuten, Prussia, 

4 May 04, 11.20 p. m. 
Field Orders 

Nr>. I . The enemy apparently has continued his march in a west- 
erly direction. The telegraph line to Landsberg and Heils- 
BERG has been cut since this morning, and to Wormditt, Gutt- 
STADT, and BruckendorF since this evening. HeilsbERG and 
Landsberg apparently were occupied by the enemy to-day. 
The I St Army Corps will march via MaldEUTEN towards Mohr- 
ungen the 5th inst., and the 2d Army Corps via LiEbemuhl 
towards Locken. 

2. This regiment will be formed by 5 a. m. the 5th inst. in 
column of route on the Mai^deuten-Gr.* Wii^msdorf highway, 
with head of column at the latter place. The ist Squadron,t 
which is to protect the formation, will be in the lead. 

3. Troop A will be sent in advance of the regiment and will 
be under my immediate orders. 

4. The baggage train, J with the advance guard pontoon 
train, will be formed by 6 a. m. the 5th inst. on the SeegerTS- 
walde-Gr. Wilmsdorp highway, with head of column at the 
Overland Canal. § 

5. Squadron commanders will report to the right command- 
er for further instructions at 5 a. m. the 5th inst. at Gr. 
Wilmsdorp. 

By order of Colonel A : 

C B , 

Capt. and Adjt. ist Cav., 

Adjutant. 
Dictated to the officers|| detailed to receive orders. 

(6) Before the above order is sent out, the commander of 
Troop A is ordered to report to the colonel, who acquaints him 
with this order, together with the necessary details concerning 
the situation, and adds the following instructions: 

"You will reconnoiter in advance of the regiment towards 
Wormditt-Guttstadt-Munsterberg, leaving Maldeuten at 4 a. 

m. to-morrow. Lieutenant B , of your squadron, is at 

Liebstadt to-night, with 12 troopers, and Lieutenant C , 

♦Abbreviation for "Grosz" (Great). — Translator. 

fOn the supposition that it furnished the outposts during the preced- 
ing night. 

JThe "regimental train" is styled "baggage train" in the proposed 
revision of F. S. R. — Translator. 

§"Oberlandische Kanal" on the 1:300,000 map. — Translator. 

||The squadron adjutants in this case. — Translator. 



14 Studies in Applied Tactics. 

of the 2d Squadron, is at Horn railway station; both can be 
reached by wire, so you would best at once communicate with 
them. Lieutenant B will be under your orders. Lieu- 
tenant C will be ordered to promptly reconnoiter to-mor- 
row morning via Briickendorf towards Gr. Buchwalde-Jonk- 
endorf and later try to join the regiment via Kallisten. At 
first I shall take the regiment in column of route as far as Gr. 
Hermenau; further dispositions will largely depend on your 
messages from the front. I shall hold the railway station at 
Mohrungen until relieved by the ist Division. 

' ' I shall request the corps commander to use his divisional 
cavalry for reconnaissance south of the Narien-see towards 
the Alle River." 

(c) After the order had been dictated to the squadron 
adjutants, the following telegram was sent to corps head- 
quarters : 

The ist Cavalry will leave Gr. Wilmsdorf at 5 a. m. the 5th inst. I 
intend provisionally to take it in column of route as far as Gr. Hermenau, 
and would request that the di»visional cavalry of the ist Division, and, if 
possible, also that of the 2d Division, be sent forward early to reconnoiter 
via the south end of Narien-see towards Munsterberg-Jonkendorf. I shall 
occupy the telegraph stations of Mohrungen and Gr. Hermenau. I would 
request that any information for me yet to arrive be sent to Maldeuten 
till 4-30 a. m., to Mohrungen till 7 a. m., and after that to Gr. Hermenau. 

(d) The following telegram is sent to headquarters ist 
Division : 

Lieutenant C , ist Cavalry, who is at Horn to-night, is ordered 

to advance early to-morrow morning via Briickendorf towards Gr. Buch- 
walde-Jonkendorf, and to send any important information to the cavalry 
of the ist Division, whose advance via the south end of Narien-see towards 
Miinsterberg-Jonkendorf I have recommended to corps headquarters. 

(e) Lieutenant C , at Horn, receives the following tel- 
egraphic orders : 

ist Army Corps will march towards Mohrungen the 5th inst., and 
the 2d Army Corps via Liebemiihl towards Locken. At 5 a. m. the 5th 
instant this regiment will advance from Gr. Wilmsdorf via Mohrungen- 
Gr. Hermenau towards Wormditt-Guttstadt-Miinsterberg. Troop A will 
leave Maldeuten at 4 a. m. to reconnoiter in advance of the regiment. 
You will start early in the morning on reconnaissance via Briickendorf 



Reconnaissance. i5 

towards Gr Buchwalde-Jonkendorf ; later joining your regiment via 
Kallisten. Send me information, if possible by wire, until 7 a. m. to 
Mohrungen, after that to Gr. Hermenau. Also send any important in- 
formation to the cavalry of the ist Division, which will advance via 
Mohrungen and the south end of Narien-see towards the Alle. 

(/) Lieutenant B , at Liebstadt, is wired as follows: 

You are placed under the orders of Captain E , commanding 

Troop A, ist Cavalry, from whom you will receive further orders. 

(g) A regimental staff officer of the ist Cavalry, who has 
been busy gathering telegraphic information since arriving at 
Maldeuten, continues his work during the night. 

An estimate of the situation often is required in problems 
on apphed tactics because it helps to a clear conception of the 
situation. Only the important and determining factors should 
be noted, omitting all well-known facts. It is not advisable to 
give reasons for details in the conclusion adopted, because judi- 
cious arrangements as a rule justify themselves. 

"Arrangements" include more than the formal orders 
issued by a commander. They include everything undertaken 
to insure unity of action among the co-ordinate parts and the 
attainment of the commander's aim. It is recommended that 
officers desiring to advance in professional knowledge repeat- 
edly write out messages, instructions, etc., so their form may 
present no difficulties when circumstances demand quick deci- 
sion and action. 

The situation of the ist Cavalry and the arrangements to 
be made by its colonel in some respects are of great importance, 
and therefore a more detailed discussion of them will follow 
what has gone before. 

Colonel A (as always should be done by subordinates) 

doubtless has consulted the General Staff map (scale i : 100,000) 
as well as the General map (scale i -.300,000), to get a compre- 
hensive idea of the situation as regards the whole army. He 
could easily see that there was still a considerable distance be- 
tween the opposing armies. If on the evening of May 4th the 
leading hostile patrols have but reached the line Wormditt- 



1 6 Studies in Applied Tactics. 

Briickendorf, it may be assumed that the heads of the main 
columns are at least a day's march east of the AUe. Ivieutenant 
D 's message, stating that Landsberg and Heilsberg ap- 
parently are occupied by the enemy on the 4th, strengthens 
this assumption. As it is a question of large bodies on both 
sides, whose rate of march is lessened by depth of column and 
scarcity of good roads, it is reasonable to conclude that there 
will be no serious engagement on the 5th. The probability of 
encountering hostile cavalry necessitates holding our own well 
in hand, and it is all the more important to go past the north 
end of Narien-see as the ist Cavalry is called upon to protect 
the left flank of the ist Army Corps as well as to screen its ad- 
vance. The latter duty is self-evident and needed no special 
mention in orders from corps headquarters. If army head- 
quarters had not sent the railway rolling-stock back so com- 
pletely and so far (a measure that now proves very detrimen- 
tal), detachments of infantry could be sent forward on May 4th 
to Liebstadt, Gr. Hermeng^, Mohrungen, and Horn, and thus 
materially simplify the duties of the cavalry. 

The question arises as to whether 5 a. m., the selected hour 
of departure, answers the purpose, or seems too late. 

The sun rises at about 4 a. m.* It will take over half an 
hour for the troops to assemble from their cantonments, and 
we must allow at least an hour for feeding and saddling, if this 
is not to be done hurriedly ; therefore the men must be astir by 
3 a. m., and perform some of their duties in the dark, notwith- 
standing the favorable season of the year and the not very early 
time set for departure. Further news of the enemy, the head 
of whose columns did not arrive on the Passarge River until 

evening, is not to be expected before Colonel A 's arrival 

at Gr. Hermenau — i. e., between 7 and 8 a. m. ; and not until 
then can it be decided on what road to continue the advance. 
Therefore it would be of little use to arrive at this cross-roads 

^Central European time. 



Reconnaissance. i7 

any earlier. Although so far the exertions required of the troops 
may not have been excessive, still, a consideration of the com- 
ing day demands every permissible economy of strength; and 
a materially earlier departure, instead of permitting a quiet issue 
of orders, would have necessitated hurry and marching by night, 
which unduly consume strength,' Unnecessary curtailment of 
rest indicates nervousness on the part of the leader and shakes 
the confidence of the troops in his capabilities. 

Colonel A simply orders the assembly of his regiment 

and defers issuing the order to march until later. Although on 
the evening of the 4th he had already decided in what direction 
to march, his delay in announcing this is natural, for experience 
shows that even well-founded decisions often need alteration 
at the last moment, and that therefore it is wise to never order 
more than what is absolutely necessary. Assembling on the 
road instead of in the adjoining fields saves time and strength 
and can be ordered unhesitatingly, as there is no danger of sur- 
prise by the enemy. Paragraph 3 of the regimental order, and 
the instructions to the commanding officer of Troop A based up- 
on it, require special notice. 

While the plan here adopted of having a troop perform all 
the reconnoitering in the main direction of advance is not con- 
trary to the German Field Service Regulations, still, it is not 
generally followed in the Army. More frequently the diflferent 
reconnoitering-patrols are sent out directly by the higher com- 
manders, and receive their instructions from the latter, while 
troops sent after them form their support and are charged with 
keeping up communication. Obviously it is very difficult for 
a higher commander to arrange for the movement and relief of 
distant patrols day by day, aside from the fact that this method 
does not take full advantage of the discretion and experience 
of troop commanders. Further events in our problem may help 
to clear up this subject. 



i8 Studies in Applied Tactics. 

Concerning the remainder of the regimental order there 
need only be said that it contains the necessary information of 
the enemy and of our supporting troops in concise terms, so 
that all concerned may take notice. The baggage train is 
assembled somewhat later than the troops, thus enabling the 
latter to use their heavy baggage until the last moment. Be- 
sides, it is very detrimental for the train to load and depart in 
the dark. But 6 a. m. probably is the latest time permissible 
for its assembly if it is to march ahead of the train of the ist 
Division. In case of danger the train would have to join that 
of the I St Division, in which event it would be unable to rejoin 
its regiment on the 5th. Such separation can be endured for 
a short time, but if prolonged, it not only is inconvenient, but 
also dangerous. Were the baggage train not urgently need- 
ed, it surely would soon have disappeared as an unnecessary 
impediment. Just remember that the baggage train includes 
rations and forage-wagons, and that the troop wagons, besides 
officers' baggage and re^rve clothing for men, carry armorers' 
outfits, horse medicines, and field forges.* 

In staff rides and maneuvers, where heavy baggage ap- 
pears only on paper, we often see in orders the words, "The 
baggage train will go into park here or there." As soon as 
the train actually appears, it becomes a different question to 
dispose of it judiciously. 

As a rule, the light bridge train, the same as medicine-carts, 
goes with the light train, which is never separated from the 
troops and therefore needs no special mention in orders. But 
it has heavy, cumbrous wagons that cannot keep up with troops, 
especially on country roads. Therefore it is preferably left 
with the baggage train as soon as it appears probable that 
the bridge train will not be needed in the first line. 



*Company and troop wagons may carry 950 lbs. tentage, 250 lbs. 
officers' baggage, 350 lbs. cooking utensils, and two days' rations and 
grain. (Par. 396, F. S. R.) 



Reconnaissaxce:. 19 

Colonel A is fortunate to have the telegraph available 

for communication with the different headquarters as well as 
with his own patrols. This is an advantage due to being in 

friendly territory, and is utilized by Colonel A in making 

his arrangements. It may seem strange that his orders and 
messages, intended for transmission by wire, should not be ab- 
breviated to a so-called telegraphic style. But experience has 
taught me that this style greatly favors mistakes. The omis- 
sion of a single word, even if it seems superfluous, may lead to 
no end of confusion. Short, clear sentences are preferable. 

It is mentioned, under "^, " that a regimental staff officer 
has been busy obtaining telegraphic information since arriv- 
ing at Maldeuten. Naturally he would have several C3^clists 
as orderlies. Every means must be utilized that will afford 
additional information of the enemy. In spite of this, war 
often is very disappointing on account of the scarcity, unreli- 
ability, and slowness of information. From Maldeuten an effort 
can be made to learn from a larger telegraphic station — such as 
Elbing — how far on the Allenstein-Korschen* line telegraphic 
communication still exists; and inquiry of the last station on 
the line may throw a flood of light on the situation. Of course 
such information must be cautiously received, because the enemy 
in this way may try to spread false reports ; and our telegrams 
must never prove traitorous. Therefore you must studiously 
avoid any expressions from which the enemy might draw con- 
clusions as to our situation or intentions, such, for instance, as 
"Answer by wire to headquarters ist Cavalry at Maldeuten." 
One way of accomplishing the object is to collect the answers 
at a remote station with which we are in assured telegraphic 
communication. It must be separately decided in each case 
whether the subordinate (in our case, Colonel A ) may 

*See General map. Korschen is northeast of Allenstein, beyond the 
limits of the map. — Translator. 



20 Studies in Applied Tactics. 

conduct such telegraphic inquiry without reference to higher 
authority. 

The date of the regimental order is "4 May 04, 11-20 p. m." 
Very likely May 5th has arrived before the squadron adjutants, 
receiving the order, are dismissed. Therefore the words "to- 
day" and "to-morrow" in the body of the order might lead to 
misunderstanding — this is avoided by inserting the date. Not 
until late at night are the orders received by those for whom 
they are intended. These officers, awakened from a heavy 
sleep of exhaustion, by poor light must consult maps that have 
become more or less unintelligible through use in wind and rain, 
and must hastily make their dispositions. This forms a fruitful 
source for the most unlikely misunderstandings. 

It is long past midnight at regimental headquarters before 
all arrangements are completed for the following day, which 
surely will tax officers and men in the extreme. Only a few 
hours remain in which to rest and gain new strength — a re- 
minder that some of theiime before arrival of orders from corps 
headquarters should have been thus utilized. A soldier should 
be able to store up sleep, as it were, considering that he never 
knows what may be required of him at any time. As soon as 
information or orders arrive, the guard at regimental head- 
quarters must awaken the officer on duty. The latter must 
decide whether or not the regimental commander should be 
awakened. 

Leaving regimental headquarters, let us consider the im- 
portant task that devolves on Captain K , commanding 

Troop A. This troop is quartered at Maldeuten, where it ar- 
rives on the afternoon of May 4th, after a march of 26 miles. 
It is well quartered and had plenty to eat for horses and men. 
Its baggage train arrived at 8 p. m. 

Captain E makes a memorandum of the verbal instruc- 
tions received from Colonel A , and reads them aloud before 



Reconnaissance. 21 

leaving the latter's headquarters, finding it unnecessary to ask 
any questions about them. 

What arrangements does Captain E make after 

RECEIVING HIS instructions AND AFTER HAVING LEARNED BY 
WIRE FROM THE TWO OFFICERS IN LlEBSTADT AND HORN THAT 
THEY HAD NOTHING NEW TO REPORT? 

After leaving his regimental commander, Captain E 

presumably verbally told his squadron commander what orders 
he had received, directed his first sergeant and squad-leaders 
to report to him for orders, and went to the railway station to 
communicate with the officers at Liebstadt and Horn. He 
would send the following telegrams from the office at the rail- 
way station. 

(a) To Lieutenant C , at Horn: 

Troop A, ist Cavalry, en route to Gr. Hermenau, will arrive at 
Mohrungen shortly after 5 a. m., and looks for reports at both places. 

(6) To Lieutenant B , at Liebstadt: 

You will continue your reconnaissance via Wormditt and Guttstadt. 
By 6 a. m., at Gr. Hermenau, I shall expect a report of your reconnaissance 
to Wormditt and Scharnick. Any approach of the enemy must be at once 
wired here and after 4 a. m. also to Mohrungen. 

If Captain E has not a list of telegraph stations, and 

cannot obtain one at the station, he should enter a list of tele- 
graph lines and stations on his General map, as obtained upon 
inquiry from the station agent, and arrange with the latter to 
forward telegrams. The captain then returns to Maldeuten, 
and it will be fully an hour after midnight before he will have 
issued his orders. These will be as follows: 

1. Lieutenant F will report at my quarters at 2 a. m., with 

1 sergeant and 14 men of his platoon, ready for patrol duty. [This order 
is sent to the lieutenant at once.] 

2. Troop A will be assembled at 4 a. m. at the southern exit of 
Maldeuten, ready to march. 

3. The troop escort wagons will be ready at the same place at 5-45 
a. m., and will join the baggage train of the squadron. 

The first sergeant copies these orders. At 2 a. m., when 
Lieutenant F reports, the captain explains the situation 



22 Studies in Applied Tactics. 

to him, including the instructions sent Lieutenants B and 

C , and directs him as follows: 

"You will ride via Mohrungen-Gr. Hermenau, at first to 
reconnoiter towards Kallisten and then along the Kallisten- 
Guttstadt road. I shall expect a report of your reconnais- 
sance as far as the Passarge by 6 a. m., at Herzogswalde, to 
which place I shall send a connecting-patrol." 

The captain had previously written these instructions in 
his note-book. 

Chance has favored Captain E with an important and 

enviable task. His efficiency is increased not only by the ela- 
tion of a cavalryman who feels that he now may show of what 
he himself is capable and what his troopers can do, but also by 
an appreciation of the difficulties and responsibilities devolving 
upon him. An experienced troop commander is ready to meet 
all manner of obstacles and appreciates the bearing his work 
has on the decisions of higher authority. Therefore, with care- 
ful deliberation he tries to provide for every contingency. It 
is important that he, as* well as his regimental commander, 
should obtain information at Gr. Hermenau from all points 
under consideration. He is justified in ordering the patrol at 
I/iebstadt to reconnoiter via Wormditt as well as Guttstadt, 
because telegraphic communication still seems possible for 
some distance along the railway towards Wormditt. The cap- 
tain does not think it advisable to send Lieutenant B more 

detailed instructions, for example, about dividing his patrol, 
holding the telegraph station at Liebstadt, etc. How easily 
may the conditions there change before morning, so that such 
instructions could not be carried out and the oflftcer would be 
placed in an embarrassing position. Therefore the lieutenant 
is told what is expected of him and is allowed to do it in his 
own way. 

The captain sends Lieutenant F into the gap between 

Lieutenants B and C , the region south of the Lieb- 



Rfxonnaissance. 23 

stadt-Guttstadt road. It is to be hoped that information will 
be available from Lieutenant C^ — 's district before the troop 
reaches Gr. Hermenau. 

It is true that the net broadly and promptly spread by 

Captain E to obtain information has wide meshes, but it 

affords some assurance that the enemy will not be able to slip 
through unobserved. 

In Troop A the issue of orders has taken until towards early 
dawn. The first sergeant and squad-leaders hardly will be able 
to obtain another half-hour's rest in the straw if everything 
among horses and men is to be in ship-shape order for the long 
day's work by 4 a. m., the time for departure. This is an earn- 
est reminder for higher authorities to issue their orders early, 
as these form the basis for others. 

By 4 a. m. May 5th word is received from Elbing that tele- 
graphic communication has been interrupted with Konigsberg 
and Pr. Eylau since a. m. of May 4th, and with Landsberg since 
noon that day. The latter office was dismantled on the ap- 
proach of hostile troopers. The telegraph line was destroyed 
between Mehlsack and Wormditt on the evening of May 4th, 
but at Mehlsack itself the enemy had not appeared up to 2 a. m. 

May 5th. At 2 a. m. Lieutenant B reported that he was 

about to leave for Guttstadt with 7 troopers, sending Sergeant 
H — — and 5 troopers to Wormditt. 

These reports do not cause Captain E to change any 

of his arrangements. At 4 a. m. he marched from Maldeuten 

and sent Corporal M with 3 troopers ahead to Herzogs- 

walde as a connecting- patrol for Lieutenant F . At 5-20 

a. m. the troop arrived at the Mohrungen station, where the 
following telegrams were found: 

I. By wire from Horn railway station at 5 a. m. May 5th. 

Hillside just west of Bruckendorf, 

5 May 04, 4-10 a. m. 
Found railway station near Bruckendorf occupied by enemy, who 

fired on us. C 

Lieutenani. 



24 Studies in Applied Tactics. 

2. 

Maldeuten, 
5 May 04, 4 a. m. 

Major D , with 3 troops 3d Cavalry, leaves Drenken at 5 a. m., 

reconnoitering via Pfeiling towards Miinsterberg-Jonkendorf. 

By order of Colonel A : B , 

Adjutant. 

Captain A leaves a corporal and i private at the 

railway station with orders to see that all messages received 
for the troop are repeated to Gr. Hermenati, and to take charge 
of any for regimental headquarters. None of these must be 
allowed to fall into the enemy's hands. Upon arrival of reg- 
imental headquarters the detail is to rejoin its troop. The 
telegraph office in the town of Mohrungen had received no dis- 
patches of any importance. It and the postoffice were notified 
to hide all matter that could be of any value to the enemy, and 
to remain in constant communication with the railway station. 

The troop commander sent a short dispatch back to reg- 
imental headquarters at Gr. Bestendorf and then continued the 
march. At 6 a. m. the troop arrived at Gr. Hermenau, where 
the following dispatche's were found. 

1. Message from Sergeant H , who was sent to Worm- 

ditt by Lieutenant B : 

WORMDITT, 

5 May 04, 4 a. m. 
Yesterday evening 20 hostile troopers cut the telegraph line, de- 
stroyed the instruments, and blew up rails and switches at the station. 
They remained here over night and left at i a. m., going towards Aiken. 

(This message was wired from Sportehnen to Gr. 

Hermenau.) 

2. Lieutenant B reports at 5.30 a. m., from Pittehnen 

(forwarded by wire from Liebstadt) : 

Shortly after 4 a. m. I encountered a platoon of hostile cavalry at 
Scharnick and retired to this point. Am still holding the crossing. The 
Passarge here can be crossed only on the bridge. 

3. Lieutenant F reports from the edge of the woods. 

north of Sanglau at 5 a. m. : 



Reconnaissance;. 25 

Twelve hostile troopers are riding from Lettau towards Herzogs- 
walde. I shall continue my reconnaissance via Sanglau towards Kallisten. 
I have sent a lance corporal and 2 men to Sackstein to report direct to the 
troop. 

The trooper carrying this message passed between Ponarien 
and Royer Forst (Forest), but did not see an3rthing more of the 
enemy. Upon inquiry, he stated that the highway at Walters- 
dorf was entirely deserted at about 5 a. m. 

No word had been received from the patrol sent to 
Herzogswalde. 

To WHAT DECISION DOES CaPTAIN E COME, AND WHAT 

ARRANGEMENTS DOES HE MAKE, AFTER 6 A. M. ? 

Hostile troopers are reconnoitering on all roads leading 
from the east. But no insight has yet been obtained behind 
these advanced parties. 

The captain may have hoped for more definite informa- 
tion from his patrols. He probably hoped for information at 
Gr. Hermenau that would have simplified his task. 

But on again comparing time and distance he realizes that 
by 6 a. m. he hardly could have expected more definite informa- 
tion unless large bodies of hostile troops crossed the Passarge 
early in the morning. So far there is no word about Kallisten 
from Lieutenant F , nor about Sackstein, although Lieu- 
tenant F had sent a patrol to the latter point. Therefore 

the question arises whether Captain E should await the 

arrival of further information that might serve as a basis for 
further arrangements. It takes time to wait, and, as the patrols 
everywhere have encountered hostile ones, which hamper their 
freedom of action, the same uncertainty might still obtain upon 
arrival of the regiment, if the troop did not take an active part 
in the reconnaissance. 

There are good reasons for not sending further strong pa- 
trols in the three main directions: Kallisten, Guttstadt, and 

Wormditt. At neither point would a decisive superiority be 
— 3 — 



26 Studies in Applied Tactics. 

obtained, the captain's personal supervision and power to assist 
would become nil, and the scattered troop hardly could be as- 
sembled again during the day. In case the regiment encoun- 
tered the enemy, the troop would have lost its fighting power. 
Therefore it seems best that the troop continue on its way as a 
closed body, so that at one point, at least, it may be able to 
pierce the hostile screen and obtain some light. What direc- 
tion shall the captain choose? 

Captain E need not bother about the hostile patrol 

that advanced early in the morning from Wormditt towards 

Aiken. A part of Lieutenant B 's patrol is at Wormditt, 

and it is to be hoped that this will be able to make the necessary 
dispositions to watch the roads converging on that point. 
But, as this party might be driven off by other advancing hos- 
tile troops, it is advisable to send out an intermediate patrol to 
Iviebstadt, where this in addition should take charge of the im- 
portant telegraph ofi&ce. Lieutenant F is advancing via 

Kallisten. The 12 hogJ:ile troopers that passed him are an 
annoyance, but at the latest they will be driven back by the head 
of the regiment, and must not influence Captain E 's deci- 
sion. It is to be hoped that, if Lieutenant F 's report on 

Kallisten does not reach the troop in time, it at least will thus 

reach the regiment. And, besides. Major D , 3d Cavalry,* 

will reconnoiter via Kallisten. 

Therefore the Liebstadt-Outtstadt road seems to offer the 
best opportunity for profitable reconnaissance, although no 
definite conclusion can be drawn from the sole fact that in that 
direction Lieutenant B met a rather strong hostile detach- 
ment. It is the central one of the three possible directions and 
admits of a change to either of the other two without too great 
a detour. 

Probably many a one whom the "maneuver-habit" would 
have led to choose the Gr. Hermenau-Liebstadt highway as 

*0f the divisional cavalry. — Translator. 



Reconnaissance. 27 

the route for the troop's advance would never have given a 
thought to the country road via Herzogswalde-Reichenthal as 
a desirable route. How often we hear the advice, ' ' Remain on 
the good roads," and "Even do not hesitate to make a detour 
if thereby the troops can remain on a good road." The princi- 
ple is correct, but, in my opinion, as a rule, is not applicable on 
reconnaissance duty. Large bodies of troops will and must 
select the best roads ; therefore on these we shall find the enemy's 
columns. But if your advanced patrols also keep to these 
roads, the enemy's will prevent all insight. 

Patrols and reconnoitering troops can accomplish their 
object much more readily on side roads. Of course there is a 
limit to the use of side roads and fields when thereby the ad- 
vance is too much retarded. In this case there are other reasons 
favoring the Herzogswalde-Reichenthal road: the troop will 
be able to keep the bridge at Sackstein under observation, 
whence no report has been received, so far; the troop can 
quickly turn south if necessary on account of reports received 
from Kallisten; it may be possible to drive off the hostile patrol 
coming from Lettau; and, as the route leads over high ground, 
an extended view is obtained of a large territory. Therefore 

Captain E orders his advance party to ride via Narien mill,* 

sends a small patrol of 3 troopers around the south side of 

Royer Forest to the Teufelsberg 185, and sends Sergeant L 

with 6 troopers to Liebstadt. The latter is ordered to occupy 
the railway station near the town, see that messages for the 
troop are sent the latter on the Herzogswalde-Reichenthal- 
Pittehnen road, and repeat all important messages for the troop 
to Gr. Hermenau. In addition he is directed to observe the 
roads leading to Gottchendorf, Wormditt, Klogehnen, and 
Pittehnen. Anything important to be wired direct to regi- 
mental headquarters at Gr. Hermenau. A connecting-post of 
3 men is left at Gr. Hermenau. 

*"Narien M." on 1:100,000 map. — Translator. 



28 Studies in Applied Tactics. 

Captain E then dictates the following message to 

regimental headquarters : 

Gr. Hermenau, 
5 May 04, 6-20 a. m. 
Twenty hostile troopers were at Wormditt last night, destroyed the 
railway and telegraph at that point, and left on the way towards Aiken at 

I a. m. I am not pursuing them from this point. Sergeant H and 5 

troopers are now located at Wormditt. 

Lieutenant B encountered a platoon of hostile cavalry at Schar- 

nick early this morning, and at 5.30 a. m. had retreated to Pittehnen. 

At 5 a. m. to-day 12 hostile troopers, coming from Lettau, rode 
towards Herzogswalde. Their whereabouts is not known. Lieutenant 

F is reconnoitering via Kallisten towards Guttstadt. Troop A will 

advance via Herzogswalde-Pittehnen to reconnoiter the Liebstadt-Gutt- 

stadt road. Lieutenant F sent a lance corporal and 2 troopers to 

Sackstein. No report yet received from them. 

I am leaving connecting-posts at telegraph stations in Liebstadt 
and Gr. Hermenau and at Herzogswalde. 

E . 

Captain. 

The message is wired to Mohrungen and in addition is sent 

to Colonel A by a trooper riding along the highway. The 

man is instructed to note when and where he meets Colonel 
A , and is then to ride to Corporal M , at Herzogswalde. 

In practice rides and at ICriegs-spiel many of you may have 
been surprised to notice, as I have, that, when under similar cir- 
cumstances a leader was asked for his decision and arrangements, 
his first answer would be: "I shall at once forward the mes- 
sage." At maneuvers, on the contrary, the message is entirely 
forgotten, or at least is not thought of for some time. Both 
practices are contrary to what is required in war. The sending 
of a message is seldom of more importance than a consideration 
of further necessary arrangements, which as a rule also must 
form the subject of a report. A combined report of what has 
been seen and what has been resolved upon furnishes the supe- 
rior with a better picture than would two separate reports for- 
warded by two horses instead of one. 

It is evident that in maneuvers as in war, where the enemy 
actually is in evidence, and miles are not measured only by the 
dividers, a message is easily overlooked. Time presses and 



Reconnaissance. 29 

more thought is devoted to riding than to writing. A watchful 
assistant — an adjutant or a first sergeant — may remind you 
of it. 

It is self-evident that the regimental commander should be 
kept constantly informed of the reconnaissance work and where- 
abouts of the troop. Captain E possibly might content 

himself with forwarding the messages received ; simply append- 
ing his intended action. 

It seems expedient to me that he should report to his colo- 
nel in an abbreviated form what has happened so far, possibly 
showing the source of his information. He thus would spare 
his superior the labor of reading unnecessary details, or mistakes 
that would have to be sifted, and force himself to carefully test 
all information received. Only in exceptional cases should the 
original messages be forwarded, as when time presses or when 
the exact words received are of importance for the recipient. 
To habitually forward all messages would be incompatible with 
the troop commander's obligation, whose duty it is to see that 
the situation is cleared up, and who therefore should separate 
the important from the unimportant — the true from the false. 
It would be different if the troop acted simply as a support for 
a number of independent patrols. In this event the original 
messages would have to be promptly forwarded. This would 
increase the demand for horses and increase the difficulties of 
supervision at regimental headquarters. 

The time that the captain has devoted to quietly composing 
and writing his report (of which report he will retain a copy) he 
will regain in overtaking his advance party in company of a 
subaltern and several troopers (trumpeter, etc.), his troop fol- 
lowing at a trot. 

If in the meantime Lieutenant B has been driven away 

from Pittehnen, the time may be at hand when Captain E 

first meets the enemy. He might also encounter the hostile 
patrol that advanced via Lettau. Notwithstanding the rapid- 



^o Studies in Applied Tactics. 

ity of movement, it is important to carefully look about in every 
direction, to avoid being surprised. An officer and 2 troopers 
are sent to the Teufelsberg, which limits the view to the south, 
while the captain himself rides to Knoll 136 west of the north 
end of Herzogswalde, carefully concealing himself and his com- 
panions from hostile observation. The view to the northeast 
is quite limited, the heights at Pragsden and Wuchsing limit it. 
The highway from Pragsden to lyiebstadt is visible almost along 
its entire length, and nothing of importance is visible on it, 
neither is there on the short stretch of highway visible near 
Blumen. In the vicinity of Warrhof there is a small group of 
horsemen moving on the Alt-Bolitten-Liebstadt highway. The 
captain turns his field-glasses in that direction, but his horse's 
movements prevent his obtaining an accurate view. But he 
does not wish to dismount until he finds out what the situation 
is in Herzogswalde, whither he sends a trumpeter. Neither his 

advance party nor Corporal M 's connecting patrol is visible, 

and, by the time he learns that the latter is at the southern edge 
of the village and the advance party at the exit towards Reich- 
enthal, his troop is already approaching. While thus waiting, 
the captain may have indulged in some strong language, for both 
detachments committed an error. Fortunately, no disastrous 
results have followed, but it serves as a lesson and will not be 
repeated. Both parties have thought only of the front and 
forgot that the large village behind them obstructed all view of 
the troop. The advance party should have left a man on Knoll 

136. For his own safety, Corporal M at least should have 

guarded the cross-street in the village if perchance Knoll 136 had 
not ser\^ed his purpose better by affording a better lookout and 
cover. 

The captain did not at once dismount, even though he could 
not advantageously use his field-glasses while mounted. Pos- 
sibly he had the French General Staff officer in mind who, leav- 
ing his escort at the foot of a hill near Beaumont, August 29, 



Reconnaissance. 3^ 

1870, dismounted and was captured by some Prussian Garde- 
Uhlans, who ascended the hill from the opposite side, unob- 
served. In the present case the large village of Herzogswalde 
might have harbored enemies; hence the captain's befitting 
caution. It is ascertained that the group of horsemen south 

of Liebstadt is Sergeant L 's patrol (connecting- post). 

After the captain had scanned the whole surrounding country 
with his glasses without discovering the enemy, the officer, who 
had returned from Knoll 185, reported that from the latter point 
(whence a view could be had to beyond Waltersdorf, as far as 
Seubersdorf, the Seubersdorf Forest, and Willnau) neither our 
own troops nor those of the enemy were visible. The officer 
there overtook the patrol sent around Royer Forest; it had not 
seen anything suspicious. The three troopers were left on the 
knoll until further orders and were continuing in observation. 
Nothing is known of the enemy in Herzogswalde. The 
inhabitants are assembled partly in the village street and partly 
in the church, where, notwithstanding its being a week day and 
very early in the morning, religious services are in progress. 
The fields and trails are deserted. News of the approach of the 
hostile army, as well as of the interruption of telegraphic com- 
munication, has spread among the villages. Fear and terror 
have taken possession of the people. This is increased by false 
and exaggerated rumors and by the absence from home of the 
able-bodied men who have been called to the colors. Although 
these people do not talk much, still, the captain has the trouble 
of investigating several rumors brought to him by them. He 
recognizes these rumors as untenable and fantastic, still he 
takes the necessary time to investigate. 

Then he has his advance party resume its march, first di- 
recting it to Knoll 153, and orders the patrol at Teufelsberg to 
ride towards Naglack, thus covering the advance of the troop 
on the south. On account of the supposed presence of a hostile 



32 Studies in Applied Tactics. 

patrol in the neighborhood, Corporal M 's patrol at Herzogs- 

walde is increased to 6 men, with the following instructions: 

"You will ride to the Teufelsberg, observdng in all direc- 
tions as far as you can, and watching the course of the troop 
as far as you can, which will advance on Guttstadt via Pit- 
tehnen. You will keep up communication between the troop 
and the regiment, and therefore will read all messages arriv- 
ing and see that everything of importance is forwarded to the 
regimental commander, who should arrive at Gr. Hermenau 
shortly after 7 a. m. I must leave it to your judgment to 
send me any messages that are of importance for me and that 
still can reach me. You know that at 5 a. m. a hostile pa- 
trol of 12 men was seen riding from Lettau towards Herzogs- 
walde, and that it has since disappeared. Do not allow your- 
self to be surprised by it." 

The captain sends a short written report to the regiment, 
stating that the enemy could not be seen from Herzogswalde ; 
that no further information had been received; that the troop 
had resumed its march towards Pittehnen, and that Corporal 

M , with 6 men as connecting-post, had been sent to the 

Teufelsberg. Then (it is now 6.50 a. m.) he starts his troop at 
a trot and himself rides to the height near Wuchsing. 



Let us devote our attention for awhile to Lieutenant F- 



Awakened at 1.30 a. m, in Maldeuten, he had received his 
orders in the captain's quarters at about 2 a. m., at once record- 
ing them. It would have been fatal if later his memory should 
have failed him concerning a name or number. Beidses, as a 
means of protection, the patrol-leader, as well as the one order- 
ing him to duty, should have the orders in black and white. 

The orders were as follows: 

You will ride via Mohrungen-Gr. Hermenau, first to reconnoiter 
towards Kallisten and then along the Kallisten-Guttstadt road. I shall 
expect a report of your reconnaissance as far as the Passarge by 6 a. ra. at 
Herzogswalde, whither I shall send a connecting-patrol. 



Reconnaissance. 33 

The captain also imparted the information concerning the 
enemy, the regimental commander's intention, the troop's orders 

and those of Lieutenants B and C , and that the cav- 

ahy of the ist Division would advance from south of Narien-see 
towards the AUe. 

Captain E has been busy the past three hours making 

arrangements for his scout, and he certainly is entitled to unin- 
terrupted rest until the time of departure of his troop. Still, 

Lieutenant F , before leaving his superior, must carefully 

think over his orders with his map before him, so he can ask 
for information on any points about which he may be in doubt. 
The bodily exhaustion and mental tension that are the rule in 
war must be fought at every point by will-power. 

Concerning maps, it is to be assumed that all cavalry offi- 
cers are provided with a General map and a General Staff map 
of the section under consideration. This may be so in your 
own country. The patrol-leaders' tasks would become most 
difficult without maps. In such cases they would have to pre- 
pare maps for themselves, showing at least the principal roads, 
villages, railways, and water-courses. 

Lieutenant T had no questions to ask of his captain. 

But before having his patrol mount he satisfied himself, as far as 
darkness would permit, that his men were properly equipped for 
the trip. A lame horse or a sick man could still be exchanged. 
The hurried departure necessitated deferring an examination 
of the saddling and shoeing until the first halt. The horses 
could not be fed before starting, but it may be assumed that 
they had a good feed in the evening. It is of no consequence 
that the men start without breakfast. A patrol has an advan- 
tage over a troop in securing food. A piece of bread and cheese 
with a cup of milk can be had at almost any farm-house. 

Although the ride as far as Mohrungen can be considered 

perfectly safe, still Lieutenant F forms a point or advance 

party of three men and has it precede the patrol about 300 



34 Studies in AppIvIEd Tactics. 

yards on the highway. And until daylight 2 men ride as con- 
necting-file between the point and the patrol. When first com- 
ing to a walk from a trot, the officer informs his men of the task 
before them and informs the sergeant, who is to take his place 
in case of accident, more in detail concerning the situation. 
The sergeant, too, will write down the import of the order at 
the^first opportunity. Arriving at the railway station of Gr. 
Bestendorf the lieutenant inquires for news, but receives none, 
any more than at Mohrungen. From the latter place be makes 
telegraphic inquiry of Liebstadt, Gr. Hermenau, and Horn, 
but learns nothing new. He simply receives word that the 
patrol left Liebstadt at 2 a. m., and the one at Horn left at 3 
a. m. The short halt at the railway station of Mohrungen was 
utilized to readjust the saddles, then the patrol continued along 
the highway via Georgenthal. About 4 a. m., at dawn, the 
patrol reaches Gr. Hermenau. A hasty survey of the terrain 
reveals nothing suspicious ; the inhabitants know nothing about 
the enemy; a farmer who was in Alt-Bolitten yesterday after- 
noon states that the enemy had not been seen there either. 
Renewed inquiry by wire of Liebstadt and Mohrungen results 
in no change in the situation. Upon inquiry of Maldeuten, 
word is received that telegraphic communication with Landsberg 
and Pr. Eylau, as well as between Wormditt and Mehlsack, 
was cut off the 4th inst. The village president (of Gr. Hermen- 
au), upon inquiry, states that at Kloben, Kallisten, Sackstein, 
and farther down the Passarge averages 15 yards in width and 
2 yards in depth; that the meadows along the stream are 
marshy; that, as far as he knows, the stream can be crossed 
only on the bridges; and that there are no fords between 
Briickendorf and Pittehnen. 

What will Lieutenant F do after this, and what 

arrangements does he make at about 4 a. m. ? 

Although the captain's orders specifically direct the patrol 
towards Kallisten, the leader realizes that Lieutenant B ,. 



Reconnaissance. 35 

who is to reconnoiter from Liebstadt towards Wormditt and 

r ll f '.^^''''°^ '^^ ^^^ ^°"^^^y ^°"th of the I^iebstadt- 
Guttstadt highway, and that therefore this task devolves on 

Lieutenant F . It is simplified by the fact that the Passarge 

between Kallisten and Pittehnen apparently can be crossed only 
on the bridge at Sackstein. The next point of crossing above 
Kalhsten the bridge at Kloben, also lies within Lieutenant 
t- s domain; while the Passarge south of this point prop- 
erly can be left to the charge of Lieutenant C reconnoiter- 

mg toward Jonkendorf and to the cavalry of the ist Division. 

iherefore Lieutenant F 's reconnaissance from Gr Her 

menau should at first be directed towards the Passarge between 
Kloben and Sackstein, and, being well-versed in map-readin- 
he concludes that the village president's statement concernin<: 
the passableness of the stream is correct, as there are no trails 
or roads mdicated on the map across the broad meadows along 
the river. The work can be accomplished by sending small pa- 
trols towards the three bridges, while the leader with the remain- 
der of his patrol follows on the central road to the vicinity of 
Lettau-Waltersdorf. The small patrols cover quite a large 
territory and it will be difficult for any hostile detachment to es- 
cape their notice. What one does not see, another will The 
captam at Herzogswalde expects a report of the reconnaissance 
as far as the Passarge by 6 a. m. It is over 9 miles from Gr. 
Hermenau to the Passarge, and about 6 miles back to Her- 
zogswalde. Therefore there is no time to be lost, and simul- 
taneous reconnaissance towards all three bridges promises 
the quickest results. ^ f 

V ^""^1^^'^ T °^J^^ti°^« to this method of procedure. 
Each of the small patrols must contain at least 3 men, so that 
after sending back the first message, it may not be reduced to 
a single pair of eyes. Therefore the lieutenant would retain 
but the sergeant and 5 men. But he may encounter the enemy 
on this side of the Passarge. In this event the scattered smaH 



36 Studies in Applied Tactics. 

patrols probably would be completely dispersed. Their mes- 
sages largely would fail to reach the officer, and where are they 
then to go ? Neither the messengers nor the leaders of the small 
patrols are sufficiently well acquainted with the general situa- 
tion. They have no maps, and the absence of field-glasses 
limits their power of vision. They therefore can do little more 
than report the presence of hostile advance parties. The offi- 
cer, with his few remaining men, cannot carry out his instruc- 
tions even if he should succeed in slipping by the hostile detach- 
ments unobserved. After sending back a single message, he 
would be almost without escort. Being unable to protect his 
march with point and flankers, his activity would soon come 
to an end. 

In time of peace, when fighting capacity does not count, 
where most persons have maps, where no one is captured, and 
where individual messengers safely ride past hostile detach- 
ments, the subdivision of an officer's patrol into a number of 
small groups may sometimes achieve the desired end. In time 
of war it exposes the leader to the loss of his escort, which is 
necessary for his safety, for reliefs to messengers, and for fight- 
ing. Ferreting out, recognizing, and observing the enemy es- 
sentially is the function of the leader. He alone has a general 
view of the situation, and with his map and field-glasses posses- 
ses superior facilities for the work. His men can perform only 
secondary duties for him; and small parties of them will be 
detached only for short distances and to accomplish some 
minor object — otherwise the reins will slip from the leader's 
hands and the thinnest hostile screen will become impenetrable. 

Should Lieutenant F conclude to send a patrol each to 

Sackstein and Kloben and with the remainder of the patrol 
himself to ride to Kallisten, he would reduce his detached 
parties to 6 men; but, should he encounter the enemy, he could 
not count on sending messages. He would not improve his 
case much. He would prefer to keep his men together as long 



Reconnaissance. 37 

as possible and divide them only when it becomes absolutely 
necessary, and when a reassembling seems reasonably assured. 
He can at least advance to the vicinity of Herzogswalde with 
his patrol united. 

Lieutenant F 's decision as to the extent of territory 

to be covered by him, and his action concerning the Passarge, 
lead to the question : ' 'Why is he required at first to reconnoi- 
ter only towards KalHsten? Why did not the captain say, 
'Reconnoiter the Passarge from Kloben to Sackstein' ? " 

In the Field Service Regulations we see "that orders must 
state clearly what information is desired, what points are of 
special importance" ;* and it undoubtedly was of importance to 
the captain that on his arrival at Gr. Hermenau he should have 
news not only of Kallisten, but of the entire Passarge within 
reach of this patrol. 

It must be admitted that more detailed orders in this par- 
ticular would have been desirable. But the captain had a right 
to count on the officer's interpreting the orders in the manner 
intended. As a rule, it must be sufficient to give the general 
direction— the main line of advance— in which a reconnaissance 
shall take place. If, in addition, the patrol commander is in- 
formed of the orders of the neighboring patrols, his discretion 
and energy may be trusted to look out for the intervening 

country. 

The second part of the order simply calls for a reconnais- 
sance of the Kallisten-Guttstadt road. But no officer on this 
account would claim that hostile detachments off the road did 
not concern him. At Maldeuten no special importance could 
be assigned the bridges over the Passarge because the captain 
so far had no information as to the passableness of the stream. 
We also must bear in mind the many arrangements we had to 
make hastily and late at night before condemning any failure 
of his to go into minute details in any particular case. Too 

*See par. 75, F. S. R. 



38 Studies in Applied Tactics. 

great anxiety easily leads to pedantry and certainly would have 

delayed Lieutenant F 's departure. A fault-finder even 

might take exception to the word "reconnoiter," and ask that 
the officer be told to what extent the reconnaissance should be 
carried — whether hostile patrols, cavalry in close formation, or 
even the infantry in rear of these should be sought out. Lieu- 
tenant F very properly asked no questions of this sort when 

he recorded his orders. The captain simply could have replied 
that he was not a clairvoyant, and could not know in advance 
what important things might happen at the front. The value 
of an officer's patrol materially depends on the military judg- 
ment of the leader, who should be able to grasp the situation 
and work into his superior's hand without previously receiving 
an enumeration of all details — a feat of which the latter would 
not be capable. 

Lieutenant F will be able to learn from the inhabitants 

of Gr. Hermenau whether the Teufelsberg affords as good a 
point of view as is to be ^inferred from the map; if it does, then 
this becomes the next objective. It seems less advisable to go 
there around the south side of Royer Forest than to gain the 
eastern edge of the forest by the Gr. Hermenau-Herzogswalde 
road and then to continue across the hilly country between the 
village and the forest. In this way we shall obtain a quicker 
and better view of the road-forks at Herzogswalde. 

Although, in the darkness and while covered by the lake 
to the eastward, the patrol could safely advance (to Gr. Her- 
menau) with only a point in advance, from now on greater pre- 
cautions will be necessary to prevent an unexpected clash with 
hostile detachments. A mounted patrol cannot crawl, but must 
advance rapidly. Its safety depends on a skillful utilization of 
cover and continuous and vigilant watch for the enemy in every 
direction, so as to discover the enemy before being itself dis- 
covered. As spying and feeling for the enemy is very difficult 
while going at a rapid gait on horseback, the movements of a 



Reconnaissance. 39 

patrol will usually be by rushes, as is the case with the cavalry 
point of an advance guard. 

A detachment on patrol duty will be organized in such a 
way that certain designated men are permanently held respon- 
sible for the observation of the country to the flanks and rear, 
with authority to leave the road as necessary to reach good 
view-points or to accompany the patrol with a lateral interval, 
but without becoming conspicuous at a distance. There has 
been endless discussion as to whether it is better for a patrol to 
advance as a compact body or on a broad front. There is no 
formation that will apply to all cases. On a road through a 
dense forest, a compact formation may be best, while in a nar- 
row valley flankers might be very necessary. Only in excep- 
tional cases should the patrol-leader ride with the point, as when 
he alone is able to find the way or where there is no special dan- 
ger. He should not unnecessarily expose himself to the danger 
of capture. 

The arrangements Lieutenant F has to make at 4 a. m. 

consist in dividing and instructing his men in accordance with 
the foregoing principles, at the same time showing them the 
map, explaining the situation and informing them of his im- 
mediate intentions. 

He will have the nose-bags filled with oats at Gr. Hermen- 
au. Who knows if there will soon be another opportunity to do 
this? The supply of grain carried along enables the patrol to 
feed at any secluded spot without again visiting a village. 

The men can take advantage of the short halt at Gr. Her- 
menau to get their breakfast and lay in a supply of food for the 
future. Of course the ofiicer protects himself against surprise 
by posting sentries, and does not allow his men to remain within 
inclosures. In France this resulted in the capture of many a 
German cavalry patrol, and even in your own country it is a 
dangerous practice. 



40 Studies in Applied Tactics. 

In leaving Gr. Hermenau the of&cer has the point precede 
the patrol at a considerable distance. The point must ride to 
the eastern edge of Royer Forest, the patrol not following into 
the forest until it is informed, by pre-arranged signal from con- 
necting files, that the field is clear. 

Using the necessary cautionary measures and after vainly 

questioning the inhabitants of Narien mill,* Lieutenant F , 

sharply looking to all sides and into the depths of the forest, 
arrives at its eastern border. Then, after sending two troopers 
to Herzogswalde to make inquiry, and, riding outside the village, 
to rejoin the patrol, Lieutenant F — — takes the patrol through 
low-lying ground to the Teufelsberg. This prominent hill also 
might have attracted hostile troopers ; therefore the point of the 
patrol advances towards it considerably in advance of the re- 
mainder of the party. At 4.40 a. m. the top of the hill is reached. 
The sun has risen, but the hazy spring morning does not ad- 
mit of a distant view. But the highway north and south of 
Waltersdorf can be plainly seen as well as the country about 
Bergling and Reichau, Gr. Trukainen, Naglack, Banners, and 
Pragsden. The 2 troopers who had been sent to Herzogs- 
walde reported that nothing was known of the enemy at that 
point. The people on the farms near the Teufelsberg say the 
same thing. 

Nowhere in road or field is man or beast visible. 

The of&cer decides to continue the advance and, to avoid 
the highway, will go along the Sanglau-Bergling road, whence 
he hopes to be able to watch the highway and country just west 
of it and get a glimpse of the Kallisten-Seubersdorf road. But 
it now becomes necessary to send a detachment to Sackstein. 
The sergeant, who in case of necessity must command the patrol, 
is not selected for this duty, but an adroit lance corporal and 2 
men, who are given the following instructions: 

*"Narien M," east of Gr. Hermenau, on 1:100,000 map. 



R£;connaissance;. 41 

'You will ride to Sackstein and see if anything can be 
learned about the enemy, also carefully questioning the inhab- 
itants. Send report of your investigation to the troop at Herz- 
ogswalde. It is about 5 miles to Sackstein, and, as the troop 
commander expects a report by 6 a. m. a rapid gait must be taken 
— abo ut 7 or 8 miles an hour. Should the connecting-patrol sent 
by the troop to Herzogswalde not yet have arrived, the report 
must go back to Gr. Hermenau. From Sackstein you will try 
to rejoin your patrol as soon as possible via Mathildenberg." 

The officer shows the men on the map the route they should 
follow (also pointing it out in the country before them), shows 
them the route he will follow, and gives them the names of the 
villages in sight. He sees the 3 men depart and then continues 
on his way. 

Shortly after 5 a. m., as he reaches the fir thicket north of 
Sanglau on the Herzogswalde-Sanglau road, he sees the point 
taking cover behind the nearest buildings of Sanglau and sig- 
nalling, "Enemy in sight." The connecting-file drops behind 

a little knoll and repeats the signal. Lieutenant F , looking 

across some underbrush (where the letter L of " Lettau " is on the 
map), discovers 12 troopers trotting along the road from Lettau 
towards Herzogswalde; 2 men about 100 yards in advance of 
the point. Nothing is seen on the road norti; of Lettau, nor 
at Waltersdorf or on the road between this poiuu and .Mathil- 
denberg. Looking through his field-glasses, the lieutenant 
becomes satisfied that the men are hostile troopers. 

What does Lieutenant F decide to do? 

Instead of discussing the subject now, I should prefer that 
instruction be derived from the events following, as far as these 
may serve the purpose. Therefore I shall proceed with the 
narrative and return to particular points later. 

Lieutenant F remembers several cases in his peace 

service where superiors called attention to the directions in the 
— 4 — 



42 Studie;s in Applied Tactics. 

Field Service Regulations that the prime duty of a reconnoiter- 
ing patrol was to see — combat being simply a means to an end. 
He cannot remember a single case where the so-called "bat- 
tling" of patrols met with the approval of superiors. In every 
instance the opposing patrols got out of each other's way and 
both continued their reconnaissance. To be sure, the young 
officer realizes that war may on occasion demand a different 
method of procedure. But on careful examination of the case 
he remembers that the Regulations state that "patrols should 
avoid combat unless it is absolutely necessary in the execution 
of their orders."* As the hostile patrol apparently is about to 
ride past him into the woods, presumably it will not prevent 
his continuing his reconnaissance. Therefore, as soon as the 
enemy has reached the woods, he trots ahead across a meadow, 
keeping a sharp lookout to the rear. But before doing this, he 
sends the message of which we already know: 

Twelve hostile troopers are riding from Lettau towards Herzogs- 
walde. I shall continue my reconnaissance via Sanglau towards Kallisten. 
I have sent a lance corporS.1 and 2 men to Sackstein to report direct to the 
troop. 

The messenger is ordered to rapidly ride between Ponarien 
and Royer Forest, and then via Narien mill to Gr. Hermenau. 
He is to take advantage of the woods to cover himself from the 
hostile patrol. Sending the message is in accord with the para- 
graph of the Regulations which says that ' 'as soon as it is certain 
that the enemy has been discovered, a message should be sent."t 

Lieutenant F considers that one trooper is sufficient to 

carry the message. He must economize in horses and men and 
has reasons to hope that the man will succeed in reaching the 
goal which is near. The man cannot be sent via Herzogswalde 
as he might easily fall into the hands of the hostile patrol. Ex- 
ception might be taken in various ways to the wording of the 

*See par. 80, F. S. R. 
tSee par. 79, F. S. R. 



Reconnaissance. 43 

message. The captain woefully misses any definite mention of 
the extent to which the reconnaissance has progressed; for he 
can only indirectly learn by questioning the messenger that 

Lieutenant F has seen nothing of the enemy, aside from 

the 12 troopers, not even on the Naglack-Waltersdorf-Kallisten 
road ; but to what extent this road was visible the captain does 
not learn. It is fortunate that the messenger remembered the 
name "Waltersdorf." But the exacting captain may forgive 
the young patrol-leader, should he meet the latter again and 
learn how hurriedly the message was written and how his atten- 
tion was almost constantly directed to the hostile patrol. 

Carefully taking advantage of the conformation of the 

ground, Lieutenant F reaches Seubersdorf (R. G.)* at 5.45 

a. m. From the heights near Bergling the highway is visible 
from Waltersdorf to Kallisten, but nothing is noticed on it, 
any more than on the heights near Deppen which limit the view 
to the east. In Seubersdorf the inhabitants say that about an 
hour ago 12 to 15 hostile troopers passed through the village 
on the way towards Willnau. 

What arrangements must Lieutenant F make 

NOW? 

Lieutenant F started with i sergeant and 14 men, of 

whom he sent 3 to Sackstein and i to Gr. Hermenau, leaving 
him I sergeant and 10 men. His captain certainly would like 
to learn very soon what the lieutenant knows up to now, espe- 
cially as the message concerning the reconnaissance to the Pas- 
sarge cannot be delivered by 6 a. m., as originally ordered. By 
6 a. m. the troop was to be at Gr. Hermenau, but would hardly 
remain there. Should it go towards Liebstadt or Pittehnen, 
the message even if forwarded by the connecting-post at Her- 
zogswalde, would reach the captain rather late and would lose 
its importance. Should the troop advance via Sackstein or 

*"R. G.," abbreviation for Rifier-gut, a knight's manor. 



44 Studies in Applied Tactics. 

Waltersdorf, it would be approaching the patrol, and a message 
from the latter would be less urgently needed. Already at 
Bergling the lieutenant debated about sending a report stating 
that no enemy was visible en the highway as far as Kallisten, be- 
cause this would have taken at least two messengers without his 
having cleared up the situation as far as the Passarge, Not the 
spirit but only the form of the captain's orders would have been 
complied with in this case by sending a report to Herzogswalde 
by 6 a. m. ; and, besides, the road thither presumably was 
blocked by the hostile patrol that had recently gone in that 
direction. Even now the message must be forwarded by at 
least two men, as the hostile troopers in rear render the region 
unsafe. Should the three troopers sent to Sackstein fail to 
rejoin the patrol, it would be reduced to eight men, and yet 
the day's work which may still call for a number of messages, 
has hardly begun. It is proper to consider whether Lieutenant 

F should UDt defer writing his next message until he can 

report something more definite concerning the state of affairs 
on the Passarge, more particularly because in Kallisten or the 
neighboring villages he probably will learn something more 
about the hostile detachments that crossed the stream early 
in the morning. Then, should the message not reach the troop, 
presumably it will reach the regimental commander, who, as the 
lieutenant knows, expects to arrive at Gr. Hermenau by 7 a. m. 
Nothing would be gained by following the hostile detach- 
ment that went towards ^Willnau. It ought to run into the 
cavalry of the ist Division, and hardly could be overtaken. 

Lieutenant F at once turns towards Kallisten. The ride 

to this point requires caution, as the enemy may be holding the 
Passarge bridge, but it would^^take too long to go via Kloben. 
The officer carefully examines Kallisten through his field-glasses 
and questions the occupants of the mill (at K of "Kallisten" 
on the map), but learns nothing. Then the point rides ahead 
towards the village, while 2 men at a rapid gait follow the Weng- 



Reconnaissance. 45 

litten-Kloben road along the left bank of the Passarge to find 
out the nature of the stream and examine the construction of 
the bridge at Kloben. 

The point finds that there is no enemy in Kallisten and 
rapidly rides to the nearest height east of Deppen. Lieutenant 

F , constantly keeping a sharp lookout to the rear, follows 

into the village as far as the bridge. The lance corporal with 
one private from Sackstein trotted up to this point and reported 
as follows : ' ' Nothing was seen of the enemy in or near Sack- 
stein; and the villagers knew nothing about him." He had 
sent one man with a written message to Herzogswalde and then 
rode along the edge of the woods on the left bank of the Pas- 
sarge without seeing anything suspicious in the river valley or 
on the eastern ridge of hills. Upon being questioned, the lance 
corporal is unable to give definite information concerning the 
construction of the bridge at Sackstein, and very properly is 
censured for it by the lieutenant. It is true that the patrol 
received no specific instructions to examine the terrain, but this 
is so much a matter of course as not to require special mention 
and would always be attended to by a skillful patrol-leader. 
It is inexcusable that the importance of a bridge across an un- 
fordable stream should not have appealed to the patrol-leader. 

The inhabitants of Kallisten state that early in the morn- 
ing a hostile body of horsemen crossed the bridge and rode off 
on the road to Waltersdorf. Statements differ as to the 
strength of the body. There were 6 men in the lead, followed, 
according to some, by 30 or 40 more ; according to others, by 
an entire troop. 

The lieutenant is inclined to believe that the latter estimate 
is an exaggeration, as he probably would have noticed sd large 
a body in the vicinity of Bergling-Waltersdorf, and as only 12 
to 15 men are reported to have passed through Seubersdorf. 
He argues that west of Kallisten a part of the 30 or 40 hostile 
troopers took the Waltersdorf-Lettau road, and the remainder 



46 Studies in Applied Tactics. 

the road to Willnau. A hostile officer who spoke German 
pretty well inquired at Kallisten about the roads and about 
our troops. The villagers answered truly that they had seen 
no soldiers, but that a large army was advancing from western 
Prussia. A trooper, sent back by the hostile officer, took the 

road to Heiligenthal. lyieutenant F ■ further inquires about 

the depth of water in the Passarge and about the existence 
of fords, orders the sergeant to have a sentry-post at the western 
exit of Kallisten to guard the bridge and keep open the line of 
retreat, and then gallops to the point. The latter has halted 
about 650 yards east of Deppen on the road to Heiligenthal, 
which road can be seen for about 1,100 yards. Aside from 
this the view extends only as far as the nearest woods north 
and south of the road and to Knoll 123 on the road to Schlitt. 

As Lieutenant F notices nothing of importance, he is 

about to write his message when he concludes that it would be 
advisable to survey the country from Knoll 157, which is near 
by and promises an extended view. Leaving a connecting-file 
behind, he gallops after the point which he had sent ahead, 
and finds his expectations realized. The view extends beyond 
Heiligenthal and Ankendorf to Queetz. To the north he can 
follow the highway almost as far as Scharnick and can over- 
look the more elevated parts of the ground between this high- 
way and the Passarge. South of the Heiligenthal-Queetz high- 
way the view is limited by Knoll 170 (southeast of Heiligen- 
thal), but between this and Height 157 near Alt-Garschen the 
view extends to Rosengarth, and south to the vicinity of Schlitt. 
To the rear (west) he can see the heights between Kloben and 
Seubersdorf, but the Willnau-Seubersdorf-Kallisten road can- 
not be seen. Examining this region, first with the naked eye 
and then with his field-glasses, and at the same time orienting 
himself by his map, he concludes in a few minutes that nothing 
hostile is in sight. The fact that none of the population is work- 



Reconnaissance. 



47 



ing in the fields makes it less difficult to reconnoiter than in 
time of peace. 

Writ© the message to be sent at 6-30 a. m. ; and how 
wiIvIy it be forwarded? 

With the renewed reminder that my solution shall serve 
only as an example and not as a model, I shall give the word- 
ing of the message, because it presents my ideas in the briefest 
form and because the continuation of the study requires this 
as a basis. 



SENDING DETACHMENT. 


LOCATION. 


DAY. 


MONTH. 


TIME. 


Officer's Patrol, 

Lieut. F , 

ist Cav. 


Knoll 157, 

S. W. of Heili- 

genthal. 


5 


5 


6-30 

a. m. 


No. 2. 


Received 









To Captain C , xst Cavalry: 

After having avoided the hostile patrol of 12 troopers near Lettau 
(whose presence I have already reported), I came here via Bergling-Seu- 
bersdorf (R. G.)-Kallisten without seeing anything of the enemy en route 
or on the continuously observed Waltersdorf-Kallisten highway. Inhabit- 
ants of Seubersdorf say that before 5 a. m. to-day 12 to 15 hostile cavalry- 
men passed through their town, going towards Willnau. Inhabitants of 
Kallisten state that early this morning a hostile cavalry detachment rode 
through their town. Estimates of the strength vary from 30 men to a 
troop; the latter seems to me excessive. A hostile officer who spoke Ger- 
man inquired in Kallisten concerning the roads and our troops. He was 
told that none of our troops had been seen, but that a large army was ap- 
proaching from west Prussia. The officer sent back a trooper, who took 
the road to Heiligenthal. The hostile detachment went westward along 
the highway. I presume that part of it went towards Willnau, and the 
remainder towards Waltersdorf-Lettau. A lance corporal of my patrol 
found no enemy at Sackstein and sent a message to Herzogswalde. From 
here nothing is visible of the enemy towards Schamick, Queetz, Rosen- 
garth, or Schlitt. I shall continue reconnoitering towards Guttstadt, and 
intend keeping north of the highway. 

The bridge at Kallisten consists of a broad stone arch; the one at 
Kloben is narrow and of wood, but suitable for wheel traffic. The Pas- 
sarge is quite high ; inhabitants claim that it averages at least 2 yards in 
depth. The meadows are marshy, and no fords exist in the neighborhood. 
Apparently passage of the stream is everywhere limited to the bridges. 



48 Studirs in Applied Tactics. 

Inhabitants of this vicinity claim that the bridge at Sackstein is of wood, 
but suited for wheel traffic. Although the road thence to Waltersmiihl 
is used by teams, it in part is an unreveted causeway.* 

F , 

Lieutenant. 

A trooper of the point is designated to take back the mes- 
sage and received the following verbal instructions: 

"In the first place, you will ride back to the bridge at 

Kallisten, tell the sergeant to give you Private P as a 

companicn, and then to take the entire patrol to the edge cf 
that grove of trees (grove northeast of Deppen), where I shall 
join him. 

"Your further instructions are to take this message to 
Herzogswalde. The captain intended posting a patrol there 
to forward my messages. You will deliver the message to the 
patrol with the following orders : The message should be sent 
to the captain if he can be readily and easily reached. Should 
there be any doubt about this, the message must go to the reg- 
imental commander, who expected to be at Gr. Hermenau at 
7 a. m., and presumably will continue his march from that 
point. It is more important that the colonel, than the cap- 
tain, should receive the message. If you should not find the 
patrcl at Herzogswalde, you must look up the colonel. The 
envelope should remain unsealed. Carefully read the message 
and impress its contents on your mind. The important points 
in it are: Kallisten and the Heiligenthal region are free from 
the enemy; Sackstein was so as late as 5.25 a. m. A hostile 
cavalry detachment early this morning rode through Kallisten ; 
a part of it rode towards Willnau, the remainder towards Wal- 
tersdorf-Lettau. A hostile messenger rode from here towards 
Heiligenthal. I am going towards Guttstadt. 

"You will ride along the highway through Mathildenberg, 
then through Bergling-Sanglau back over our route, and must 

*The latter statements naturally would be omitted from the reader's 
solution. 



Recoxnaissance. 49 

carefully avoid meeting the hostile patrol in cur rear. Ycu 
will take the message to the captain, if you should see our 
troop. You will not return to me, but will join the troop or 
the regiment. Try to reach Herzogswalde by about 7.30 a. ra. 
The distance is about 7 miles, so you must go alternately at 
a trot and walk." 

Lieutenant F — ■ — 's message, as well as the instructions he 
gave, deserve closer inspection. 

To begin with, it may seem strange that the message is 
designated as "No. 2." The one sent at 5 a. m. was "No. i." 
The lance corporal sent to Sackstein knew nothing of the latter 
fact, and therefore numbered his "i," with 'sending station' 

as "Lieutenant F 's officer's patrol." His signature and 

the contents of Lieutenant F 's first message will help ex- 
plain the apparent inconsistencies to the receiving officer. But 
it is a question whether the message sent at 6.30 a. m. should 
not be numbered "3," The numbering of messages is intended 
to help the receiving officer determine whether any have gone 
astray. In this event, it is hoped he will investigate and be 
able to supply the deficiency. The case under consideration 
shows that the directions don't always fit; and my readers 
probably have had the same experience themselves. For ex- 
ample, if a patrol must send messages to different parties, as 

is the case with Lieutenant C , who not only reports to the 

regimental commander, but, under certain conditions, also to 
the cavalry of the ist Division (see page 14), messages can 
hardly be numbered without causing confusion ; and even the 
instructions that a series of numbers shall hold for one day 
only will cause misunderstandings. The moment such specific 
instructions cannot be generally carried out they are of doubt- 
ful value. They draw on a painstaking patrol-leader's time 
and energy and produce false impressions at the receiving 

station. Had Lieutenant F designated his message as 

"No. 3," his captain probably would have concluded that 



50 Studies in Appi^iud Tactics. 

one liad been lost. Furthermore, experience teaches that 
where numerous messages are received there is seldom op- 
portunity to check up the numbers, as should be done to ob- 
tain the object in view. The one attempting to do this will 
have endless trouble and confusion. In time of peace it usually 
takes place at the end of a maneuver, and then serves as a point 
for the discussion following. This should prove the small prac- 
tical value of a requirement whose discontinuance would help 
to simplify the message system. It would be more valuable in 
any message briefly to refer to a preceding one, as was done at 
the beginning of the foregoing example. 

The address also demands our attention. Lieutenant 

F can expect his message to reach Captain E only in 

case the troop has followed towards Kallisten. He himself 
specifically tells the messenger that it is more important the 
message should reach the colonel than the captain. The recon- 

noitering of Troop A is to serve as a basis for Colonel A 's 

decisions, and although Captain E must retain control of 

the reconnaissance service as much as possible, still, in this case, 
it is highly probable that the message will not reach the captain, 
but the colonel. Therefore the instructions given the messen- 
ger were right and proper. Why, then, was the message not 

addressed to Colonel A ? Lieutenant F fears that the 

message might fall into the hands of the hostile patrol in his 
rear, and that in this case the colonel's address might be a valua- 
ble pointer for the enemy. We must admit that he is right, and 
that his caution is reasonable. Our Field Service Regulations 
wisely omit instructions on similar points. The practical sol- 
dier always will be able to help himself; for the impractical 
one there could not be minute enough instructions given to 
cover every case and its exceptions. 

The captain's not having told or even intimated to Lieu- 
tenant F what route he would follow from Gr. Hermenau 

makes it more difficult for the lieutenant now and later to cor- 



reconnaissance;. 51 

rectlv address his messages. But even if the lieutenant before 
leaving Maldeuten had asked the captain about this, he would 
have received no definite answer. On the contrary, an erro- 
neous designation of the route might easily divert the messen- 
ger service into wrong directions. In the body of the message 
the information concerning the direction taken by the hostile 
messenger upon leaving Kallisten is not without importance; 
and Lieutenant F should liave inquired about the direc- 
tion had the information not been volunteered. 

The description of the terrain in the message is all too often 
omitted in time of peace. Its value for the higher cavalry 
commander is patent. It must simplify matters for Colonel 

A to learn, already at Herzogswalde or Gr. Hermenau, 

whether the Passarge can be forded or can be crossed only on 
the bridges; and he would have cause to praise an officer who 
in sending such a message distinguished between what he him- 
self had seen and what was hearsay. Unfortunately, as later 
transpires, the colonel is quite angry on accoimt of the illegible 
writing, which lessens the value of the message. 

The length of the message is justified by its importance. 
The Field Service Regulations very properly state: "It is not 
the profusion of messages that counts, but the quality, such as 
will clear up the situation and are exhaustive and suitable as a 

basis for further action." Lieutenant F was able only to 

report on small hostile scouting parties, and has seen nothing 
of the enemy near Heiligenthal ; but this very fact will be of 
importance for the regimental commander. And the lieuten- 
ant's accurate statements afford a safer basis for future action 
than if the message read: "There is no enemy in the region 
as far as the Passarge or near Heiligenthal, with the excep- 
tion of a few hostile patrols on the west bank of the Passarge." 
The wording would be "short and sweet," but might arouse 
the regimental commander's doubt as to its accuracy and 
reliabilitv. 



52 Studies in Applied Tactics. 

The trooper who is to carry the message will have to prick up 
his ears and tax his wits if he is to understand and remember 
his lieutenant's instructions, which, by the way, hardly could 
have been shortened. 

The route to be followed by the trooper is easily described 
if the man carefully observed the country during this morning. 
An experienced patrol-leader will embrace every opportunity 
to instruct his men concerning roads and names of localities, 
so they could find their way back. He thus leaves behind a 
string of landmarks— Daumling's* white pebbles. Without 
these the enlisted man will lose himself, even in friendly ter- 
ritory where the inhabitants can help him. How much more 
difficult is it for him in hostile territory where the names of 
localities sound strange to his ears and the inhabitants either 
give no information at all or such as is false, and on occasion 
even endanger the life of a solitary horseman. 

Lieutenant F did not mark the rate of speed on the 

envelope in the usual way. Even if the cavalryman is taught 
not to mechanically foltow the rate of speed indicated, but that 
the horse's condition and the nature of the country may call 
for deviations, still, he does not as a rule find mile-stones along 
his route to regulate his speed. The explanation in the Field 
Service Regulations is of little assistance. "Ordinary" speed 
calls mainly for a walk ; "rapid," mainly for a trot. How little 
shall he trot in the first instance, and how little shall he walk in 
the second? In time of peace it may be possible to drill messen- 
gers in these gaits, but in time of war there will be little left of 
the skill acquired, due to weariness of the horses from the extra 
weight they have to carry and the roughness of the country to 

*Daumling," in German folk-lore, was the youngest of seven children 
whose indigent parents in a time of famine decided to abandon them in a 
dense forest. Daumling, overhearing the plot, gathered a lot of pebbles, 
and, when taken to the forest with the other children for the purpose stated 
secretly dropped these pebbles from time to time and afterwards by their 
means led the other children out of the forest again. — Translator. 



Reconnaissance. 53 

be traversed that often is lacking in roads. In many cases 5 
miles per hour (as prescribed for "ordinary") will not suffice, 
while 7 to 8 miles per hour ("rapid") would be imnecessary, or 
should not be required after a long ride, while a slightly slower 
gait is still possible. It is therefore praiseworthy if the send- 
ing officer also considers this point, and, deviating from the 
routine form, adds explanatory remarks. If the messenger is 
relieved from the necessity of estimating the number of miles 
per hour he is traveling, he can devote additional time to look- 
ing out for the enemy and examining the terrain, and is relieved 
from the necessity of estimating distances and of frequently 
consulting his watch, shovld he have cne. 

As the patrol, after but a short night's rest, has already 

traveled about 25 miles. Lieutenant F thinks best that his 

messenger take a medium gait which should bring him to Her- 
zogswalde in 60 to 65 minutes. 

Another point requires consideration. Lieutenant F 

gives the messenger a companion, notwithstanding the fact 
that he must husband his strength to the utmost. The inse- 
curity of the district in which the enemy is already prowling 
about exposes a solitary trooper to great danger. Four eyes 
see better than two, and mutual assistance helps to overcome 
difficulties of the road. Two horsemen can help each other 
across swampy meadows and marshy ditches where one would 
be mired. If one horse becomes disabled, the other can carry 
the message farther. One man stands guard while the other 
inquires the way and questions countrymen. In a hand-to- 
hand fight the two support each other, and one of them, in case 
of necessity, can make use of his firearms. For these reasons 

we must approve Lieutenant F 's sending the men together 

instead of writing a duplicate message and sending a copy by 
each man ever a different route. The chances for safe delivery 
would hardly be improved in the latter case. Having each of 
the duplicate copies carried by 2 men would be an unwarranted 



54 Studies in Applied Tactics, 

drain. With good instruction had in time of peace, it is un- 
necessary to caution that the message must not fall into the 
enemy's hands. 

Lieutenant F continues in observation while writing 

the message and instructing the messenger. When he sees that 
the patrol, led by the sergeant, has reached the edge of the 
grove north of the Deppen-Heiligenthal road, he indicated to 
the point a knoll northwest of Heiligenthal, to which it is next 
to ride. He himself gallops to the grove and says to the ser- 
geant: "I shall ride with the point. You will follow with the 
patrol to the left and rear under cover and will watch for signals 
from me." As the country is open and affords a good view in 
all directions, thus precluding a surprise, the oJB&cer considers 
it permissible to ride near the point, where he can use his own 
eyes and indicate to the point the route to be followed. 

Keeping west of the Heiligenthal-Scharnick highway, 
whose shade-trees, though without leaves, afford some cover, 
and only peering over the crest of the ridge of hills, he passes 
Komalmen, whose inhabitants know nothing of the enemy, 
and arrives at Height 135 east of this village. The sergeant 
had been on Knoll 140 southeast of Waltersmiihl, and had re- 
ported that nothing suspicious was visible from that point. 
The lieutenant had sent 2 men to Waltersmiihl, who have just 
returned and report that nothing had been seen of the enemy 
in that village. The lieutenant scans the horizon, naturally 
looking mostly to the east. At this instant (7.25 a. m.) he sees 
6 troopers on the Queetz-Guttstadt highway, northwest of 
Glottau, trotting towards Oueetz. They are followed at a 
distance of several hundred yards by a body in close order. 
The shade-trees along the highway prevent an accurate esti- 
mate of the number. Besides, there is a group of horsemen 
visible on Height 150 northeast of Queetz (R. G.). The latter 
village itself is hidden by Height 138. East of Glottau the 
Glottau-Guttstadt highway is not visible. Finally, a single 



Reconnaissance;. 55 

trooper is seen trotting along the highway from HeiHgenthal 
towards Ankendorf. Towards Lingnau-Neuendorf the coun- 
try is visible as far as the highway connecting these points and 
is free from the enemy. Farther west, Knoll 141 at the north 
end of Zaun-see limits the view, then we see the roofs of Schar- 
nick and Warlack, but not the Lingnau-Wolfsdorf highway 
Nor is there anything suspicious visible in this direction. 

What arrangements wilIv Lieutenant F • make at 

about 7.25 a. m., and how wii.i. he conduct himself? 

Apparently hostile cavalry from Guttstadt is following 
its patrols sent across the Passarge early in the morning, and 
in a very short time will bar the way via Kallisten. 

Possibly communication via Sackstein will yet remain 
open for a little while. But after that the patrol's retreat will 
be seriously menaced and presumably it will be able to regain 
safety only by going in a northerly direction. But the enter- 
prising officer thinks of safety only in so far as through its being 
threatened his undertaking might suffer. An officer is placed 
in charge of a patrol not only because his military judgment is 
considered superior to that of a non-commissioned oflEicer, but 
because the utmost is expected of his determination and capac- 
ity for self-sacrifice. Should he now ride back via Sackstein, 
he would be able to report only about detached hostile groups 
which would afford no basis for weighty decisions. 

Lieutenant F positively must send a message concern- 
ing what he has just seen. He further decides to continue his 
reconnaissance and observe what is coming from Guttstadt, 
fully realizing the difficulties and dangers of his venture. He 
can depend on his horses and on his own nerves. He hopes to 
benefit by his past careful conduct, for the enemy apparently 
has not discovered him; and it is of prime importance that he 
remain undiscovered. Unfortunately, this requirement pre- 
cludes his attempting to capture the hostile trooper now trotting 



56 Studies in Applied Tactics. 

by before his eyes. The patrol under cover quickly rides into 

the grove on the southwest shore of Zaun-see and hides itself 

there. The lieutenant sends the sergeant and 3 men to Knoll 

125 at the north end of the grove to observe without showing 

themselves, and himself remains in the south end of the grove, 

where he writes the following message: 

Near KomalmEn, 
5 May 04, 7-35 a. m. 
To Captain E ; 

Six hostile troopers are trotting along the highway from Glottau to- 
wards Queetz; in rear of them follows a body of cavalry in close order, 
whose strength cannot be determined. A second group of horsemen is 
visible on Knoll 150 northeast of Queetz (R. G.). I shall remain east of the 
Passarge. 

F , 

Lieutenant. 

As the officer cannot see the highway near Queetz as well 
from the grove near Komalmen as he could from his former 
point of view, and as time presses, he must forego naming the 
strength of the hostile body in his message. In view of the 
reduced numbers of hi^ patrol, he decides to send but one man 
with the message, for this purpose choosing the man who had 
been to Sackstein with the lance corporal. He directs the man 
to go via "Waltersmiihl-Sackstein to Herzogswalde, which route 
he still thinks available. The message again is addressed to 
the captain, though the messenger is cautioned that it is more 
important the colonel should receive the message. Again in 
this case the rate of speed is not marked in the orthodox way. 
Five miles per hour ("ordinary") seems too slow to him, and, 
considering that the horse already has traveled over 30 miles 
to-day, it will not be able to go these 8 or 9 miles at the rate of 
7 to 8 miles per hour ("rapid"). Therefore he says to the mes- 
senger: "You will go at a slow trot, alternating with short 
distances at a walk." The messenger is directed to ride along 
the slopes in such a way that, without losing the opportunity 
to look around, he still will be fairly well concealed. He is to 
avoid habitaticns as much as possible, except that in Komal- 



Reconnaissance, 57 

men he is to tell the people that the patrol, passing along in 
rear of the height, has gone via Warlack towards Kleinefeld. 
In this way the officer wishes to mislead hostile inquirers. 

Leaving Lieutenant F to his own devices, the divers- 
ity of the situation will warrant our following the experiences 

and conduct of Lieutenant C . The latter passed the night 

of May 4th-5th in the little farm-houses close to Horn rail- 
way station, and about midnight received the following tele- 
graphic orders from headquarters of the ist Cavalry: 

I St Army Corps will mardi towards Mohrungen the 5th inst. and the 
2d Army Corps via lyiebemiihl towards Locken. At 5 a. m. the 5th inst. 
this regiment will advance from Gr. Wilmsdorf via Mohrungen-Gr. Her- 
menau towards Wormditt-Guttstadt-Mixnsterberg. Troop A will leave 
Maldeuten at 4 a. m. to reconnoiter in advance of the regiment. You will 
start early in the morning on reconnaissance via Briickendorf towards Gr. 
Buchwalde-Jonkendorf ; later joining your regiment via Kallisten. Send 
me information, if possible by wire, until 7 a. m. to Mohrungen, after that 
to Gr. Hermenau. Also send any important information to the cavalry 
of the I St Division, which will advance via Mohrungen and the south end 
of Narien-see towards the AUe. 

Soon after this Captain E 's telegram from Maldeuten 

was received: 

Troop A, ist Cavalry, en route to Gr. Hermenau, will arrive at Mohrun- 
gen shortly after 5 a. m., and looks for reports at both places. 

As Lieutenant C already knew in the evening that the 

telegraph station at Ziegenberg had been closed and that the 
one at Brtickendorf no longer answered to its call, he decided 
to advance on the latter place with his whole patrol at 3 a. m. 
the 5th inst. He hoped to obtain better results on this day 
with fresh horses, and rightly feared that an expedition by 
night, when no sur\'ey of the situation could be had, would 
yield no adequate return. It was suspected as far back as 
Maldeuten that a hostile advance party had reached Briicken- 
dorf. More than this could hardly be determined during the 

night. Besides, Lieutenant C considered the condition of 

his patrol consisting of i sergeant and 12 troopers (quartered 

in the two farm buildings) of whom not more than one-half 
— 5— 



58 Studies in Appued Tactics. 

dared sleep at the same time. Sending out 3 or 4 men would 
have made it impossible for the remainder to gain strength for 
the coming day. 

There was no telegraph chart at Horn railway station, but 
the operator stated that in the vicinity there was nothing but 
the railway telegraph line, excepting a single wire between 
Ivocken and Osterode. 

After providing for the destruction of the message tapes* 
at the office and after the members of the patrol were informed 
of the situation and the task of the patrol, he departed with it 
early on the 5th, via Gubitten, for Ziegenberg, and here en- 
coimtered 3 hostile troopers whose retreat to Briickendorf he 
vainly attempted to cut off. Several shots were fired on the 
pursuers from the bridge, but without taking effect ; and so the 
patrol assembled at the farm (north of the letter c in " Briicken- 
dorf ") about 1,400 yards west of Briickendorf. Through the 

mist in the valley Lieutenant C could only make out that 

several persons, some on foot and some mounted, were moving 
about at the bridge. Lieutenant C — — • learns from the farmer 
that hostile troopers, whose language he could not understand, 
had arrived in the village and at his farm the preceding even- 
ing; that they had taken a good horse from him and then re- 
turned to the station; that early this morning he had seen 3 
troopers ride by towards Ziegenberg; and that he did not know 
how large a detachment of the enemy was at Briickendorf. 

Lieutenant C further learns that the Passarge is flooded, 

the water being at least 2 yards deep everywhere, and that 
there are no fords in the vicinity. The Passarge meadows 
recently were flooded, and can be crossed only by foot-men. 
There is said to be an old wooden bridgef over the Passarge 

*These contain signals recorded in ink, giving a permanent record; 
thus differing from our system, where the signals are received by sound 
alone. 

fSee map i : 100,000. 



Reconnaissance. 59 

opposite the north end of Briickendorf which can be approached 
only from the left bank — there bemg no road through the 
swampy meadow on the right bank. At Alt-Kochendorf there 
is said to be a single stringer of a former bridge across the Pas- 
sarge, a narrow foot-path leading to this from both sides of the 
stream. The next crossing further down is said to be at Kloben, 
where there is a good wooden bridge. 

What are Lieutenant C 's intentions and ar- 
rangements AT 4 A. M. ? 

(As a matter of course, the message on page 23 might 
be altered as thought best; its contents were intended simply 
as a basis for Captain E 's decisions.) 

It is with Lieutenant C • as with his comrade, Lieuten- 
ant F ; his main idea is to make an extended reconnaissance 

to the Alle. Lieutenant F was unopposed at the Passarge 

crossing of Kallisten, but Lieutenant C at Bruckendorf is 

opposed by hostile fire-arms. Even if the opponents should 
be few in number, it would be very venturesome to attempt 
forcing a crossing afoot or on horseback. Swampy meadows 
preclude his using the nearest bridge, which in addition lies 
within effective fire of the enemy. It would require at least an 
hour and a half to go around by Kloben, with the possibility of 
finding the bridge occupied by the enemy. It would be less of 
a detour to go via Magergut-Kammersdorf, but this is con- 
siderably to one side of the route to be followed by the regiment. 
It would not be surprising if the officer desisted from any fur- 
ther attempt at penetrating farther to the east, thinking it 
impracticable to do so at this time, and hoping that the enemy 
himself might soon advance and open the road. He might be 
confirmed in this view by the thought that he would be able to 
keep the enemy in sight, who also could find no crossing near by, 
and thus render good service to the cavalry of the ist Division 
which is following. But on further reflection he must see that 



6o Studtks in Appi^iud Tactics. 

it is highly improbable the enemy himself will open the trouble- 
S3me door for him. If the enemy leaves but a few men behind, 
the door will remain closed. Upon further reflection he realizes 
that his solicitude for the divisional cavalry is simply an excuse 
with just enough color to quiet his military conscience, which con- 
demns inactivity and a waiting policy in a patrol. It is not un- 
reasonable to assume that the three hostile troopers who barely 
escaped across the Passarge will exaggerate the number of their 
pursuers and induce the leader to remain at the bridge and net 
venture to an encounter with us on the left bank of the Pas- 
sarge. In the meantime we have a more free field. If Lieu- 
tenant C looks beyond his regiment and the divisional 

cavalry, it may occur to him that a message by wire from Locken 
to Osterode may reach Army headquarters sooner than through 
regular channels of the ist Army Corps. If only the message 
should amount to something — -if it only really cleared up the 
situation! He can hardly hope to discover anything of im- 
portance in the comer between the Passarge and Mahrung-see. 
He can report that he encountered the enemy at Briickendorf , 
and then cheerfully intrust the divisional cavalry with the task 
of settling with the hostile parties in front of the Army Corps. 
He is anxious to take advantage of the hours' start he has over 
his troop and of the carefully treasured strength of his horses, 
and dismisses the last remaining objection — viz., that his patrol, 
in advancing via Kammersdorf , puts itself on the line of march 
of the neighboring corps. If the latter's cavalry is far enough 
in the lead, it will be all the easier for the patrol to advance. 
He decides to send a message to the telegraph station at Horn, 
citing his further instructions (which, therefore, should have 
been included in the message on page 23) and then to tide 
forward under cover towards Magergut, keeping the Passarge 
bridge under observation so as to take advantage of any oppor- 
tunity that might offer there. Then he intends advancing via 
Kammersdorf towards Schaustern. East of Kammersdorf the 



Reconnaissance. 6i 

Passarge does not flow through open meadows, but between 
closely wooded banks. Should the bridge on the road to Schau- 
stem prove unserviceable or be blocked by the enemy, the two 
yards' depth of water has no terrors for him or his horses. At 
Kammersdorf he will be able to learn of places suitable for 
swimming the stream. It is very important to be cautious 
during the advance. The point must keep well to the front, 
for it is highly probable that hostile troopers also will be en- 
countered in the vicinity of Kammersdorf. To this point 

Lieutenant C wishes to ride rapidly and then, before going 

any farther, will watch the highway at Briickendorf for a little 
while. In the meantime inquiry is to be made as to the condi- 
tion of affairs at Locken and whether telegraphic communica- 
tion still exists with Ostercde. 

To be sure, a doubt arises as to whether Colonel A , 

who expressly prescribed the route via Briickendorf, will ap- 
prove of the deviation to the south. But on various occasions 

during peace maneuvers Lieutenant C had noticed that 

his colonel approved of the decision of a subordinate not be- 
cause it was the best, but because it was a decision. He pins 
his faith to this and unhesitatingly proceeds to carry out his 
plan. 

The patrol reaches the vicinity of Jagd-see* unmolested; 
the highway towards Locken is deserted, two troopers are sent 
to the latter place. The sun shines brightly and has scattered 
the mist. A glance through the field-glasses shows no change 
at Briickendorf. No one is visible on the left bank of the Pas- 
sarge. The patrol crosses the highway bridge across the low 
ground between Jagd-see and Miihlen T.f and turns to the left 
into the country road towards Kammersdorf. As the point 
reaches the grove northeast of Mergel-see, the leader overtakes 

*See map i :ioo,ooo — a small lake marked "Jagd-S." south of 
Mahrung-see and west of Kammersdorf. 

fA long narrow mill-pond just west of Jagd-see. 



62 Studies in Appi^ied Tactics. 

it at a gallop and at the first glance to the east from the grove 
he discovers several horsemen on the Kammersdorf-Schaustem 
road.* They are several hundred yards east of the cemetery, f 
and, trotting towards it along the road that is visible almost to 

the edge of the woods, Lieutenant C comits 12 men and 

recognizes them as enemies. A second glance shows that there 
is no enemy in sight as far as Point 128 on the Locken-Sten- 
kienen road or towards Eissing-see. The main body of his 
patrol is just trotting across the bridge between Jagd- and 
Mergel-see. The two troopers sent to Locken have not yet 
returned. 

What does Lieutenant C decide to do? 

A signal to the patrol and a short gallop would carry it 
back to the highway and Ramten mill, to a safe point of obser- 
vation, though under penalty of separation from the 2 men 
sent to Locken, who would have to try to rejoin the patrol 
along the left bank of the Locke. To insure a union with 
these 2 men, the patrol might ride back to Locken. 

The hostile patrol might be avoided in yet another way: 
By rapidly riding along the eastern shore of the Mergel-see and 
hiding in the vicinity of Gr. Schwa rze-see until the enemy has 
passed, unless one of his scouts, riding up the high ground east 
of the latter lake, should discover the ruse, and unless other 
enemies should approach from Pulfnick. It is hardly practica- 
ble to secure a hiding-place at Kammersdorf in the few minutes 
available. And with the most patriotic motives of the inhab- 
itants the matter could not be kept secret, aside from the rattle 
of accouterments and neighing of horses. Neither does the 

the grove near the road, in which Lieutenant C now is, 

offer any place of concealment. 



*The place where Lieutenant C halts is but a trifle lower than 

KnoU 108, so that, being mounted, he can look over and beyond it. 

fOn the Kammersdorf-Schaustem road, about 700 yards east of the 
former place. 



Reiconnaissance;. 63 

The young officer does not long consider. It never occurs 
to him to hurry back to Ramten or Locken. Without taking 
his eyes off the enemy he quietly says to a member of the point : 
"This way with the patrol at a gallop!" Then he loosens his 
sword in its scabbard, forms his approaching troopers within 
the grove so they cannot be seen without, and awaits his oppor- 
tunity. The enemy halts at the cemetery; 2 men ride into the 
village, the remainder go to Knoll 109. After anxious minutes, 
the two hostile troopers reappear at the south edge of the vil- 
lage and signal to the others, and, while the former ride along 
the edge of the village towards the bridge between Jagd-see 
and Mergel-see, the larger body trots towards the edge of the 
grove — straight at the corner where our patrol is halted. Lieu- 
tenant C allows it to come quite near and then charges it, 

disregarding the detached troopers. The melee is soon ended. 
Eleven troopers against ten ; powerful well-ridden horses against 
hardy but underbred ones. In addition to this, there is the 
advantage of surprise. The hostile point of 2 troopers will not 
change the result, even though it arrived on the scene. The 
disparity in numbers under the latter contingency might even 
be more unfavorable without affecting the victory. 

For the present we shall not discuss whether Lieutenant 

C acted correctly and judiciously. We shall let later events 

decide, as in the case of Lieutenant F , who at Lettau al- 
lowed the hostile patrol to ride past unmolested. Identically 
the same conditions are never repeated either in life in general 
or in war, and the reader surely will have noticed the difference 
between the two cases. In accordance with his orders, Lieu- 
tenant F could continue his reconnaissance, via Kallisten 

towards Guttstadt, without being detected. Lieutenant C 

would have been able to continue his advance only in case he 
succeeded in hiding himself with his patrol en the eastern shore 
of Mergel-see, which was highly improbable. His soldier's 
pride resented the idea of a retreat to Ramten or Locken before 



64 Studies in Applied Tactics. 

an enemy but slightly superior in numbers; for our cavalryman 
felt himself more than equal to the enemy under existing con- 
ditions — a feeling to be encouraged and not repressed. Even 
if the patrol were defeated in the enccimter, for example, if at 
the decisive moment hostile reinforcements appeared, no stain 
would attach to the officer's escutcheon of honor, a gain so great 
that no theory may thrust it aside unheeded. An officer would 
forever lose the confidence of his men, who ought willingly to 
follow him to certain death, should he but once give them cause 
to suspect him of cowardice. 

At the most, lyieutenant C 's military judgment might 

'be criticised. But we cannot refuse to praise his quick decision 
and skillfully led attack, which brought success. It might be 
objected that, instead of charging in knightly fashion, he should 
have used his rifles. Roosevelt's Rough Riders or a mounted 
"body of war-experienced Boers would have done the latter, 
and it is recommended that every one of our cavalry officers 
carefully consider in individual cases, whether the saber or 
bulkt promises the best results. Here at Kammersdorf dis- 
mounting to fight on foot would have had to be executed in 
considerable haste, and had the enemy changed the direction 
of his march and not ridden into the ambuscade, valuable time 
would have been lost. He would have been obliged hastily to 
return rifles and mount again. And, if dismounted, an excited 
man very easily might have pressed the trigger prematurely 
and spoiled the surprise. Against single troopers the rifle 
promises good results only at close range. How difficult it is 
to drop fleeing game at even loo yards' distance! How much 
greater is the nerve-tension of the soldier than that of the 
hunter, and, besides, the former must aim more than lo yards 
ahead of a trooper galloping by at 600 yards' distance. The 
rattle of 20 to 30 shots would alarm the whole neighborhood 
and would attract all hostile detachments within hearing. 
I^ieutenant C did right to remain in the saddle, whereby 



RECONNAISSANCli;. O5 

it became easier to cut off the enemy's retreat and capture 
prisoners. 

As a basis for the continuation of our problem the follow- 
ing will be assumed: Two severely and two slightly woimded 
enemies and one unwounded one fell into our hands; likewise 
two sound horses. Four hostile troopers, including an officer, 
escaped towards Pulfnick, and three towards Schaustern. At 

5.10 a. m. Lieutenant C has assembled his patrol at Knoll 

108, excepting two men whom he has sent to Height 128. Of 
his men, one was seriously woimded by a saber-cut across the 
face, another was lightly wounded, also in the head. With the 
exception of a few scratches — the lieutenant himself received 
a severe blow across his arm with the fiat of a saber — no damage 
was done. The two troopers sent to Locken have returned, and 
report that nothing has been seen there of the enemy or of our 
own troops; and that the telegraph line to Ost erode is in work- 
ing order — one operator being on hand. 

The hostile patrol belonged to the 6th Dragoons. It was 
impossible to talk with the prisoners. Several troopers are 
now visible en the heights southwest of Briickendorf, who, 
through field-glasses, are beHeved to belong to the enemy. 

What wihh Lieutenant C do — bearing in mind 

THAT conditions ARE DIFFERENT FROM TIME OF PEACE, WHERE 
THERE ARE NO WOUNDED AND NO PRISONERS? 

The officer again has his men take cover in the grove near 
Jagd-see, whence he continues his cbserv^ations, for the same 
purpose designating individual men to watch certain districts 
to the rear. He takes care that no one shows himself unneces- 
sarily and that there is as little moving about as possible. The 
soldier, as well as the hunter, appreciates the value of immo- 
bility, which materially lessens the danger of discovery. The 
wounded also are brought into the grove. Even the two se- 
verely woimded prisoners must submit to this. War is a rough 



66 Studies in Applied Tactics. 

trade. Human sympathies must give way before the exigencies 
of the service. The lieutenant sends the sergeant and a trooper 
to the village to bring back the village president and four re- 
liable men with two well-horsed wagons filled with straw. The 
village president is intrusted with the care of the three severely 
wounded men imder the protection of the red cross, and the 
slightly wounded are bound up as well as possible. Then the 
two slightly wounded and the unwounded prisoner, shackled if 
necessary, are put in the wagons under guard of the slightly 
woimded trooper and the four villagers, and are sent to Locken 
in charge of a reliable unwounded trooper. The officer retains 
one of the captured horses as an extra mount; the remaining 
led horses are fastened alongside the draft -horses of the wagons. 
The man selected as escort for the wagons receives the follow- 
ing instructions: 

"You will take the wagons back through Locken to Liebe- 
miihl and will take care that the prisoners and this message are 
delivered to a high-ranking officer of troops marching on this 
road (the Locken- Liebemiihl highway), taking receipt for the 
men and message. Then you will ride with our wounded 
trooper, or at least with his horse, to Mohrungen, and will see 
that the original of the telegram I shall give you reaches head- 
quarters of the ist Army Corps. Should the wounded be un- 
able to stand the journey, they will be left in some house along 
the road, taking receipt for them. " 

The telegram is as follows: 

Locken, 

5 May 04, a. m. 

To the Telegraph Operator, Osterode: 

At 4-40 a. m. to-day I encountered 1 2 men of the hostile 6th Dragoons 
near Kammersdorf ; and I sent 3 prisoners back over the road to Liebemiihl. 
I was unable to converse with them. 

Briickendorf is occupied by hostile troopers. I shall continue towards 
Jonkendorf. This message should be promptly wired to Army headquar- 
ters, whose whereabouts is unknown to me, and to Mohrungen. 

C 

Lieutenant xst Cavalry, 
Commanding Patrol. 



Reconnaissance. 67 

The message was worded in the same way, except that the 
last sentance was omitted. The message and telegram are 
given to the trooper in an unsealed envelope with instructions 
to familiarize himself with the contents. The telegram is to be 
wired from Lccken, the trooper again taking possession of the 
original, after sending, as already stated. The trooper is cau- 
tioned that he will be held responsible for the prisoners, and 
warned to guard the unwounded one with special care. Upon 
arriving at Mohrungen, he is to make a verbal report of what 
has happened at Briickendorf and Kammersdorf. 

As soon as the wagons have left, and Lieutenant C is 

satisfied that no danger threatens from Magergut or Pulfnick, 
he continues on his way with the patrol. Presumably this can- 
not be until about 6 a. m. The incident described requires 
considerable time. We should very much like to have matters 

proceed more rapidly and have Lieutenant C resume his 

march earlier. But we must avoid illusions, although some- 
times in reality many things can be hurried. In hostile territory 
I have known a hay- wagon to be hitched up at night and made 
ready to transport wounded men in a few minutes. Possibly 
the officer might limit himself to writing the message and tele- 
gram, leaving everything else to the sergeant. But in thinking 
the matter over we must realize that the sergeant hardly would 
be in a position to appreciate all the attending circumstances, 
that it seems most important the telegram should safely reach 
headquarters at Mohrungen, and that the prisoners should be 
delivered to someone able to question them. The statements 
of the prisoners alone might be more valuable than the gain of 
half an hour in resuming the reconnaissance. The prisoners' 
departure must be guarded against detection by other hostile 
patrols that might appear at any moment. And, finally. Lieu- 
tenant C hesitates, as did Lieutenant F , to separate 

himself from the sergeant who must lead the patrol, should any 
accident happen to the officer. 



68 Studie;s in Applied Tactics. 

The telegram simply gives Mohrungen as the second ad- 
dress, not "Headquarters ist Army Corps," because this would 
disclose too much should the dispatch fall into the enemy's 
hands. 

Should our wounded trooper be unable to act as guard on 
the wagon, another trooper probably would have to be sent 
along. In fact, an escort of two is sufficient only on the sup- 
position that the four villagers will do their duty. The laws 
of war make it expedient to make believe these civilians are 
simply to minister to the needs of the wounded. But it may 
be assumed that these friendly villagers wdll not allow any 
prisoner to escape. The officer need have no conscientious 
scruples about this arrangement. Other nations do not observe 
the laws of war as strictly as we do. It is too important that 
the patrol, already reduced to a sergeant and 8 men, be net 
further weakened. 

The detailed account of Lieutenant C 's conduct after 

encoimtering the enemy must only be looked upon as an attempt 
to call the attention of anyone not familiar with war to the dif- 
ference between it and peace conditions. In time of peace, 
opposing patrols on meeting possibly exchange friendly greet- 
ings and then proceed with their respective roles irrespective 
of each other. Our example shows how serious is the duty of 
a patrol under such circumstances in time of war. But general 
rules of conduct cannot be devised. Bach case must be de- 
cided on its own merits. Everyone must depend on expedients 
that ingenuity and experience will suggest. Many may be able 
to devise more suitable measures than these given by me. But 
in two particulars I wish to defend mine against possible objec- 
tions — viz. : Why does not Lieutenant C turn over all his 

wounded to the care of the village president of Kammersdorf ? 
In this case he would have to arrange for the transportation of 
but one unwounded prisoner, which would have simplified the 
proceedings and saved time. But undoubtedly more can be 



Reconnaissance. 69 

gleaned from the statement cf three pris:ners cress-questioned 
separately than from only one, and war experience (all too 
easily lost in time cf peace) shows the great value of such state- 
ments for higher commanders. An oft-repeated reminder of 
Napolecn's to his generals was, "Send me prisoners." The 
Field Service Regulations also call attention to the importance 
of prisoners. Our slightly wounded trooper is sent along not 
only as a guard, but also to preclude the possibility of his fall- 
ing into the hands of hostile patrols at Kammersdorf and being 
questioned by them. Were it possible to move our seriously 
wounded trooper, he, too, would be sent back. 

The transportation must first go to Locken because the 
telegram is to be sent from there. But it dees net go thence 
over the shortest route (via Eckersdorf) to Mohrungen and our 
own army corps on account of the length and insecurity of the 
road. The prisoners ate of more importance even than the 
telegram (in which the number of the hostile regiment is the 
only important news) and should be promptly brought to a 
place of safety and where they can be questioned. This sug- 
gests the idea of turning them over to the 2d Army Corps ad- 
vancing via Liebemiihl. 

Lieutenant C will have found out from the inhabitants 

of Kammersdorf where the Passarge can be most easily forded. 
Should such a place be near a road, it will be used not only to 
avoid a possible ambuscade at the bridge, but also to make his 
messengers feel independent of the bridge on their way back. 
Horses trained to swim streams can cress narrow places 2 yards 
deep without difficulty, and with the rider in the saddle. Of 
course the rider also must be experienced and must assist the 
horse; if necessary, dismounting and holding on by the mane. 

The patrol succeeds in crossing the Passarge east of Grim- 
mak-see (at the point on the map where the letter Fof "Fcrst" 
is located). The enemy is not found at the bridge. The 2 
troopers are called in from Knoll 128, and report that the flee- 



70 Studies in Applied Tactics. 

ing troopers disappeared in the woods northeast of Pulfnick. 
At 6.30 a. m. the patrol reaches Knoll 119 south of Labens. 
From this point the villages of Stenkienen, Windtken, and 
Schaustern can be seen, as well as the railway nearly to the 
woods south of Kl. Gemmern. The view is limited by Heights 
127, 135, 131, and 128. Nothing is seen in motion an5^where. 
The inhabitants of Labens report that early in the morning a 
body of hostile troopers had passed there going towards Kam- 
mersdorf; that nearly an hour ago 3 troopers had returned 
in haste and had continued towards Windtken; and that no 
hostile troops were in Schaustern or Windtken during the night. 

Which way will IvIe;utenant C go now, and what 

ARE HIS plans concerning THE RAILWAY AHEAD OF HIM? 

As the day advances it becomes more likely that larger 
bodies of hostile cavalry will be met. The three troopers re- 
treating towards Windtken presumably came from there; and, 
even without this pointer, the roads from Jonkendorf to Bal- 
lingen and to Pupkeim and the Jonkendorf-Blankenberg road 
would be likely lines of approach for the enemy. He probably 
also will approach along the Alt-Schoneberg-Stenkienen road, 

but this region is beyond the sphere of Lieutenant C 's 

patrol. It is best to observe the Jonkendorf-Ballingen and 
Jonkendorf-Pupkeim roads from between the two, where 
several patches of woods offer concealment. The patrol must 
move in that direction, but without going through Windtken, 
for this would take us directly towards the enemy and keep us 
too long in the open. It would be best to ride across country, 
between Schaustern and Windtken, towards the nearest woods. 
If the meadows covild not be crossed, a road could be followed 
from Knoll 131 to the woods. Anyone who has actually at- 
tempted to take up rails realizes that the patrol on reaching 
the railway must not be delayed by such effort. And as the 
patrol has no high explosives, it would be useless to attempt de- 
stroying track or switches at Windtken without the assistance 



Reconnaissance. 71 

of the railway employees. The officer received no specific 
instructions to undertake any such work and hesitates to do so 
on his own responsibility, because it seems to him very unlikely 
that the enemy will use this part of the track. For the present 
this district may be included in the enemy's field of operations, 
but it may soon belong to that of our own army. 

But the destruction of the telegraph line is a different ques- 
tion. According to the German Field Service Regulations, 

Lieutenant C 's right to do so is somewhat problematical, 

as only by a forced construction can he be looked upon as an 
independent commander. But he knows that the station at 
Briickendorf must have been surprised by the enemy, for the 
operator did not report the latter's approach nor his (the 
operator's) intention to discontinue his office. It is therefore 
possible that the enemy is using the line to send back his own 
messages. This might be ascertained at Windtken. But the 
officer does not want to visit this place. A strict and conserv- 
ative interpretation of the Regulations would result in Lieu- 
tenant C 's deciding not to molest the telegraph line. Thus 

he would assume no responsibilities and possibly avoid the un- 
pleasantness of an explanation, considering that his instruc- 
tions do not indicate that he is to attempt any demolitions. 

But Lieutenant C , as he already has demonstrated, is a 

man who does not fear to assume responsibility and who re- 
members the splendid words of the introduction to the Field 
Service Regulations, which are that "every officer must unhes- 
itatingly act to the best of his ability in every contingency, 
even without waiting for orders concerning details." He also 
remembers the concluding remarks, which are: "Even the 
lowest soldier must bear in mind that he will be more severely 
dealt with for an omission or neglect than for any error in 
choice of means." While superior authority sometimes might 
be able to indicate the points in advance where demolitions 
should be attempted, still it is impossible to give instructions 



72 Studiks in Appukd Tactics. 

to every patrol concerning railways and telegraph lines that 
may be encountered. 

If nothing but the wire is cut, there will be but little work 
to subsequently repair the line. But if the wire is strung on 
high poles, it will be difficult to cut without iron climbers and 
wire-nippers. The best place to select would be near a section- 
house. The patrol must not be long dela3^ed by the work as 
it might be discovered if it remained long in such an exposed 
position. 

At about 7 a. m. the patrol may reach the woods east cf 
Schaustern after having cut the telegraph wire just S3Uth cf 
said village with the assistance of some countrymen. The 
patrol is only about 8 miles from Horn in an air- line, but has 
actually come about I2| miles in 4 hours. This apparently 
is a short distance. The regimental commander at Gr. Her- 
menau, not understanding the situation, may be very angry 
at the infrequency of messages from this patrol, particularly 
because they could be forwarded by wire from Horn. It re- 
mains to be seen whether the loss of time that resulted from 

Lieutenant C 's detour via Kammersdorf and skirmish 

will be made good in other ways. 



Bearing the following in mind, let us glance back at Troop 
A, which at 6.50 a. m. left Herzogswalde for Reichenthal. 

Captain E left Corporal M and 6 troopers at the Teu- 

felsberg (it might be added that the corporal made arrange- 
ments at the southern exit of Herzogswalde to have messengers 
directed to his new station) ; 3 were sent to Naglack to observe 
towards the south; i sergeant and 6 troopers were sent to 

Iviebstadt; and Lieutenant F , with 14 men, was sent via 

Kallisten towards Guttstadt. Of the latter patrol, i trooper 
has returned with a message and has rejoined the troop. Then, 
2 men were left at Mohrungen, 3 at Gr. Hermenau, and i man 
was sent back from each of these two places with a message 



Reiconnaissance;. 73 

for the regimental commander. Therefore the captain has r 
officer and 63 men left. Nothing is known of Lieutenant F — — , 
except that about 5 a. m. he rode past 1 2 hostile troopers near 
Lettau (of these nothing has since been heard), and that he 
sent a lance corporal to Sackstein, but the latter's message has 
not yet been received. 

At 7.05 a. m. the captain reaches Knoll 153 near Wuchsnig 
with his point, and looks about. The houses of Pittehnen are 
visible, but no details. No enemy is visible on the Liebstadt- 
Pittehnen highway, nor in the intervening country. Two horse- 
men are visible on Knoll no near Elditten, but it cannot be 
determined whether they are friend or foe. The flanking-patrol 
is galloping in from Gr. Trukainen. A small detachment, ap- 
parently hostile, is seen galloping alongside the highway from 
the south towards Naglack. The captain sends a non-com- 
missioned officer and 3 troopers on reconnaissance to Pittehnen , 
and has the troop halt under cover in rear of the hill, with the 
idea of surprising the hostile troopers as soon as they should 
approach near enough. At the same time he sends several 
troopers via Gr. Pragsden (where they are concealed from the 
south) to the Passarge to examine the river and look for fords. 
It is true that he was told in Herzogswalde that there are no 
fords in the vicinity, but he wants to be sure about it. The 
hostile detachment, consisting of 10 men, halts between Nag- 
lack and Banners. The captain then orders his leading platoon 
to drive the enemy away and to advance far enough to obtain 
a view of the country about Lettau-Waltersdorf and towards 
Sackstein. The hostile troopers retreat towards Alt-Menzels 
and disappear in the woods. The platoon follows as far as a 
hill south of Alt-Menzels and sends a patrol to Sackstein and 
another to Height 148 near the highway. 

At 7.45 the platoon returns via Naglack. The platoon 
commander reports that the hostile detachment crossed the 
Passarge at Sackstein. The pursuing patrol was ordered by 

—6— 



74 Studies in Applied Tactics. 

the platoon commander to remain at Sackstein for the present 
and continue watching the enemy. Nothing suspicious was 
seen at Waltersdorf or Lettau nor on the part of the highway 
visible south of Waltersdorf. The inhabitants of Naglack 
stated that at 5 a. m. to-day 3 friendly (blue) troopers passed 
through the village and inquired the way to Sackstein. Im- 
patient at the time lost through the hostile patrol, the captain, 
looking backwards to see if the regiment has yet come in sight, 
trots towards Reichenthal without further delay, going north 
of the road through the low ground, to be covered from view 

as much as possible. He depends on Corporal M , at Teu- 

felsberg, discovering his march and notifying the colonel about 
it, as well as about the encounter with the hostile patrol. The 
orders of the patrol at Sackstein are not changed ; and 2 troopers 
are again sent towards Naglack to keep on the lookout to the 
south. 

Even before reaching Reichenthal, the captain recognizes 
the situation at Pittehnen. Shots are fired from the heights 
on the right bank of the Passarge which are answered from the 
houses of the hamlet. A hostile troop of cavalry is visible on 
the Pittehnen-Elditten highway, having just halted about half- 
way between these two points. A part of the troop dismounts 
and advances towards Pittehnen. East of Elditten the high- 
way is visible as far as the woods between this point and Wclfs- 
dorf, but nothing is visible on it. The scouts sent to the Pas- 
sarge have reported that the stream is not fordable and that the 
meadows will not support the weight of a horse. The inhabit- 
ants of Gr. Pragsden have informed the captain that between 
Sackstein and Pittehnen there is neither ford nor bridge, but 
that there are two fords at Kalkstein. 

What does the Captain decide to do at 8 a. m. at 
Reichenthal? 

(It must be remembered that lyieutenant F 's mes- 
sages of 6.30 from Heiligenthal and 7.35 from Komalmen have 
not yet been received.) 



Reconnaissance. 75 

If the captain at Herzogswalde or Wuchsnig had received 

word of Lieutenant P from Heiligenthal and of the lance 

corporal from Sackstein, he might have decided to advance via 
Sackstein, and, driving back the hostile patrol, would now be 
on the right bank of the Passarge; whereas this bothersome 
stream, like an impenetrable wall, still precludes an extended 
view, while the regiment is already on the captain's heels. 

Without knowing what Lieutenant F in the meantime 

had discovered, it would have been justifiable for the captain 
to deviate from the chosen route of Pittehnen-Guttstadt only 
in case the hostile patrol from Naglack had been backed up by 
larger bodies. At the same time the captain, notwithstanding 
his impatience, could not continue his march until he had shaken 
off this patrol and obtained a view behind it. Now the hostile 
troop at Elditten forms a new obstacle. The captain may 
correctly guess the colonel's displeasure, who will have expected 
better results from the former's discretion and spirit of enter- 
prise. How often such mishaps mar the plans of the most 
active and experienced leader ! Had it not been for the delay 
caused by the hostile patrol, the captain long ago would have 
been at Elditten — possibly victor over the hostile troop — and 
would have had an extended view of the road to Guttstadt. 
When the captain learns what considerations induced Lieuten- 
ant F to desist from accepting battle at Lettau, he may 

exclaim: "Would that my dear lieutenant had remembered 
less of the Regulations!" 

But how shall the captain adjust himself to the new 
situation? 

It will not do to turn back from Reichenthal and go to 
Sackstein. This would open the way for the hostile troop via 
Pittehnen and enable it promptly to ferret out our regiment 
and send back welcome news. And, besides, it might not be 
possible to ride to Sackstein unobserved. It seems equally 
inadvisable and impracticable to attempt fording the Passarge 



76 Studies in Applied Tactics. 

at Kalkstein. If we are not to lose more time by waiting, there 
is nothing to be done but to forcibly break through at Pittehnen. 
If the hostile troop waits dismounted on the right bank of the 

Passarge, Captain E also must dismount and drive the 

enemy away by dismounted fire action and capture the bridge. 
Of course fire-superiority cannot be obtained by numbers, but 
by superior markmanship. Would a company of blue infantry 
hesitate in the face of a hostile company? Why should it be 
different with troop against troop than with company against 
company? 

It would be advantageous if the troop could reach the 
vicinity of Pittehnen under cover, where Height io8 apparently 
offers a commanding position. We might succeed in this by 
circling to the west and crossing the highway at the point P of 
"Pittehnen." It will be necessary to use combat patrols, 
particularly towards Kalkstein ; unfortunately, this reduces the 
fighting strength. But doubtless the hostile troop also has weak- 
ened itself by using similar patrols. We must consider whether 
the led horses should be kept west of Height io8, and what 
amount of mobility is desired of them. If the horses are im- 
mobile,* the men after capturing the bridge on foot would have 
to return for their horses ; while, if mobile, they can be brought 
up to the riders. But in the latter case from one-fourth to 
one-half of the men must remain with the horses, which greatly 
reduces the number of men on the firing-line. Quick results 
are to be expected only when not a man is missing. If the 
troop is victorious, there will be time and opportunity to mount 
— this may take place by platoon. If the troop does not suc- 
ceed, the men can quickly fall back on their horses. Neither 
must there be a mounted reserve, though one is ordinarily pre- 
scribed — the stream, which protects from any sudden hostile 
mounted attack, justifies the omission. 

*A11 the horses of a platoon linked together in a circle and watched by 
a single horse-holder. (Wagner's "Organization and Tactics.") 



Reconnaissance. 77 

Presumably the hostile troop dismounted simply to clear 
the way to Pittehnen. The enemy probably will remount and 
cross the Passarge as soon as he has driven the blue patrol out 
of Pittehnen. But the captain does not want to wait for this. 
It is quite possible that his troop has already been discovered 
by the enemy; for example, from Knoll no south of Blditten. 
If the enemy simply wishes to block the way at Pittehnen, he 
can all the better make preparations for this the longer he is 
left undisturbed. The captain also rejects the idea of asking 
for assistance from the colonel, by the time this could arrive 
the enemy also may have been reinforced; and it is doubtful 
if the colonel would grant the request. Asking for reinforce- 
forcements is very properly frowned upon in the (German) 
Army. If a detachment positively is not strong enough to do 
what is required of it, the situation and present intentions of 
its commander are reported to higher authority, and it is left 
for him to decide whether reinforcements shall be sent or not. 



Deciding to act at once, the captain sends a non-com- 
missioned officer and 4 troopers via Blumen towards Kalkstein, 
as a protection against the north and northwest, and conducts 
the troop along depressions of ground to the west of Reichen- 
thal, constantly keeping an eye on the enemy. When he, with 
his troop close behind him, and so far apparently not seen by 
the enemy, reaches the Reichenthal-Blumen road, he sees 

Lieutenant B 's patrol hastily riding baek from Pittehnen 

on the road towards Liebstadt, and sees the hostile troop mount ; 
whereupon the following happens: He (the captain) lets the 

hostile main body, which is following Lieutenant B in some 

disorder, get out of Pittehnen about 1,000 yards, and then 
charges it in flank. He has nearly 1,000 yards to go, but it is 
down hill and for a short time the terrain still conceals him. 

But fortune only half-way favors the captain. The enemy 
discovers the attack too soon, and gives way to the north. The 



78 Studies in Applied Tactics. 

troop, advancing at a gallop, forces the enemy to separate and 
retreat hastily. A few hostile troopers escape into the woods 
and a group rides around the southern border of the same, 
while the greater part turns north towards Klogehnen. The 
captain follows the latter with his troop, only detaching half of 
the left platoon to the left around the woods. He sends an 
officer and 6 troopers towards Pittehnen to protect the right 
flank. 

The horses are tired out by the time they reach Height 94 
southeast of Klogehnen. The captain is convinced that he 
cannot overtake the enemy, who is continuing his flight in dis- 
order towards Gillwalde and Stollen. He orders Sergeant K 

and 6 troopers to follow and keep touch with the enemy. As 
he assembles the troop the group detached from the left flank 
rejoins on the Polkehnen-Klogehnen road. The leader re- 
ports that he sent 3 troopers to follow the hostile troopers flee- 
ing towards Stollen. The combat-patrols join the troop, as 

well as Lieutenant B and 6 men of Troop B, who were 

driven from Pittehnen (i man fell in the engagement at the 
Passarge bridge). Three of the hostile troopers, who retreated 
into the woods, have been captured. One of our troopers is 
able to talk with them, and the captain thus learns that he had 
encountered Troop No. 2, 5th Dragoons, which left Heilsberg 
early this morning, having spent the night there with the entire 
regiment. The prisoners can neither describe the road over 
which they came to-day nor tell where they were night before 
last, or where their regiment is, which they have not seen to- 
day. Nor can anything else of importance be found out from 
them. 

The troop is assembled by 8.35 a. m. Of the detached 
troopers, 5 have reported who were left at Mohrungen and Gr. 
Hermenau and were relieved by others from the regiment, and 
the 2 messengers sent to the regimental commander. They 
report that the regiment arrived at Mohrungen at about 6.20 



Reconnaissance. 79 

a. m., and at Gr. Hermenau shortly after 7 a. m. They bring 
no orders or information. Four horses were captured by the 
troop, which, aside from two horses seriously hurt by falling, 
has had no losses. 

About this time a regimental staff officer, accompanied by 
a trooper, arrives and states that the advance guard of the 
regiment arrived at Herzogswalde at 8 a. m., where the reg- 
imental commander expects to halt for a while. The troop 
commander is to report how matters are progressing with him. 
The staff officer is unable to definitely answer the captain's 
inquiries concerning messages received by the regimental com- 
mander or the latter's intentions. He simply remembers to 
have heard that a message had been received from Lieutenant 

F . The enemy was not visible from Herzogswalde, and 

while the staff officer en route through Reichenthal saw what 
had happened in the troop, he saw nothing else concerning the 
enemy. 

The officer who with 6 troopers was sent to protect the 
right flank of the troop during the pursuit is visible on the right 
bank of the Passarge at the bend of the highway northeast of 
Pittehnen. 

What are Captain E 's decisions and arrange- 
ments SOUTH OF KlOGEHNEN ABOUT 8.35 A. M.? 

Should the captain follow the retreating troop, he would 
drive it farther away and prevent its obtaining any insight into 
the movements of the regiment. But in this event he would 
abandon his reconnaissance towards Guttstadt. Both of these 
enterprises cannot be carried out together. If the pursuit is 
continued to the north, only small patrols can be sent towards 
Guttstadt, which would not assure an energetic and profitable 
reconnaissance. But, taking all things into consideration, the 
latter direction is of greater importance than the one towards 
Wormditt. Hostile infantry surely will not be encountered 



8o Studies in Applied Tactics. 

towards Wormditt. If the 5th Dragoons turned that way 
from Heilsberg, the road through Guttstadt may be all the more 
accessible for operations against the main columns of the enemy, 
and the troop may yet be able to obtain timely information 
about them. If larger bodies of hostile cavalry are approach- 
ing from Guttstadt, a further pursuit of the defeated troop 
would be useless. 

There is an objection to a continued advance to the east. 
Soon after crossing the Passarge, communication with the reg- 
iment will become precarious, unless the latter should follow 
on the same road. The captain does not know whether this 
will happen or not. Should the regiment take a different direc- 
tion, the colonel might want to have the bridge at Pittehnen 
held. Therefore the captain might conclude to halt until he 
had asked for further orders, as he is but 4^ to 5 miles from the 
regiment. He can get word in an hour if the regiment has re- 
mained at Herzogswalde. During this time he can cover the 
regiment from the hostile troop that retreated to the north as 
well as from Guttstadt ; and he can begin further reconnaissance 
in the latter direction by sending out new patrols. Uncon- 
sciously the mental lassitude, observed by those experienced 
in war to follow even successful engagements, works in favor 
of the latter plan. The over-taxed nerves clamor for their 
rights, and it takes a strong will-power to overcome this 
condition. 

To ask for orders of a superior and await his reply is a 
doubtful expedient for an enterprising and self-reliant man. 
Often enough he had urged his subordinates to independent 
action and self-help, and in many instances had shown them 
what a mistake it was to ask for orders. Is it possible that here 
we have the exception that authorizes or calls for a departure 
from the rule? The captain tries to imagine himself in the 
colonel's position when the latter received the request. At the 
most he will communicate the plans he has formed in the mean- 



Reconnaissance. 8i 

time, but he hardly will be able to give minute instructions as 
to the future conduct of the troop. He knows less about the 
situation at Pittehnen than the captain, and does not know 
what information has been received there since the request 
was made, or that may be received during the next half-hour. 
Very likely, therefore, he will refer the captain to his general 
instructions, and emphatically call his attention to the fact 
that all details are left exclusively to him. Possibly the request 
will shake the colonel's confidence in the captain, and induce 
the former against his will to give detailed instructions that 
later seem impracticable and only place the captain in a worse 
predicament than before. 

To be sure, we here have to deal with a sin of omission on 
the part cf the colonel or his adjutant; namely, that the staff 
officer sent to Pittehnen was not carefully informed about the 
information that had been received at regimental headquarters, 
or the colonel's further plans — an error with which also the 
staff officer himself is to be blamed. Had the latter been able 
to inform the captain concerning the situation, the latter would 
have been able to decide more readily. But no matter how 
much such mistakes are to be regretted, and how much damage 
they may do, they always will happen. Every leader must be 
prepared for them and know how to deal with them. 

If the captain has been at all in doubt, he will be brought 
to a decision by the fact that, in case the regiment in the mean- 
time should have left Herzogswalde, he might have to wait 
hours for an answer, and that in any event valuable time again 
would have been lost. Should the regiment follow via Pit- 
tehnen, communication is not threatened; should it advance 
via Sackstein or Kallisten, the troop in going towards Gutt- 
stadt would more quickly regain communication than if it 
remained at Pittehnen. If, contrary to all expectation, the 
regiment should turn towards Wormditt, as might happen if 
positive and conclusive information should demand it, the troop 



82 Studies in Appued Tactics. 

is all the more obliged to reconnoiter towards Guttstadt. Fi- 
nally, the message to be sent by the staff officer to the colonel 
will enable the latter to make any arrangements necessary to 
further the troop's action. 

But the troop commander will not let the staff officer go 
until the latter fully understands the former's plans and 
arrangements. 

The most important thing is the route to be taken by the 
troop. The smooth highway favors speed and apparently af- 
fords a good view. But it has already been ' mentioned that 
reconncitering parties as far as possible should avoid the high- 
ways. It is fair to assume that the hostile troop encountered 
near Pittehnen will be followed by a larger body of cavalry, 
and this can be more readily discovered and its strength esti- 
mated from the country to one side of the road than by a direct 
encounter with it on the road. The vigilance of point and 
flankers may guard against surprise, but they are not suited 
for careful and thorough reconnaissance work, because they are 
forced to defend themselves against hostile patrols that are 
striving to prevent observation. The enemy's eyes, the same 
as our own, most carefully scan the highway and would dis- 
cover our troop all too soon. But the best way to observe the 
enemy is from a place of concealment. The highway can be 
farther and better overlooked from the heights to the south 
than to the north of it and the southern route will more 
promptly establish communication through Sackstein, whence 
no further information has been received. 

Therefore the captain decides at first to ride to Kleinefeld, 
which he hopes to reach unobserved. But before beginning 
his march he must attend to several things. 

What shall be done with the prisoners? As the troop had 
an interpreter, it is unlikely that more will be found out from 
them at regimental headquarters than has already been learned. 
The regimental staff will hardly have time to bother with them. 



Reconnaissance. 83 

and, besides, it is uncertain where the regiment will be found. 
Therefore it seems best to send them back to the army corps. 

Sergeant L 's patrol is still at Liebstadt. He can send 

back the prisoners through Gr. Hermenau to Mohrungen by- 
means of the police or citizens assisted by a trooper. They 
will be taken to Liebstadt in a wagon from Pittehnen, escort- 
ed by 3 troopers, who are promptly to return to Pittehnen and 
report to Corporal P . These troopers will inform the non- 
commissioned officer at lyiebstadt of the situation and the cap- 
tain's further intentions. Corporal P is informed of this, 

and is ordered to remain at Pittehnen with 3 troopers as a con- 
necting-post and to secure the way across the Passarge. This 
detail includes the two men whose horses were injured in the 
pursuit. The captured horses are turned over to Corporal 

P as remounts for the two men. The 3 troopers detailed 

to escort the prisoners, upon returning, will form part of the 
connecting-post. Corporal P is cautioned that all mes- 
sages of importance for corps headquarters must be sent to 
Mohrungen, particularly if communication with the regiment 
becomes uncertain. For this purpose it is advisable to use the 
telegraph from Liebstadt. 

It is not the great distance, but the unsafe road, that leads 
to the establishment of a post at the Passarge bridge. Later 
in the day it may prove useful as a means of communication 
with the army corps. 

Finally, instructions must be sent Sergeant K , who 

was ordered to follow the hostile troop, and the message to be 
taken back by the staff officer must be written. 

It is recommended that both these messages be writ- 
ten IN FUIvIv, and, to show HOW LONG IT TAKES, THAT THE 
WRITING BE TIMED. 

PiTTEHEN, 
5 May, 8-40 a. m. 

To Sergeant K .• 

Troop A will continue its advance towards Guttstadt via Kleinefeld. 
You will keep touch with the defeated troop and protect the regiment to- 



84 Studies in Applied Tactics. 

wards the north. Messages should be sent to the regiment through Ser- 
geant L , at Liebstadt, or Corporal P , at Pittehnen. At 8 a. m. 

the regiment was at Herzogswalde. The 3 troopers that the chief of the 
3d platoon sent to follow the enemy towards Stollen are placed under your 
orders. The bearer of this message should return to the connecting- post 

at Pittehnen. E , 

Captain. 



Pittehnen, 
5 May, 8-55 a. m. 
To Adjutant, ist Cavalry: 

After being delayed by a group of hostile troopers at Naglack, this 
troop arrived at Reichenthal at about 8 a. m. and attacked a hostile troop 
that was advancing from Pittehnen on the highway towards Blumen. The 
enemy escaped to the north and was pursued as far as Klogehnen. He has 
disappeared towards Stollen. Sergeant K and 9 troopers are follow- 
ing to keep touch with the enemy and protect the regiment towards the 
north. Three prisoners state that the enemy consisted of Troop No. 2, 
5th Dragoons, which left Heilsberg early this morning, where it had passed 
the night with the entire regiment. The prisoners neither can describe 
the route they followed to-day, nor tell where they were night before 
last, or where their regiment, which they have not seen to-day, now is. 
They apparently know nothing else of importance. I am sending the 
prisoners to Mohrungen via Liebstadt, and shall advance via Kleinefeld 

towards Guttstadt. A connecting- post, under Corporal P , is left at 

Pittehnen, to which point^please send information concerning future move- 
ment of the regiment and of any important messages received. I shall 
attempt to establish communication with the regiment through Sackstein. 
I have not yet received any word from the right bank of the Passarge. 
Below Sackstein the stream can be crossed only on bridges, excepting at 
Kalkstein, where there are said to be two fords. 

Captain. 
It took me about 5 minutes to write the instructions to 

Sergeant K , and the message to the adjutant took nearly 

15 minutes. Some may be able to do it in less time. It is not 
so much the actual writing, as a careful consideration of the 
subject-matter, that takes time. In the field, additional time 
will be consumed by all sorts of interruptions and the observa- 
tion of terrain and enemy. All this must be borne in mind by 
both the sender and receiver. It is desirable to diminish the 
time required as much as possible. But can this best be done 
by shortening the wording? Searching for the shortest form 
of expression might take longer than rapidly writing several 



RSCONNAISSANC]?;. 85 

longer sentences, and might result in ambiguities similar to 
those often arising from the so-called telegraphic style. It is 
most appropriate to say, "Please excuse this long letter; I 
haven't time to write a shorter one." It is hardly possible to 
omit anything contained in the foregoing messages. 

But the question arises whether the captain might not 
have saved the 15 valuable minutes taken in writing the second 
message, by letting the staff officer carry back a verbal report. 
As we here have an officer, and above all, the colonel's selected 
staff officer, to take back word, the captain certainly would be 
authorized in sending a verbal message to his superior. No 
one would blame the captain if he considered such verbal mes- 
sage sufficient. But his confidence in the staff officer may have 
been somewhat shaken by the latter's imperfect knowledge of 
the situation, for a reliable and energetic officer would not have 
left Herzogswalde in such blissful ignorance. The captain is 
the responsible party, and he would be blamed for any mis- 
understanding caused by inaccurate transmission of the mes- 
sage. He knows what a valuable document a written message 
is. Possibly he already has learned by experience that such a 
document may ser\^e as a protection against unmerited censure ; 
and, even if this consideration would not be the motive for a 
high-minded man's course of action, still, the thought of his 
reputation as a careful commander justified his course. The 
troop cannot start at once; it must first let the point and flank- 
ers gain the necessary lead. This allows some time in which 
to restore order after the pursuit, and enables horses and men 
to somewhat recover from its effects. It also affords some time 
for writing the message which is dictated to two men so that a 
copy can be retained by the first sergeant. 

While the latter forms the troop under cover near Pit- 
tehnen, the captain has an opportunity to commend his men 
for their meritorious conduct, and to order the horses to be 
watered, before joining the officer whom he has intrusted with 



86 Studies in Applied Tactics. 

keeping watch towards Guttstadt. He finds the latter and the 
6 troopers at the bend of the road northeast of Pittehnen. 

The captain took along Lieutenant B and his 6 men of 

Troop B, as well as 2 non-commissioned officers and 10 men of 
his own troop, to promptly make the necessary arrangements 
on the right bank of the Passarge. 

The ofiicer, Lieutenant S , reports that two hostile 

troopers were visible for a few minutes on Height no south 
of Elditten; but that he had seen nothing else of the enemy. 
The captain scans the country, excepting a number of depres- 
sions, as far north as Klogehnen, and to Height in north of 
Schwenkitten, then from the grove on the road to Dittrichsdorf 
beyond Height 1 11 to the border of the woods on the slope of 
Hasenberg,* as far as half-way between Elditten and Kleinefeld 
and as far as Height no south of Elditten. There is nothing 
suspicious to be seen anywhere, and the occupants of the neigh- 
boring farm do not know anything more than what the captain 
already has learned. To the rear the view extends as far as the 
highway at Gr. Prags3en and Wuchsnig. There is nothing to 
be seen of the regiment. 

The captain requests the staff officer to listen to his next 
arrangements and then to rapidly ride back to the colonel. 

What arrangements does Captain E make at the 

bend of the highway northeast of pittehnen? 

So far the patrols in front of the troop, whose arc had been 
partly penetrated by the hostile troop, have been detained by 
the Passarge. The assembled blue troop, after driving the 
enemy away, has entered the outer zone of the reconnoitering 
screen and its own safety as well as a continuation of the recon- 
naissance calls for a rearrangement of the service in its front. 
We can resort to the regulation plan of sending cut patrols in 
fan-shape order: one patrol via Arnsdorf-Ereymarkt towards 

*"Hasen B." on map. 



Rejconnaissanci;. 87 

Schmolainen, one along the Wolfsdorf-Guttstadt highway, one 
via Kleinefeld-Warlack towards Glcttau, and possibly a fifth 
via Hohenfeld-Waltersmiihl towards Heiligenthal-Rosengarth. 
These would form the orthodox screen and would sufficiently 
protect the body of the troop, following at some distance, from 
surprise. But on closer examination of existing conditions we 
see that such a typical formation is not suited to this case. 

Even in figuring on a minimum strength for these patrols, 
we hardly would have each one consist of less than a leader and 
5 men; taking 30 men in all. This would reduce the strength 
of the main body of the troop to an unwarranted extent. But 
even patrols of 6 men, if the distance from their support in- 
creases, cannot perform their duty properly and will become 
helpless as soon as they have sent back two or three messages. 
And, as for sending these messages by 2 men each, as should 
be done in clcse proximity to the enemy, this is entirely out of 
the question. 

But at least the patrol sent via Arnsdorf-Freymarkt to- 
wards Heilsberg would have to be considerably stronger, as it 
probably could not return to-day. If the captain does not 
wish to see his command melt away in small detachments, he 
must adopt a different system. 

Of what use is the typical net-work of small patrols whose 
threads cross all avenues leading towards the enemy? Practi- 
cally only as a means of protection. These small groups ac- 
complish relatively little in the way of obtaining information — 
the hostile screen will see to this. Even if the latter is raised 
a little here and there, thus affording the patrols an extended 
glimpse, it will seldom happen that the messenger sent back 
will bring the information obtained on time. 

On page 35 mention has already been made of the small 
value of reconnaissance by junior non-commissioned officers 
without map or field-glasses, and without comprehensive mili- 
tary judgment. 



88 Studies in Appukd Tactics. 

The united troop is able to tear the hostile screen, and the 
captain, who, with his practiced eye is able to judge the com- 
plete situation, exposes the enemy's cards if he personally ar- 
rives on the spot where there is something to be seen. It is a 
very different matter if he can report, "I have seen," than if he 
must repeat the incomplete and frequently contradictory re- 
ports of his non-commissioned officers. It therefore seems best 
that the captain personally undertake the reconnaissance at the 
head of his troop south of the Pittehnen-Guttstadt highway, 
and for the same purpose intrusting an officer with a large patrol 
north of this highway. The men detailed to protect the march 
of the troop will confine themselves to narrow limits and, like 
the latter, will try as far as possible to remain unseen. It is 
unnecessary to send a patrol along the highway, as this is visible 
from the road through Kleinefeld, and would unnecessarily 
attract the enemy's attention. 

In many other cases a similar method to the foregoing 
might be applicable, but it would be folly to think of deducing 
a general rule from it. More valuable than the recognition of 
the suitability cf the foregoing scheme is this: that it is more 
easy to ride on the road of careful thought and conformity than 
in the ruts of conventionality. 

The captain orders Lieutenant S to take i non-com- 
missioned officer and 8 men and ride ahead to Elditten, to ob- 
serve from that point — using the church-tower for this purpose. 
He intends to follow with the troop and go to Kleinefeld under 
cover alongside the road, with a point i,ooo to 1,500 yards in 
advance. A flanking patrol will be sent via Hohenfeld to keep 
the Passarge valley and its left bank under observation and 
permit of visual communication with the regiment, should it 
advance via Pittehnen of Sackstein. 

To Lieutenant B , who, with his 6 troopers, has gone 

a comparatively short distance to-day, the captain assigns i 



Reconnaissanci:. 89 

non-commissioned officer and 8 men of his own troop, and sends 
him to reconncdter north of the Guttstadt highway. 

What instructions does the Captain give to Lieu- 
tenant B ? 

"We have learned from prisoners that during the past 
night the 5th Dragoons was at Heilsberg. We have not found 
out whence the regiment came, where it is to-day, or to what 
larger unit it belongs. The hostile cavalry might advance 
from Heilsberg towards Wormditt or Liebstadt, or via Gutt- 
stadt. It is important that this point be cleared up for our 
colonel, but it is more important that corps headquarters find 
out something about the infantry columns following, over what 
roads they are advancing, and where the heads of columns are. 
I am going towards Guttstadt with the troop, and for the pres- 
ent shall remain south of the highway. You will reconnoiter 
the country north to include the Wormditt-Freymarkt-Heils- 
berg highway and east to the Alle. If you have time, you will 
also cbserv^e the Guttstadt-Heilsberg road, which you may be 
able to do by going via Sperlings to Liewenberg. Friendly in- 
habitants were unable to give any information west of the Pas- 
sarge. Now that hostile advance patrols have passed by, more 
may be learned by questioning the inhabitants. If you find 
the road at Freymarkt and the Alle crossings free of the en- 
emy, you must report the fact — you yourself must decide when 
your patrol shall return. The prospect of discovering some- 
thing of importance and the condition of your horses may de- 
cide you to pass the night in an advanced village. I wish to 
remind you that it is not important to investigate details, but 
that you should find out the general situation as conclusively 
as possible. 

"Send your messages to the relay station at Pittehnen. 
Should this have been discontinued, or the road be barred, 
you must not search for the troop or regiment, but the mes- 



90 Studies in z\ppi,ied Tactics. 

sengers should endeavor to forward messages to corps head- 
quarters at Mohrungen; for this purpose reach Liebstadt and 

thence wire to Mohrungen. Sergeant Iv and 6 men are 

at Liebstadt. It is reported that there are two fords across the 
Passarge at Kalkstein." 

These might be the verbal instructions for Lieutenant 

B , and presumably they are longer than those composed 

by the majority of my readers. Therefore, referring to what 
I have said on page 19 concerning the "telegraphic style," 
and to my draught of previous messages, I wish further to 
justify the above instructions. 

Very properly stress is laid on military brevity. But who- 
ever has learned by experience, as I have, will admit that brevity 
may be overdone and become a useless formula. How often 
mistakes have arisen from short commands even on the drill- 
ground, where a few clear sentences would have explained 
matters. Whoever reads the orders and instructions of great 
commanders, hande4 down to us in history, sometimes is sur- 
prised at their minuteness, deviating very much from the scant 
style of our maneuver^ and map problems. When the Prusso- 
German Army began its last great war, a lack of skill and un- 
certainty in composing orders became manifest in many cases, 
which, as soon as recognized, was earnestly combated and 
remedied by careful instruction. Our Army Regulations de- 
voted much attention to this important point; and in the 
General Staff and the military schools, as well as with tioops, 
strenuous efforts were made to lemedy the defects. Therefoie 
gteat progress has been made in the art cf issuing orders in the 
German Army. Even the candidate for a commission is re- 
quired to understand it on his entrance examination, and on 
maneuvers the wording of orders takes up much of the critique. 

The progress attained by years of study is unmistakable. 
But on many occasions I have found out that this art is merely 
a matter of form, that many points contained in some orders 



Reconnaissance. 91 

based upon the prescribed models were superfluous and that 
other points were missing that happen not to be mentioned in 
these models. I wish to call attention to the provisions of the 
Field Service Regulations relating to Letters of Instructions,* 
in place cf orders, a form that is but little used any more, but 
which I believe should be used not only with larger commands, 
but also with smaller ones — particularly in reconnaissance duty 
and verbal communications in general. 

An ordinary conversational form often is clearer and more 
easily understood than the brief order-form, which, besides, 
deters a subordinate from asking for elucidation or further ex- 
planation, and which seldom affords insight into the situation 
or the commander's plans. Whoever has seen General von 
Goeben, one of our most prominent commanders, in trying 
times, will never forget the friendly and instructive manner in 
which he gave his instructions and orders, thus helping his 
subordinates to a successful cooperation. The general had the 
reputation of being taciturn, but his orders in time of war — 
particularly his verbal ones — often assumed the form of in- 
structions without losing definiteness of character. 

Particularly Goeben's example called my attention to this 
point, and I must caution you not to sacrifice necessary details 
to brevity and terseness. 

It is possible that my draft of instructions to Lieutenant 

B , if included in a report on a maneuver, or delivered before 

an inspector, would be unfavorably criticised. Instructions 
something like the following would be mere favorably received: 

"The troop will advance south of the Pittehnen-Gutt- 
stadt highway; you will reconnoiter north of the same towards 
Freymarkt-Heilsberg. ' ' 

I admit that this form would do if Lieutenant B were 

a specially capable officer, who looked out for everything else 
himself; who realized how important it is to get a glimpse be- 

*See par. 29, F. S. R. 



92 Studies in Applied Tactics. 

hind the hostile cavalry, to find the infantry columns and the 
crossings of the Alle, to get a view of the Heilsberg-Guttstadt 
highway, to report to corps headquarters, to remain out all 
night if necessary, to question inhabitants, and to make use 
of the telegraph line from Iviebstadt. But if the captain is not 
absolutely certain of such exceptional intelligence in his subordi- 
nates, it would be better for him to impart some of his own 
intelligence and knowledge. Besides, co6pera,tion would be 
more likely to result. The captain by all means must tell the 
officer what he found out from the prisoners, and he ought to 
say mere about the situation in general than is contained in 

my draft, were it not fair to assume that L-ieu tenant B 

already had this information from the colonel, who had sent 
him ahead. Neither would it do to omit instructions concern- 
ing the messengers' route. 

I am not in favor of instructions covering all sorts of pos- 
sible contingencies; but the omission of a useful hint is more 
questionable than thp addition of a sentence that on close in- 
spection proves to be superfluous. Excessive brevity as easily 
causes doubt as verbosity. 

But the abbreviated form of instructions, with addition 
of messengers' route, may do for the lieutenant's note-book and 
the first sergeant's letter-book. 



After discussing a number of important events at the ex- 
treme front of the cavalry reconnoitering parties, we must 
return to regimental headquarters; but in doing so, you must 
try to forget in your deliberations and discussions what has 
been said as having happened at the front, very much as you 
would a vivid and impressive dream. To help produce this 
effect, let us assume for the time being that entirely different 
reports concerning the enemy and our own patrols have been 
received. 



Reconnaissance. 93 

Then it is recommended that pages 9 to 15 be re-read to 
refresh the memory. 

During the night (May 4th-5th) the messages received by 
Captain E from Elbing also came to regimental headquar- 
ters; viz., that telegraphic communication had been interrupted 
with Konigsberg and Pr. Eylau since early on May 4th and with 
Landsberg since noon the same day; that hostile troopers had 
seen seen at the latter place; that the telegraph line was de- 
stroyed between Mehlsack and Wormditt on the evening of 
May 4th; and that the enemy had not appeared at Mehlsack 
itself as late as 2 a. m. May 5th. The following telegram is 
received from corps headquarters: 

The cavalry of the ist Division and at least one troop from the 2d 
Division will reconnoiter via Pfeilings towards Jonkendorf-Miinsterberg 
on the 5th inst. 

Colonel A— — • was not awakened on account of these mes- 
sages. They were not shown him until after 4 a. m., when the 
following was received: 

Drenken, 
5 May, 3-30 a. m. 
bhall leave at 5 a. m. with 3 troops to reconnoiter via Pfeilings to- 
wards Jonkendorf-Miinsterberg. 

D , 

Major T,d Cavalry. 

The regimental commander considers it desirable to have 
a personal interview with the major, whose message should be 
acknowledged. He therefore sends back word by the return- 
ing messenger asking the major to overtake him on the road 
to Mohrungen. 

There are no further arrangements necessary at this time 
(about 4 a. m.) ; still, corps headquarters is informed by wire 
that there is no change in the situation and that the regiment 
will start on time. A messenger would not have been sent for 
this purpose, but, the telegraph line being convenient, this 
report of minor importance is sent by wire. It is not without 



94 Studies in AppuEd Tactics. 

value for corps headquarters to learn that nothing has hap- 
pened to interfere with the execution of existing orders. 

Before starting, the regimental adjutant reports that Lieu- 
tenant F had wired from Gr. Hermenau at 4 a. m., asking 

to be informed by wire of any further information received 
since his departure and stating that he had neither seen nor 
heard anything of the enemy. So far telegraphic communica- 
tion with Mohrungen and lyiebstadt as well as with Horn has 
not been interrupted. Upon inquiry it has been learned that 

Lieutenant C left the latter station at 3 a. m. Troop A, 

ist Cavalry, left Maldeuten at 4 a. m., as ordered. 

On his way to Gr. Wilmsdcrf the colonel and his staff ride 
past the different troops which already have largely joined the 
column and dismounted upon arriving at their respective places, 
as is always done without orders upon halting, unless it be neces- 
sary to be in immediate readiness for action. Promptly at 5 
a. m. Colonel A arrives at Gr. Wilmsdorf. Unless unavoid- 
able, he purposely tries never to arrive before the time named 
by himself, so as to avoid even the suspicion of being nervous 
or perturbed, and not to interfere with the routine duties of his 
staff. The squadron commanders report at Gr. Wilmsdorf, 
stating that nothing of importance has happened among the 

troops. Troop C, Captain W commanding, has been sent 

forward half way to Gr. Bestendorf to protect the regiment 
while assembling. A platoon of Troop D is at the railway sta- 
tion of Maldeuten for the same purpose. This station is occu- 
pied by a platoon of the organized militia. 

What arrangements does Colonel A make at 

5 A. M.? 

The German Field Service Regulations say practically 
nothing about the manner in which cavalry divisions, or sub- 
divisions of the same, shall protect their march ; one is tempted 
to add, "fortunately." Here, where everything depends on 



Reconnaissance. 95 

circumstances, every regulation, no matter how carefully- 
worded, would be a detriment. But, in spite of the notable 
absence of instructions, there is hardly a cavalry officer who 
would be helpless in the face of the problem. Most of them 
certainly would devise suitable arrangements, even though 
differing from each other. And yet the protection of the 
march of cavalry is by no means easier or simpler than that 
of a force of all arms, whose work in this particular to a great 
extent is performed by the cavalry sent in advance. We might 
almost believe that the detailed and comprehensive instructions 
of our Field Service Regulations, for the protection of the march 
of the main columns of an army, unconsciously are based on a 
long-since-forgotten system of peace training and on a conviction 
of its being innocuous. My contemporaries may remember the 
careful method of examining localities along the line of march, 
and which no body of troops was allowed to pass until point 
and flankers had sent back word that everything was all right. 
This method was conscientiously followed for a whole day by 
the division to which I belonged in the campaign of 1866. We 
had started at 3 a. m. and at 6 p. m. we reached our destination, 
12 miles away. But, beginning with the following morning, 
no one ever thought of the carefully practiced rule which never- 
theless has been partly resurrected in long paragraphs of the 
Field Servdce Regulations, to be sure in a purified and better 
form, so that following it cannot result in similar disadvantages. 
But it would be a decided advantage if the present regulations 
were condensed and all figures and measurements were omitted ; 
for no one can depend on these, but everyone is forced to make 
arrangements on his own judgment and responsibility in ac- 
cordance with the requirements of each case. As the (German) 
Field Service Regulations require that cavalry must adopt 
such formation of column and means of protection as may 
be demanded by circumstances, commanders of infantry would 
also be able to do this if only the fundamental principles 



96 Studies in Applied Tactics. 

of the service of security are established and peace training as- 
sures an intelUgent and certain execution of the same. Later 
I shall return to this subject, but think it appropriate to refer 
to the subject here so as to call the cavalry leader's attention 
to the value of the independence authorized by the Regulations. 

The measures adopted to obtain information also help in 
the matter of security or protection, but are not sufficient. 
The troops must not be surprised by the enemy and must ex- 
tend a second and closer series of tentacles, finer meshed and 
more reliable, to serve as a second network of reccnnoitering 
bodies. The subdivisions of this system will differ according 
to the country and circumstances, and require a more permanent 
organization and supervision. 

As the commander of a larger bcdy of troops cannot per- 
sonally attend to the details of this service, he intrusts it to the 
care of one or more subordinates, and, as it is not a question of 
independent action, and to avoid unnecessary expenditure of 
energy, the detachments for this purpose are made as small as 
circumstances will permit. 

Colonel A wishes to intrust Troop C, which already is 

in front, with the duty of protecting the march of the regiment. 
But the troop will be unable to satisfactorily perform this duty 
towards the north, the exposed flank, of the regiment. The 
platoon of Troop D at the Maldeuten railway station is con- 
veniently situated to assist in this matter. But the latter easily 
might need reinforcement, and if it remained under the imme- 
diate command of the colonel, the latter, contrary to his wishes, 
would have to continually arrange the various details.. There- 
fore the colonel orders as follows: 

"The regiment provisionally will march via Gr. Bestendorf 
and Mohrungen to Gr. Hermenau. Troop C is detailed as ad- 
vance guard. I shall personally give the captain his orders. 

Major W , commanding ist Squadron, is charged with the 

protection of the left flank. For this purpose he may use the 



Reconnaissance. 97 

platoon of Troop D now at the Maldeuten railway station. Our 
march will begin at 5.10 a. m., at a walk. Afterwards the 
gait will be regulated by that of the advance guard, where I 
shall be." 

The regimental and squadron adjutants write down this 
order. 

Then the colonel joins Troop C and gives the captain the 
following orders: 

"Hostile patrols arrived last night at Wormditt, Guttstadt 
and Briickendorf. The regiment provisionally will march via 
Gr. Bestendorf and Mohrungen to Gr. Hermenau. You will 
form the advance guard with your troop. Besides protecting 
our march in front, it is important that you reconnoiter the 
defile between Narien-see and Mahrung-see and the Willnau- 
Kallisten road. Lieutenant C left the railway station near- 
est Horn at 3 a. m. to-day to reconnoiter via Briickendorf to- 
wards Jonkendorf-Gr. Buchwalde. There is still telegraphic 
communication with the station nearest Horn via Mohrungen; 
also with Liebstadt. Troop A at 4 a. m. advanced from Mal- 
deuten to Gr. Hermenau and will reconnoiter towards Worm- 

ditt-Guttstadt-Miinsterberg. Major W is charged with 

the protection of our left flank. You will keep connection with 
the main body of the regiment. I shall remain with your troop 
and indicate the gait." 

After having satisfied himself that Captain W has 

obtained no information concerning the enemy, so that pre- 
sumably the march will not be interfered with for the present, 
the colonel sends the following written order to the officer in 
charge of the baggage train: 

The baggage train will start at 6 a. m., at first following the regi- 
ment on the Mohrungen-Georgenthal highway to a point east of the Moh- 
rungen railway station. 

It may seem strange that no arrangements are made for 
the protection of the bagage train, which might be attacked 
by hostile patrols from the north. It also may have been 



98 Studies in Applied Tactics. 

noticed that the regimental order of May 4th neither designated 
an escort nor a commander for the train.* 

With the baggage train of a cavalry regiment (sup- 
posedly about 400 yards long, but probably 500 or 600 yards 
long) there always is a considerable number of armed men, 
such as men in charge of led horses, convalescents,^ men whose 
horses have become disabled, and other detailed men — probably 
amounting to 7 or 8 men per troop and aggregating 80 or 90 
all told. If these men are properly utilized, and not unneces- 
sarily scattered, they will be sufficient to drive off hostile patrols. 

The detail of 8 or 10 troopers would not help matters much, 
especially as there always are some mounted men with the train. 
The men with the train would best be commanded by an officer 
and this is the rule in our field maneuvers. But in time of war 
an officer seldom can be spared for this purpose, as his presence 
would be badly missed in his command,! whereas he probably 
never would become actively engaged with the enemy while 
with the train. Why would not one of the paymasters answer 
the purpose ? All of them are reliable non-.commissicned officers 
accustomed to command. Even for an entire division, pay- 
masters in time of war have often conducted trains with perfect 
satisfaction. In the regimental order no mention is made of 
a paymaster to command the train because it is assumed that 
he has been permanently detailed for this purpose. 

Some explanation is necessary for the colonel's order re- 
quiring the troop to preserve connection with the main body. J 
This is contrary to the requirement of the (German) Field 
Service Regulations, which provide that subdivisions of col- 
umns shall preserve connection with those farther to the front. 

*But see pars. 399, 401, and 402, F. S. R. 

fPar. 401, V. S. R., provides that the regimental quartermaster shall 
control the train. The Germans keep all their regimental staff with the 
troops for service with them. — Translator. 

JBut see par. 105, F. S. R., where this is prescribed. 



Reconnaissance. 99 

In woods, close country, at night, or in a fog it often happens 
in larger commands that connection is lost. Who has not 
experienced this? I ascribe the fault mainly to the above 
named requirement. The commander of the entire force usu- 
ally is in front with the advance guard and directs its move- 
ments. If the commander of the main body or of its leading 
unit, who but casually understands the situation and knows 
nothing of the information received, is charged with preserv- 
ing connection, he can simply make the customary arrange- 
ments: he sends a few privates forward where even an officer 
at times might be led astray. In close country, in towns of 
straggling villages, for example, the advance guard sends a 
reconnoitering detachment to one side, the connecting-file may 
easily mistake this for the advance guard itself and, following 
it, may lead the entire main body en a wrong road, for there 
is no one with the latter who at once would recognize the mis- 
take. But the advance-guard commander knows the road and 
all he has to do is to notify the main body the moment there 
is a change of direction, or if it becomes difficult to follow. If 
he is held responsible for preserving connection, he will be 
careful to see that the main body does not lose its way, for he 
alone, aside from the commanding officer, is able to do this. 
This provision of the Field Service Regulations doubtless is a 
relic of the time when the commanding officer, who had to 
know the road, habitually marched with the main body and 
not with the advance guard. 

Now let us see what the subordinate commanders decide 
to do in consequence of the colonel's orders. 

First: What arrangements does Major W — ■ — , com- 
manding First Squadron, maice? 

The major is charged with the protection of the left flank 
of the regiment. Here, naturally, as elsewhere, "protection" 
includes keeping the enemy at a distance and preventing recon- 



loo Studies in AppuFvD Tactics. 

naissance en his part. This need not be impressed on an ex- 
perienced cavalry officer, although good protection does not 
always insure perfect screening. For example, holding a bridge 
may prevent all attacks by the enemy, while neighboring 
heights might aflFord him ample opportunity for reconnaissance. 

At first the Eestendcrf Forest will form a complete screen 
for the regiment; if it is to remain so, the enemy must be pre- 
vented from entering it unobserv^ed. A protecting body there- 
fore must be sent to the north border ; in part also because that 
affords an extended view. As the regiment will start at once 
and seen will go at an increased gait, there is no certainty that 
the platoon at the Maldeuten railway station will gain sufficient 
distance via Freywalde to insure its being able to protect the 

flank in time and by itself. Therefore Major W selects 

a platoon of the leading troop and instructs its commander as 
follows in the presence of the troop commander: 

"The regiment will start at once and at first go as far as 
Gr. Hermenau via Gr. Bestendorf-Mohrungen. Troop C, 
which is in advance,* will form the advance guard. You will 
cover the left flank and at first will ride via Alt-Kelken to the 
north border cf the forest and then in the general direction of 
Steindorf-Rollnau to Wiese. You will remain at Wiese until 
further orders, reconnoitering thence towards Kahlau, Gold- 
bach, and Silberbach. The ist platoon of Troop D, which now 
is at the Maldeuten railwa}^ station, will at first follow you via 
Freywalde to Rollnau and protect the flank in rear of you." 

The ist platoon of Troop D receives orders conforming 
to the foregoing. It is self-evident that both platoons must 
look out for their own protection towards the north and must 
observe the region about Hagenau and Konigsdorf. Their 
orders contain nothing about the enemy, because it may be 
assumed that the squadron commanders already have told 
all their officers what is known of the enemy, and that the 



Rejconnaissance. ioi 

officer at the Maldeuten railway station secured this informa- 
tion for himself from the telegraph office at that place. 

It is true that half a troop is used as flank guard, but the 
two platoons will not have to make much of a detour, and 
presumably they could be en hand in case of an engagement. 
The distance accidentally existing between the two platoons 
is not objectionable; it broadens the front of protection on 
the north. The platoons will arrive respectively at Wiese 
and RoUnau before the regiment passes Mohrungen, and the 
anticipated halt at the latter place will enable the major to 
issue further instructions. 

What are the advance-guard commander's arrange- 
ments? 

It may be assumed that the captain has vedettes at 
Wolla and Alt-Kelken and a patrol on the highway at the 
eastern exit of Gr. Bestendorf. Protection must promptly 
be arranged for to the front, so that the regiment's march may 
not be delayed. Therefore the captain orders as follows in a 
loud tone cf voice, so that every man may understand: 

"The troop is the advance guard for the regiment. The 
line of march at first is through Mohrungen to Gr. Hermenau. 
Troop A went ahead an hour ago over this road. 

"Patrol ahead of the advance party: Lieutenant G 

and 8 troopers, including the patrol at the eastern exit of 
Bestendorf. You will ride ahead, at first to the vicinity of 
Alt-Bolitten and Herzogswalde. 

"Advance party: Sergeant B with i corporal and lo 

troopers. You will go past Mohrungen railway station and 
Georgenthal — trot out! 

"Right flank patrol: Lieutenant N and 12 troopers, 

including the vedette at Wolla. You will ride through Kuh- 
diebs-Paradies-Himmelforth-Willnau towards Kallisten, and 
will protect the right flank of the regiment. Messages at 



I02 Studies in Appi.iEd Tactics. 

first will be sent to Mohrungen, with which point there is still 
telegraphic communication from Horn railway station; later, 
messages will be sent direct to Gr. Hermenau. Lieutenant 

C , I St Cavalry, who left Horn railway station at 3 a. m., 

is going past Briickendorf towards Jonkendorf. You must 
hasten your ride as far as the vicinity of Horn. 

"Left jiank patrol: Sergeant K with the vedette at 

Alt-Kelken, and 5 troopers. You at first will ride past Alt- 
Kelken-Neu-Bestendorf-Neuhof to the north exit of Georgen- 
thal and will protect the left flank of the troop. 

"Sergeant V and 5 troopers: You will ride between 

the troop and the main body of the regiment, and are respon- 
sible for preserving connection between the two bodies." 

If, in the meantime, the troop must start, he can give 
part of the instructions en route. The captain rides at the 
head of the main body of his troop and keeps the advance 
party or connecting-files in sight. 

The colonel, who has listened to the captain's orders, adds 

the following to Lieutenant N 's orders: "Be sure and 

report by wire from the station nearest Horn. Major D , 

with 3 troops of the 3d Cavalry, leaves Drenken at 5 a. m., 
following the regiment at first and then reconnoitering through 
Pfeilings toward Jonkendorf." The colonel's additional order 
shows how judicious it was for him to have listened to the 
captain's orders. It was not done from distrust of the latter's 
judgment, but from a desire to keep track of events and to be 
able to add to his own orders if necessary, which would still be 
possible at this time. In his orders to the captain he omitted 
the information concerning the detachment of the 3d Cavalry, 
which is of importance for the troop as well as for Lieutenant 
N . Such an error may be made by even the most method- 
ical commander. In listening to the orders given by a subordi- 
nate, a superior must be very careful to interfere only in case 



Reconnaissance. io3 

of extreme necessity. He should give the subordinate a free 
hand, even if thereby his orders are carried out a Httle differ- 
ently from what he had anticipated. 

Neither of the commanders has given any instructions 
about the distance of the advance party from the troop or of 
the latter from the main body of the regiment. The colonel 
himself will order the advance guard to start, and then will 
regulate its distance from the main body of the regiment with- 
out expressing this in figures. The captain purposely omitted 
stating in yards the distance the advance party should be ahead 
of the troop. It is self-evident that the advance party must 
try to reach the edge of the woods west of Mohrungen as soon 
as possible, to get a good view; an order to keep i,ooo yards 
ahead might only serve to confuse it in this intelligent purpose. 

Sergeant V 's orders to preserv^e connection with the 

main body does not relieve the captain of the responsibility 
for the proper execution of this duty. But the sergeant is a 
well-instructed intermediary, able to transmit information from 
the captain to the main body concerning any change of route. 

As soon as the advance party and patrols had made some 
headway, the colonel had the main body of the troop start and 
at about 6 a. m. he arrived with it at the eastern edge of Best- 

endorf Forest. Here Major D , of the 3d Cavahy, comes 

up. The colonel informs him of his intentions and arrange- 
ments. The major reports that he intends going via Briicken- 
dorf. The advance guard inquired for telegrams at the Gr. 
Bestendorf station, and brought the colonel the message sent 

by Captain E at 5.20 a. m. from Mohrungen, in which the 

latter stated that the situation remained unchanged and that 
he would continue his advance towards Gr. Hermenau. At 

6.25 a. m. Colonel A , the advance guard, and Major 

D arrived at the Mohrungen station, where the follow- 
ing message from Lieutenant C was received by the 

colonel : 



I04 Studies in Applied Tactics. 

Hillside just west of Bruckendorf, 

5 May, 4-10 a. m. 
Found railway station near Bruckendorf occupied by enemy, who 
fired on us. 

C , 

Lieutenant. 

The message was wired at 5 a. m. from Horn railway sta- 
tion. It was also learned that this station no longer answered 
to its call. Nothing was seen of the enemy at Neuhof, Wiese, 
Georgenthal, or Dohringshof. 

The colonel did not see fit to stop the march. He surmised 
that only some advance patrols of the enemy had reached Horn 

and believed that Major D could cope with them. The 

regimental commander's decision is of interest because there 
is a possibility that larger hostile bodies of cavalry already may 
have reached the defile between Narien- and Mahrung-see. 
But it will not do to halt on account of this possible contin- 
gency so as to assist Major D in case of necessity. It 

might take a long time to find out something definite, and we 
might keenly regret the delay if in the meantime the enemy 
appeared from the north, where the regiment's main duty lies. 

Major D remained to await the arrival of his troops; 

Colonel A , with the advance guard took the road past the 

railway station towards Georgenthal, but sent an ofiicer into 
the town of Mohrungen to inquire for messages of the Postal 
Telegraph office, destroy all tape records of the past few days, 
and question the mayor concerning news of the enemy. 

Upon arriving at Georgenthal at 6.50 a. m., Colonel A 

received the message from Captain E , which was as follows: 

Gr. Hermenau, 
5 May, 6-20 a. m. 
Twenty hostile troopers were at Wormditt last night, destroyed the 
railway and telegraph at that point, and left on the way towards Aiken 

at I a. m. I am not pursuing them. Sergeant H and 5 troopers are 

now at Wormditt. 

Lieutenant B encountered a platoon of hostile cavalry at Schar- 

nick early this morning, and at 5-30 a. m. had retreated to Pittehnen. At 
5 a. m. to-day 12 hostile troopers, coming from Lettau, rode towards Her- 



Reconnaissance. 105 

zogswalde. Their whereabouts is not known. Lieutenant F is recon- 

noitering via Kallisten towards Guttstadt. 

Troop A will advance via Herzogswalde-Pittehnen to reconnoiter the 
Liebstadt-Guttstadt road. 

Lieutenant F sent a lance corporal and 2 troopers to Sackstein, 

No report yet received from him. I am leaving connecting-posts at tele- 
graph stations in Liebstadt and Gr. Hermenau and at Herzogswalde. 

Captain. 

Continuing at a walk, Colonel A , while lie held his 

map before him, had the message read to him. It is less 
troublesome to find the names of localities than is usually the 
case on peace maneuvers. The seriousness of war forces com- 
manders and their staffs to carefully consider all contingencies 
in advance and familiarize themselves with the map. 

The message contains nothing necessitating a change of 
plans, particularly as in the meantime nothing has been seen 
of the enemy at Goldbach or Silberbach. 

At 7.15 a. m. the advance guard reached Gr. Hermenau. 
The colonel discovered that telegraphic communication still 
existed with Liebstadt and that the patrol of Troop A located 
there knew nothing of the enemy. Beyond lyiebstadt tele- 
graphic communication exists only as far as Sportehnen. A 
short message was received from Captain E at Herzogs- 
walde, stating that he had seen nothing of the enemy there and 
had received no further information. The troop had resumed 
its march towards Pittehnen at 6.50 a. m., and had sent the 

connecting-post under Captain M ■ to the Teufelsberg. The 

colonel thought it inadvisable to pursue the hostile patrol 
that went from Wormditt towards Aiken, but he informed the 

advance guard commander and Major W about it. He 

sent a short telegram to the corps commander, stating what 
had been accomplished, and then quietly continued the march 
towards Herzogswalde, leaving i non-commissioned officer and 
4 troopers at the telegraph station in Gr. Hermenau. 

Arriving at Herzogswalde shortly after 8 a. m., the reg- 
imental commander receives the following messages: 



io6 Studies in Applied Tactics. 

1. Frcm Ccrpcral M , Troop A, Teufelsberg, 7-55 a. m. 

Ten hostile troopers were seen riding along the road from Naglack 
towards Banners. They were pursued in an easterly direction by a platoon 
of Troop A, ist Cavalry. The troop is now in the vicinity of Reichenthal. 
Nothing else seen of the enemy. 

2. The same ncn-commissioned officer transmits the mes- 
sage sent by Lieutenant F at 6-30 a. m. from Knoll 157 

southwest of Heiligenthal. (See page 47.) 

3. A message from Major D , sent from Dohringshof 

at 7-20 a. m. 

Fifteen hostile troopers reported as retreating from Pfeilings along 
railway. Nothing heard from Lieutenant C . 

This message was wired from Mohrungen to Gr. Hermenau. 
No word has been received from the patrols sent out by the 
advance guard towards Reichau, Sanglau, Waltersdorf, and 
Sackstein. The situation is still obscure. The regiment has 
marched nearly 16 miles and is considerably ahead of the army 
•corps. It is still early and there may be considerable more to 

do to-day. Colonel 4 thinks it best to order a halt, which 

will give the reccnnoitering bodies time to obtain further infor- 
mation. He sends an officer to Troop A to find out something 
more definite about this (his most important) recoimoitering 
body. 

The squadrons are billeted on Herzogswalde for rations 
and forage; the advance guard is charged with the protection 

of the regiment towards the south and east, while Major W 

continues to see to the protection towards the north. (In the 
the meantime the platoon of Troop C has rejoined the troop; 
and the ist platoon, Troop D, is at Alt-Bolitten.) 

The colonel takes advantage of the halt to orient himself 
and obtain a personal view of the sm-rounding country. First 
he goes to the Teufelsberg, where he learns that the message 

from Sackstein, referred to by Lieutenant F , has not been 

received, and carefully scans with his field-glasses the broad 



Reconnaissance. 107 

expanse of country visible. His view extends beyond the line 
Willnau-Seubersdorf-Kallisten and to the heights east of Dep- 
pen and to Waltersmiihl. Our own patrols are visible at 
Reichau and Waltersdorf, but nothing is seen of the enemy. 
No conclusions can be drawn from the movements of individual 
figures seen in the distance. Following the horizon around 
farther to the north, Hohenfeld is seen. A view to Elditten 
and Pittehnen is prevented by the tree-covered heights east 
of Gr. Pragsden and west of Reichenthal. To the north, Lieb- 
stadt and the country west of the railway can be seen, but 
nothing suspicious is noted. Then the colonel rides across 
country between Herzogswalde and the Wuchsnig-see, to the 
north end of this lake, hoping there to get a glimpse of the 
country about Pittehnen. But even Height 153 does not ad- 
mit of this. At Elditten he sees several horsemen, but cannot 
tell whether they are friend or foe. 

At 9.30 the regimental staff officer of the ist Cavalry sent 

to Troop A returns with Captain E 's message of 8.50 a. m. 

(See page 84.) While the staff officer is giving a more de- 
tailed account, a message is received from Sackstein, stating 
that our patrols are being fired on from the right bank of the 
Passarge at that point; but that the enemy's strength could 
not be determined; and that individual hostile troopers are 
visible on the heights near Waltersmiihl. 

The squadrons found forage in Herzogswalde, and it may 
be assumed that they have watered and fed by this time, 
9-35 a. m. 

What are Colonel A 's further intentions? 

(Lieutenant F 's message dated 7.35 a. m., from Komal- 

men, has not been received by the colonel, and therefore canno- 
be considered.) 

Considerable valuable information is at hand, and a suc- 
cessful encounter has been had with the enemy; nevertheless 



io8 Studies in AppIvIi^d Tactics. 

there is uncertainty about many things, and it [is by no means 
self-evident what shall be done. 

We again see that uncertainty is the normal condition in 
war, and that the more commanders are obliged in time of 
peace to grope about in this semi-darkness, the more will their 
sense of touch and power of combination be developed. 

Troop A's engagement with the enemy has demonstrated 
that we have to deal with quite a force of the enemy's cavalry. 
One of his troops has been temporarily defeated, but where the 
remainder of his cavalry force is can only be surmised. Whether 
it is acting alone or in combination with other troops is entirely 
unknown. The hostile regiment of dragoons was at Heilsberg 
during the night and sent one of its troops towards Pittehnen. 
But so far nothing but hostile patrols have been noticed at 
Kallisten and Sackstein; and a larger body hardly could have 
concealed itself in the river valley near Sackstein. Thus it is 
possible that the hostile cavalry, or at least a part of it, will 
follow towards Pittehnen. This assumption is the more likely 
to be correct because it may seem more advantageous to the 
hostile commander to advance past the north end of Narien- 
see than through the defile between it and Mohrung-see. Of 
course, if this assumption is correct, the enemy can just as 
well advance via Wormditt or Kalkstein as via Pittehnen. It 
does not signify that so far nothing has been heard from the 
patrol at Wormditt. It is a long way off, the patrol may have 
been pushed aside, oi its message may have been intercepted. 

Nevertheless, should the hostile cavalry as a whole or in 
part come via Guttstadt-Kallisten-Willnau, it at first would 
meet Major D— — , and later the advance guard of the army 
corps, which would be less objectionable than if it succeeded, 
by a detour to the north, in reaching the flank of the ist Army 
Corps and locating one flank of the army. 

Herzogswalde is favorably located, in that from here the 
regiment can promptly advance against the enemy should he 



Reiconnaissance. 109 

approach on any of the above-named routes. But, after all, 
is it Colonel A 's duty to advance against the hostile cav- 
alry? According to the wording of the order, he is simply to 
"reconnoiter," and the Field Service Regulations emphasize 
that, "the main object being to observe the enemy, combat 
should be avoided, except as a means to this end."* 

Before further discussing Colonel A 's plans, it is de- 
sirable to get a clear idea of this fundamental question. 

A great number of patrols close to each other, on an ex- 
tended front, followed by contact troops, apparently would 
insure our cavalry seeing everything to a great distance. How- 
ever, if the reconnoitering is to be performed in this way not 
for only two or three days, but for a long time, provision must 
be made for the relief, reinforcement, and support of this ad- 
vance cavalry, for even the contact troops will be able to con- 
tinue this destructive activity for a few days only. This neces- 
sitates a further division of the force, so that possibly each regi- 
ment of the cavalry brigade would have to advance on a separate 
road. Although this theory has been advocated by some, still it 
is generally objected to, because thereby the force would be too 
much scattered. Experience proves that sometimes it is neces- 
sary to fight to clear up the situation, and that to succeed in this 
event it is necessary to keep the force together ; for it is seldom 
that we know in advance whether there will be a fight or how 
strong the enemy is. But there is another reason for keeping 
your force together and being careful in sending out detach- 
ments. The enemy is quite as anxious as we are to get infor- 
mation, and to insure our success it is almost as important to 
prevent the enemy from reconnoitering and to keep his com- 
mander in the dark as it is for us to have ample information 
of him. 

Preventing hostile reconnaissance, which under the term 
of "screening our own movements" is not as clearly and 

*See par. 65, F. S. R. 



no Studies in Applied Tactics. 

sharply defined as it should be, must be considered by our 
cavalry as of almost equal importance with reconnaissance. 
The word "almost" in this sentence is justified only on the 
supposition that our own commander-in-chief is superior to 
the enemy's and is better able to utilize the information he 
receives than is the case with the enemy. 

By combat alone can this end be attained, and rational 
principles of warfare teach that it is not necessary to defeat 
every small detachment, but simply the main hostile force; 
which result will immediately be followed by the retreat of 
the smaller detachments, and end the enemy's extended activity 
in reconnaissance, while furthering our own. No one would 
censvire the cavalry leader who, trusting in his own good troops, 
looks upon a combat with the hostile cavalry not as a last 
resort, but as the first and best one. If he seeks a decisive 
encounter instead of avoiding it, his confident demeanor will 
be a powerful factor for success as opposed to any less certain 
and determined enemy. 

A recognition of the correctness of this principle will not 
induce a prudent man to omit carefully weighing each separate 
case or utilizing every advantage. He would not wish to offer 
an easy victory to a superior hostile force. Cool calculation 
must check eagerness for combat; first consider, then venture. 
Sometimes, contrary to our wishes, safety lies in accepting the 
inevitable by patiently and craftily waiting for a favorable 
opportunity. 

It therefore will be well for Colonel A from the begin- 
ning to bear in mind the possibility of an encounter with the 
enemy and try in advance to secure all possible advantages 
in case the combat should take place as early as to-day. Even 
the halt for feeding at Herzogswalde will pay for itself by in- 
creasing the power of endurance of his troops. 

The foregoing general remarks were called forth by the 
fact that the regiment from Herzogswalde could oppose the 



Reconnaissance. m 

enemy on any of his possible lines of advance. It may be as- 
sumed that our patrols at the latest would discover the enemy 
when he crosses the Passarge at one of the few bridges. And 
the elevated ground near Wuchsnig-see makes it possible to 
discover the enemy's arrangements and strength while still 
at a distance. Presumably the enemy is still in ignorance of 
the presence of our regiment, and, by remaining motionless 
and under cover at Herzogswalde, it probably would not be 
discovered, so that it would be able to make an unexpected 
attack, or, in case of the enemy's great superiority, it would be 
able to retreat in time. 

It is not very tempting to lie in wait for an enemy who 
may be making a long detour or possibly has no idea whatever 
of crossing the Passarge. But had we reliable information of 
the advance of greatly superior hostile forces, such action would 
be earnestly recommended, as a continuation of our advance 
would be admissible only under very exceptional circum- 
stances. Only too easily the advantages of a dash to the Alle 
under such conditions might be lost by sacrificing the regiment. 
But the incentive for such an enterprise is wanting — ^viz., the 
certainty of the advance of a superior hostile force. It is pos- 
sible and even probable that we will encounter such a force; 
but the contrary is also possible, or the possibility of meeting 
a detached force that, however, would still offer a chance for 
a victory. Our own consciousness, and historical criticism, 
would never forgive us if, through excessive caution, we lost 
the chance before the decisive battle to penetrate the darkness 
that so far has surrounded the enemy's movements. 

If after thoughtful consideration it seems to be a choice 
between boldness and caution, there can be no doubt as to the 
proper course to follow. 

Therefore Colonel A decides to continue his march. 

The direction is fixed by the fact that hostile reconnaissance 
from the north must be especially opposed and that a safe 



112 Studies in Applied Tactics. 

crossing of the Passarge has been secured by Captain E . 

This direction of advance also will make it more difficult for 
the hostile troop, which has retreated towards Stollen, to re- 
sume its advance. On the right bank of the Passarge, Colonel 

A depends on receiving further news from Captain E , 

as a basis for further arrangements. Already in going to Pitt- 
ehnen he will have the regiment advance as much as possible 
under cover, even if to do so he would have to leave the regular 
road. Only in case of absolute necessity would he be willing 
to sacrifice the advantage of remaining unseen and of being 

able to surprise the enemy. Captain E is informed of 

the colonel's decision. The colonel does not think it neces- 
sary to make further report to corps headquarters at this time. 
At lo a. m. the advance guard arrives at Pittehnen and 
the main body at Reichenthal. The commander of the con- 
necting-post at Pittehnen turns over the following messages: 

1. From Sergeant K , sent from Stollen, 5th May, 

9-15 a. m. 

The hostile troop crossed the Passarge north of Sportehnen and disap- 
peared in the woods. There is no enemy at Kalkstein, where there are 
two fords. Nothing is to be seen of the enemy as far as Albrechtsdorf . 

2. From lyieutenant B , sent from Height 114 north- 
west of Dittrichsdorf, 5th May, 9-35 a. m. 

Nothing suspicious visible at Kalkstein or Voigtsdorf, on the highway 
west and east of Arnsdorf, or at Lauterwalde-Petersdorf. A hostile patrol 
rode through Dittrichsdorf two or three hours ago. I shall go via Arnsdorf 
towards Freymarkt. 

3. From Captain E , sent from Kleinefeld, 5th May, 

9-40 a. m. 

After my advance party drove back 5 or 6 hostile troopers from 

Kleinefeld towards Scharnick, 2 of Lieutenant F 's messengers, who 

till then had been stopped by the hostile troopers, delivered the inclosed 

message. I have not received Lieutenant F 's 7-35 a. m. message. 

Aside from the above 5 or 6 troopers, nothing is seen of the enemy in the 
country before me. And nothing is visible on the Elditten-Guttstadt 
highway, which I can see quite well to beyond Lingnau. A hostile troop 
rode through Wolfsdorf this morning, presumably the one I defeated at 
Pittehnen. At Sackstein there is a hostile patrol that I shall drive away. 
I shall next ride to Waltersmiihl and send an officer to Guttstadt. 



Reconnaissancb;. 113 

Lieutenant F- 's message is as follows: 

Zaun-see, near Komai^men, 

5 May, 8-35 a. m. 
Five hostile troops of cavalry are advancing along the Guttstadt- 
Heiligenthal highway. The leading one is the one I reported at 7-35 a. m. 
and must be at Heiligenthal by this time; the other four have passed 
■Queetz. There is nothing visible on the highway back of them as far as 
near Glottau. Hostile patrols have prevented my sending a message until 
now. I shall remain here in observation. 

What does ColoneIv A decide to do? 

The situation has not materially changed since the regi- 
ment left Herzogswalde. Apparently there are no large bodies 
of hostile cavalry on the Liebstadt-Guttstadt highway or the 
country north of it (though this is by no means certain) ; but 
that these, contrary to all expectation, have taken the road 
from Guttstadt to Kallisten. 

Five hostile troops are reported, and they probably belong 
to the 5th Dragoons, of which one troop was defeated at Pitt- 
ehnen; but possibly they simply are the advance guard of a 
larger body following at some distance. From present indica- 
tions they are going past the south end of Narien-see. Of course 
they might change the direction of their march if they heard 
of the presence of our regiment or of the misfortune that befell 
their troop at Pittehnen. Should they continue the march 
beyond the left bank of the Passarge, they will reach Naglack, 
Reichau, or Willnau by 10.30 a. m. But for the present they 
might be content to hold the Passarge bridge at Kallisten and 
send out patrols from that point. This is highly probable if 
the 5 troops as yet have no substantial backing. Already, at 

Mohrungen and Herzogswalde, Colonel A had reflected on 

the possibility of hostile cavalry driving back Major D , 

advancing towards Mohrungen past the south end of Narien- 
see, and thus discovering the advance of the ist Division. 
Notwithstanding this, he chose the northeastern line of march, 
because it seemed to him more important to prevent hostile 
reconnaissance of our left flank and because he hoped for better 



114 Studies in Applied Tactics. 

results from reconnaissance extending around by the north. 
It would be detrimental for us to have hostile cavalry discover 
the head of our infantry columns at one point or another, but 
it cannot always be prevented on a broad front. However, 
it would be of much greater advantage for the hostile com- 
mander-in-chief to locate the flank of our army; for example, 
to learn that strong columns are marching on the Saalfeld- 
Mohrungen highway, and that the district north of that road 
is unoccupied. This would form a safe basis for his decisions, 
while the discovery of the head of a column at Mohrungen 
would not be a guarantee that other blue columns are not 
marching on Liebstadt and Wormditt. 

Therefore if the hostile cavalry remains in the direction 
of Ka'llisten-Willnau, it can do but little damage, and the reg- 
iment unhesitatingly can devote itself to its reconnaissance 
towards the Alle. But it is not yet known in what direction 
the enemy will advance after crossing the Passarge. Should 
he advance via Herzogswalde-Gr. Hermenau, the hostile com- 
mander-in-chief might be furnished with the important infor- 
mation above referred to. At present (lo a. m.) the regiment is 
only about 3 miles from Herzogswalde, and within an hour 
we might have an opportunity to render the enemy harmless, 
and then be able to resume our reconnaissance to the east 
with our messenger-route secured. This possible chance must 
not be thrown away. But it would be a mistake for us to 
enter on a wild chase after the 5 hostile troops on the left of 
the Passarge. The distances are too great and the country is 
too extensive. And, anyway, who can tell whether we shall 
find the quarry? Possibly the enemy will remain at Kallisten, 
as already suggested. In this case the regiment would have 
the bothersome stream between itself and its objective. At 
Pittehnen the regiment, so to speak, has one foot on each bank 
of the stream, ready to draw either to the opposite side if neces- 
sary. Troop A by this time must be near Waltersmiihl and 



Reconnaissance. 115 

have a view of the Queetz-Heiligenthal road as well as towards 
Kallisten. In a short time we ought to have word from the 
troop and the numerous patrols sent via Willnau, Reichau, 
Lettau, Walter sdorf, and Sackstein, as to whether the enemy 
has crossed the Passarge and what route he has taken from 
Kallisten. It seems all the more desirable to await this as 
our reconnaissance towards Guttstadt and Heilsberg does not 
seem to be interfered with at present, and the delay in the 
regiment's advance therefore does not check its regular work. 
The colonel's desire for action is again blocked by this renewed 
halt, but experience has taught him that it is the rule for 
closed bodies of cavalry to advance tentatively, cautiously, and 
deliberately until that moment when the occasion calls for quick 
and sure action. He knows that nothing so quickly destroys 
the confidence and efficiency of men as when hasty decisions 
have to be paid for by many miles of trotting. 

The colonel will take advantage of the proximity of the 
telegraph station at Liebstadt to send his report to corps head- 
quarters, in which he will invite attention to the advantage of 
having Gr. Hermenau promptly occupied by a detachment of 
cyclists so as to check hostile reconnaissance. 



The situation growing out of Lieutenant C 's recon- 
naissance is of more than ordinary interest, and therefore will 
next occupy our attention. His experience could not be con- 
tinuously followed without presenting a distorted picture. 

Lieutenant C had cut the telegraph wires at Schau- 

stern and at 7 a. m. had arrived at the grove east of Schaustern 
apparently without having been detected by, and without him- 
detecting, the enemy. (See pp. 57-72.) His patrol, besides 
himself, still consists of i non-commissioned officer and 8 
troopers, one of whom is leading a captured horse. At Schau- 
stern it was learned that yesterday evening about 20 hostile 



ii6 Studies in Applied Tactics. 

troopers passed through there, going towards Briickendorf. 
Nothing has been learned from the neighboring villages, be- 
cause everybody is staying at home. Lieutenant C , care- 
fully working forward through the various groves, at 7.20 a. m. 
reaches Knoll 160 north of Gottken and from here sees several 
horsemen riding from Height 155 east of Wengaithen towards 
the latter village, and also sees several others riding along the 
highway from Jonkendorf towards Pupkeim. He withdraws 
to the north-most grove, from whose border he carefully con- 
tinues his observations. The groves consist of a mixture of 
pines and firs, with underbrush along the border, whose young 
foliage affords fair cover, so that the officer succeeds in remain- 
ing concealed and by 9 a. m. has discovered the following: 
Four hostile troops followed the advance party on the Jonken- 
dorf-Pupkeim highway, and at the latter place diverged to- 
wards Schlitt, They have just (at 9 a. m.) passed Schlitt. 
Since then no others have followed them on the road as far 
back as near Jonkendorf, where the lieutenant's view ends. 
Another hostile body of one or two troops rode over the ridge 
east of Wengaithen towards the latter village, but could not 
be followed any farther, as Knoll 160 was occupied for some 
time by a hostile patrol and the Wengaithen-Schaustern road 
could not be seen from the hiding-place. Since 8 a. m. nothing 
more has been seen of the enemy at Wengaithen. 

Lieutenant C did not care to report the hostile patrols, 

for which purpose the way probably would still have been open 
via Neu-Kockendorf-Kloben or via Kammersdorf. When he 
saw the closed bodies of the enemy the patrols already were 
far in advance — some troopers had gone via Pupkeim towards 
Neu-Kockendorf — so that his message no longer could get 
through. 



Reconnaissance:. 117 

What are Lieutenant C 's arrangements and in- 
tentions AFTER 9 A. M. ? 

It is self-evident that it would be of considerable value 

for Colonel A to know what Lieutenant C has seen. 

How can the information be sent? The regiment might have 
reached Gr. Hermenau at about 7 a. m. It is hard to guess 
where it now is or where it will be two or three hours from now. 

It is true that later Lieutenant C is expected to rejoin 

the regiment via Kallisten, and naturally a message should be 
sent in that direction. But even should the messenger succeed 
in getting through the hostile cavalry, it may be confidently 
assumed that the events would overtake the message. Long 
before it could reach the regimental commander the latter 
would gain touch with the enemy. It is all the more hazardous 
because the Passarge can be crossed only on bridges, and these 
the enemy surely will hold. In view of the fact that the mes- 
sengers (of whom there must be at least two) must avoid meet- 
ing the enemy, how will they be able to find their way without 
a map over the circuitous route they must take? Lieutenant 

C does know that Troop A is to reconnoiter ahead of the 

regiment towards Wormditt-Guttstadt-Munsterberg. But it 
seems even more hopeless to try to find the troop in the broad 
expanse of territory between the Passarge and the Alle. It 
might be suggested that the message be sent to Locken, and 
thence either be wired via Osterode to Molirungen, or be de- 
livered to the advance parties of the 2d Army Corps, which 
by this time should have reached that vicinity. But even if 
promptly forwarded by wire, the message probably would not 
reach the regimental commander until afternoon. Its contents 
are of no value for the commander of either the ist or 2d Army 
Corps, for these know without being told that closed bodies of 
cavalry will follow the hostile patrols. The manner in which 
these troops are grouped is of no particular value to the corps 
commanders; and the message gives insufficient information 



ii8 Studies in Applied Tactics. 

concerning their strength, because those so far seen might be 
followed by entire regiments in the next half-hour. 

The result of the deliberation is : A message reporting the 
appearance of the hostile troops of cavalry would be of but lit- 
tle use, probably would not reach its destination, and would 
seriously weaken the already reduced patrol. It is evident 

that Lieutenant C cannot be of service to the colonel in 

the latter 's immediate deliberations. Any information that 

Lieutenant C might send him about the appearance of 

hostile cavalry near Pupkeim would not arrive in time. He 
will the more energetically devote himself to the general is- 
sue: the reconnaissance towards Jonkendorf-Gr. Buchwalde. 
Should he succeed in reaching Allenstein Beechwoods (AUen- 
steiner Buchwald) unobserved, he may hope not only to get 
a view of Jonkendorf, but also of the Jonkendorf-Gottkendorf 
highway. 

After the hostile troops have disappeared from view to- 
wards Schlitt, and it had been ascertained from the south-most 
grove, near Knoll 1 60,' that the enemy no longer was visible at 
Windtken, Ballingen, or Gottken, the patrol trotted towards 
Allenstein Beechwoods, utilizing the cover afforded by the 
ground. It is hard to get through the woods, on account of 
some marshy ground and several wet ditches. The patrol does 
not reach the edge of the woods near Knoll 173 until 10.30 
a. m. From this point Jonkendorf, Mondtken, and the high- 
way can be seen almost as far as Wilhelmsthal. To the east 
the view extends as far as Knoll 143 northeast of Mondtken. 
No one is to be seen anywhere. 

What klse will Lieutenant C do? 

Although the colonel's orders simply call for a reconnais- 
sance to Jonkendorf, and do not indicate that it is to extend 
beyond this point, still it must seem very desirable to go a 
little farther. 



Rejconnaissance. 1 19 

The preceding night at Maldeuten, when the colonel dic- 
tated the order, he must have looked upon the line Jonken- 
dorf-Gr. Buchwalde as a well-advanced goal, and in doing so 
it probably did not occur to him that the patrol might get 
behind the closed bodies of the hostile cavalry. This is a rare 
piece of good luck of which the patrol-leader must take ad- 
vantage on his own initiative. The commanding officer in 
advance cannot mention all possibilities, his orders thereby 
would become too minute and indefinite. He must depend on 
an officer's supplementing his orders where demanded by cir- 
cumstances. Subordinates should not aim to carry out their 
orders literally, but to efficiently support their superior's in- 
tentions and intelligently utilize all advantages that chance 
may ofifer. 

According to the wording of Lieutenant C 's orders, 

it would answer if he now rode to the vicinity of Gr. Buchwalde 
and then to Kallisten to look up his colonel and report: "At 
10.30 a. m. there was no enemy at Jonkendorf or Mondtken, 
and at a. m. there was none at Gr. Buchwalde." 

But this can't be done now. Having come this far, is it 
not possible to investigate a little farther and provide head- 
quarters with better information? Under proper supervision 
few officers would be lacking in the enterprise and insight here 
necessary to independently exceed these orders. 

The farther the patrol now advances the more easily may 
its retreat be intercepted. The district towards Allenstein, 
bounded by river, lake, and marshy ground, calls for special 
caution. As the patrol should remain undiscovered, it is ad- 
visable not to advance from Knoll 173 straight across the 
open country between Jonkendorf and Mondtken, but to 
work along the edge of the woods to the vicinity of Knoll 
143, and then, rapidly crossing the open country, to gain the 
shelter of the grove east of Mondtken. 



I20 Studie;s in Applied Tactics. 

The northwest corner of this grove was reached at ii.20' 
a. m., and the non-commissioned officer with 2 men was posted 
at the southern edge, while Lieutenant C — — , from a favor- 
able lookout at the northwest corner, carefully examined the 
vicinity. Here, as elsewhere, a pair of good field-glasses 
proves to be of great value for the cavalry officer. The very 
best kind is only just good enough. Lieutenant C over- 
looks the valley of the AUe to beyond Bergfriede, the Mossong- 
see and the hills on its eastern shore, the wooded lowlands 
to beyond Braunswalde, whose northern exit and its church 
are very distinctly visible. He also sees the elevated village 
of Hochwalde, but Diwitten is hidden by woods and hills. 
He sees nothing suspicious anywhere. A section-hand, who 
has remained in his section-house at the edge of the grove, 
says that early in the morning several hostile troopers went 
through Kainen towards Polleicken. The officer has the tele- 
graph wire cut, with the assistance of the section-hand, and 
then proceeds to the south edge of the grove. From here he 
can see as far as Redigkainen and Height 138 east of Redig- 
kainen-see ("Redigk. S." on map). Knoll 124, near Kalt- 
fliesz, obstructs part of the view, but, past its southern end, 
the western end of the Gottkendorf railway station can be 
seen, and, proceeding farther west, the terrain sloping up- 
wards to the heights on the northern shore of the Okull-see 
can be seen. The towers of Allenstein are plainly visible in 
the distance. Four horsemen are trotting from Gottkendorf 
towards Wilhelmsthal along the highway. Nothing else is to 
be seen of the enemy in this district, either. The officer is 
aware that the Alle forms an obstacle similar to the Passarge, 
and the section-hand states that a horseman could not ford 
it ; that the meadows of the Alle are reported soft and marshy ; 
and that there is a wooden bridge at Kainen suitable for 
light teams. 



reconnaissance;. 121 

What will Lieutenant C do at 11.40 a. m? 

Still nothing is seen of the hostile main columns. A 
message stating that nothing more had been seen of the ene- 
my up to 11.40 a. m. at Kainen, Kaltfiiesz, and Gottkendorf 
would be more valuable than one stating that none had been 
seen at Jonkendorf and Mondtken up to 10.30 a. m. But 

the difference in value is not very great, and Lieutenant C 

hopes to do still better. He does not yet despair of getting 
touch with the hostile main forces, well knowing how im- 
portant this may be for his commander-in-chief. And though 
continuing his reconnaissance, he hopes to be able to report 
negative results in time, whose value is not to be under- 
estimated, if none other are obtainable. Being far in advance 
of the army, he feels the importance of his task, for in all 
probability there is not another patrol in front of the ist Army 
Corps that can see as far as he can. Less than four miles 
away lies Allenstein, whose steeples seem to beckon to him. 
If insight is to be had anywhere, it ought to be at this im- 
portant cross-roads. Should nothing be seen there of the 
hostile columns early in the afternoon, and should he succeed 
in returning to his regiment or to Locken by evening or even 
by dawn the following day with this information, the com- 
manders would have a very different basis for their further 
decisions than if they remained without it. It is true that 
difficulties are increasing. The space between the Alle and 
the Okull-see is becoming so narrow that the danger of getting 
cut off is growing to an alarming degree. Therefore, that his 

mission may not fail at the last moment, Lieutenant C 

decides to use extraordinary precautions, and to not cross the 
troublesome creek that flows past Wilhelmsthal and Kaltfiiesz 
into the Alle until he to some extent has made sure of his retreat. 

For this reason the sergeant is sent ahead with two troop- 
ers. He is to ride to Kaltfliesz, look about from Knoll 124, 
and, if the country seems safe, to leave one man at this knoll 
—9— 



122 Studies in Applied Tactics. 

and with the other one ride to the heights at the south end 
of the Redigkainen-see to obtain a view of the Gottkendorf- 
Allenstein highway. He is authorized to carefully make in- 
quiries at the railway station, and in isolated farm-houses. 
The sergeant, in the presence of his 2 men, is carefully in- 
structed about the roads and localities. He doubtless already 
knows how to take advantage of the folds of the ground for 
cover. If, in spite of this, he should stumble on the enemy, 
his good horse may be expected to bring him back. At any 
rate, the officer will receive information from the lookout near 
Kaltfliesz, and can govern himself accordingly. A signal is 
agreed upon for use between the sergeant and the patrol 
through the lookout, in case the sergeant finds the region 
about Gottkendorf free of the enemy; in which event the 
patrol will continue its march. 

During the sergeant's absence the entire region — ^also to 
the rear — will be carefully watched, and the four hostile troop- 
ers, trotting towards Wilhelmsthal, will be kept in view as 
far as conditions wiirpermit. 

At 11.50 a. m. the sergeant left, and at 12.30 p. m. he 
returns at a rapid gait and reports: 

"From an elevation near the railway station a part of 
the highway on this side, and beyond, a village, situated on 
the lake, was visible. A column, which I believe to be in- 
fantry, was marching on this highway. At the same time 
several horsemen appeared at Gottkendorf." 

Lieutenant C himself sees 5 or 6 horsemen on an ele- 
vation west of the Gottkendorf railway station. The four 
troopers trotting ahead towards Wilhelmsthal continued along 
the road and disappeared from view in Jonkendorf. Nothing 
else has been seen of the enemy, not even from the north edge 
of the grove in looking towards Braunswalde and Bergfriede. 



Reconnaissance:. 123 

What are Lieutenant C 's further intentions? 

At first it will be necessary to further observe the enemy 
and see if the sergeant's suspicions as to infantry are correct. 
This can be done from the hiding-place where the patrol has 
lain concealed for an hour. But shall we be able to determine 
the strength and composition of the enemy's force from this 

point? It is highly probable that Lieutenant C will soon 

be forced to vacate his point of observation. If he now boldly 
advances via Kaltfliesz, he may still be able to reach a point 
of observation on the enemy's flank and count his battalions 
and batteries — an achievement for which under similar con- 
ditions in maneuvers he probably already has been highly 
praised. Even the Field Service Regulations emphasize the 
importance of obtaining accurate figures of the enemy's 

strength.* Who knows if Lieutenant C will again have 

this opportunity? It is only necessary for the enemy to halt 
in the vicinity of Jonkendorf or Mondtken, and the opportunity 
is gone. 

We here have a case where it is possible to obtain clearness 
on one of the duties of reconnoitering bodies that is left in semi- 
obscurity by the uncertain light of maneuver experiences. 

If the patrol-leader an hour ago felt very dubious about 
advancing any farther with his entire patrol, without at first 
having some assurance as to the safety of his line of retreat, 
his farther advance now would be a bold venture, challenging 
fate. Even should he reach the Redigkainer-see, it cannot be 
hoped that later he would still find the crossing at Kaltfliesz 
unguarded by the enemy. He would have to retreat via Redig- 
kainen, and it would be too much to expect fortune to keep 
open the route via Braunswalde to Kainen or Bergfriede. 
Even if the adroit officer's well-known cunning should save 
him from capture, it may be assumed that he would have to 

*See par. 79, F. S. R. 



124 Studies in Applied Tactics. 

make a detour of many miles beyond the Alle to get back. 
And, after that, would there be a single horse in condition to 
get a message on time through the enemy's cavalry on the 
Passarge ? 

But all these objections would be swept aside were it 
certain that the results would warrant the venture. 

The scout sent ahead almost established the fact that 
hostile infantry is approaching, and we doubtless shall soon 
be able to verify this point from where the patrol now is. Of 
what particular value would it be if we could count a number 
of battalions and batteries on the highway at Gottkendorf? 
Imagine yourself in the commander-in-chief's position, who 
receives this information late in the evening or during the 
night. Doubtless it is important for him to know that at 
noon hostile infantry appeared at Gottkendorf. But of what 
value for him is the information that there were 2 or 4 bat- 
talions followed by 3 or 6 batteries? In rear of these there 
might be a great many more battalions and batteries; in the 
prospective encounter of the two large armies this would be 
highly probable on such a fine road as the one through Gott- 
kendorf, even if Lieutenant C had seen but a single com- 
pany or battalion. Should patrols attempt to let the whole 
hostile column pass so they can count every man and gun? 

The highly praiseworthy and arduous efforts of the (Ger- 
man) Great General Staff to draw attention to the service of 
information of the cavalry during grand maneuvers of recent 
years expose certain illusions we largely had entertained, and 
point the way to a rational method and judicious action. The 
reports of the General Staff with painstaking accuracy follow 
the experiences of almost every patrol, and enable us to form 
an unprejudiced opinion. A majority of the patrol-leaders 
looked upon the problem as a forced ride, which promptly 
brought them in contact with the hostile columns, but with 
their horses used up, which forced them to rest there or even 



Reconnaissance, 125 

in rear of these columns in very unwarlike fashion. No mat- 
ter how much they saw, their superiors remained ignorant of 
it. The strength of the horses had been exhausted and no 
longer was available for sending a message which, besides, in 
time of war, certainly would have been captured. 

Thus it has happened that the commander-in-chief never 
received a single message informing him of the approach of 
numerous hostile columns, although officer's patrols had been 
sent out against them in all directions, and the commanding 
general's decisions materially depended on a knowledge of 
the time at which the hostile advance parties would reach a 
certain district. It was not necessary to inform him that 
these advance parties would be followed on all good roads by 
long columns; and he never would have been able to cal- 
culate the strength of these columns from the most careful 
compilation of his patrols' reports. It is a vain and dan- 
gerous undertaking for them to try to deliver a strength re- 
port of the enemy to their commander-in-chief. They should 
rather remember the admonition that the best reconnaissance 
is worthless if information gained by it reaches the commander 
too late or not at all. In smaller maneuvers, such as those 
carried on by brigades and divisions, the efforts of patrols 
to learn the strength, composition, and direction of march of 
hostile columns, and, if possible, also the intention of the hos- 
tile commander, often are successful, and result in exhaustive 
reports (spoiling the commanding officers) that owe their ac- 
curacy almost entirely to the fact that in time of peace no 
prisoners are captured and blank cartridges are used. 

And, finally, to take cognizance of another point, Lieu- 
tenant C 's situation reminds us of the advice of the Field 

Service Regulations, which is that "occasionally it will be ad- 
visable for the leader to leave his patrol in a place of con- 
cealment, and continue his observation with one or two com- 



126 Studies in Applied Tactics. 

panions; in the case of cavalry, the leader and the men thus 
detached should be well mounted."* 

Anyone well versed in the Regulations very properly 
might ask if this should not have been done when Lieutenant 

C sent the sergeant out past Kaltfleisz, and if even now 

more might not be accomplished in this way than by waiting 
in the edge of the woods near Mondtken. 

It may often happen that the officer's superior judgment 
and the greater speed and endurance of his horse may have 
to be utilized as suggested by the Field Service Regulations. 
But this will mostly be where the distance under considera- 
tion is short — a few thousand yards — to save the entire pa- 
trol's going over this distance, and but seldom on account of 
trying to remain concealed. In the open country even a single 
horseman would be visible, and where one can be concealed 
there is always cover for several. If the leader goes too far 
from his men, or places obstacles between them and him- 
self, such as a stream or marshy ground, there is danger of 
becoming permanently separated from them. If Lieutenant 

C , instead of the sergeant, had gone to Redigkainen-see, 

how easily might he have been pushed back from Kaltfleisz 
and forced to retreat via Redigkainen ! And how easily might 
hostile troopers have driven the remainder of his patrol out 
of the grove near Mondtken! In neither case is it likely that 
the officer would have found his patrol again. He would 
have been unable to carry out his orders, presumably the re- 
sults thus far attained would have been lost, and there would 
have been nothing left for him to do but to attempt retreat- 
ing alone over the long and dangerous road to Kallisten. A 
consideration of this possibility surely would have induced 
him not to go without an escort, and if he took one or two 
men, he might as well have taken the whole patrol. 

*See par. 79, F. S. R. 



Reconnaissance. 127 

But there are other reasons why it is inadvisable for the 
officer to go entirely alone, even if he can fully depend on his 
horse and his horsemanship. The slightest mishap might 
render him helpless, or the neighing of his horse going by 
itself might disclose his presence. 

Should the sergeant not have returned, there was nothing 
to prevent a continuance of the reconnaissance. But the loss 
of the leader robs the patrol of its mainstay and endangers 
its further usefulness. Imagine the situation of the sergeant, 
without map or field-glasses in the grove near Mondtken, if 
his lieutenant did not return after half an hour or an hour, 
or if he himself were forced by hostile detachments to retreat 
into Allenstein Beechwoods. It would have been right and 
proper for him to consider it his duty to make every efifort 
to find his officer again. He would not have been justified to 
ignore the lieutenant's fate and to solely think of continuing 
the reconnaissance. These reasons will more strongly influ- 
ence the lieutenant and decide him not to separate himself 
from his patrol, but to continue in observation from his pres- 
ent hiding-place. 

About I p. m, troops appear at the Gottkendorf railway 
station, which are readily recognized as infantry, and detach- 
ments of about half a battalion each, with advanced parties, 
march from there towards Kaltfliesz and Wilhelmsthal. Lieu- 
tenant C withdraws into Allenstein Beechwoods, and 

thence watches the placing of outposts on Height 131 north 
of Wilhelmsthal and at the edge of the woods east of Mondtken. 

Lieutenant C continues to retreat before hostile infantry 

patrols, at first towards PoUeicken, and, while riding west of 
Buchwalder-see towards Gr. Buchwalde, he is fired on from 
the heights east of the lake, thereby having one horse wounded. 
At 3.30 p. m., from the grove east of Neu-Garschen, he is 
able to distinguish hostile infantry establishing outposts close 
to the village and sending out patrols. Individual horsemen 



128 Studies in AppuEd Tactics. 

are visible between Rosengarth and Gr. Buchwalde and near 
Neu-Garschen. 

What does Lieutenant C think of the situation 

AT 3.30 p. M., and what orders DOES HE GIVE? 

It is true that Lieutenant C has not seen any long 

columns of troops, and he is not likely to do so. But he 
will conclude that the discovery of hostile infantry outposts 
will be just as important for his headquarters. In a ma- 
neuver further procedure would be quite simple: a message 
would be written and sent back by a man on a good horse 
with orders to follow the easily-found road via Neu-Garschen- 
Blankenberg-Schlitt to Kallisten, where, if he did not find 
the regiment, he at least would find ways and means to have 
the message taken farther. The patrol commander, whose 
horses have traveled only about 25 miles to-day, mindful of 
the regulations which specify that every patrol upon obtain- 
ing touch with the enemy must retain it, could devote him- 
self to the duty; could further observe the enemy with the 
object of discovering 'the bivouac of some large body; also 
could investigate the state of afifairs at Miinsterberg; and, 
after sending a last message late in the afternoon, could, with 
the consciousness of an energetic performance of duty with 
good results, take shelter in one of the numerous farm-houses 
in front of the enemy's position, and the following morning, 
still having i non-commissioned ofiicer and 6 men, could re- 
sume his duties with renewed energy. 

But he does not find things as smooth as this in time 
of war. A single trooper surely would not succeed in carry- 
ing the message. Even 2 men hardly would succeed. Even 
sending a duplicate message by two different routes may not 
be successful and would take 4 troopers. It would be out of 
the question for the messengers to follow the traveled roads, 
where they almost certainly would be captured. Presumably, 



reconnaissance;. 129 

Kloben and Kallisten are occupied by the enemy, so that the 
messengers would have to go towards Sackstein or Pittehnen 
to cross the Passarge. How will they find their way across 
country through woods and marshes without a map? 

These thoughts assail the officer as he, to avoid the next 
danger — i. e., a hostile infantry patrol— works his way to the 
western edge of the grove, and, leaving Neu-Garschen to the 
left, finds safety in the southeast corner of the woods through 
which the Neu-Garschen-Ankendorf road runs. He is con- 
vinced that he alone, with the aid of map and field-glasses, 
may still be able to get the important message to its destina- 
tion, and that to accomplish this he will need all his caution 
and experience and possibly the fighting strength of his men. 
He debates for a moment whether it would not do to go with 
but 5 men, leaving the sergeant and 3 men behind to retain 
touch with the enemy. In this way he would carry out the 
letter of the instructions of the Field Service Regulations, but 
only the letter. It simply would be a subterfuge to avoid 
reproach. The sergeant would be able to accompHsh but 
little. In the midst of hostile cavalry, he would be con- 
stantly on the move, seeking for hiding-places, and the little 
that he might see he would be unable to report upon. 

As soon as night fell, observation and reports would cease, 
and the following morning would not improve matters for 
the small tired group, which, without a map, would have to 
depend on information received from occupants of isolated 
habitations to keep from getting lost. 

But possibly 9 men will enable Lieutenant C to over- 
come hostile opposition attempting to bar his way, when 5 
men would not suffice. The stronger he remains, the more 
likely is he to succeed in capturing hostile messengers on 
their way back. 

If Lieutenant C is satisfied that he must himself take 

back the message, and with his whole patrol, he will finally 



I30 Studie;s in AppIvIEd Tactics. 

consider whether he cannot add to it. A knowledge of the 
extent of the enemy's front would be of great importance, 
and if he could determine whether or not Miinsterberg is oc- 
cupied by infantry, it undoubtedly would be of decided ad- 
vantage. The horses, having traveled only about 25 miles, 
and having been singly watered and fed during the numerous 
halts, surely are not yet tired out. But it must be remem- 
bered that the ride would require more than an hour and 
largely would be across open country. New and increased 
dangers would threaten the important message giving infor- 
mation of the hostile outposts at Mondtken and Gr. Buch- 
walde, and the later it arrives at Mohrungen the less valuable 
it would be. 

This doubt may turn the scale; and, besides, the officer 
has a right to hope that Troop A, reconnoitering towards 
Miinsterberg-Guttstadt, and the rest of the regiment, have 
accomplished results that make his work in that direction un- 
necessary. But it would not be wrong or censurable if his 
endurance and love of'action should induce him to round out 
his line day's work by a ride to Miinsterberg. If he should 
conclude to go back at once, it would be advisable (after ex- 
changing the wounded horse for the captured led horse and 
turning the former adrift as soon as it became bothersome) 
to go along the eastern edge of the woods which the patrol 
has just entered, then passing through the northern part to 
the northwest corner of the same and from here force his way 
to Kallisten or Sackstein. 



Notwithstanding the diversity of instructions given to 
the patrols we have followed, none of them was decidedly 
what is sometimes called a "strategical patrol." Even those 
that went farthest cooperated with the main body of the 
troop, which acted as their support and on which they would 



Reconnaissance. 131 

fall back. It simply required a varying number of hours to 
execute their orders, and these did not keep them out until 

the following day. Possibly Lieutenant C 's instructions 

to reconnoiter via Briickendorf towards Jonkendorf-Gr. Buch- 
walde might be looked upon as passing beyond the sphere of 
minor into that of great operations of war, and we might 

look upon his patrol and upon that of Lieutenant B , sent 

by Captain E from Pittehnen via Freymarkt towards 

Heilsberg (see page 89), as "strategical patrols " — anyway, 
the name does not matter ; our Regulations do not contain it, 
and it is merely a handy, easily understood term for a not 
easily described idea. For there is no sharp line of demark- 
ation between "ordinary" or "small" and "strategical" pa- 
trols. But it will pay to examine the conditions under which 
a patrol-leader would operate in the sphere of the strategical 
activity of cavalry, considering that theory sets great store by 
such patrols, which are called "the eyes of the commander- 
in-chief." 

Although there are several successful long-distance pa- 
trol rides on record from our campaigns of 1866 and 1870-71, 
still, German Army headquarters were not informed in time 
of the movements of the French army on the left bank of 
the Mosel the i6th of August, 1870, or of the extent of the 
French line of battle west of Metz on the 17th of August; 
and the decision to turn to the right, on the left bank of the 
Meuse, towards Beaumont and Sedan, had to be made be- 
fore reliable and conclusive information had been received (of 
the movements of MacMahon's army). Moreover, the Aus- 
trian cavalry in Bohemia (in 1866) was not used in a way 
that would have completely blocked the way of our patrols, 
and the French cavalry (in 1870-71) practically offered no 
opposition to German reconnaissance. Therefore, at the time 
in the field and later in discussions many complaints were 
heard that our patrols in distant reconnaissances, as a rule, 



132 STUDiiiS IN Appi^ied Tactics. 

did not accomplish what had been expected of them. Gen- 
eral Goeben, too, as he personally has told me, belonged to 
these dissatisfied ones. The above-named experiences in grand 
maneuvers in Germany indicate that, in spite of years of 
earnest endeavor in time of peace. Army headquarters to-day 
cannot depend on being furnished with good information by 
' ' strategical ' ' patrols. 

One of the patrols (so far but casually mentioned in our 
study) received comprehensive instructions of a strategical 
nature. A discussion of the movements of this patrol might 
help to an understanding of the reasons that cause the above- 
named deficiency. 

As early as the afternoon of May 3d, Lieutenant D , 

ist Cavalry, with 10 troopers on selected horses, left Marien- 
berg. He had received orders from the commanding general 
to reconnoiter in the general direction of Heilsberg-Barten- 
stein. On the same day he reached Pr. Holland, 28 miles 
away, rested here a few hours, and started again at 4 a. m. 
May 4th. At 8 a. m. Tie arrived at Wormditt, 22 miles away, 
and reported thence by wire that so far he had seen nothing 
of the enemy. This information was of no special value to 
the commanding general, who could have obtained it from 
the telegraph operator without the patrol. It is true that in 
the enemy's country, where the telegraph would not be avail- 
able, this information would have been of some consequence. 

But it is doubtful if I/ieutenant D would have sent one 

of his men to Saalfeld on accoimt of this information. It is 
more than 31 miles from Wormditt to Saalfeld. Therefore, 
the messenger would have traveled 53 miles since leaving Pr. 
Holland and 81 miles since leaving Marienberg, and hardly 
would have arrived (at Saalfeld) before 3 or 4 p. m. on May 
4th. To know that the enemy was not at Wormditt at 8 
a. m. would be no criterion for the commanding general as 
to how matters stood there or at Mehlsack or Liebstadt sev- 



Reconnaissance. I33 

eral hours later. Lieutenant D had a right to assume 

that it would not be his duty to reconnoiter this district, 
lying so near the field of operations of the army — at least, 
not in so far as it related to matters of minor importance. 
If he was in doubt on this point, the blame partly would lie 
in the wording of his instructions, which very properly might 
have included a statement to the effect that his reconnais- 
sance should be of a general nature only. Reference also 
should have been made to the intentions of the corps and 
army commanders, so that Lieutenant D could act in har- 
mony with the ideas of the higher commanders, and could 
send his messages in the right directions. He should have 
known that the army corps would reach the vicinity of Saal- 
feld. May 4th, and presumably would march towards Mohr- 
imgen on the 5th, if the corps commander could have given 
this information as early as the 3d. Let us assume that Lieu- 
tenant D received the additional information at the latest 

upon his telegraphic inquiry from Wormditt, where arrange- 
ments should at once be made to destroy the tape records 
of telegrams. 

In view of the already mentioned requirement of the Field 
Service Regulations (that a patrol's orders must state clearly 
what information is desired [see page 33] ), it would still 

seem that Lieutenant D 's instructions are too general. 

But if we imagine ourselves in the position of the command- 
ing general, who, at Marienburg, on May 3d, only knows that 
a hostile army is approaching from the east, we can appre- 
ciate the order, to which only might have been added how 
far telegraphic communication still existed on this day. Even 
had it been possible approximately to guess where the enemy 
was on May 2d, his movements for May 3d, 4th, and 5th could 
not have been foreseen. A more definite order to the patrol — 
for example, that it should locate the enemy's right flank — • 
would have been an error. It was uncertain whether the pa- 



134 Studies in Appi^ied Tactics. 

trol would find the enemy's right flank in the direction of 
Heilsberg-Bartenstein. The hostile army might have kept 
much farther to the south, so that the enemy would not have 
been found at Heilsberg or Bartenstein. Again, the enemy 
might have moved in a northwesterly direction, so that the 
patrol would have encountered the enemy's front. To this 
might be objected that it would have been better to let the 
officer choose his own route, and simply order him to locate 
the hostile flank. What a difficult task for the young officer 
and his little group of men! The commander-in-chief him- 
self would have to go to accomplish this. Is hostile cavalry 
to be regarded as the enemy's flank? Where is the flank in 
question if the enemy is not advancing on a closed front, but 
by detachments? Which way should the patrol go if it learns 
that hostile detachments have arrived at Pr. Eylau? Should 
these be looked upon as the hostile flank, or be ignored on 
the plea that presumably they are detached to invest or ob- 
serve the fortress of Konigsberg? We can readily see that 
the uncertainty of the situation made it impossible for the 
commanding general on the 3d of May to say any more to 
the patrol-leader than that he should reconnoiter. It is ex- 
pected that the latter 's messages will form a basis for more 
definite instructions to be given the cavalry of the army corps. 
It seems fitting that the commanding general should have 

sent Lieutenant D in the general direction where it was 

expected the hostile flank would be found, if surmises were 
correct. In this way he prevented an aimless wandering about 
of the patrol, and formed a sort of tentacle on an avenue near 
one flank of the army. Had not the field of reconnaissance 
of Konigsberg included Pr. Eylau, Domnau, and Friedland, 
doubtless a patrol would have been sent via Mehlsack-Lands- 
berg-Pr. Eylau, but this would not have influenced the move- 
ments of Lieutenant D , which we now shall follow. 



Reconnaissance. 135 

It is noteworthy that apparently the commanding gen- 
eral does not expect Lieutenant D 's explorations to have 

any influence on the movements of the army until after May 
5th. The movements for May 5th certainly will be ordered 
from Army headquarters, at the latest by the afternoon of 
May 4th — i. e., at a time when the patrol may have reached 
the vicinty of Heilsberg, but not yet have been able to send 
any report. Only in case the patrol should encounter the 
enemy on the morning of May 4th near Wormditt and be able 
to send a detailed report by wire, would it be practicable to 
make any changes in the proposed march of the army for the 
5th. If telegraphic communication were not available, then 
such report probably would arrive too late to change the di- 
rection of march of the army on the 5th. 

The patrol rested at Wormditt, naturally exercising every 
precaution. Such duties are made easier in friendly territory, 
because courageous inhabitants always can be found who are 
willing to watch from church-towers or hilltops. During this 

halt Lieutenant D made telegraphic inquiry of Liebstadt, 

Mehlsack, Zinten, Landsberg, Pr. Eylau, Heilsberg, Barten- 
stein, and Guttstadt. In this way he found out that the en- 
emy had not appeared at Liebstadt, Guttstadt, Mehlsack, Zin- 
ten, or Landsberg. But Landsberg reported that communi- 
cation with Heilsberg had been interrupted since 7 a. m. All 
this information was wired to corps headquarters. Up to 9.30 
p. m. no reply had been received to the message sent Pr. Ey- 
lau via Konigsberg. The telegraph operator at the latter place 
stated that he had informed the military governor of the 
message. 

Lieutenant D— — decides not to await information con- 
cerning Pr. Eylau. It is evident from the message from Lands- 
berg that he is approaching the enemy, and he might have to 
wait too long to get news from the governor of Konigsberg. 
He decides to go towards Heilsberg past Frauendorf, but, as 



136 Studies in Applied Tactics. 

far as possible, to keep off the highway. Therefore, he rides 
via Thalbach-Kaschaunen. As he omits sending scouts to 
the edges of woods to save his horses, he does not get an ex- 
tended view again until he reaches Kaschaunen. He is more 
anxious not to be discovered or delayed than he is to dis- 
cover every hostile patrol. He hopes in a way to make good 
the deficiencies of his reconnaissance by questioning the farm- 
ers. Of course he might meet hostile patrols on the wood- 
roads, but he hopes to avoid being surprised by keeping a 
sharp lookout to the front and flanks and having the point 
well in advance of the main body of the patrol. The dense 
woods would quickly hide him again from the enemy, and his 
map would help him along. 

Nothing has been seen of the enemy at Kaschaunen. The 
patrol continues on its way south of the Drewenz River, and 
about I p. m. arrives near Bogen. From Height 114, north- 
east of the village, 5 or 6 hostile troopers are visible at the 
wind-mill northeast of Raunau. 

What Are Lieutenant D 's Reflections Concerning 

Further Action on His Part? 

The officer sent off on a reconnaissance of several days' 
duration has to consider the conduct of his patrol on meeting 
hostile patrols, the same as we have seen was the case with 

Lieutenants C and F . His messages are in greater 

danger than those of patrols sent out but a short distance, if 
hostile troopers penetrate between him and his army, for the 
longer road increases the dangers besetting messengers. "Stra- 
tegical" patrols, too, can help screen the movements of their 
army by destroying or capturing hostile patrols; can help to 
interfere with the enemy's messenger service; and for them, 
also, the answers of prisoners are of great importance — often 
clearing up the situation better than prolonged personal ob- 
servation. It is, of course, necessary that at least one member 
of such patrol be able to speak the enemy's language. 



Reconnaissance;. 137 

And yet conditions are different from those of patrols 
working in a more restricted area. The farther away a pa- 
trol is from its army, the harder it is to bear losses incident 
to engagements, which cripple further activity of the patrol 
or stop it altogether. Unless it is a question of individual 
hostile troopers, the easiest and most successful feat of arms 
will be of no value, but simply will call up a swarm of ene- 
mies. As a rule, it seems inadvisable to forcibly penetrate 
the hostile screen. We know that the screen has wide gaps, 
and that in field warfare the cloud of patrols, as a rule, passes 
but once or twice over the ground. Waiting in a good hiding- 
place until the vicinity is again free from patrols offers better 
chances, because even a successful fight cannot keep the road 
to the rear open for messengers. This is more readily accom- 
plished nearer the army by the mutual support of the denser 
network of patrols. Messengers from "strategical" patrols 
are always instructed to make use of remote trails and skillful 
dodging, and always will be exposed to the dangers of the 
solitary ride within reach of the enemy. 

Nevertheless, even this class of patrols, on principle, must 
not invariably avoid an engagement, and certainly must not 
let slip any chance to capture hostile messengers. But they 
must very carefully consider the probable outcome of an en- 
gagement, and, in case of doubt, preferably turn aside and 
continue on their way unseen. 

As telegraphic communication between Heilsberg and 
Landsberg has been interrupted since early in the morning. 
Lieutenant D has not to deal with individual hostile sol- 
diers that might prove an easy and tempting capture, and so 
he decides, for the present, to wait and watch the Heilsberg- 
Frauendorf highway. He succeds in fording the Drewenz at 
a covered spot and in hiding himself in the vicinity of the 
Nickelsberg. 

Should he send back a message? 
— 10— 



138 Studies in AppuiEd Tactics. 

It is true that the Field Service Regulations state that 
"as soon as it is certain that the enemy has been discovered 

a message should be sent";* still Lieutenant D has a 

right to doubt whether he would perform any noteworthy ser- 
vice for the commanding general were he to report the ap- 
pearance of a hostile patrol at Raunau. It was easy to infer 
at Saalfeld that the enemy had reached the vicinty of Heils- 
berg, from the telegram stating that telegraphic communica- 
tion between Landsberg and Heilsberg had been interrupted. 
Therefore, the message would not relate anything new, and 
would cost the officer at least one man. The officer has a 
right to hope that he soon will be able to report other and 
more important facts. 

After the hostile patrol near Raunau had ridden back to- 
wards this village and disappeared. Lieutenant D con- 
tinued his ride via Krug and Workeim to near Neuendorf, 
where he arrived at about 3 p. m. Nothing was known of the 
enemy in Workeim. A single hostile trooper is seen trotting 
along the road from^F.f Grossendorf towards Heilsberg; but 
the intervening marshy meadows interfere with an attempt to 
capture him. People at Neuendorf state that at various times 
during the day hostile troopers passed through the hamlet, 
some going towards Petershagen and others towards Heils- 
berg. This adds to the probability that detachments of hos- 
tile cavalry are at Heilsberg, and Lieutenant D , remem- 
bering the teachings of times of peace, decides to go farther 
around the enemy's flank if possible, to get a view of the 
Heilsberg-Bartenstein road, or to find out something more 
definite from the inhabitants about the enemy at Heilsberg. 
He reaches Grossendorf Woods (Grossendorfer Wald), but 
then, to avoid a hostile patrol which appeared at Grossendorf, 
he went via Jegothen to Gunten, where he arrived at 4.30 p. 

*See par. 79, F. S. R. 

t Abbreviation for Forsterei, "Ranger's house." 



Reconnaissance. 139 

m., and halted at Height 94. The inhabitants of neither of 
the two places know anything definite about the enemy; they 
simply know of a rumor that there is hostile cavalry at Bart- 
enstein and Heilsberg, 

From Pr. Holland to Gunten the patrol came 43 miles, 
and during the past 24 hours it has traveled over 70 miles. 
Most of the horses are tired out, and a continuation of the 
ride to-day would completely use them up; therefore, they 
absolutely need a good rest. 

What arrangements does Lieutenant D make at 

4.30 p. M. May 4TH? 

The estate of Gunten is too extensive to use as quarters 
for the patrol, because the latter could not properly guard it, 
and, being at a cross-roads, it might receive sudden visits 
from hostile patrols. The patrol will be able to rest only at 
a remote point; the best place would be in the woods south 
of Gunten, far from the road. Being in friendly territory, 
where there is no danger of treachery, one of the farms south- 
west of Borchertsdorf might be used in case of bad weather. 
Although the nights during May still are quite cool in East 
Prussia, the officer doubtless will prefer the woods, where, 
under protection of a sentry-post, the horses can be fed and 
watered in a creek flowing into the Elm River. Feed would 
be taken along from Gunten, or would be carried from there 
after dark. 

He now considers it necessary to send off a message, and 
composes the following: 

To Telegraph Station, Saaljeld: ^ ^^'^' ^ ^' ""• 

At I p. m., while riding from Wormditt via Kaschaunen and Bogen 
1 noticed 5 or 6 hostile troopers at Raunau. Later I saw a mounted mes- 
senger on the Neuendorf-Heilsberg highway; and I went via Te<^othen 
to avoid a hostile patrol that appeared near Grossendorf. Farmers say 
that during the day patrols have frequently come through Neuendorf 
some going towards Heilsberg and some the opposite way. Apparently 
Landsberg, Heilsberg, and Bartenstein are occupied by hostile cavalry. 

D , 

Lieutenant. 



I40 Studies in Applied Tactics. 

How shall the message be forwarded? The condition of 
the horses and the numerous hostile patrols that are abroad 
preclude its being sent towards Saalfeld. An effort must be 
made to reach a telegraph station that still is in communi- 
cation with the district occupied by our army. The best op- 
portunity to do this seems to be on the Landsberg-Zinten rail- 
way. Landsberg, which seems to be occupied by the enemy, 
must be avoided, and the message sent say from Sangnitten 
or Arnstein, or even farther north. 

In friendly territory, where information from the inhab- 
itants helps out, a single horseman may thus be able to avoid 
the enemy and get through; and, in view of the small number 

of his men. Lieutenant D may consider it permissible to 

send but one man, because the message apparently is not of 
great importance. The messenger will have to go i8 miles 
or more to the desired telegraph station. Even the best horse 
would not be able to stand this after the exertions of the last 
24 hours. But in the horse-country of East Prussia it ought 
to be possible to find a suitable saddle-horse, even after the 
drain upon it for war purposes. Otherwise, the sending of 
the message must be deferred until the messenger's horse has 
rested sufficiently. The day's experience will induce Lieu- 
tenant D , if there is still an opportunity, to take a horse 

from the owner of the estate or from some farmer, as a pre- 
cautionary measure, giving a receipt therefor, and have it 
taken along as a remount together with the horse the mes- 
senger leaves behind. A reminder that the enemy surely will 
requisition all serviceable horses, and probably without giving 
receipts, may induce the owner to give up a horse more readily. 
If the spare horse becomes troublesome, it can be let loose 
at any time. 

The messenger will be told that after seeing that the 
message is sent by wire he must try to reach the army corps, 
going in the general direction of Mohrungen, and calling on 



Reconnaissance;. 141 

village authorities to supply him with a new mount when- 
ever necessary. He is to keep the original copy of the mes- 
sage until he reaches his command again, unless he should be 
obliged to destroy it on account of imminent danger. Anything 
of importance that he might learn of the enemy during his 
ride he is to add to the telegram over his own signature. Un- 
der this heading would come any information as to whether 
or not Ivandsberg is occupied by the enemy. 

It might be added, concerning the wording of the mes- 
sage, that the address, 'Chief of Staff, ist Army Corps," is 
purposely omitted ; likewise the name of the place where Lieu- 
tenant D is and route he expects to follow after resting. 

It is intended that the message should disclose as little as 
possible, should it fall into the enemy's hands. The scanti- 
ness of information received from inhabitants of the country 
by patrol-leaders belies the experience of time of peace. While 
during maneuvers the appearance of a body of troops at Heils- 
berg would be known in a couple of hours in all the surround- 
ing habitations, lyieutenant D obtains nothing but un- 
reliable rumors, except in the villages where the enemy actu- 
ally has been seen. During maneuvers, travel on the country 
roads becomes more active than in ordinary times. Wagons, 
cyclists, horsemen travel from place to place. Not a single 
movement of troops escapes the curiosity and interest of the 
inhabitants, and a wide-awake patrol-leader often can better 
inform himself about the march of a hostile body of horse- 
men from the statements of country people than if he had 
seen it himself ; but it is otherwise in time of war. The towns- 
man and the countryman, the tradesman and the official, all 
are kept home by duty or apprehension, unless a panic should 
drive them into the woods. Women and children, who dur- 
ing maneuvers are attracted in multitudes by the noise of 
arms, hoof-beats, drum and trumpet, in war hide themselves 
in excessive fear of the approaching enemy of their coun- 



142 Studies in Appi^ied Tactics. 

try. Therefore, even in friendly territory, patrol- leaders must 
be prepared to find out much less about the enemy than they 
do during time of peace. 

Granted that the messenger can be furnished a good horse 
of fair gait — a badly-broken, obstinate brute cannot be used 
in this case, even by an excellent rider — he hardly could leave 
before 5.30 p. m. He would give Landsberg a wide berth, 
possibly going via Eichhorn, Worienen, Schonwiese. Prob- 
ably the telegraph stations at Sangnitten and Arnstein have 
been abandoned, even if the enemy has not yet arrived there. 
He probably will have to go as far as Zinten, a distance of 
25 to 28 miles, before finding an office that is still open, and 
it will be late in the evening before the telegram is received 
at Saalfeld. 

Lieutenant D will not get much information in his 

hiding-place during the remainder of the afternoon and even- 
ing. If he wishes to remain concealed, he must remain quiet. 
Not until after dark will he try to obtain information from 
neighboring farms thfough countrymen. It is true that these 
people thereby would risk their necks, but doubtless some 
can be found who are willing to do this service, even if they 
did not go as far as the enemy's lines. 

In this way Lieutenant D learns that Heilsberg act- 
ually is occupied by the enemy, and that from Settau, where 
a hostile patrol was seen during the day, several troops of 
cavalry were seen, which early in the evening rode through 
Roggenhausen towards Heilsberg. Nothing had been seen of 
the enemy at Borchertsdorf. 

What are Lieutenant D 's further intentions? 

Lieutenant D 's orders direct him towards Barten- 

stein, and the rumor seems plausible that hostile cavalry had 
reached that point, presumably the main body of the ad- 
vanced detachments known to be at Landsberg and Heils- 



Reconnaissance;. i43 

berg. Therefore, Lieutenant D takes Bartenstein as his 

next objective. The endeavor to remain on the outer flank 
of the enemy, as well as solicitude for his messenger-route 
(which must continue towards telegraph stations situated at 
the north or northwest), make it desirable to remain north 
of the Alle. And, not to run into the arms of hostile detach- 
ments on the straight and convenient Bartenstein-Reddenau 
road, the ofhcer intends to cross this road and for the present 
ride past Albrechtsdorf towards Pilwen. At Albrechtsdorf he 
may be able to get more definite information about hostile 
detachments supposed to be at Landsberg; and there, as well 
as at Pilwen, something definite may be learned about Bart- 
enstein. He wishes to cross the Bartenstein-Albrechtsdorf 
road before dayUght, and therefore orders the patrol to start 
at I a. m. May 5th. A countryman on horseback is taken 
along as guide. There is no necessity to send back any further 
message. By i a. m. the horses have rested 8 hours, and 
doubtless have had an abundance of feed. And presumably 
the men were passably well provided for, as food could be 
obtained from neighboring farms and from Gunten at night. 
Of course, the guard and the officer obtained very little rest, 
but a few hours' sleep in the grass are sufficient to provide 
new strength. 

At a farm near Albrechtsdorf the officer learns that about 
15 horsemen passed the place the day before, going towards 
Landsberg. After reaching Pilwen at about 3 a. m., where 
nothing is known of hostile troops being in Bartenstein, the 
patrol cautiously continued its reconnaissance, and found out 
that the town actually was not occupied by the enemy. In 
the outer houses the officer learns that yesterday afternoon 
the hostile 5th Dragoons, coming from Schippenbeil, passed 
through the town, towards Heilsberg. Since then only oc- 
casionally had single hostile troopers passed through the town. 
The mayor, who had been sent for, verifies this report, and 



144 Studies in Applied Tactics. 

adds that yesterday afternoon several baggage-wagons passed 
through the town and that on the order of the hostile com- 
mander, who spoke German, he had sent ten wagon-loads of 
oats to Schonbruch and Langheim (near Korschen), respect- 
ively, where they were to report to army officials. The mayor 
had heard nothing more about the grain. He did not know 
how matters stood in Schippenbeil, but yesterday evening 
there was no enemy in Legienen, Wehrwillen, Sandlack, or 
Plensen. Telegraphic communication with Pr. Eylau and 
Korschen has been interrupted. The telegraph instruments 
of the Postal Telegraph and of the railway station of Bart- 
enstein have been destroyed. 

What ark Lieutenant D 's reflections and de- 
cisions concerning further action? (It is now about 
4.15 a. m.) 

The justified assumption that the enemy's main body 
would be found at Bartenstein has proven erroneous. In time 
of war things often t«m out differently from what was an- 
ticipated. Were there a large hostile force at Schippenbeil, 
there would be more traffic through Bartenstein. But it may 
be assumed that hostile troops are at Schonbruch and Lang- 
heim, for it is improbable that army officials whould be sent 
to these points in hostile territory without being accompanied 
by troops. The direction whence they came to Schonbruch 
will give a clue to the enemy's intentions, and this may be 
more easily found out on the Schippenbeil-Schonbruch road 
than at Schonbruch itself, where hostile outposts certainly 
would prevent near approach. As it is only about six miles 

to Langanken, Lieutenant D will not send a message until 

he has reached this point. Possibly he will find out something 
about Schippenbeil at Langanken. 

At 5.45 a. m. the patrol approaches the highway at Lang- 
anken, on which there is a convoy of army and civilian wag- 



Reconnaissance. i45 

ons, guarded by dragoons moving towards Schonbruch. Ivieu- 

tenant D counts 30 wagons. He lets them pass and they 

disappear in the woods north of Woduhnkeim; then he sends 
a party to Langanken. Here he finds out that yesterday a 
hostile regiment of dragoons, coming from Schippenbeil, passed 
by and halted for the night north of Schonbruch. Its train, 
which has just passed by, halted for the night at Langanken 
and Woduhnkeim. A sick officer, unable to travel, remained 
at the Langanken estate. He understands some German, but 
refuses to give any information. He belongs to the 4th Dra- 
goons. His servant hid himself upon the approach of our 
patrol, and cannot be found. 

Nothing is known at Langanken about Schippenbeil. 

To find out something more definite about the where- 
abouts and line of march of the hostile cavalry. Lieutenant 
D sends 2 troopers towards Gahlkeim and 2 others to- 
wards Schippenbeil, while he, with the remainder of his pa- 
trol, conceals himself in a grove west of Langanken. 

By 8.30 a. m. it is learned that the hostile cavalry reg- 
iment left Schonbruch at 5 a. m. and marched towards Dom- 
nu along the highway, and that the train is following it on 
this road. The troopers sent towards Schippenbeil were fired 
upon from the northwest exit of the town, but they, as well 
as the two sent to Galkeim, returned unharmed. The inhab- 
itants of Thorms stated that, with the exception of a ford 
at Hoschenen, there is no place of crossing over the Alle be- 
tween Bartenstein and Schippenbeil. 

What are; Lieutenant D 's further arrangements 

AND INTENTIONS? 

The hostile regiment of cavalry either is marching to- 
wards Konigsberg or is making so wide a circuit around the 
flank of our army that it is useless to follow it. The im- 
portant thing is to find the hostile columns of infantry, and 



146 Studies in Applied Tactics. 

it is questionable if the patrol will do so in the direction it 
has so far gone. The Schippenbeil-Bartenstein road, on which 
the hostile 5th Dragoons marched yesterday, apparently is 
deserted to-day. The road south of the Alle has not yet been 
seen, nevertheless the march of a column there would have 
become evident: Bartenstein would not have been found un- 
occupied by the enemy, and at Schippenbeil more would have 
been noted than the whistle of a few bullets fired by con- 
cealed men. And if hostile columns were approaching Schip- 
penbeil from the east, their advance detachments already 
would have been felt. These points are not conclusive evi- 
dence, but they are indications which, though not proving 
anything mathematically, when considered together have a 
certain weight. Positive information can be obtained by 
riding a few miles farther east. The Alle probably can be 
crossed at Stolzenfeld or Massaunen; and even information 
that the enemy was not encountered on the roads east of 
Schippenbeil will help clear up the situation for headquarters. 

But military instinct warns the patrol-leader against fol- 
lowing this plan. If, contrary to expectation, hostile infantry 
columns should be on the march to Schippenbeil, they hardly 
could get any farther than Bartenstein to-day, and to-morrow 
but little beyond the line Landsberg-Heilsberg. But only on 
this line they become of importance to our army, whose left 
wing to-day. May 5th, is expected to reach Mohrungen. There- 
fore, if they find out this evening at Mohrungen that up to 
this morning only the hostile 5th Dragoons have come along 
the Schippenbeil-Bartenstein-Heilsberg road, this in itself will 
form a basis for judging the situation. 

If the patrol clings any longer to the Heilsberg-Barten- 
stein-Schippenbeil road and its eastern prolongation, it may 
sacrifice important affirmative information in favor of nega- 
tive information. Should the 5th Dragoons simply be a flank 
guard, and should the enemy's main columns already be march- 



Reconnaissance. 147 

ing on the roads through Bischofstein and Seeburg, there would 
be danger in the delay. Information of this could be sent 
promptly enough, as the heads of these columns might en- 
counter our own as early as the 6th. But if the enemy is not 
on these roads, timely information of this fact probably will 
be more welcome than any news from the district east of 
Schippenbeil. To be sure, many doubts still remain. If the 
heads of the enemy's main columns have not yet advanced 
as far as the line Schippenbeil-Bischofsburg, the patrol, in 
going south, might get in front of the hostile army and lay 
itself open to the charge of neglecting the important duty of 

locating the enemy's flank. And Lieutenant D can safely 

assume that his regimental commander will have the district 
east of Guttstadt reconnoitered, so that his own work in the 
vicinity of Bischofstein and Seeburg would be superfluous or 
of minor importance. And, finally, the officer cannot under- 
estimate the obstacles there would be to the forwarding of 
his messages should he go south, for in this case he would 
give up the use of the telegraph. 

The decision requires such a deep insight into the require- 
ments of greater operations of war that it can but seldom be 
found in officers of limited experience. Prudence, therefore, 
demands that commanders-in-chief should not set their ex- 
pectations too high, for many a patrol will fail simply because 
it is imable to hit upon the right thing to do in such com- 
plicated situations. And yet it is very seldom that these "stra- 
tegical" patrols, these "eyes of the commander-in-chief," can 
be explicitly told just what to do. They are permanently 
thrown on their own resources concerning the objective of 
their trip. No instructions, no matter how thoroughly thought 

out or carefully weighed, given Lieutenant D on the 3d 

of May, could have simplified the weighty decision for him 
that he must now make — a decision that finally results in fa- 
vor of turning south, because, reaching the flank of the hostile 



148 Studies in Applied Tactics. 

columns, he would be able to see much more than would the 
patrols sent from Guttstadt against the heads of these columns. 

The patrol must ford the Alle at Hoschenen, and pre- 
sumably at Louisenhof will be able to find out something more 
definite about the garrison of Schippenbeil. Then the patrol 
will ride to Gr. Schwansfeld. 

But before crossing the Alle a message must be sent to 
the commanding general. What was discovered early this 
morning is of sufficient importance, and this may be the last 
opportunity to use the telegraph line. It is not advisable to 
wait until after crossing the stream before sending the mes- 
sage. It is not expedient to send single horsemen through a 
swollen stream, and at Bartenstein they might unexpectedly 
run into the enemy without being able to get away. 

What shall the message contain and how shall it be for- 
warded ? 

Near SchippEnbSil, 5 May, g a.m. 
To Telegraph Station, Saalfeld: 

Yesterday at noon the hostile 5th Dragoons coming from Schippen- 
beil passed through Bartenstein towards Heilsberg. At 4 a. m. to-day 
there was no enemy in Bartenstein and so far no other troops have followed 
the 5th Dragoons. Yesterday the mayor of Bartenstein was forced to 
send 10 wagon-loads of oats to Schonbruch and Langheim, respectively. 

The hostile 4th Dragoons camped last night at Schonbruch whither 
it marched from Schippenbeil. At 5 a. m. to-day it left for Domnau. 
Several shots were fired at my men from Schippenbeil. No troops were 
visible there and, therefore I think the place contains but few of the enemy. 

I shall not follow the hostile cavalry that apparently is marching 
towards Konigsberg, and, as apparently hostile columns will not use the 
Schippenbeil-Bartenstein-Heilsberg road, I shall turn south towards the 
roads passing through Bischofstein and Seeburg. 

D , 

Lieutenant. 

It is unlikely that a telegraph office will be found in op- 
eration in Pr. Eylau or on the Pr. Eylau-Konigsberg railway. 
This district is too near the 4th Dragoons. Besides, a mes- 
sage sent in that direction easily might fall into the enemy's 
hands. It is more promising to have the messenger follow 
the same route as did the one of yesterday — ^viz., towards the 



Ri;CONNAISSANCE. 149 

Landsberg-Zinten railway. The wooded country between the 
two Hnes of railway will favor the messenger's slipping through. 
But the way is long and hard to find. Too many obstacles 
threaten a single horseman, and the importance of the message 
justifies sending 2 men, even though this will reduce the pa- 
trol to 7 men. 

Will the message escape the danger of the road? Even 
if the messengers are given remounts, or if such are obtained 
during the trip, these are not accustomed to great exertions, 
and easily may give out. It is 31 miles to Zinten by direct 
route; who knows what detours the messengers will have to 
make, or number of wrong roads they will take, as they must 
avoid the highways, keep to the woods, and solely depend on 
statements of inhabitants, who seldom can give accurate in- 
formation about roads to distant points. The troopers for 
nearly two days have been engaged in very fatiguing nervous 
work and constantly in the saddle, except during short pauses. 
Weariness and the opportunity to rest and refresh themselves 
en route will delay the ride, so that the messengers hardly will 
arrive at Zinten before 4 p. m. 

The hostile cavalry at Schonbruch surely sent a detach- 
ment as far as Pr. Eylau, and the latter naturally will cut off 
telegraphic communication to-day between Konigsberg and 
the western parts of the province. If, as we know, the rail- 
way and telegraph were destroyed at Wormditt on the evening 
of May 4th, we may certainly expect the same iliin.j to hap- 
pen to-day at Zinten, which is only 16 miles from Pr. Eylau. 
Therefore, it cannot be expected that the niessr.ge can be sent 
from Zinten, and it would be useless to make further search 
along the road either towards Mehlsack or Konigsberg. The 
happy thought to ride to Pleiligenbeil might accomplish the 
desired object. Will this saving thought occur to the two 

troopers, or will I^ieutenant D have sufficient forethought 

to direct them to this point before their departure, in case 



I50 Studies in AppuEd Tactics. 

they find the telegraph line no longer working at Zinten? It 
is only too likely that the message either never arrives at 
headquarters of the ist Army Corps or arrives so late that 
the chief of staff will place it with the retained papers marked 
"Obsolete." But granted that by luck or chance it reaches 
headquarters at Mohrungen on May 5th, whither it certainly 
would be forwarded from Saalfeld, it could hardly influence 
the arrangements made at Army headquarters for May 6th. 
It would be of but slight advantage even for the commanding 
general, ist Army Corps, no matter how important it may 
have seemed to the sending officer. 

The general has the right to assume that larger bodies 
of hostile cavalry will not appear on his left flank on May 6th, 
and, if in addition he can feel sure that there are no hostile 
columns approaching Heilsberg from Bartenstein, he still does 
not know whether such columns have reached Heilsberg from 
Bischofstein. Notwithstanding every exertion of horse and 
rider, and the leader's unusual caution, and unusual good 
luck which saved the, patrol from mistakes and errors, false 
information and the bullets and sabers of the enemy, and the 
advantage of operating in friendly territory, and the favor- 
able season, good weather, good roads, the faithfulness of tel- 
egraph operators in clinging to threatened stations, and the 
supply of suitable horses for the messengers — in short, not- 
withstanding a succession of favoring incidents, all of which 
could hardly be expected to happen, the message that finally 
reaches its destination contains nothing that could point out 
the way to Army headquarters. 

If we assume that the goddess of fortune further favors 

Lieutenant D , he may be able to ford the Alle without 

accident at Hoschenen, and learn at Louisenhof that Schip- 
penbeil is occupied by a small detachment of cavalry, a sort 
of connecting-post, and that the place was occupied the night 
of May 3d-4th by the 5th Dragoons, while the 4th Dragoons, 



Rejconnaissance;. 151 

coming from Romsdorf, marched through the town May 4th, 
going towards Schonbruch. About noon the patrol may- 
reach the Bartenstein-Langheim highway at Gr. Schwansfeld, 
and find out that so far nothing but patrols have passed over 
it. The further information that the railway center, Kors- 
chen, has been occupied by the enemy since May 3d, will 
save the patrol-leader from the erroneous assumption that on 
the 5th, at Schwansfeld, he still is ahead of advance detach- 
ments of the hostile army, and therefore must return to the 
Bartenstein - Schippenbeil road. After obtaining some rest, 
which is much needed after the 30-miles ride of to-day, he 
may be able to find out by 4 or 5 p. m. whether or not, and 
from what direction, hostile columns have come to Bischofstein. 

In either case the news would be of great value to the 
commanding general of the ist Army Corps, although no 
change could be made in the orders issued for May 6th. But 
how difficult it becomes to forward the message! The tele- 
graph stations that still are in operation are so distant that 
it would not pay to look for one of them. The remaining 
strength of their horses must carry the messengers back to 
within reach of our troops. If the enemy has not marched 
through Bischofstein, the effort can be made to send the mes- 
sage directly back via Blumenau-Reichenberg-Sperlings-Gro- 
nau-Pittehnen. Otherwise, it must be sent in a wide circuit 
northwards, possibly crossing the Alle at Katzen, as hostile 
detachments surely would have possession of the bridges at 
Heilsberg. 

The patrol has covered more than 37 miles to-day, over 
140 miles in the last 48 hours, and now from 35 to 50 miles 
more are required. 

Even if the messengers should be fortunate enough to 
find remounts, it is too much to expect that they would find 
their way, going the long distance through an unknown re- 
gion, and also escape from the midst of hostile cavalry. The 



152 Studies in Applied Tactics. 

attempt would be absolutely hopeless on their own overworked 
horses. 

If our imagination carries us a step farther on the route 

that Lieutenant D has mapped out for himself, on the 

supposition that he will find Bischofstein unoccupied by the 
enemy, we possibly shall see him the evening of May 5th — 
after a 50-miles ride that day and 125 miles from Marienburg, 
mostly traveled across country with many a detour, frequently 
going at a rapid gait, and under constant nervous strain — op- 
posed by hostile infantry outposts; or at Lantern, watching 
hostile wagon-trains pass by. 

At the same time we shall see him in despair at not being 
able to send back a report in time of what he has seen. 

Thanks to good luck and his perseverance and prudence, 
he has succeeded in carrying out the ideal requirement of pass- 
ing around the enemy's flank and through the latter 's cavalry 
screen to the flank of his main columns before the main battle 
is fought. 

But of what use is this to the commander-in-chief, whose 
forces now have approached within a day's march of the heads 
of the hostile columns, which presumably have reached the Alle. 

The Army Corps must have received their orders some 
time ago for the coming day, which will lead them against the 
enemy and decide the role they must play in the coming bat- 
tle. And yet there lie between the patrol and its nearest out- 
posts 30 to 40 miles, two rivers, and the entire zone of the 
hostile reconnoitering and protecting force. What a slight 
chance there is to overcome these obstacles, even by the fore- 
noon of May 6th ! — and by that time the information will have 
been overtaken by the events it foreshadowed, and, in the din 
of battle, will be relegated to the scrap-heap. 

The officer was not confronted by adverse circumstances. 
We are satisfied that fortune rode at his side. And we can- 
not reply in extenuation that he took the wrong road and 



Reconnaissance;. 153 

thus took too much time. But, on the contrary, we can con- 
fidently assert that he acted judiciously, and, guided a little 
by me, took the right direction a little more promptly than 
if he had been left entirely to his own inspirations. 

How many patrol-leaders would have followed the hostile 
cavalry that was discovered near Schonbruch ; how many would 
have gone east beyond Schippenbeil ; how many would have 
gone from Schippenbeil towards Kdrschen ! 

There is nothing unusual in finding hostile cavalry from 
12 to 15 miles beyond the flank of an army. Moreover, it 
was fortunate for Lieutenant D that this flank guard con- 
sisted only of cavalry. And he did not proceed in a leisurely 
manner, but spared neither horse nor rider. Notwithstanding 
the progress made by our cavalry in long-distance and endur- 
ance rides, and however great may be the number of miles 
that officers and non-commissioned officers now and then have 
ridden on good horses, the number of voices is increasing that 
warns against overdoing and illusions. Quite a number of 
horses failed to come up to expectations or succumbed before 
reaching the goal. 

If we consider that a troop-horse already at the time of 
mobilization and concentration is subjected to unusual exer- 
tions, long journeys by rail, etc. ; often is poorly sheltered and 
fed at irregular times; that besides rider and accouterments it 
must carry a heavy pack ; and that even in a troop of selected 
horses we can count only on average results where the weakest 

sets the pace, we must look upon Lieutenant D 's ride as 

an unusual achievement that but seldom would be possible 
during a long campaign. 

The indifferent success of the patrol was not due to mis- 
takes of the leader or his men, but to the difficulties of the 
task, which are emphasized in the example we have minutely 
followed. Had patrols been sent from Marienburg towards 
Gvittstadt and Landsberg as well as via Heilsberg-Bartenstein, 
—11— 



154 Studies in Appi.ie;d Tactics. 

the result would have been practically the same. The patrol 
sent through Guttstadt would have met the hostile advance 
detachments and would have been driven back, the one sent 
through Landsberg simply would have been able to locate 
the hostile cavalry marching towards Konigsberg. As things 

turned out, only Lieutenant D 's patrol was so situated 

as to get a glimpse of the movement of the hostile army, and 
therefore a discussion of its experiences was the most instructive. 



Although Lieutenant D had to overcome many dif- 
ficulties, they don't compare with the obstacles that are met 
while reconnoitering in the enemy's country. How many ex- 
pedients available in a friendly territory are denied the patrol - 
leader upon crossing the boundary! He must find his way 
with a poor map or possibly v/ithout any. It becomes more 
difficult to understand the inhabitants — is practically impos- 
sible for a single man — and the inhabitants' statements con- 
cerning roads and the enemy can be accepted only with mis- 
giving, even if the population is not wrought up and guerrilla 
warfare does not threaten the life of individual men. 

No habitation should be entered without extreme cau- 
tion ; only force will procure food for men and horses ; no place 
of concealment is safe, because treachery lurks everywhere. 
In friendly territory the people freely give information about 
the enemy to the reconnoitering cavalry; in the enemy's coun- 
try very little that is true and much that is false will be heard, 
and no telegraph office will be found outside the field of op- 
erations of your own forces to assist in forwarding messages. 

To properly appreciate the increased difficulties, I would, 
in conclusion, call the attention of my patient readers to the 
hostile patrol that spent the night of May 4th-5th at Wormditt 
(see page 28). 



Reconnaissance. 155 

This patrol presumably was sent from Schippenbeil early 
on May 4th, with instructions to destroy the Seeburg-Lands- 
berg railway near Heilsberg and the railway between Worm- 
ditt and Mehlsack. After completing this work, it presuma- 
bly will be expected to reconnoiter via Pr. Holland towards 
Marienberg-Saalfeld, as the detaining of troops on the Vistula 
(Weichsel) probably has not remained a secret. Possibly it 
also has orders to cut the railway farther west. 

The patrol's orders are so important and carry it so far 
into hostile territory that it will consist of at least 2 officers, 
2 non-commissioned officers, and 20 men; of these, i officer 
and I non-commissioned officer speak German a little. As 
the army intends assuming the offensive, and later expects 
to make use of the railways, it cannot be the intention to 
completely destroy the railways, but simply to block them 
for a few days, so that technical troops can repair damages 
in a short time. Therefore, it will be sufficient if the patrol 
has a number of dynamite cartridges, so it can destroy rails 
and switches. As i cartridge is sufficient to destroy a rail, 
40 cartridges would enable the patrol to do considerable 
work. Therefore, each man must carry 2 cartridges, for which 
room can be made by leaving behind other articles of the 
pack; or 2 led horses might be loaded with the cartridges, 
thus furnishing valuable remounts in case of necessity, al- 
though they might somewhat delay progress across country. 
Naturally, the patrol must destroy all telegraph lines, and is 
equipped with instruments to tap the line. 

At Bartenstein and Heilsberg the patrol found the tele- 
graph offices abandoned, so that there was no chance to in- 
tercept any messages. At the Heilsberg railway station the 
patrol commander limited himself to destroying two railway 
switches, but consumed some time in destroying neighboring 
telegraph offices. Neither in Heilsberg nor in Bartenstein 



156 Studies in Applied Tactics. 

could the telegraph instruments be found, as they had been 
removed. 

Late in the afternoon, after a ride of about 50 miles (in- 
cluding side trips), the patrol arrived at Wormditt, and sur- 
prised the telegraph ofhces in the town and at the railway sta- 
tion. The two German-speaking members of the patrol (an 
officer and a non-commissioned officer), who also know how 
to telegraph, will have tried to utilize the telegraph line, and 
force the operator to make inquiries in various directions. 
But it is hardly to be expected that this ruse will succeed 
under present conditions. The nature of the inquiries would 
arouse suspicion, and the results are more likely to mislead 
than enlighten. And even listening to messages coming over 
the wires would not lead to any important results, as care 
would be taken not to send valuable news to outl3dng sta- 
tions. At the most, Saalfeld or Maldeuten might ask Worm- 
ditt for news about the enemy. This would be dangerous only 
in case, as in time of.peace, the imposing title of the sending 
authority adorned the heading of the telegram. 

The situation of a small detachment of horsemen in a 
large hostile settlement is endangered by a prolonged stay and 
the keeping up of telegraphic communication, which can be 
but imperfectly controlled, and easily, by some pre-arranged 
signal, may reveal the presence of the detachment. There- 
fore, efforts to get information over the wire will soon be 
stopped and the instruments be destroyed. Searching the re- 
tained copies of recently-received telegrams, which the oper- 
ator may be forced to translate under threat of death, and 
seizing the letters and newspapers found at the post-office, 
might reveal valuable information ; but this would be very te- 
dious work for one only superficially versed in the language of 
the country. Nevertheless, during the night of May 4th-5th, 
the patrol in this way might discover something about the de- 
training of troops at Marienburg on May 3d. This informa- 



Reconnaissance. i57 

tion might reach Heilsberg the morning of May 5th, and by- 
noon of the same day the higher commanders, supplementing 
similar information received from other sources. 

In destroying telegraph lines one thing must be remem- 
bered by an isolated patrol, the neglect of which might ab- 
ruptly end its career: Interference with a line will soon be 
noticed by the neighboring stations and will be reported by 
them to stations farther back, so that any opposing troops 
that may be near at hand can receive the news and come to 
the rescue. Therefore, prudence dictates that the line be de- 
stroyed in several places to increase the space in which the 
enemy must hunt for the ofifenders and make it more difficult 
for him to find them. The railway demolitions at the Worm- 
ditt station will be more extensive than at Heilsberg, and will 
require at least 8 or 10 cartridges. 

An undisturbed night's rest cannot be expected at Worm- 
ditt. It was a mistake that the patrol remained there. It 
should have left the place as soon as it had accomplished its 
object, and spent the night at some isolated spot. But pos- 
sibly it v/as delayed by its efforts at the telegraph office and 
the investigation of mail-matter. It also was a mistake for 
the patrol to ride along the Wormditt-Aiken highway early on 
the 5th; but possibly the patrol was forced to do this by the 
darkness and the absence of a good map, which in the ene- 
my's country cannot be replaced by information obtained from 
the inhabitants. 

The patrol, leaving at i a. m., with horses fairly rested, 
and cautiously working its way past habitations, at 7 a. m. 
reaches Pr. Holland, after successfully avoiding several hostile 
troopers, and finds the town and railway station occupied by 
hostile infantry. It is doubtful if the patrol will learn that the 
garrison consists of organized militia (see page 10). At any rate, 
considerable time will be consumed in reconnoitering the 
town; and in the attempt to pass to the north and south of 



158 Studies in Applied Tactics. 

the town it is discovered that the entire line of railway is 
guarded. It will not be until 9 a. m. that the patrol-leader 
will be able to send back a message concerning the situation 
at Pr. Holland. The messenger has to go more than 30 miles 
to reach Guttstadt. His horse, after 5 or 6 hours' rest at 
Wormditt, has traveled over 50 miles and the day before trav- 
eled about 50 miles, or over 100 miles in a day and a half. 
It will be 5 or 6 p. m. before he can reach Guttstadt, going 
the shortest way — i. e., via Liebstadt, and we know what dan- 
gers threaten on the way, should he find it. As the higher 
commanders probably are not in telegraphic communication 
with the advanced cavalry, the message will not be received 
by them until late at night on May 5th, and it might confuse 
instead of enlighten them, should the patrol not have discov- 
ered that the garrison of Pr. Holland consists of organized 
militia. 

If this patrol, in its efforts to locate and turn the hostile left 
flank, makes a circuit to the north towards Elbing, its further 
efforts would be in va'in. Should it break through the line of 
railway guards south of Pr. Holland, to get a glimpse behind 
the screen of organized militia, it is doubtful if any messenger 
v/ould succeed in repassing the line. Only in case it turned 
south towards the road between Maldeuten and Mohrungen is 
there any prospect of a profitable reconnaissance, although 
the flank guard of the ist Army Corps would interfere with 
the patrol's activity. But it would be phenomenal if informa- 
tion, say of blue outposts being established at Steinsdorf, Roll- 
enau, and Wiese, should get through the district covered by 
the ist Cavalry, or, passing around this via Wormditt, should 
reach headquarters before the morning of May 6th. And, then, 
what would have been gained? Considering that the com- 
mander-in-chief had learned that blue cavalry had been en- 
countered between the Alle and the Passarge during May 5th, 
and blue patrols had appeared in front of his infantry at Jonk- 



Reconnaissance. I59 

endorf and Gr. Buchwalde, he will not be surprised to learn 
that blue infantry was found at Mohrungen on this day, and 
only positive information that the enemy did not appear on 
the Pr. Holland-Iyiebstadt road during the afternoon would 
justify him in concluding that the flank of the blue army was 
at Mohrungen. Even if the message gave conclusive informa- 
tion on the subject, no changes could be made in the move- 
ments of the army, which would have to proceed in accord- 
ance with orders formulated the day before. Only detailed 
orders for the troops on the flank might be changed by it. 

Let us assume a more favorable case for the patrol — one 
on which regulations and theories greatly count — viz., that the 
patrol, making a wide circuit around the flank, is able to watch 
the march of hostile columns. Let us imagine that the or- 
ganized militia on the Maldeuten-Elbing railway does not ex- 
ist, and that the way is open for the patrol via Pr. Holland 
to the west. Let us even assume that the patrol received in- 
formation at Pr. Holland that obviates a groping about and 
saves long detours, so that, crossing the overland canal (Ober- 
landischen Kanal), it reaches the vicinity of Gr. Arnsdorf as 
early as lo a. m., and discovers the ist Army Corps march- 
ing on the Saalfeld-Maldeuten road — which, of course, pre- 
supposes criminal negligence on the part of the Army Corps. 
The distance traveled from Wormditt was from 35 to 40 miles, 
and the messenger would have to cover about 45 miles on un- 
known roads back to Guttstadt, if he wishes to avoid the dense 
zone of protection of the ist Army Corps. When will he ar- 
rive? when will headquarters, located possibly at Wartenburg 
or Bischofsburg, receive the message? 

The enemy would have succeeded no better than the blue 
force in sending out several "strategical" patrols to clear up 
the situation on the northern flank. A patrol coming via Lieb- 
stadt either would have been forced on to the route of the one 
whose fortunes we have followed, which came via Wormditt, 



i6d Studies in AppuEd Tactics. 

or it would have met the ist Cavalry; and a third patrol, 
coming via Mehlsack, would have obtained nothing but neg- 
ative results. Only by the rarest of good luck might it have 
happened to catch an important message on the Miihlhausen- 
Braunsberg telegraph line. But even such a message would 
have been belated in reaching Wartenburg or Bischofsburg. 

It might be objected to the "situation" assumed in the 
foregoing study, and the conclusions drawn as to the results 
of patrols working over an extended territory, that there was 
not enough room allowed for strategical reconnoitering ; that 
both parties should have sent out their patrols on May ist or 
2d, and not as late as May 3d or 4th. Whoever takes the 
trouble to carefully examine the case will find that the pros- 
pects would not materially change for either party. The pa- 
trols simply would encounter the opposing cavalry one or two 
days earlier, behind which the main columns of the army 
would still be able to make considerable lateral movements; 
the messenger routes would become longer and more danger- 
ous; the powers of horse and man would be more greatly 
taxed; and all too soon the small band would melt away, 
whose connection with its army would constantly become 
more precarious, and whose conduct would become more dif- 
ficult the farther it advanced. 

Should Lieutenant D^ ^'s blue patrol reach the vicinity 

of Schippenbeil the morning of May 4th instead of May 5th, 
it would come within reach of the 5th Dragoons, who remained 
there the night of May 4th-5th. Should the patrol succeed 
in avoiding the 5th Dragoons, it might encounter the 4th Dra- 
goons, who later turned off towards Schonbruch, and, to defi- 
nitely ascertain the direction of march of the latter, the patrol 
might have to tarry in observation until the morning of May 
5th, so that no time would have been gained for the recon- 
naissance of the roads to the south. However, if a lucky in- 
spiration sent Lieutenant D to the north more promptly, 



Reconnaissance. i6i 

he presumably would have met hostile patrols and flank guards 
on the afternoon of May 4th in the vicinity of Bischof stein 
that would have prevented further insight on this day, whose 
advance to the Alle on May 5th, however, would have enabled 
him to penetrate beyond Bischofstein to the Lautern-Seeburg 
road. A message received at the headquarters of the blue 
army on the morning of May 5th, concerning hostile advance 
troops at Bischofstein, in no wise would have cleared up the 
situation, as everything would have depended on whether the 
columns in rear of them would have marched to Seeburg or 
Heilsberg on the 5th. 

Of course. Lieutenant D could not have guessed this 

on May 4th, and could not have transmitted this important 
information any earlier than the morning of May 5th, which 
would have been too late to use as a basis for the commander- 
in-chief's decision for May 6th. 

In the same way the unchangeable laws of time and space 
would have prevented the hostile patrol sent via Wormditt 
(had it not reached this point on the 4th, but as early as the 
3d or 2d of May) from sending its commander-in-chief infor- 
mation that would have removed all doubt and have informed 
him on the 4th or 5th what roads the hostile columns would 
follow on this day, so that he could have regulated his own 
movements accordingly. Even if the patrol on May 4th had 
discovered blue cavalry at Maldeuten or infantry outposts near 
Saalfeld, and even if this information miraculously had been 
sent back the 68 miles to Bischofsburg in time to reach head- 
quarters on the evening of May 5th, he never would be able 
to guess whether the enemy on the 5th would march to Mohr- 
ungen or Liebstadt, and whether on the 5th the flank column 
of the blue army would not appear on the Pr. Holland-Lieb- 
stadt road. 



1 62 Studies in AppIvIEd Tactics. 



RETROSPECT. 

This clipping from the hfe of the cavalry service does not 
begin to exhaust the variety of situations constantly present- 
ing themselves in surprising shapes to those called upon to 
decide and act. The situations are very different for recon- 
noitering cavalry when the army to be screened is engaged in 
a flank march, or a retreat, or is awaiting an attack in a pre- 
pared position; or in minor warfare. And the customary 
method of having the mass of cavalry several days' march 
ahead will be greatly changed if, before the beginning of hos- 
tilities, both armies concentrate in the immediate vicinity of 
the frontier. 

It was not the object of my work to devise rules of con- 
duct for all these cases, to which might be added a great many 
others, such as operations in a mountainous country, in deso- 
late regions, in winter, besieging and defending large fortresses, 
etc. I simply aimed to assist in coming to a correct decision 
under various conditions; and the discussion of my simple 
"special situation" will show what great demands the recon- 
naissance service makes on the capacity of troops, the in- 
telligence, energy, and endurance of leaders as well as of in- 
dividual troopers. Judicious deliberation and boldness tem- 
pered by caution are the guiding stars of a cavalryman, who 
always must have a remedy at hand, scent danger from afar, 
whose sharp eye must see for miles, and whose nerves must 
never relax, if he wishes to retain his aim. The best precepts 
and theories fail if practice and experience do not hold sway. 

There is room for only a few noteworthy hints of a gen- 
eral character. 

The Field Service Regulations state that the strength of 
a patrol will depend on circumstances,* and that single men 

*See par. 74, F. S. R. 



Re;connaissanc]5;. 163 

or a small group of men are best for purposes of observa- 
tion only. 

What has gone before shows that an officer's patrol sent 
to a great distance must not be too small, otherwise it would 
soon have to discontinue its messenger service, and its ex- 
plorations would be useless. As we have seen, it must have 
a certain fighting power and must be able to furnish reliefs 
for guards at night. On the other hand, there is a demand 
that details be economized to avoid scattering the strength of 
a force and insuring superiority of numbers at the decisive 
point. Our study will have demonstrated that important pa- 
trols cannot get along with 5 or 6 men, and that even 10 men 
seldom will suffice. 

Lieutenant F 's valuable message of 7.35 a. m., re- 
porting the presence of assembled hostile cavalry at Glottau 
(see page 56) was lost. Sent via Sackstein, it presumably 
fell into the hands of the hostile patrol which Lieutenant 

F discovered early in the morning near Lettau, and which 

he allowed to pass unmolested, although its defeat was prac- 
ticable. The same patrol probably also intercepted the mes- 
sage of Lieutenant F 's lance corporal who was sent to 

Sackstein; and we know that it delayed Captain K for 

some time near Wuchsnig. Who knows what it saw and re- 
ported from Teufelsberg, where it doubtless viewed the coun- 
try. It is true that Lieutenant F 's messr. re v^as carefully 

worded, but if it could not be destroyed, it si-Ill would reveal 
a number of noteworthy things — among others, the number of 
the blue cavalry regiment. 

On the other hand, we see considerable advantage re- 
sulting from Lieutenant C 's fight near Kammersdorf (see 

page 62). It assured him a clear road to the front and for 
some time a safe messenger-route to the rear. It for a while 
stopped hostile reconnaissance in this vicinity, and superior 



164 Studij-s in Applied Tactics. 

authority probably derived some advantage from questioning 
the prisoners. 

Although these two examples may be objected to on the 
plea that they owe their existence to the imagination and 
bias, still they may serve to recall other cases from maneu- 
vers and kriegsspiel, and thus clear up matters. In my opin- 
ion, the seriousness of war does not justify a turning aside, 
advocated by theory, that endangers the messenger service 
and freely permits a hostile patrol to get a view of our columns. 

Our troopers not only should have recourse to arms when 
forced to do so, or when fortuitous circumstances suggest this 
course, but they should systematically make life a burden to 
hostile patrols and to shrewdly and cunningly devise ambus- 
cades for them. Reconnaissance service will be a very dif- 
ferent affair if danger threatens the hostile advance detach- 
ments from behind every bush, and if the superiority of our 
patrols in minor warfare forces the enemy to hold back from 
our front. 

Time thus consumed would be regained, and it would 
be imwarranted to assume that in such a method of proced- 
ure our men would be losers. Such an objection might be 
raised against any skirmish or battle. If we cannot hope for 
victory, we should not go to war. But even this principle 
must not be accepted as a model for invariable use; and it 
would be unreasonable were every patrol, regardless of every- 
thing, to charge the enemy with a loud hurrah whenever seen. 

The events of a few hours that in our study are culled 
from the course of a campaign do not permit an appreciation 

of the advantages of intrusting Captain B with the entire 

reconnaissance in front of the regiment in contradistinction to 
the system of a large number of patrols sent out by the higher 
commander (colonel). A consideration of an episode of sev- 
eral days would show the advantages in a clearer light. We 
would more readily see that great difhculties are encountered 



RECONNAISSANCt- 1 65 

by a higher commander in directing patrols; that touch with 
them is easily lost; that their members and capacity are soon 
exhausted ; and that it hardly would be practicable to fill gaps 
in time. Every change in the situation that would necessitate 
a change of route or produce a new task for troops would cause 
patrols to wander about in wrong directions, ignorant of the 
condition of affairs in front of the army; and the threads to 
guide this tangled net would soon slip from the commander 
in spite of the invention of "message assembly stations," which 
is a fragile makeshift that would work hardly a single day. 
Even the reconnaissance of troops sent forward to supplement 
the activity of the patrols will help out the defects of this 
system very little. A troop commander hardly will know the 
number and duties of the patrols and will be unable to keep 
touch with them. Then, how can he support them and sup- 
plement their activity? 

Notwithstanding the bad luck that I purposely placed in 

Captain E 's way, to present a convincing case, we see 

how he passably well controlled his patrols on a broad front, 
and how his military judgment and the fighting power of his 
troop assured the continued progress of the reconnaissance. 
This would have been more clearly shown had Lieutenant 

F , at 5 a. m., attacked and dispersed the hostile patrol 

near Lettau. 

The obstacle formed by the Passarge and the encounter 
with the hostile troop at Pittehnen would have thwarted in- 
dividual patrols not under the captain's orders, or would have 
forced them to make wide detours, in which case their mes- 
sengers would have been unable to find their way back. The 
captain would have found out something from one or the other 
of these patrols by chance only ; and it hardly would have been 
possible to newly organize the system of reconnaissance after 
crossing the Passarge, unless he, on his own authority and in 
excess of his orders, had assumed the role that, to my notion, 



i66 STUDiiiS IN Applied Tactics. 

fundamentally belongs to a "reconnaissance troop." A "re- 
connaissance troop" should be intrusted with the full duties 
that the name implies, thus at the same time forming a living 
and permanent "message assembly station." There is noth- 
ing to prevent a superior commander, if he sees fit, from send- 
ing out other patrols with special missions — a means that can 
be successfully employed even by the commander-in-chief of 
an army without his feeling obliged to personally direct the 
general patrol-service in front of the army. 

The results accomplished by the patrols sent out for stra- 
tegical purposes during the course of this study seem to be 
in sharp contrast with what in many quarters is hoped from 
them. Nevertheless, our examples might have some effect 
on those who are less skeptical, and, imbued with enthusi- 
asm for their branch of the service, look upon the officer's 
patrol as destined to point out the way to victory to the 
commander-in-chief. 

Our two strategical patrols promised the best results, as 
their efforts were directed against and around the flank of the 
hostile army. They had no unusual obstacles to overcome. 
I rather exerted myself to smooth their way, to show how 
thorny and rocky it is even under favorable circumstances. 
Even at the grand maneuvers we have strategical patrols fail 
us; how vastly less can we expect of them in time of war. 
How often will their messages, if they escape capture, arrive 
too late and have no effect on the movements of the army! 
And should instruments be invented that would enable pa- 
trols to communicate by wireless telegraphy, reliable messages 
could be hoped for in this way only if the enemy should be 
unable to read them too, and if he by the same means should 
not be able to deceive our headquarters. 

I do not believe that I have exaggerated the difficulties 
and dangers or the exhausting effect of patrol-service, or un- 
derestimated the number of miles that horsemen can be ex- 



Reiconnaissance. 167 

pected to go. To corroborate my statements, I shall refer to 
a few examples from actual war that happened on the classical 
ground of our study. 

When, early in 1807, Benningsen, the Russian commander- 
in-chief, surprised the French in their winter quarters, and 
Marshal Ney, who was first attacked, had provisionally brought 
his threatened troops into safety in the Guttstadt-Allenstein 
district, he (Ney) sent word from Allenstein of what had hap- 
pened on the evening of January 2 2d to Elbing, the head- 
quarters of Bernadotte's corps, which was next to him. The 
distance was 56 miles, and it took 24 hours to carry the mes- 
sage. The "operation order" which Napoleon sent January 
31st from Willenberg to Bernadotte at Lobau was intercepted 
by the Russians, and, notwithstanding the Emperor's efforts, 
communication] between him and Bernadotte continued in- 
terrupted. Even on February 7th, the eve of the battle of 
Pr. Eylau, the Emperor was ignorant of the whereabouts of 
Bernadotte's corps, although the latter general sent messages 
January 30th from Lobau, February ist, 2d, and 3d from 
Strasburg, the 5th again from Lobau, and the 6th from Os- 
terode; all these arrived afterwards. The distances between 
Bernadotte and imperial headquarters were about 75 miles 
at Strasburg and from 50 to 60 miles at Lobau and Osterode. 

Marshal Ney received the "operation orders" on January 
31st, at Gilgenburg, and the Emperor had to wait until Feb- 
ruary 2d for the anxiously-hoped-for information that Ney 
had begun his march, although the Emperor had sent him one 
messenger after another, and the distance was only between 
35 and 45 miles. 

Several days later, on February 5th, Ney fought the Prus- 
sians between the Passarge and Narien-see, and occupied Lieb- 
stadt in the afternoon of that day. The Emperor, who had 
spent the preceding night with the Marshal at Schlitt, did not 
receive Ney's report of the action at his new headquarters at 



i68 Studies in Applied Tactics. 

Arnsdorf, about 8^ miles from Liebstadt, until the morning 
of February 6th. 

In the summer campaign of the same year, which also 
began unexpectedly for the French, it took over 24 hours for 
a report of the first encounter (which occurred on June 4th, 
at Spanden on the Passarge) to reach the Emperor's head- 
quarters, 37 miles away; though a message received at the 
same time from Ney at Guttstadt, 50 miles away, came through 
in 9 hours. A letter that the Emperor, on the evening of 
June 6th, sent from Finkenstein to Davoust, who was 40 miles 
away, reached its destination in 13 hours. 

Napoleon laid great stress on rapid and safe systems of 
communication, which were well organized in his armies. 

All the above-named dispatches were carried by officers 
and within the French field of operations passed over well- 
known roads. And although, especially in the winter cam- 
paign, the roads were far from what might have been desired, 
the couriers were not limited to riding horseback, but, accord- 
ing to circumstances, *made use of wagons and sleighs, for 
which purpose villages, furnished the necessary teams. 

The Emperor's aides knew his strict ideas concerning their 
duties in carrying messages, and extensive experience in war 
had familiarized them with all expedients for overcoming ob- 
stacles. It is true that maps were defective, but communi- 
cation with the inhabitants was simplified by interpreters, 
furnished by German auxiliaries serving with the French. 
And, besides. Napoleon's officers already had been through a 
number of campaigns on German soil. 

If, in spite of all this, the transmission of orders and the 
messenger service generally was greatly handicapped by all 
manner of friction, we must be all the more careful in esti- 
mating the capacity of patrols sent far ahead into the field of 
operations of the enemy. An appreciation of the obstacles 
and dangers surrounding them will not paralyze the energy 



Reconnaissance. 169 

of their leaders, but urge them to greater exertions than if 
they had to be aroused from their illusion by stern realities 
of each case. 

Large armies do not always encounter each other along 
a serried front. If strategical patrols move against the flanks 
of hostile columns, or into intervals between hostile columns, 
there may be opportunities for more profitable employment 
than in the case assumed by our study. The two campaigns 
of 1807 in Prussia furnish proof of this. 

At the same time that Ney sent the above-named message 
of January 2 2d to Bernadotte, he sent a message to Berthier 
at Warsaw, which was intercepted by a Russian patrol south 
of Allenstein, and was delivered to Russian headquarters at 
Bischofstein the evening of January 23d. It contained a state- 
ment of the location of the Marshal's troops, his intentions 
and optimistic view of the situation. The copy of the opera- 
tion orders sent by Napoleon to Bernadotte on January 31st 
was intercepted by Cossacks, and the same day was sent from 
Dt. Eylau, by Prince Bagration, to Benningsen, at Mohrungen, 
where it arrived late in the evening of February ist. 

In both cases the Russian commander-in-chief, had he been 
equal to the occasion, Would have derived incalculable ad- 
vantage from the knowledge of the opponent's situation that 
the papers conveyed. 

And in our own times similar rewards beckon to the en- 
terprising patrol-leader, as is shown by the already mentioned 
case of the capture of the French General Staff officer near 
Beaumont, August 28, 1870, whose order-case contained Mac- 
Mahon's operation orders. 

In all three cases the enemy's flank and his line of com- 
munications lay in the direction of the patrols' march and of- 
fered a nearer and more convenient objective than if the hos- 
tile flank had to be reached by a wide detour. But I wish to 
call attention to this fact, as emphasizing what has been said 
—12— 



lyo Studies in Applied Tactics. 

above: not one of the important documents would have been 
captured from the enemy had the bearer been allowed to pass 
on unmolested. Of course, the most ardent advocate of the 
theory that patrols should simply see and not fight would not 
mean that such valuable prizes should be allowed to slip away. 
But who will be able to guess whether hostile troopers, dis- 
covered by the patrol-leader's sharp eyes, are carrying such 
treasures in their saddle-bags or not. 

The grand prize in the shape of the enemy's operation 
orders will not daily fall into the commander-in-chief's lap 
and relieve him from the burden of uncertainty. Notwith- 
standing the most self-sacrificing activity and brilliant endow- 
ment of his patrol-leaders, his own sagacity, groping in the 
dark, must know how to find the right way. The reconnoiter- 
ing bodies cannot relieve him of his office as guide, but they 
can assist him, and they can do this the more successfully the 
better they understand their business and the more their efforts 
surpass those of the enemy. 

Lieutenant C ''s patrol (of those sent due east from 

the ist Cavalry) was quite successful after overcoming the ob- 
stacle presented by the Passarge. 

It is quite likely that the result of his reconnaissance (the 
principal value of which consists in the discovery of the loca- 
tion of hostile infantry outposts) will be carried back by Lieu- 
tenant C before dark. It also may be assumed that Cap- 
tain E 's arrangements, by early in the afternoon, will 

clear up the situation in the vicinity of Guttstadt. It is quite 
possible that by evening Army headquarters can be wired from 
Gr. Hermenau concerning the state of affairs on the Alle, and 
that, although the orders for May 6th will have been issued, 
some changes may still be made, suitable to the changed sit- 
uation. Of course, in the enemy's country we cannot count 
on such prompt telegraphic communication. The headquar- 
ters of the ist Army Corps undoubtedly will derive benefit 



Reconnaissance. 171 

from the messages, and the service done by the ist Cavalry 
during the forenoon of May 5th entitles it to due credit, even 
if the achievements have not been brilliant. The service was 
in accordance with the capabilities of the regiment and such 
as could be expected by headquarters. The comparatively 
favorable results no doubt in part were due to the fact that 
until noon no large bodies of hostile cavalry had been encoun- 
tered, and that there were gaps in the hostile cavalry screen, 
through which our patrols and troops could either slip or 
force their way. 

If my narrative, based on experience in campaigns, his- 
tory, and imagination, at all conforms to the manner in which, 
reconnaissance should be carried on, then there is a vast dif- 
ference between the way this service is performed in peace 
and in war. For a fact, it is very difficult to organize this 
service on a war basis in time of peace. Even in the school 
of the troop it is hardly possible for the captain to observe 
all his patrols, and it is quite likely that some of the regula- 
tions that prescribe a pacific demeanor for patrols are due to 
the difficulties in the way of reconnaissance in time of peace. 

And yet this duty is the foremost and most important 
devolving on cavalry. If it is not to prove a failure in war; 
if our troopers are not to become helpless and useless the mo- 
ment they encounter a real enemy instead of a maneuver- 
opponent who does not shoot, cut, or make prisoners; if our 
commanders are not to become bitterly disappointed at the 
non-receipt of messages that in time of peace arrive with sur- 
prising regularity, we must find the way to a proper training 
for war. 

In time of peace great care is taken to check anything 
done by infantry or artillery that is inconsistent with war 
conditions. No mounted man is allowed to show himself in 
the fire-swept zone; no order or message may be delivered 
that would not reach its destination in time of war; officers 



172 Studies in AppuKd Tactics. 

and men alike must take advantage of cover and conform to 
difficulties of command incident thereto. Only the cavalry 
patrols ride as and where they wish, as if the grayish helmet- 
cover were a "hood of darkness" (tarnkappe), not only ren- 
dering the wearer invisible, but also invulnerable; and their 
messengers go unharmed through the midst of the enemy by 
the shortest and best roads. 

We sometimes hear this justified on the plea that the dash 
and hardihood of cavalry must not be interfered with, and 
that whistling bullets would soon enough produce the neces- 
sary sobering effect. We might on the same grounds forbid 
infantry and artillery to take advantage of shelter on the 
ground and construct artificial cover in time of peace. It might 
only too easily happen that this hardihood of peace would 
change into its opposite if the soldier in time of war unex- 
pectedly encountered dangers and obstacles he has not learned 
to overcome. My own experience justifies me in this misgiv- 
ing. If we remove the obstacles that the trooper encounters 
at every turn, and if, on account of the difficulty to observe and 
instruct him in extended territory, we do not give him any 
chance to acquire and practice caution, adroitness, and power 
of decision, which alone will carry a patrol through all vicissi- 
tudes to its objective and the message back, the smooth and 
successful course of peace maneuvers will be founded on self- 
delusion. These important attributes will not be produced 
by a twist of the wrist upon declaration of war. 

It is equally true of the cavalry as of the other arms, that 
only such troops are well trained as in war need change noth- 
ing they learned in time of peace. 

In addition to giving instruction on the map through 
problems and kriegsspiel, which also is suitable for non-com- 
missioned officers, I consider it essential to increase and im- 
prove the means of troop-leading in field exercises. If a large 
number of well-trained umpires (some of whom may be non- 



Re;connaissance. i73 

commissioned officers) watch the conduct of reconnoitering 
bodies, the commander will be able to control and properly 
instruct patrols without adopting any measures contrary to 
practice in war. A knowledge that unskillful action, inatten- 
tion, and indecision will lead to failure as in war ; that patrols 
which are surprised or receive effective fire will be ruled out 
of action the same as infantry and artillery; that messengers 
falling into the enemy's hands will remain prisoners and must 
give up their messages as in war, will be the best school- 
mistress. To insure a decision when no umpire happens to 
be present, it might be ordered that the senior commander 
of the two opposing bodies render the decision. It does not 
matter if this decision should be slightly biased. In larger 
operations the officers detailed as umpires should each have 
several assistants to look after patrols, who, under the direc- 
tion and supervision of their superiors, surely would give to 
reconnaissance on a large scale the similitude of war. 

The entire service will benefit by the experience gained 
by officers and non-commissioned officers as umpires. 

I conclude these pages with the wish that the reader, who 
has entrusted himself to my guidance, may receive benefit 
from his work, and that I may have succeeded in impressing 
some of the realities of war upon him who has not yet expe- 
rienced it. 

Whoever may not be fully satisfied with my solutions 
should remember that no one is born a master, that many 
roads lead to Rome, and that, fortunately, the enemy also 
makes mistakes. 



Studies in Applied Tactics. 



PART II. 

CAVALRY OUTPOSTS, MARCHES AND 
COMBINED OUTPOSTS. 



PREFACE TO PART II. 



The Preface to Part I. of these studies gives information 
as to its object and plan and the method in which it should 
be studied. A conviction that the only sure way to become 
a troop-leader is by practice, and an effort to present realistic 
material for my readers to think about, are my guiding-stars. 

Service can only be properly performed in the predom- 
inant branches of the Army — the Infantry and Artillery — if 
everyone has a clear idea of the powers and limitations of cav- 
alry. Therefore, the first part of this work is devoted to cav- 
alry reconnaissance, anc^, the second part first deals with cav- 
alry outposts, which are intimately related to reconnaissance, 
and later with marches and outposts of the arms combined. 

It is intended later to make use of the understanding 
hereby established between the reader and myself by discuss- 
ing operations and battles. 

Georg von Alten. 

Berlin, August, 1904. 



CAVALRY OUTPOSTS. 
SeIvEction and Occupation of the Night Position. 

The "situation" is a continuation of that discussed in 
the first part of this work. A blue army is moving from the 
Vistula (Weichsel) on the front Gilgenburg-Saalfeld against a 
hostile (red) army coming from the east. The two cavalry 
divisions (ist and 2d) of the blue army are united on the right 
flank of the army. The left wing of this army consists of the 
ist Army Corps, to which the ist Cavalry has been attached 
from the ist Cavalry Division. The fortress of Konigsberg 
has its full armament and is garrisoned by (blue) organized 
militia. The orders issued on the evening of May 4th from 
headquarters of the ist Army Corps at Saalfeld provide that 
on the following day the corps will continue its march via 
Maldeuten towards Mohrungen, while the ist Cavalry will re- 
connoiter to the front and left flank. 

Subsequently the corps commander ordered that 3 troops 
of the 3d Cavalry, under Major D , of the divisional cav- 
alry of the two divisions of the corps, take charge of the re- 
connaissance south of Narien-see towards Jonkendorf-Miin- 
sterberg. The ist Cavalry had left Gr. Wilmsdorf at 5 a. m., 
May 5th. At 10 a. m. its advance guard reached Pittehnen 
and its main body Reichenthal. 

Part I. tells of the regiment's experience to this point 
and gives the arrangements of the regimental commander and 
subordinates, as well as the contents of messages received, in 
so far as they are of importance to the situation. Our im- 
agination will now further accompany the regiment. 

At 10 a. m. the colonel had received from Captain E , 

who had advanced with Troop E via Kleinefeld towards Wal- 

177 



178 Studies in Applied Tactics. 

tersmiihl, the message of Lieutenant F (who, for several 

hours, had been in the vicinity of Komalmen), stating that 
at 8.35 a. m. 5 hostile troops of cavalry were marching along 
the Glottau-Queetz highway towards Heiligenthal. Colonel 

A temporarily remained at Reichenthal awaiting further 

developments. Contradictory reports detained him longer than 
he wished. The information received, that several hostile 
troops had crossed the Passarge at Kallisten and had gone 
towards Waltersdorf, was soon modified by further informa- 
tion that only i troop had gone towards Waltersdorf, halting 
at Mathildenberg. Some of the blue patrols west of the Pas- 
sarge had to fall back before the enemy, and had lost sight 
of the Passarge valley at Kallisten. It was not until 11 a. m. 

that a message from Captain E cleared up the situation. 

At 10.20 a. m., from Height 140, south of Waltersmiihl, he 
had discovered several hostile troops dismounted near Deppen, 
while nothing had been seen of the enemy on the highway 
between Heiligenthal and Glottau since 9 a. m. 

Thereupon the regiment resumed its march via Elditten 
and Kleinefeld, and at 12.30 p. m. arrived north of Walters- 
miihl. Captain E reported that several hostile troops 

were advancing from Deppen. While the regiment was form- 
ing for action at Waltersmiihl the enemy halted south of the 
creek flowing from Komalmen past Waltersmiihl, which forms 
a serious obstacle. After vainly waiting for some time, the 
regimental commander decided to advance via Komalmen. 

Thereupon the enemy, from whom the movement could 
not be concealed, fell back; while doing so it was possible to 
estimate his strength, which was placed at 7 or 8 troops. The 
regiment advanced via Ankendorf, with the idea of cutting 
off the enemy's retreat; but the latter could not be overtaken, 
as he branched off via Alt-Garschen, where, at 2 p. m., it gained 

touch with Major D , who had taken 2 troops of the 3d 

Cavalry to Schlitt. The colonel learned from the major, who 



Cavalry Outposts. i79 

rode up, that he had vainly tried to capture the bridge at 
Briickendorf by dismounted action, in which his men had ex- 
pended most of their ammunition. He then had ridden north 
and crossed at Kloben, after a hostile troop had retired from 
there via Schlitt towards Blankenberg. He estimated that 
at least 200 rifles had been opposed to him at Briickendorf 
station (marked "H.St." east of Briickendorf on map). His 
casualties were 3 dead and 14 wounded; the latter were left 
at Briickendorf. Troop E, 3d Cavalry, which belongs to the 

2d Division, has not yet joined. Major D has sent it 

word to watch the enemy near Briickendorf and prevent his 
reconnoitering towards Mohrungen. He himself intends going 
towards Jonkendorf-Gr. Buchwalde with Troops A and B. The 
major stated that he already had sent patrols in this direction, 
but that his command needed some rest. 

The colonel explained the situation to the major and ar- 
ranged with him that the 1st Cavalry would return to the 
Heiligenthal-Guttstadt road, and reconnoiter towards the AUe 

north of Miinsterberg, while Major D would reconnoiter 

towards Gr. Buchwalde-Jonkendorf and farther south with 
his 2 troops. 

In the meantime the hostile troops had continued their 
retreat via Blankenberg towards Steinberg. 

At 2. 30 p. m. the regiment arrived at Heiligenthal, where, 
at 2.50 p. m., word was received from Troop A, ist Cavalry, 
that the enemy had not been seen at Gut+stadt up to 11.30 
a. m., or at Knopen up to noon; that an officer's patrol was 
going beyond Guttstadt to reconnoiter towards Freudenberg- 
Tollack; that another patrol had been sent up the AUe via 
Knopen- Althof-Lower (Unter) Kapkeim; and that the troop 
for the present would remain at Queetz, sending small patrols 
towards Schwuben, Miinsterberg, and Rosengarth. 

The colonel sent Troop G to Rosengarth to reconnoiter 
towards Miinsterberg-Gr. Buchwalde, and as a means of pro- 



i8o Studies in Appued Tactics. 

tection. The regiment took post west of Heiligenthal and 
dismounted. 

To protect his own messenger route and to block it for 
the hostile patrols remaining on the left of the Passarge, Colonel 

A increased the post at Pittehnen to i officer and 1 5 men, 

then placed a non-commissioned officer and 10 men at Sack- 
stein, and later sent a platoon of Troop H to Deppen with 
orders also to occupy the bridge at Kloben. 

Several prisoners have been brought in whose statements, 
partly corroborated by inhabitants, reveal the following: The 
hostile 5th Dragoons,* which spent the preceding night at 
Heilsberg, this morning came via Guttstadt to Kallisten, where 
it joined the 6th Dragoons,* which was at Allenstein the pre- 
ceding night. The two regiments belong to different brigades, 
but both belong to the 2d Cavalry Division and are with the 
2d Army Corps. During the night of May 3d-4th the 5th 
Dragoons was alone at Schippenbeil. It could not be deter- 
mined where the 6th Dragoons was during the same night. 
But the prisoner from the regiment says that his troop camped 
beside the railway, and that on the forenoon of May 4th he 
was sent back to this railway with a message, which he de- 
livered to an infantryman at the place where he had camped 
the night before ; that on the afternoon of May 4th, constantly 
riding along the railway, he had returned to his troop at 
Allenstein; that he estimated the distance from his former 
camping-place to Allenstein to be 25 versts (about 16 miles); 
that he had seen no troops during this ride; and that the rail- 
way was double-tracked. 

In addition, two messages had been captured. The first 
is as follows: 



*In this translation the enemy s (red) cavalry regiments are sup- 
posed to consist of 600 sabers each, which conforms to the strength of 
European regiments, and is only half that of our own. But the red 
troop is taken at 100 men, corresponding to our own. — Translator. 



Cavalry Outposts. i8i 

ToMLACK Woods,* South of Willnau, 

5 May, 11-30 a. m. 

To Colonel M ; 

The two hostile troops reported by me at 8-30 a. m. as advancing 
from Mohrungen via Pfeilings forced me back into the woods, and are 
now followed by a third troop, which has reached Horn railway station 
and is trotting east along the track. The 2 troops first reported have ad- 
vanced via Gubitten. After 10 a. m. we heard small-arms fire from the 
direction of Briickendorf. There are hostile patrols at Gallinden and 
Willnau. 

N , 

Lieut. $th Dragoons. 

The messenger was captured at Seubersdorf by a patrol 
of Troop C, 3d Cavalry. His comrade escaped. Nothing has 
been learned concerning the whereabouts of the hostile oflEicer's 
patrol. 

The second captured message is as follows: 

Teufelsberg, South of Herzogswalde, 

5 May, 1 1-30 a. m. 

To Colonel M ; 

Circling around Waltersdorf, and avoiding a hostile patrol, I arrived 
here, after 4 or 5 troopers, who had occupied this knoll, had retreated 
towards Alt-Bolitten. Nothing suspicious can be seen from the Teufels- 
berg. I shall continue towards Gr. Hermenau. 

M , 

Lieut. 5th Dragoons. 

The two bearers of this message carelessly approached 
Kallisten after it was occupied by a platoon of Troop H, ist 
Cavalry. The vedette at the western exit shot down one of 
the men; the second, whose horse was killed, was captured. 

At 4.30 p. m. Lieutenant C , ist Cavalry (see page 

130), arrived at Heiligenthal and reported the resilt of his 
reconnaissance. Riding along the edge of the woods west of 
Rosengarth, he recognized Troop G of his regiment en route 
to Rosengarth and verbally reported the situation to its 
captain. 

The gist of his report is that during the forenoon a hostile 
cavalry regiment advanced from Jonkendorf, the greater part 
going via Pupkeim towards Schlitt and about one-fourth going 

*"Tomlacker Wald" on map. 



i82 Studies in AppuEd Tactics. 

via Gottken-Ballingen; that between i and 2 p. m. hostile 
infantry outposts were posted at Wilhelmsthal and east of 
Mondtken; and that about 3.30 p. m. infantry outposts also 

were posted at Gr. Buchwalde. Lieutenant C had seen 

nothing of the hostile cavalry that according to another report 
had retreated via Blankenberg towards Steinberg. 

About 5 p. m. a message is received from Major D , 

dated 4.30 p. m., in which he states that the enemy has with- 
drawn from Briickendorf, Troop E, 3d Cavalry, then crossing 
at this point and advancing towards Pupkeim ; that the enemy 
had taken along 3 wounded of the 3d Cavalry and the officials 
of Briickendorf station on wagons via Kl. Gemmern, leaving 
behind 13 seriously wounded and 6 dead of his own, most of 
whom belonged to the 6th and a few to the 3d Dragoons ; that 
the hostile troops at 3.30 p. m. had left Steinberg for Poll- 
eicken; and that the major would follow towards Pupkeim 
with Troops A and B. 

Troop G, ist Cavalry, reports from Height 166 north- 
west of Rosengarth that individual infantrymen have been 
seen at the edge of the woods east of Rosengarth, near the 
Rosengarth-Miinsterberg road, and on the Rosenberg-Gr. 
Buchwalde road, who fired at long range on our patrols; and 
that shots also were fired from New Garschen. 

Troop A, ist Cavalry, is at Queetz. It reports that as 
late as 3.30 p. m. the enemy had not appeared at Knopen, or 
at Guttstadt, where a picket under a non-commissioned officer 
is stationed. The inhabitants of Guttstadt state that no hos- 
tile troops have passed through that town excepting the 5 th 
Dragoons. May 4th a strong hostile patrol destroyed the 
telegraph line and railway switches at the station. A patrol 
of Troop A, ist Cavalry, which advanced through Schwuben 
fell back at 4 p. m. before at least a company of hostile infantry 
which came fromKlutken mill ("Klutken M." on map) and oc- 
cupied Height 113 near Schwuben. The patrol also -claims to 



Cavalry Outposts, 183 

have seen hostile infantry on Podonnenberg near Miinsterberg. 
The enemy has not been seen at Knopen as late as 4 p. m. A 
patrol sent south via Battatron was fired upon from Klutken, 
mill and from the height northeast of Lower (Unt.) Kapkeim, 
and discovered an infantry post a few hundred yards north of 
this village on the highway leading through Battatron. 

The connecting-post at Pittelmen compiled a report from 
the messages there received, from which it appears that Lieu- 
tenant B (who was sent via Freymarkt towards Heilsberg 

in the forenoon by Captain E , Troop A, ist Cavalry) at 

11.20 a. m. arrived at Freymarkt without seeing anything of 
the enemy, and continued his reconnaissance towards Launau; 

that Sergeant K , Troop A, ist Cavalry, following the troop 

defeated by Captain E , lost track of it north of Sportehnen 

and rode towards Wormditt; and that Sergeant L , Troop 

A, ist Cavalry, reports from Liebstadt that Gr. Hermenau has 
been occupied by a battalion of the ist Infantry. 

Hostile cavalry patrols are no longer visible anywhere 
except near Neu-Garschen and Blankenberg. 

Colonel A sent word to the commanding general of 

the ist Army Corps, via Kallisten and the telegraph station 
at Gr. Hermenau, of the events happening up to 3 p. m. : the 
appearance of the two hostile cavalry regiments, their with- 
drawal towards Blankenberg, his meeting Major D , and 

that the enemy had not appeared at Guttstadt up to 11.30 
a. m. or at Knopen up to 12 noon. 

At 5 p. m. 3 troopers from the connecting-post at Gr. 
Hermenau arrived with the following telegram: 

Headquarters ist Army Corps, Mohrungen, 

5 May, I p. m. 
To the Comdg. Officer, ist Cavalry: 

The ist Division will be quartered for the night at Himmelforth, 
Pfeilings, Horn, and Kranthau, the 2d Division at Mohrungen and Gr. 
Bestendorf, corps headquarters at Mohrungen. Your orders remain un- 
changed. So far no reports received here sufficiently clear up the situa- 



184 Studie;s in Applied Tactics. 

tion east of the Passarge. Last message received from you is dated 
Pittehnen, 11 a. m. 

By command of Lieutenant-General G. : 

E. S , 

Chief of Staff. 

The commander of the connecting-post has added the 
following : 

Gr. HermEnau, 
5 May, 1-30 p. m. 
The importance of the enclosed telegram and the insecurity of the 
road induced me to send it by 3 men. A strong hostile patrol was seen 
near Herzogswalde at 11 a. m. We still have telegraphic communica- 
tion with Liebstadt, where, so far, nothing has been seen of the enemy. 
A battalion of the ist Infantry has occupied Gr. Hermenau. 

H , 

Sergt. Troop C, ist Cav. 

The bearers of the message came via Alt-Bolitten, where 

Corporal M , Troop A, ist Cavalry, joined them and rode 

with them to Teufelsberg, whence he had been driven at 11 
a. m. by a hostile patrol. At Sanglau they were obliged to 
hide themselves from hostile troopers until the latter rode 
back towards Seubersdorf, and thus they were considerably 
delayed. It was not iintil they reached Waltersdorf that they 
were able to continue on their way undisturbed to Kallisten, 
where they found the platoon of Troop H, ist Cavalry. 

The ist Cavalry, leaving Maldeuten at 5 a. m., has come 
about 33 miles. It fed at Herzogswalde from 8 to 9.35 a. m., 
rested at Reichenthal-Pittehnen from 10 to 11 a. m., and has 
been at Heiligenthal about 2 hours, during which time the 
troops were able to water in succession. 

Discussion of the Situation of the: Regiment; Intention 
AND Arrangements of Its Commander at 5 p. m. 
At last, word is being received about the enemy's infantry. 
The colonel has a right to hope that the report he is about to 
send, and which ought to arrive at Mohrungen by 8 p. m., will 
clear up the situation for the commanding general as far as 
this is possible up to date. Hostile infantry outposts are es- 



Cavalry Outposts. 185 

tablished all along the line from Schwuben via Gr. Buchwalde 
and Mondtken to west of Wilhelmsthal. It may be confidently 
assumed that, in rear of these, columns have followed as far 
as the Alle. The fact that so far we have had to deal only 
with cavalry belonging to the 2d (red) Army Corps justifies 
the surmise that this corps has occupied the line of the Alle — 
but only the surmise. It would be of no advantage to lead 
the regiment against the hostile outposts to find out further 
particulars. We could not find out for certain even if we suc- 
ceeded in penetrating the line at great cost. The Alle would 
check further progress. And of what advantage would it be 
to know that at some point there are a few battalions of the 2d 
Army Corps? It is sufficient for the commanding general to 
know that the advance of the hostile infantry has crossed the 
Alle. 

But it would be of great importance if corps headquarters 
could be informed where the northern flank of the enemy is. 
The message concerning hostile outposts at Klutken mill and 
Lower Kapkeim is a pointer on this subject. But a definite 
conclusion cannot yet be drawn, for we still have no news about 
the roads leading east from Guttstadt on which hostile infantry 
also might be found. 

The reconnaissance of the ist Cavalry probably will no 
longer have any influence on the decision of the army com- 
mander, but it will serve the commanding general ist Army 
Corps, and possibly of the 2d Army Corps also, as a basis for 
orders on May 6th, and may even be of use for their orders to 
be issued on the evening of May 5th. In Part I. attention was 
called to the fact that too much must not be expected from 
cavalry reconnaissance; and it must be admitted that the ist 
Cavalry did not encounter any unusual difficulties. On the 
contrary, it was favored by the unexpected weakness and the 
withdrawal of the hostile cavalry; and if the hostile infantry 
had arrived later, its presence might not have been detected 

—13— 



i86 Studies in Appued Tactics. 

until evening, so that a report about this might not have been 
received at Mohrungen until early the following day. 

So Colonel A may look upon his day's work with con- 
siderable satisfaction. But how much still remains to be done, 
and how much is still enveloped in darkness! 

Minor uncertainties, such as the enigmatical appearance 
of two hostile regiments of two different brigades and the ab- 
sence of all information about the remainder of the 2d Cavalry 
Division, or the appearance of a part of the 3d Dragoons at 
Briickendorf, which, according to the well-known organiza- 
tion of the hostile army, belongs to the ist Army Corps,* are 
of small moment. It is possible that the cavalry of the neigh- 
boring army corps, coming from the south, assisted the 6th 
Dragoons at Briickendorf — but it would not pay to bother 
about such details. It is of far greater importance to find out 
definitely how far the front of the hostile army extends to the 
north; and nobody knows if late in the day a hostile column 
may not reach Guttstadt or vicinity, to prolong the front early 
in the morning and envelop our flank. 

It is true that Captain E as a precautionary measure 

has sent an officer's patrol to the east via Guttstadt, but how 
easily can a patrol be captured or forced aside; how little 
would be gained could it report that it was fired on by hostile 
outposts at Klingerswalde or Eschenau. For it is possible 
that there or even at Nosberg the troops encountered simply 
might be hostile covering detachments. 

Were it not 5 p. m., and had the regiment not already 
covered a distance of over 30 miles, it would be an easy matter 
to clear up the mystery. The way is open and a ride to Gutt- 
stadt would bring the regiment to the commanding point 
on the enemy's flank. It may very properly be asked : Why 

*The German General Staff has an accurate knowledge of the ordre 
de bataille of all foreign armies — including the names of the commanders 
of all larger organizations. — Translator. 



Cavalry Outposts. 187 

did not the regiment continue its march towards Gr. Buch- 
walde or Guttstadt as early as 2 or 3 p. m. ? This was im- 
practicable both on account of the necessity for a prolonged 
rest and the uncertainty that prevailed at the time. It was 
possible that a march to Buchwalde would bring the regiment 
immediately in front of the enemy and prevent a reconnais- 
sance of his flank ; and a march to Guttstadt might be a wild- 
goose chase. It is not until 5 p. m. that the messages received 
justify a consideration of Guttstadt as the next objective. 

But can Colonel A expect this further effort from his 

command late in the afternoon of May 5th? To-day's march 
has not demanded unusual exertions. The main body of the 
regiment marched at an ordinary gait; there was no gallop- 
ing to strain lungs or sinews of the horses; prolonged halts 
afforded opportunities to rest; it was practicable to feed at 
Herzogswalde, and, during the past two hours, it was possible 
to water at Heiligenthal ; there were no scorching sun's rays. 

Critically examining his command. Colonel A surely would 

conclude that its strength is far from exhausted. The 8 miles 
to Guttstadt could be traveled without any harm if it only 
were possible to rest there. But there energetic reconnais- 
sance would have to begin, and at that exposed point, only 
3 miles from the hostile outposts at Schwuben, it would be 
impossible to unsaddle, water, and feed. How would it be 
with the efficiency of the regiment on May 6th, the probable 
day of battle? Will it be able to give a good account of itself; 
will it be able to give efficient assistance after covering 40 
miles on May 5th and passing a restless night under a frosty 
sky? Would it not be with a last gasp of horse and man that 
it would deliver its decisive attack on May 6th to cover a re- 
treat or to pursue the enemy, if throughout the preceding 
night there should be ceaseless activity, as if May 6th were to 
be the last day of maneuver, when the "general" would be 
sounded and peace and quiet spread over the land. French's 



i88 S'ruDiE;s IN Applied Tactics. 

cavalry division may serve as a warning, which in the late 
Boer war rode into Kimberley and as the result of a single day's 
overexertion was hors de combat for a long time afterwards. 

Months may pass before peace is restored and every day 
in the meantime may bring new work, new exertions. This 
must be taken into consideration by every commander. And 
yet there is none who would hesitate to do his utmost, to shed 
every drop of blood, if necessary. Has this moment arrived 

for Colonel A on the afternoon of May 5th? Is what he 

hopes to accomplish by riding to Guttstadt worth the risk of 
materially reducing the efficiency of his regiment for the fol- 
lowing day? 

It would be different if ht v^e^.e forenoon and we were at 
Heiligenthal after a 12- to 15-mile ride. Arriving at Guttstadt 
in good shape, reconnaissance might be successfully undertaken 
on the right of the Alle. Daylight would enable us to get an 
extended view from the heights east and southeast of the town, 
troops could be sent forward as far as Nosberg and Eschenau, 
and Guttstadt could be abandoned in time for a safer place in 
case of the advance of hostile columns. 

As matters now stand, the regiment would arrive at Gutt- 
stadt as the sun is setting, approaching darkness would make 
an extended view impossible, no conclusion could be drawn 
from the picket-firing of different posts, and no columns on 
the march would be discovered. 

If, on the evening of May 5th, the regiment wishes to get 
into safe quarters from Guttstadt, the 40 miles it has marched 
would be increased to 45 or 50, to which at least 5 to 10 miles 
more must be added for the reconnoitering troops. 

Should the regiment remain at Guttstadt, it would assume 
the role of a reconnoitering-patrol close to the hostile outposts 
without the advantages of mobilty and ease of concealment 
of such patrol. A hostile platoon of infantry stealthily ap- 
proaching along the railway could attack it with impunity 
and force it to fall back in the dark. 



Cavalry Outposts, 189 

The colonel must see that the regiment at Guttstadt virtu- 
ally could accomplish no more than the patrols that have al- 
ready been sent out, and that the march thither would un- 
necessarily tire and expose it, and unnecessarily reduce its 
strength for May 6th. 

If the colonel decides not to advance to Guttstadt to-day, 
the next thing to consider is a place to spend the night. If it 
is impracticable to continue the reconnaissance against the 
enemy's flank, every other exertion seems useless. It would 
seem, then, that the only thing to do would be to gain new 
strength for to-morrow's duties and to otherwise carefully 
prepare for these. 

It would be most convenient for the regiment to remain 
at Heiligenthal and Ankendorf. The two towns surely could 
provide most of the food necessary for the 1,200 horses and 
men, and whatever may be lacking can be brought from Ko- 
malmen, Waltersmiihl, Kallisten, Deppen, and Alt-Garschen. 
Even if the baggage-train, which is still at Mohrungen, 15 
miles away, has to be dispensed with, the troops very quickly 
could make themselves comfortable. It may even be pos- 
sible to obtain straw, something unusual when bivouacking 
in the face of the enemy. For it must be a bivouac, be it 
never so cold, or should the rain descend in torrents. 

It would be rash to place the horses under cover only 3 
to 3J miles from the enemy's outposts at Neu-Garschen and 
near Rosengarth, and half a day's march from our own in- 
fantry. It is even possible that the hostile cavalry, probably 
assembled near Neu-Garschen, might make a sudden attack. 

Extensive preparations would have to be made for de- 
fense at the edge of the woods southeast of Ankendorf and 
Heiligenthal and to keep the roads thence under observation, 
and to resist the advance of the enemy from the line Alt- 
Garschen-Height 168 (southeast of Ankendorf), on the high- 
way towards Queetz and on the one towards Komalmen. 



190 Studii;s in AppIvIEd Tactics. 

The protection of the bivouac, for which purpose it might 
be necessary to detail strong interior and exterior guards in ad- 
dition, might take half of the men, while at least one troop 
would have to form a detached post at Guttstadt, so that re- 
connaissance beyond the latter point might continue. As with 
a bivouac at Guttstadt, so also one at Heiligenthal would re- 
sult in using up strength instead of conserving it. 

Cavalry finds most complete rest with the least expendi- 
ture of strength in rear of a natural obstacle. There is a quiet 
night's rest in store on the left of the Passarge if the crossings 
at Kloben, Deppen, and Sackstein are held. Even the bag- 
gage train can be brought up to the quarters by lo or ii 
p. m., and the pickets at the bridges will have an easy time 
and mostly be able to place their horses under cover. A troop 
on outpost at Sackstein, another at Kallisten (left bank of the 
Passarge) with vedettes on the crest near Deppen, a troop 
at Kloben, the remainder of the regiment at Mathildenburg, 
Wenglitten, R. G.* Seubersdorf and Seubersdorf — such a dis- 
position would insure the regiment's appearing on the scene 
May 6th rested, refreshed, and spick and span. It would be 
an arrangement that would render communication safe with 
the Army Corps, and in conjunction with pickets at Pittehnen 
and Gr. Hermenau would prevent hostile patrols gaining any 
insight of the situation of the ist Army Corps during the re- 
mainder of the day and during the night. 

In this case, too, at least one troop would have to form a 
detached post towards the enemy to keep touch with him and 
watch the roads on the right of the Alle leading towards Gutt- 
stadt. "Were this task allotted exclusively to the patrols al- 
ready in front, we would jeopardize communication with them, 
which, for example, might be completely severed by a hostile 

*"R. G." is an abbreviation for Ritter-Gut, knight's manor. 



Cavalry Outposts. 191 

troop or a platoon of infantry advancing to Queetz, Glottau, 
or Guttstadt. 

But 1 1 troops would be well taken care of on the left of 
the Passarge, and an early start on May 6th still might bring 
the refreshed and invigorated regiment on time into the vicin- 
ity of Guttstadt. 

Finally, it must be remembered that the colonel as yet 
does not know anything of the plans of headquarters for the 
6th, and that the regiment in its quarters near Kallisten will 
remain well in the commanding general's control, so that thence 
he can send it whichever way he will. He may desire to have 
the march of his corps screened by the cavalry regiment whether 
the corps turns south past Narien-see towards Briickendorf- 
Kallisten, or past the north end of the lake (see) via Sack- 
stein-Pittehnen ; and this small cavalry force can in no way 
perform this task better than by blocking the crossings of the 
Passarge. 

But should the commanding general desire the cavalry to 
advance farther, it would not have interfered with his plans. 
It could just as well advance towards Guttstadt or Wormditt, 
towards Miinsterberg, Gr. Buchwalde, or Jonkendorf, depend- 
ing on the inportance that the commanding general places on 
one or the other direction. He may have received informa- 
tion or orders calling for an entirely different view of the situa- 
tion from that acquired by the colonel from his reconnaissance. 

There are good reasons for adopting the plan just de- 
scribed. No one could censure the colonel, should he decide 
in its favor. Nevertheless, there not only arises the inevitable 
"but" with which every decision has to contend — for there 
is none that answers all requirements — there also arises a doubt 
in the colonel's mind whether, in spite of all this, there is not 
a better solution. 

irst of all, it may be the experienced leader's natural aver- 
sion to a plan that so completely meets all requirements for 



192 Studies in AppuEd Tactics. 

feed and rest as to remind him of field-maneuver methods. 
Then, too, his knightly sensitiveness rebels against the com- 
mand to retreat that he must issue if the good quarters behind 
the Passarge are to be occupied. 

It is true that quite often during a campaign the cavalry 
far in advance of an army, after a day's work is completed, 
finds it necessary to go back a step to be able to pass the night 
in a protected spot where outpost duty will be lessened and 
sufficient supplies can be found. But here conditions are dif- 
ferent. The regiment is almost toe to toe with the enemy on 
the ground vacated only a few hours since by the hostile cav- 
alry, which, avoiding an engagement, acknowledged our superi- 
ority and surrendered to the regiment and its patrols the con- 
trol of the territory between the two opponents. Ought the 
regiment now of its own accord relinquish this control and 
enable the hostile cavalry by a quick movement to gain its 
lost ground and thus make amends for the mistake of earlier 
in the day? It would "be very easy to do so. For example, 
if the hostile cavalry is on the Gr. Buchwalde-Rosengarth road, 
behind the forest screen held by the infantry outposts, and 
learns of the withdrawal of the ist Cavalry towards Kallisten 
(which hardly would remain concealed after Major D 's de- 
parture), it would only take about an hour for said cavalry 
again to be at Alt-Garschen or Heiligenthal. The Passarge 
also would protect it against a sudden attack if it should place 
adequate outposts opposite Kloben and Deppen; and the fol- 
lowing morning the ist Cavalry would have to force a defile 
before it could advance unmolested. 

The regiment might remain at Heiligenthal until dark, 
in the meantime having quarters prepared on the left of the 
Passarge. This would prevent the enemy's promptly discover- 
ing the withdrawal, but he nevertheless might accidentally 
reach Heiligenthal before the ist Cavalry again regained the 
right bank of the Passarge on the morning of May 6th. We 



Cavalry Outposts. 193 

would be trusting to luck instead of taking no chances, and 
would be sacrificing valuable time that should be devoted to 
rest and for which reason the step backwards would have taken 
place. 

It would be quite a long step, for some of the troops now 
at Heiligenthal must march back more than 4 miles. The 
thirt)''-odd miles traveled by them and by those to be sent to 
Kloben and Sackstein would be increased to nearly 40 miles; 
and it is pertinent to ask whether, as it seems necessary to go 
a few miles farther for suitable quarters, it would not be pos- 
sible to find some more suitable place than the hiding-place 
behind the Passarge. 

Such place cannot be found on the Deppen-Guttstadt 
highv/ay. Oueetz and Glottau are even more exposed than 
Guttstadt and Heiligenthal. Komalmen is too small. Wal- 
tersmiihl lies in a narrow valley close to the Passarge meadows, 
which restrict freedom of action. 

But Scharnick seems to offer what the colonel wants. 
Situated on the Liebstadt-Guttstadt highway, in close com- 
munication with the telegraph system, near enough to Gutt- 
stadt to closely watch it, far ahead of our own and near the 
enemy's flank, the regiment here would be at an advantageous 
spot ready for service early in the morning. 

Only a few miles would separate the regiment from the 
bridges across the Alle at Schmolainen, Kossen, Guttstadt, or 
Knopen, should it wish to get a view beyond the river. A 
hostile advance towards the Passarge would not escape the 
notice of the regiment, which would constantly be in a position 
to report progress of the hostile wing. It is true that the com- 
manding general has not yet issued his orders for May 6th, but 
even if the directions of 1 1 a. m. were not at hand, which repeat 
the general instructions and allow the colonel freedom of action, 
he in this contingency would have to decide for himself as to 
what he thought best for the regiment and most useful for the 



194 Studies in AppLiiiD Tactics. 

army corps and army. He practically would discontinue his 
reconnaissance against the hostile front, for, although several 
patrols would remain on the left bank of the Alle in front of 
the hostile outposts, it is to be expected that they will be forced 
back early on May 6th at the latest. They would be able to 
see little of what happens behind the hostile screen of outposts. 
The regiment even would open the way for the hostile cavalry 
to and across the Passarge, as the weak posts of observation at 
the bridges easily could be overpowered. If the colonel pictures 
to himself the corps commander's thoughts, in so far as this is 
possible without knowing what orders have been received from 
army headquarters or what information has come from the 
front through other channels than the ist Cavalry, he must 
feel satisfied that the disadvantages he would voluntarily incur 
would be of slight importance compared with the advantage 
of constantly remaining in touch with what is taking place on 
the enemy's outer flank. It is quite likely that nowhere else 
would it still be practicable to discover and report upon the 
depth of the hostile columns before they form up and come 
into action. Nowhere else could the regiment so effectively 
and successfully employ its fighting strength, either to relieve 
our own front, support the decisive attack, cover a retreat, or 
follow in pursuit. 

It still would be doubtful whether the regiment would 
reach the Guttstadt-Iviebstadt highway in time from quarters 
at Kallisten and Seubersdorf, even if there were no opposition 
to crossing at Deppen. We must count on the possibility of 
other hostile heads of columns arriving at Guttstadt on the after- 
noon of the 5th of May and by their advance on the morning of 
the 6th blocking the road to Pittehnen. The good line of com- 
munication gained at Scharnick via Liebstadt with corps head- 
quarters at Mohrungen would always make it possible to comply 
with an order of the commanding general sending the regiment 
in different directions from those so far considered correct. 



Cavalry Outposts. i95 

Judging by the map, the ground at Scharnick to a certain ex- 
tent favors a night's rest. To be sure, we shall not find the 
same ideal security and comfort as behind the Passarge, still, 
Zaun-see andthe former Lingnau-Lake("Ehe-maliger Lingnauer 
od. Sawangen-see " on map) cover a part of the front, in rear 
of which the two Scharnick estates A and B, and the village 
of Lingnau can be utilized for shelter. It is true that the 
country is quite open towards the east and north, and although 
so far there is no indication of danger threatening from these 
directions, the service of security must not be neglected there 
and will require some strength. 

The last objection that excited nerves might offer — viz., 
that the missing regiments of the hostile 2d Cavalry Division 
may be expected at Guttstadt in the evening, and that the 
enemy's superior numbers in the end might force the ist Cav- 
alry from its commanding place on the hostile flank — is pushed 
aside by the fearlessness of the soldier who does not allow him- 
self to be frightened. In the face of such untoward circum- 
stances, which so far have in nowise been foreshadowed, the 
regiment still would be more advantageously placed at Schar- 
nick than at any other point. The only change that might 
take place is that the cantonment at Scharnick and Tingnau 
probably would be changed into a bivouac at Wolfsdorf or 
Elditten. 

The colonel will issue his orders happy to think that it is 
not necessary for him to have his regiment fall back, but that 
the miles that lie between him and his quarters lead forward. 



Considerable space was allotted these reflections because 
it seemed a favorable opportunity to elucidate certain princi- 
ples concerning the conduct of independent cavalry as well as 
to show the reasoning that may precede the taking of an im- 
portant step. Many of my readers may have encountered 
difficulties in attempting to put themselves in Colonel A 's 



196 Studi£;s in Applie;d Tactics. 

place, and deduce for him a suitable and practicable plan out 
of the various possibilities presenting themselves. And yet 
the situation is not complicated or enigmatical, but compar- 
atively simple. It seems to me that the problem has developed 
itself naturally before the reader's eyes during the progress of 
events narrated, and is less obscure than is usually the case 
with scholastic problems in tactics that have to draw more 
extensively on the imagination to produce the "situation" 
desired. The problem does not call for an ingenious solution 
and is not intended to test the student's ability to discover and 
correctly apply a military principle presented in a vague and 
indefinite form. The regiment is not in an unusual stiuation 
which only a genius could fathom. On the contrary, the cir- 
cumstances are not at all unusual, but such as often occur in 
war. In my opinion, the difficulty mainly lies in the lack of 
opportunity to become familiar with the operations of larger 
bodies of cavalry in time of peace — particularly with the ques- 
tions of quarters and (3utposts for independent cavalry. There 
are few generals in the German Army who as staff officers have 
not drafted orders for detachments, advance guards, and out- 
posts of the combined arms in maneuvers, and who have not 
solved such problems in staff rides and kriegsspiel. But how 
seldom is it possible in time of peace to obtain practical ex- 
perience in the command of larger bodies of cavalry forming 
part of an army operating in the field on a war footing against 
an opponent similarly organized. The expenses of such exer- 
cises would be too great, and it would be out of the question 
to call out army corps for the sake of cavalry instruction who 
in the resulting maneuvers would do nothing for some days 
but march along in rear of the cavalry. Unfortunately, the 
few opportunities during grand maneuvers (Kaisermanover) 
often are circumscribed and spoiled by the necessity of com- 
plying with peace conditions, so that entire fieedom of action 
and decision but seldom obtains. The obstacles in the way of 



Cavalry Outposts. ^97 

organizing and carrying on reconnaissance on a war footing, 
and of taking the effect of fire into consideration (as explained 
in Part I.) add to the difficulties of command in this branch 
of the service. 

Military history furnishes but few examples illustrative 
of these principles as taught in maneuvers. The Napoleonic 
era dates back so far and deah with such radically different 
conditions that its examples but indifferently serve our purpose. 
Neither will Stuart's celebrated cavalry operations during the 
Civil War in America help us out of the dilemma because they 
took place in a different kind of country and had different ob- 
jectives from what would be the case with cavalry in Europe. 
Nor will our own campaigns of 1866 and 1870, the Russo- 
Turkish War, or the campaign in South Africa afford us suf- 
ficient instruction, as in no case tJie cavalry on both sides per- 
formed the part that must be expected of it in the wars of the 

future. 

It is not surprising, therefore, if things do not run smoothly 
in theoretical instruction, if it does not receive adequate atten- 
tion on staff-rides and at kriegsspiel. On account of lack of 
personal experience in the field and in maneuvers, the instructor 
hesitates to touch a subject where he must draw too much on 
his imagination. I am inclined to believe that we would take 
a long step in the right direction if annually we could have 
cavalry maneuvers of several days' duration under war condi- 
tions where regiment would operate against regiment and bri- 
gade against brigade; and if, whenever possible, cavalry divi- 
sions not only operated alone, but against each other under 
war conditions. The armies covered need not actually exist; 
they could be imaginary. The chief umpires soon would gain 
sufficient skill and experience to substitute messages for the 
actual appearance and co-operation of these bodies.* The 

^ have devised exercises for field artillery ^^^ere the infant^ 
and cavalry are imaginary. A similar arrangement could all the better 



198 Studies in Applied Tactics. 

extensive employment of a large number of well-trained, active, 
strict umpires would be a prerequisite ; also the adoption of 
rules based on the realities of war with reference to capture of 
prisoners, placing out of action, interception of messages, etc., 
as well as the use of the telegraph between commanders and 
umpires. As long as we lack the necessary experience we must 
all the more carefully and thoroughly think the subject over. 
The detailed discussion that I introduced concerning the situa- 
tion of the regiment was prompted by this fact. It also was 
intended as an object-lesson for the inexperienced — showing 
that by picking to pieces and testing the p'ros and cons of 
various propositions ideas can be shifted and a useful decision 
can be arrived at. The method is not infallible, but it some- 
times answers the purpose when quick intuition fails and when 
no war experience fitting the case comes to mind. The method 
in itself does not insure a correct decision ; but the more often 
such cases are thoroughly thought out, the more readily and 
easily a practicable patii will be found. But even the most 
gifted should carefully verify a quick decision. It is a myth 
that the art of troop-leading is based on sudden inspirations, 
and that campaigns and battles are unconsciously won by 
heaven-inspired genius. The very greatest of our generals 
have borne witness that their decisions have been the result of 
strenuous thought. All the more will careful, conscientious 
thought be necessary from lesser lights. 

But it would be a mistake to imagine that it was the right 
and duty of a leader in a certain measure to ask for time so 

be made for cavalry, because it, as a rule, is not in close contact with 
other branches of the service. The difficulties of obtaining forage would 
not prove insurmountable if all the villages in the maneuver area kept 
such supply on hand as they were able to spare, of which troops could 
buy for cash what they needed. Whatever was not used would remain 
the property of the community. There would be no difficulty in pro- 
curing the necessary food for the relatively small number of troopers 
from the villages. This manner of supplying food and forage would not 
be out of the way, because in time of war the cavalry would have to 
live off the country. 



Cavalry Outposts. 199 

that he alone or with the help of an assistant may think over 
the situation, when called upon to make a decision in the field. 
The mental superiority of a commander more particularly 
shows itself in an emergency by the cool methodical way in 
which he works. But it is seldom that at the last decisive 
moment there would be time for such a methodical analysis as 
is contained in the foregoing pages, and it would be dangerous 
to have the appearance of being in doubt. 

Before the moment calling for action is the time for clear- 
sighted thought, which prepares for possibilities so that you 
may not be surprised by the unexpected and taken at a dis- 
advantage. The more carefully and correctly every change 
in the situation and every report is tested and considered, the 
more you accustom yourself to look far ahead and weigh the 
arrangements that may be demanded in the future, the better 
will your mind be prepared for rapid decision. 

As a matter of fact. Colonel A was not suddenly called 

upon to come to a decision. The panorama of the situation 
was gradually unrolled before him, and long before the receipt 
of the last information (at 5 p. m.) he held council with him- 
self on the significance of details obtained from Major D , 

the messages from his own patrols and of those intercepted 
from the enemy, the prisoners, and inhabitants. Even before 
Lieutenant C personally brought information of the dis- 
covery of hostile infantry outposts. Colonel A concluded 

that hostile infantry would to-day reach the Alle, on account of 
the statement of the prisoner captured from the 6th Dragoons 
who yesterday delivered a message to an infantry major only 
1 5 miles from Allenstein. There was no more danger of lyieu- 
tenant C 's message misleading Colonel A into believ- 
ing that the hostile flank was located at Gr. Buchwalde, than 

there was of Colonel C 's message about hostile infantry 

at Schwuben and Kapkeim inducing him to believe that there 
was no possibility of Guttstadt being occupied later by the 



200 Studies in Applied Tactics. 

enemy. While the regiment was resting and watering, filHng 
nose-bags, and obtaining supplies generally at Heiligenthal, 
the colonel, presumably on Knoll 170, had two hours' time to 
think about the situation. It would have been during this 
period, in time of war, that most of the deliberation would have 
taken place which the student of the problems in this work can 
undertake only as the latter are presented in quick succession 
by the author. 

Colonel A could have come to a decision based on 

Lieutenant C 's message received at 4.30 p. m. But he did 

well to delay, for, if it proved true that the enemy's left flank 
actually was at Gr. Buchwalde, there would be no need to go 
farther north. In this case he would have been on the enemy's 
outer flank on the Kallisten-Guttstadt highway, and, being 
more than 6 miles from the enemy's infantry, could remain 
where he was. The message received at 5 p. m., concerning 
the hostile company at Schwuben, at once enabled the colonel 
to decide what to do, *as he already had thoroughly gone over 
everything that had been received before. 

It will be somewhat of a relief for junior officers to realize 
that as a rule the necessity to come to a decision does not pre- 
sent itself as suddenly as in practice problems. At the same 
time it must be remembered that in a campaign a commander 
must constantly tax his mental powers so as not to be surprised 
by occurrences, but to be prepared for the worst. As Hamlet 
says, "the readiness is all." 

The careful reader of military history often is surprised at 
the almost resigned air in Napoleon's letters written to confi- 
dential friends on the eve of battles, as if this great optimist 
and believer in his star and power wished to have a clear idea 
of the means of safety at hand in case the planned blow should 
fail. I also can refer you to Goeben, the general of unchal- 
lenged, dauntless determination, who told me that the night 
before the battle of St. Quentin he did not sleep, but for hours 



Cavai^ry Outposts. 201 

thought over the situation while referring to a map so as not to 
overlook a single chance presenting itself to him or the enemy, 
either for victory or defeat. 

Not only the last drop of blood and the last breath of horse 
and man must be risked to gain the end in view, but also the 
last particle of brain-fiber. 

Exigencies of the service often not only demand that jun- 
iors implicitly follow the orders of their superiors, but also that 
they willingly accept the latters' plans and views even if con- 
trary to their own. It therefore would be no waste of energy 
if any reader, who came to radically different conclusions from 

my own regarding Colonel A 's situation, would accept 

my own, and, based upon them, write out the arrangements 

to be made by Colonel A at 5 p. m. , before consulting the 

following : 

Arrangements Made by the Regimental Commander at 

5 P- M. 
After word had been sent to the lieutenant -colonel and 
squadron commanders to report to the colonel, the latter dic- 
tated the following report to three officers of his staff: 

I- Heiugenthal,, 

5 May, 5 p. m. 
To the Chief of Staff, ist Army Corps, Mohrungen: 

From I to 4 p. m. to-day the enemy established infantry outposts 
on the line Wilhelmsthal-Mondtken-Gr. Buchwalde-Munsterberg-Schwu- 
ben; also at Klutken mill and Lower (Unt.) Kapkeim. So far nothing 
has been seen of the enemy at Knapen, Guttstadt, or Kossen. No word 
has yet been received from the reconnaissance to the east via Guttstadt. 
No enemy was found at Freymarkt at 11-20 a. m.; an officer is now 
riding thence towards Heilsberg. Only the 5th Dragoons came through 
Guttstadt, who, in conjunction with the 6th Dragoons, at 3-20 p. m., 

went from Steinberg towards Polleicken. Major D left Schlitt for 

Pupkeim at 4-30 p. m., with 2 troops of the 3d Cavalry, to join Troop E, 
3d Cavalry, which crossed the Passarge at Briickendorf. At Briicken- 
dorf, in addition to wounded of the 6th Dragoons, there also were found 
some belonging to the 3d Dragoons. 

I am taking the regiment to Scharnick and Lingnau, where I intend 
to pass the night, and would request orders and information be sent me 
via Liebstadt to Lingnau. There are connecting-posts at Liebstadt and 
—14— 



202 Studies in Applied Tactics. 

Pittehnen. Small detachments will be left at Sackstein, Kallisten, and 
Kloben. 

I would request that Lieutenant G be retained at corps head- 
quarters to-morrow as observer. 

The colonel then dictates orders (2 and 3) to Lieutenant 

G and the regimental adjutant: 

2. 

To the Platoon Commander, Troop H, ist Cavalry, Kallisten: 

The regiment will go to Scharnick and Lingnau for the night. Your 
platoon will continue to hold the crossings at Kallisten and Kloben, and 
will be directly under my orders. Your messenger route will be via Heil- 
igenthal-Komalmen or via Sackstein- Kleinefeld-Wolfsdorf. The detach- 
ment at Sackstein will remain there for the night. 

3- 
To the Commander, Baggage Train, 1st Cavalry, Mohrungen: 

The train will at once move to Liebstadt, where it will go into can- 
tonment for the night and attend to its own safety. Report your de- 
parture from Mohrungen to me by wire via Liebstadt to Lingnau, and 
your arrival at Liebstadt via connecting-post at Pittehnen. Lieutenant 
G has authority to change or add to these instructions. 

Lieutenant G », who was one of the officers copying 

the report for corps headquarters, receives the following verbal 
instructions : 

"You will take 5 troopers and ride to corps headquarters 
via Kallisten and Willnau to deliver the report (No. i). At 
Kallisten you will give the commander of the platoon Troop H, 
ist Cavalry, this order (No. 2). 

"West of Willnau you may find outposts of the ist Divi- 
sion. You will acquaint the outpost and advance-guard com- 
manders with the contents of the report (No. i) as far as this 
is possible without losing time. You will take along two 
copies of the report (No. i); carrying one copy yourself and 
having one of your escort carry the other. You will take ad- 
vantage of every opportunity offered to send the report ahead 
more rapidly (cyclists or telegraph). I expect you to reach 
Mohrungen by 8 o'clock this evening. 



CavaivRy Outposts. 203 

"I will give you this order (No. 3) for the baggage 
train, which ought to be at the Mohrungen railway station. 
You may modify this order as may seem best to you." 

Lieutenant G departs after repeating his verbal in- 
structions, and after the colonel is satisfied that the officer is 
familiar with what has happened during the day. The colonel 
may possibly add some instructions as to what he expects the 
officer to do next day. 

The lieutenant-colonel and squadron commanders having 
arrived, the colonel gives them the following verbal instruc- 
tions in the presence of the squadron adjutants, who make 
the necessary notes: 

4. "The ist Army Corps will remain at Mohrungen, 
Pfeilings, Horn, and Kranthau to-night. 

"The enemy has established infantry outposts on the left 
bank of the Alle from Schwuben via Gr. Buchwalde and Mondt- 
ken to near Wilhelmsthal ; and on the right bank of the Alle 
at Klutken mill, north and northeast of Lower Kapkeim, as 
far as has been determined. Until quite recently the enemy 
had not appeared at Knopen, Guttstadt, or Kossen. Troop 
A, ist Cavalry, now at Queetz, sent an officer's patrol via 
Guttstadt towards Freudenberg-Tollack, but no report has yet 

been received from the latter. Lieutenant B at 11.20 

a. m. found Fre5^markt unoccupied by the enemy and then 
proceeded via Launau towards Heilsberg. At 3.30 p. m. hos- 
tile cavalry that was opposed to us left Steinberg, going to- 
wards Polleicken. Major D , with 2 troops of the 3d Cav- 
alry, is en route from Schlitt to Pupkeim to join a third troop 
of the 3d Cavalry, which crossed the Passarge at Briickendorf. 

"The troop of the hostile 5th Dragoons which this morn- 
ing retreated via Klogehnen from before Captain E gained 

the right bank of the Passarge at Sportehnen. At this point 

Sergeant K , who was following, lost trace of it and went 

to Wormditt. 



204 Studiks in Applied Tactics. 

"I intend having the regiment spend the night at Schar- 
nick and Lingnau, starting thither shortly via Komalmen. 
The i^^ Squadron will lead and will be charged with the protec- 
tion of the column towards the north, northeast, and east. 
It will occupy Lingnau and will make arrangements for the 
protection of this place as well as of the cantonment of the 
entire regiment on a front extending from the former Lingnau- 
lake (inclusive), to the Beiswalde and Neuendorf railway, and 
thence to a point on the creek between Beiswalde and the 
Scharnick-Regerteln highway southwest of Beiswalde. 

"Troop A for the present will continue as reconnaissance 
troop under my immediate orders, and provisionally will go 
to Neuendorf; but probably will spend the night with the 
squadron at Lingnau. 

"The ist Squadron is charged with watching the crossings 
of the Alle below Kossen, especially the two bridges at Schmol- 
ainen, as well as the roads leading to Liewenberg, Sperlings, 
and Launau. Requisition may be made on Beiswalde and, 
if necessary, also on Regerteln and Neuendorf. 

"The remainder of the regiment, under the lieutenant- 
colonel, will occupy Schamick. It will follow the ist Squad- 
ron, and is charged with the protection of the column towards 
the northwest, west, and south. Later it will protect the front 
of the regiment from the former Lingnau-lake (exclusive) , past 
the north end of Zaun-see, across the Scharnick-Heiligenthal 
highway to the Lingnau-Wolfsdorf road, and thence across 
the Scharnick-Regerteln road, joining the outpost of the ist 
Squadron southwest of Beiswalde. In front of the outpost, 
the roads to Freymarkt and Wormditt and the Guttstadt- 
Kallisten highway must be carefully watched. This part of 
the regiment also will keep up the connecting-posts with Pit- 
tehnen. Requisition may be made on Komalmen, Warlack, 
and Wolfsdorf. Troop G will receive separate orders and will 



Cavalry Outposts. 205 

continue in observation of the hostile outposts. Provision will 
be made for quarters for it at Scharnick. 

"The detachments at Liebstadt, Pittehnen, Sackstein, 
and Kallisten will remain in position and will receive orders 

from me. 

"The ist Squadron will reserve quarters in Lingnau for 

regimental headquarters. 

"The baggage train has been ordered to Liebstadt. It 
will not be at the disposal of the troops. The 1st Squadron 
may start in 15 minutes, provisionally going only as far as the 
north end of Zaun-see. The column must keep off the parts 
of the highways that are visible from the east. 

"All detachments necessary to provide for the service of 
security and information of the regiment and for preparation 
of quarters will be sent out at once. 

"In case of attack, the quarters occupied will be defended." 

The lieutenant-colonel and commander of the ist Squad- 
ron will require some time to think about the new situa- 
tion and their instructions, and to compose their orders, so 
that more than 15 minutes will pass before the column can 
start. The regimental commander has time to make further 
arrangements. 

He dictates the following orders : 

Heiligenthal, 
^' 5 May, 5-25 P- m- 

To Commanding Officer, Troop G, 1st Cavalry, at Rosengarik; and 
Commanding Officer, Troop A, 1st Cavalry, at Queetz: 
At 4 p. m. a hostile company of infantry established an outpost 

The regiment is about to march to Scharnick and Lingnau to pass 

^ "xroop G for the present will continue as reconnaissance troop under 
my immediate orders, and will watch the hostile outposts Unless cir- 
cumstances should forbid, it may take quarters for the night at Schar- 
nick, but will be responsible that touch is retained wrth the enemy from 
Wolken to the vicinity of Steinberg. A platoon of Troop H is at Kal- 
listen and Kloben. 



2o6 Studies in Applied Tactics. 

The I St Squadron will provide for protection at Lingnau and Beis- 
walde. At 6 p. m. Troop A will proceed from Queetz to Neuendorf under 
cover, and will continue as reconnaissance troop under my immediate 
orders. It may take quarters for the night at Lingnau, but will be re- 
sponsible that touch is maintained with the enemy to the north of Wolken 
on both banks of the AUe. 

I shall expect a report from both troops at Lingnau not later than 
8 o'clock this evening. 

I shall attend to the detachments at Herzogswalde, Liebstadt, and 
Pittehnen. 

The crossings of the Alle north of Kossen and the roads to Liewen- 
berg and Launau will be looked after by the ist Squadron. 



To the Connecting Post, Pittehnen: 

Read the inclosure and promptly forward it to Liebstadt. 

Inclosure : 

To the Connecting-Post, Liebstadt: 

The sub-joined telegram for corps headquarters to be wired at once- 
The connecting-post at Liebstadt will see that the detachments of the 
I St Cavalry at Gr. Hermenau and Herzogswalde will at once come to 
Lingnau via Pittehnen. 

The connecting-posts at Liebstadt and Pittehnen will continue their 
present duty. * 

By order of Colonel A : 

B , 

Adjutant. 

Telegram to corps headquarters, Mohrtmgen: 

Near HeiligenThal, 
5 May, 5-30 p. m. 
There are hostile infantry outposts at Lower (Unt.) Kapkeim, 
Schwuben, Miinsterberg, Gr. Buchwalde, and Mondtken. Enemy not at 
Knopen, Guttstadt, or Kossen. To-night the regiment will remain at 
Lingnau. Request orders via Liebstadt. 

A , 

Colonel. 

7. Near Heiugenthal, 

5 May, 5-35 p. m 
To Detachment, at Sackstein: 

The regiment goes to Lingnau. The detachments at Pittehnen, 
Sackstein, and Kallisten will remain in place. 

Numbers 6 and 7 are prepared in duplicate and No. 5 in 
triplicate, so the regimental adjutant will have a retained copy. 
They will be forwarded by messengers, preferably such as know 
the way. To attain this end and to sax^e men, it is usually 



Cavalry Outposts. 207 

advisable not at once to send back men who have come with 
messages, but to hold them until they can carry back a mes- 
sage or an order. 

Numbers 6 and 7 will be taken by one man, who will con- 
tinue on his way from Sackstein to Pittehnen. 

Finally, the colonel will send a non-commissioned officer 

and 3 men of Troop H to look for Major D , 3d Cavalry, 

in the vicinity of Pupkeim, and verbally tell the latter that 
the ist Army Corps will pass the night at Mohrungen, Pfeil- 
ings, and Horn, while the regiment will stay at Lingnau and 
Scharnick, leaving a platoon at Kallisten and Kloben. Should 
the major not be found at Pupkeim, then the non-commissioned 
officer is to ride via Neu-Kockendorf to Briickendorf, where 
presumably there is a connecting- post. The non-commis- 
sioned officer is to inquire where the major will stay for the 
night and what further information has been received. Then 
he is to ride to Kallisten and join the platoon of his troop at 
that point. A written report from the non-commissioned 
officer is to be sent to Lingnau. 



It can be confidently asserted that every single case deal- 
ing with the conclusion of a day's work of a body of cavalry, 
in the future coming to any reader's notice, will differ from 
the one above described. It therefore would be a loss of time 

to study Colonel A 's arrangements as prospective models. 

But it will pay to examine the wherefore of some of these ar- 
rangements, so as to derive mental benefit from such examina- 
tion of the reasons. 

The first thing to be done was to send a report to corps 
headquarters. The earlier they know about the situation at 
corps headquarters, the better can commands be issued to 
suit the case. A colonel reports in a dififerent way from a 
patrol-leader. He summarizes results while, as a rule, a young 



2o8 Studies in AppIvIKd Tactics. 

officer or a non-commissioned officer is limited to reporting on 
individual cases. 

Colonel A included in his report several pieces of 

information concerning Major D , and possibly already 

reported by the latter. Major D 's further advance that 

afternoon notwithstanding the exhaustion of his troops, and 
the appearance of troops from the 3d Dragoons, whose pres- 
ence heretofore had not been suspected, make it highly prob- 
able that he will meet with difficulties and that there might 
be trouble about his messages getting through to headquarters. 

On this account Colonel A 's addition to his report 

will be welcome at Mohrungen. One of the regimental staff 
officers is to carry the report, not only because he will be able 
to give the commanding general further details about the events 
of the day, but also to insure orders later going back to Ling- 
nau and to furnish instructions to the baggage train. Certain 

details omitted by Colonel A because he thought them a 

side issue might be of iftiportance to the commanding general; 

and while Colonel A does ask that orders for him be sent 

over a certain route, still, he has a right to expect more de- 
tailed accounts of what is worth while for him to know, if sent 
by his special representative. During the evening of May 5th 
there is so much to be done at corps headquarters that in the 
bustling activity something of importance to the regiment 
easily might be overlooked and fail to reach it in time on the 
6th, as an early start must be made. The officer is to remain 
at corps headquarters May 6th and see that the regiment is 
informed of everything of importance for it. It is not custom- 
ary to have observers with superiors ; they are more necessary 
with neighboring commands not under an immediate superior, 
for the personal interest of a superior is closely enough inter- 
woven with that of his subordinates. And Colonel A 

would not have taken this step had he not anyway been obliged 
to send an officer to headquarters with a strong escort who 



Cavalry Outposts. 209 

would not be able to get back to the regiment in time and who 
at the same time has sufficient authority and discernment to 
judiciously direct the baggage train. 

The colonel abandons the idea of having the train join the 
regiment. The staff officer will be unable to deliver the report 
at corps headquarters before 8 p. m., and the train cannot be 
counted on leaving before 9 p. m., probably not reaching Lieb- 
stadt before midnight. It would be 3 a. m. before the train 
could arrive at Scharnick and Lingnau, an hour at which the 
regiment, owing to the strained situation, no longer would be 
able to make use of the facilities offered by it. Very likely 
any orders for the train to join the troops in their cantonment 
would have to be revoked and this might necessitate special 
arrangements for protection. 

But it seems right and proper that the train should be 
ordered away from Mohrungen, where it is in the midst of the 
troops of the army corps. This seems a favorable opportunity 
to examine what the train has accomplished during the day. 

To be sure, it did not assemble at Maldeuten until 6 a. m., 
but as the regiment left at 5 a. m. the train began its work 
long before this. The escort certainly did not get up any later 
than the members of troops, and in most instances the horses, 
too, were harnessed before 5 a. m. Since 9 or 10 a. m. the 
column has halted on the road at Mohrungen, to continue its 
march late in the evening. It was impossible to obtain any 
real rest during the long wait. Although men and animals 
were able to obtain the necessary food, it was not possible to 
unharness the animals. The commander and non-commis- 
sioned officers had the difficult task of maintaining order; and 
every officer of experience knows what that means with an 
army corps marching by and a neighboring town to encourage 
infraction of orders. It is not too much to assert that a halt 
of nearly 1 2 hours at Mohrungen under such conditions is more 
wearing than would have been an additional march of 12 miles 



2IO Studies in Appliijd Tactics. 

on the smooth highway. Arriving at Liebstadt at midnight, 
the train will be nearly at the end of its tether, although in more 
than 1 8 hours it traveled only about 18.5 niiles on a good road. 
The baggage trains of all troops almost daily encounter similar 
discomfort, and unfavorable weather and bad roads increase 
the difficulties in a high degree. Although the regiment in 
this case has the prospect of obtaining food and forage in the 
neighboring localities, and thus is not dependent on the sup- 
plies carried in the baggage train, I wish to call attention to 
the difficulties that might arise under other conditions. Lack 
of supplies can destroy the best of plans and dampen the enter- 
prise of the most intrepid leader, particularly in the cavalry, 
where efficiency of the horses depends so much on forage. 

A cavalry commander especially must think of supplies, 
because this matter does not concern him in time of peace, and 
because the system of forwarding supplies and the training of 
the personnel in all European armies undoubtedly are not up 
to date. While all other appliances of war have been greatly 
improved by taking advantage of modern inventions, we are, 
as far as forwarding of supplies is concerned, almost on a 
mediaeval basis, once the support of railways fails us; for we 
depend almost entirely on the many thousand wagons, none 
of which can go much farther than 18 miles a day, and carry 
comparatively small loads. 

The colonel gives his instructions verbally to the lieuten- 
ant-colonel and squadron commanders; dictation would take 
too long and is not really necessary, as any misunderstanding 
readily could be rectified almost at any time. 

Everything about the situation might be omitted that is 
already known to these commanders. 

Different arrangements for the march and the night posi- 
tion might be ordered and still answer the purpose. The 
reader who took the trouble to work them out will have recog- 
nized the difficulties of the case notwithstanding its appearing 



Cavalry Outposts. 211 

very simple at the first glance. I have attempted to so arrange 
the duties that the colonel would have nothing more to do with 
details, and to shorten the line of outposts as much as pos- 
sible, so that a minimum number of men would be needed. 

The colonel waits with issuing orders for the troops to 
occupy their quarters. He provisionally has the regiment 
go as far as the north end of Jaun-see, because he is not yet 
certain that he can carry out his intentions. Further infor- 
mation about the enemy at the last moment might necessitate 
a change. But the detachments to prepare for the occupation 
are to be sent out at once, so that the reconnoitering and pro- 
tecting screen may be formed in the new direction before dark 
and prevent any farther delay in the regiment's going to rest. 
The colonel already has decided what to do in case of 
alarm, because the orders for the squadrons in part depend on 
this. They would have to make very different arrangements 
if, in case of sudden attack, the troops were not to defend the 
villages, but had to assemble beyond them. It is easy to see 
why the colonel decided not to assemble his men in case of 
attack. The whole regiment in a way is on outpost-duty and 
so near the enemy that in case of a sudden attack there hardly 
would be time to get out the horses. As the effort presumably 
would have to be made under fire, it would result in confusion 
and interfere with the efficiency of the men in the dark. If 
there is timely warning of an attack— if plenty of time will be 
available— there is nothing to prevent the colonel's subse- 
quently ordering the men to mount, should he consider it 
advantageous. It would be inadvisable to designate a place 
of assembly for the entire regiment even if it seemed certain 
that under all circumstances the men would act mounted. 
The colonel would thereby unnecessarily tie his hands. Any- 
way he would have to send the order to assemble to part of 
the regiment not m the first line, and it is just as well to wait 
until then before informing the men where the place of assembly 



212 Studies in Applied Tactics. 

is. Even with troops quartered in a single village, it is advis- 
able to have different places of assembly for smaller units. 
Scharnick, which is more protected and seemingly] more com- 
fortable, is not selected for regimental headquarters, but Ling- 
nau, so the headquarters may be nearer at hand to receive 
information from the outpost and guards. 

It anyway is out of the question for the colonel to expect 
a quiet and comfortable night. 

As the colonel by his orders to his subordinates has rid 
himself of the details of protection, he can the more completely 
give his attention to watching the enemy, and the terrain, and 
supervising the movements of the two reconnaissance troops. 
The services of the latter cannot yet be dispensed with and 
must not be disturbed. Relieving them just now would cause 
confusion in reconnaissance work, no matter how much it is 
to be desired that Troop A be relieved and allowed to rest; a 
better opportunity must be awaited. On the other hand, it is 
contemplated to have Both troops join their respective squad- 
rons for the night, so they may be relieved at least from the 
care of providing for their own protection. But it will depend 
on the enemy whether or not they can take advantage o this 
favor. 

A joint order was drawn up for the two troops, so they 
might mutually understand their orders and co-operate in 
carrying them out. 

The connecting-post had to have orders in any event, and 
this opportunity to send a copy of the report to corps head- 
quarters by wire could not be missed. 

Touch with Major D is somewhat relaxed by the 

regiment's departure; hence a non-commissioned officer is 
sent to Pupkeim, but without any written communication, 
because there is considerable danger of a written message fall- 
ing into the enemy's hands. As elsewhere in this study, so 
also here, the length and number of orders and arrangements 



Cavalry Outposts. ii3 

may cause surprise. It certainly would be desirable to shorten 
and reduce the number, but I did not succeed in doing it. In 
my opinion, any attempt at this would open the door to con- 
fusion and misunderstandings. The time required might be 
somewhat shortened by the discovery of various expedients 
during the routine of a campaign. For example, the com- 
mander might permanently intrust a capable officer of his 
staff with looking out for communication to the rear and to 
the flanks and with preparing and suggesting all arrangements 
to this end. In the present case this officer might have drawn 
up the orders for the detachments at Kallisten, Sackstein, 
Pittehnen, and Liebstadt, and might have suggested the send- 
ing of a telegram to corps headquarters and of a patrol to 

Major D . 

In view of the number and length of the instructions that 
a cavalry commander must order and dictate at such a time, 
it is interesting to imagine to what extent his work would 
accumulate should he wish to retain the actual reconnaissance 
work in his own control. It would be almost hopeless to make 
all the arrangements now necessary for sending information 
of the new situation to the officers' patrols far ahead, for clos- 
ing the gaps in the screen, and for providing the additional 
patrols to be sent out with suitable instructions. Five or six 
additional orders would be necessary, and even then there 
would be no certainty that provision had been made for ob- 
serving the enemy at every point and that protection was 
assured the command. It is simpler and surer to let the recon- 
naissance troops attend to this matter. 



The arrangements of the lieutenant-colonel and the com- 
mander of the ist Squadron, now to be considered by us, would 
have to be made by the map even in time of war. Therefore, 
the reader who wishes to work out these arrangements is not 
placed in an unnatural position by not being able to see the 



214 Studies in Appi^ied Tactics. 

actual ground. But it must be remembered that to-day, May 
5th, the weather is fine, while it rained for several days before. 
The rivers and creeks are flooded. The meadows in places 
cannot be crossed by teams or moimted men. It was learned 
at Heiligenthal that the bed of what once was Lingnau Lake 
can only be crossed by single footmen with experienced guides. 

What arrangements are made by the Lieutenant- 
Colonel AND THE Major commanding the First Squadron 
AT 5.30 p. M. ? 

During the ride to Heiligenthal these two ofi&cers confer 
with each other and agree about the junction of their re- 
spective outposts on the creek about 1,100 yards northeast of 
Scharnick. Upon arriving at the halting-place of the troops, 
the troop commanders are informed of the situation. 

The commander of the ist Squadron, who has also called 

up Lieutenant H , Troop C, and Lieutenant J , Troop 

D, adds the following; 

"The squadron is ordered to occupy quarters at Lingnau. 
I shall give fiurther information on the subject on the spot. 

Lieutenant H will ride ahead, divide the village among 

the four troops, and select quarters for regimental and squad- 
ron headquarters. To Troop B will be assigned the buildings 
at the exit towards Guttstadt; and to Troop C, those at the 
exit towards Wolfsdorf . The safest part of the village will be 

reserved for Troop A. Lieutenant H will attend to forage 

for all the horses ; and will have the people commence cooking 
in all the dwellings. If sufficient oats cannot be found at 
Lingnau, a further supply will be requisitioned from Beis- 
walde. The different troops will let the lieutenant have the 
necessary men. 

"Troops B and C will be the outpost troops.* 

*See par. 190, F.S. R. 



Cavalry OuTPosts. 215 

"Troop B's section of outpost will extend from the bed 
of Lingnau Lake across the Lingnau-Neuendorf highway to the 
railway, along this to the Lingnau-Altkirch road (exclusive). 
"Troop C's section begins at this road (inclusive) and ex- 
tends west across the Lingnau-Beiswalde road to the creek 
flowing from Scharnick towards Regerteln. At a point on this 
creek about 1,100 yards northeast of Scharnick the outpost 
will join that of the troops quartered in Scharnick. Each of 
the two troops will at once send forward a detachment of such 
strength as may seem necessary to provide for protection. 

"Lieutenant J with a platoon of Troop D will ride to 

Altkirch, beyond the line of the outpost, where he will watch 
the Guttstadt-Sommerfeld road, the crossings of the AUe be- 
low Kossen-particularly the two bridges at Schmolamen-and 
the roads leading to Liewenberg, Sperlings, and Launau. He 
will remain at Altkirch over night and will be under my im- 
mediate orders. 

"The squadron will start immediately and at first will go 
via Komalmen as far as the north end of Zaun-see. 

"Troop B will act as advance guard. It will be followed 
by Troop C and the latter by Troop D. 

' ' Parts of the highway visible from the east will be avoided 
bv turning to the west of the road." 

^ The captain of Troop B is instructed to send a patrol to 
Queetz to keep in touch with Troop A and to act as a protec- 
tion towards the south and southeast in the district between 
Zaun-see and the former Lingnau-see until the outpost from 
the remainder of the regiment arrives there. 

The lieutenant-colonel also has two lieutenants present 
when he issued his orders, which are as follows: 

' 'The 2d and 3d Squadrons will follow the ist in the follow- 
ing order: Troops E, F, H, and 3d Squadron. Troop M will 

form the rear guard. Lieutenant K , Troop E, with one 

platoon of his troop, will at once proceed to Scharnick, where 



2i6 Studies in Appued Tactics. 

he will provide quarters for my headquarters, Troops E, F, G, 
and the 3d Squadron. Troop E will be located at the north exit, 

and Troop F at the south exit of the village. He (Lieut. K ) 

will have at least 275 bushels of oats sent to Scharnick from 
Wolfsdorf, and prepare a supply of oats, hay, straw, and food 
for the men, in the various districts of the town. Lieutenant 

L , with a platoon of Troop E, will precede the regiment 

to Regerteln, where he will watch the Altkirch-Arnsdorf- 
Wormditt highway and the roads leading to Gronau, Frey- 
markt, Arnsdorf, and Dittrichsdorf. He will remain there 
during the night. Troops E, F, and H are designated as out- 
post troops. Troop E's section of the outpost begins at the 
creek flowing west of Beiswalde from Scharnick towards Regert- 
eln. The right flank will join the left flank of the outpost of 
of the ist Squadron about 1,100 yards northeast of Scharnick. 
The outpost will extend along this creek past the cross-roads 
north of Scharnick (which must be permanently held) and to 
opposite the north side of Scharnick B, which northern side it 
must locally protect. 

"Troop F will continue the line from west of Scharnick 
B for about 900 yards along the creek. It will locally protect 
the west, south, and east sides of Scharnick A and B. It will 
establish a detached post at the western exit of Wolfsdorf to 
watch the roads leading to Petersdorf , Dittrichsdorf, Kalkstein, 
and Kleinefeld, and keep up communication with the connect- 
ing-post at Pittehnen. 

"Troop H, of which one platoon will remain at Kallisten 
under the immediate orders ol the colonel, will form a section 
of the outpost extending from that of the ist Sqtiadron at the 
south end of the former Lingnau-see past the north end of 
Zaun-see, to the left of Troop F's section, and will permanently 
observe the Guttstadt-Kallisten road. The captain will ride 
ahead to his position at the north end of Zaun-see and will re- 



Cavai,ry Outposts. 217 

port to me what he intends doing. The troop may draw on 
Komalmen and Warlack for supplies. 

"The necessary detachments will be sent out at once. 

"The detached post of Troop F for Wolfsdorf will ride via 
Walter smiihl-Kleinef eld as a flank guard for the regiment." 



Even less than in former cases can the commanders' deci- 
sions be looked upon as typical. There is entirely too much 
room for variations. My dispositions are intended simply to 
enable the reader more readily to test his own work. If, judg- 
ing by my dispositions, he concludes that his are practicable, 
and contain everything necessary, then they are all right. 

The lieutenant-colonel and the commander of the ist 
Squadron have deferred issuing orders concerning the ways 
and means of providing shelter and the arrangements for de- 
fense. They will proceed to the spot with the troop command- 
ers (ahead of the men) and issue orders in accordance with the 
nature of the villages and their surroundings. This cannot be 
settled by the map. In place of this, some remarks will be made 
that somewhat anticipate the regular course of events. If the 
quarters lay on the left of the Passarge, or a long ways from 
the enemy, the superior officers would need to concern them- 
selves only that men and horses obtained good shelter and 
ample food supplies. Everyone, with the exception of a few 
guards and sentries, could sleep. The proximity of the enemy 
to Scharnick and Lingnau calls for greater precaution. 

Comprehensive arrangements have been made to watch 
the enemy and his avenues of approach. A circle of outposts 
will surround the quarters of the regiment. Still, sudden at- 
tacks are not precluded. The patrols might be pushed aside 
at some point and the outposts be surprised. A sudden attack 
from hostile infantry, whose nearest bodies are at Schwuben 
5 or 6 miles away, is to be feared only in case parts of the chain 

—15— 



2i8 Studies in Appwkd Tactics. 

of outposts should fail. But it is always possible that under 
cover of darkness hostile infantry might approach within sev- 
eral thousand yards of the quarters of the regiment without 
being discovered, when, possibly, the firing of the pickets 
would give the alarm. During daylight hostile cavalry, dis- 
persing the advanced detachments, might appear in front of 
the pickets almost at the same time with the report of this 
advance. A sudden attack by cavalry at night is less likely, 
because even in open country it would largely have to advance 
along roads and therefore be discovered in time. 

But we must not become pessimistic; such enterprises 
seldom take place on a large scale in modern war. As a rule, 
the advantages of success do not compare with the attending 
dangers ; and success often depends on chance and on such an 
accurate knowledge of the enemy as is but rarely available. 
And in hostile territory we find the additional obstacles of un- 
known ground and difficulty of obtaining reliable guides. Not- 
withstanding all this, w^ must be vigilant ; a single case of care- 
lessness may be severely punished. The English repeatedly 
found this out in South Africa. Nevertheless, the troops should 
be allowed as much rest as is at all possible under the circum- 
stances. It is difficult to find the correct middle course. Very 
properly, therefore, outpost duty is very carefully performed 
in the German Army ; so far only larger bodies of cavalry have 
suffered from not having sufficient opportunity in this line. 

Apparently the village of Lingnau consists of a number of 
farm-houses separated from the adjoining fields by picket or 
board fences, and occasionally by a low stone wall. The village 
street is narrow. The northwest and southeast exits and the 
east side of the village are most exposed to a sudden attack. 
The provisional division of the village among the troops into 
four approximately equal parts forms a good basis for defense- 
The major will order as follows: 



Cavalry Outposts. 219 

"Each troop will be responsible for the defense of its sec- 
tion of the village. The horses will be niainly placed in the 
farm yards west of the village street, each troop seeing that 
exits to the west exist from these yards. Sentries will con- 
stantly guard the perimeter of the village. Guards will be 
located at the eastern side and at the exits of the village. In 
case of alarm the horses will remain in place under suitable 
guards previously designated. The remaining men will as- 
semble at their respective troop assembly-places armed only 
with fire-arms, and will be handled by the troop commanders. 
A platoon from each of the two interior troops (A and D) will 
remain on the village street at my disposal. Troop A will keep 
a sentry-post at the farm-yard about 200 yards in front of the 
east side of the village. The entrances to the village will be 
blocked by wagons, but in such a way that single horsemen 
may readily pass. As far as practicable, a good lighting of the 
street and farm-yards will be provided for by means of lamps 
and lanterns. The horses will be unsaddled, unless there should 
be a change during the evening, bringing the enemy nearer. 
But several horses must be kept ready for immediate use in 
each troop. The men will not undress, and will keep their 
fire-arms beside them for immediate use." 

Similar arrangements will be made in Scharnick. There 
need be no hesitancy about placing the horses under cover in 
sheds, barns, and stables. For here it is not a question of hav- 
ing the men mounted and ready to move. On the contrary, 
the better the horses are provided for, the fewer men will be 
needed to guard them and the better they will be protected 
from bullets. If we wish to defend the quarters., we cannot at 
the same time be in the saddle. If we wish to do the latter, 
quarters cannot be occupied at all, but the command must 
bivouac with horses saddled and bridled, if necessary. This 
might be necessary if, for instance, we were opposed to superior 
numbers of enterprising cavalry with horse artillery. 



220 Studies in Applied Tactics. 

In such a case the defense of an isolated village might 
prove the ruin of the bravest cavalry regiment. 

The commander may choose between the two alterna- 
tives ; a combination of the two would lead to half-way meas- 
ures and uncertainties. 

Everything that has been seen and heard of the enemy 
during the day, and the distance from his outposts, justify the 
taking of quarters in the two villages, so as not to waste any 
strength for the coming day. 

Protection. 
Having previously disposed of the subject of quartering 
troops because it would be difficult later to interweave this in 
the study, and because the principles concerned must be familiar 
to subordinates if they are to act in conformity with the views 
of their superiors, we now can turn to the duties of individual 
troops, which afford an opportunity to discuss important ques- 
tions concerning outpssts. 

What arrangements does the commander oe Troop 
b make after receiving the instructions of the squadron 

COMMANDER AT HEILIGENTHAL? 

Troop B, as outpost-troop, will take post in Lingnau at 
the exit towards Guttstadt. Its section of the outpost will 
extend from the bed of Lingnau Lake across the Lingnau- 
Neuendorf highway to the railway, and along this to the Ling- 
nau-Altkirch road (exclusive). There is no road across the 
bed of Lingnau Lake. According to the map, the meadow in 
this lake bed is marshy and presumably impassable for horse- 
men, and during the night also for footmen. It is unlikely 
that hostile troops will venture on this uncertain ground. The 
troop commander probably will find out the nature of this 
underfeature at Heiligenthal. On the supposition that the 
information agrees with what has been assumed, it will be 
necessary only to observe this meadow, unless an inspection 
should prove that other measures are necessary. 



Cavalry Outposts. 221 

The troop commander, who has explained the situation 
to his officers and non-commissioned officers, therefore orders 
as follows: 

"The third platoon under Lieutenant R , will ride 

ahead to Lingnau, going along the highway as far as the north 
end of Zaim-see and thence past Height 141, will occupy the 
exit towards Guttstadt, and temporarily will see to the protec- 
tion of the regiment's quarters from the north end of Lingnau 
Lake bed to the Lingnau- Altkirch road (exclusive), which will 
be occupied by Troop C. A strong picket will be required on 

the Lingnau-Neuendorf highway. Sergeant N and 3 men 

of the 3d Platoon will ride to Queetz and obtain touch with 
Troop A, which at 6 p. m. will go thence to Neuendorf and 
which should be kept in view. He will protect the march of 
the squadron towards the south between Zaun-see and former 
Lingnau-see, and will return to the troop at Lingnau as soon 
as the outpost has been established in this region by the re- 
mainder of the regiment." 

The captain waits with giving orders about observing the 
bed of Lingnau-see until he shall arrive on the groiuid. 

Lieutenant R , covered by a point, trots ofif almost at 

the same moment as Lieutenant J , Troop D, who is ordered 

to Altkirch, and as the platoon of Troop C which is going to 
the north end of Jaun-see to act as a protecting force. In this 
way the three officers have an opportunity mutually to discuss 
their duties and plans and can agree on a plan for mutual 
support. 

It will be 5.50 p. m. before they reach Komalmen. Behind 
them they see their squadron following them on the road from 
Heiligenthal. Continuing their ride, they can see Troop A 
moving from Queetz towards Neuendorf. 

About 6.30 p. m. they reach Lingnau. Lieutenant R 

proceeds to the slight elevation east of the southern exit of the 
village. From this point he obtains quite an extended view. 



222 Studies in Applied Tactics. 

It is true that Beiswalde is hidden by Knoll 143 and 133, but 
to the northeast Altkirch can be seen and beyond to Schtno- 
lainen woods (Schmolainer Wald). Almost all of the highway 
between Guttstadt and Altkirch can be seen, the Guttstadt 
railway station and church-tower can be seen as well as Neuen- 
dorf and the greater part of the railway from Guttstadt to the 
Ivingnau-Altkirch road. South of the bed of Lingnau-lake 
whose impassability for horsemen in the meantime has been 
determined, the view is limited by the hills along the former 
southern shore of the lake. 

Lieutenant R has half of his platoon dismount at the 

southeast exit of Lingnau and with the other half rides forward 
along the Lingnau-Neuendorf highway. The bend of the road, 
where a field-road leads north towards the railway, seems to 
him a suitable place for the intended picket, after learning that 
a ravine in his front, across the highway, is an awkward obstacle 

for horsemen. He gives Sergeant C 12 men and instructs 

the sergeant as follows (the sergeant already has been informed 
of the situation in general and instructed about the surround- 
ing country) : 

"You form picket No. i on the Lingnau-Neuendorf high- 
way to protect Lingnau along a front extending from here to 
the Lingnau- Altkirch road (exclusive). Your picket is not 
large enough to establish a vedette in the ground north of this 
highway. For the present it can be seen from here ; after dark 
you must send patrols along the railway as far as the road to 
Altkirch, which will be watched by Troop C. I shall send you 
supplies in two wagons, use the latter to block the bridge across 
the ravine ahead of you as soon as Troop A, now at Neuendorf, 
returns to Lingnau, but leave a passage-way for patrols. You 
will inform Troop A of your orders and location." 

After Lieutenant R inspected the ground along the 

railway, he returned to Lingnau. It is now 7 p. m. The ser- 
geant whom he left at Lingnau posted several dismounted men 



Cavalry Outposts. 223 

in the farm-yards at the village entrance, and has one man as 
a lookout in a gable-window affording a good view. The horses 

are in rear of one of the houses. Sergeant O (picket No. 

i) reports that Troop A has learned nothing new about the 
enemy, and that it has orders to return to Lingnau. 

In the meantime the squadron commander, hastening 
ahead of his command, has arrived at Lingnau with his troop 
commanders, and has informed these of the already described 
arrangements for quarters and defense. 

The commander of Troop B, proceeding with his own 

duties, has Lieutenant R report. Although the space 

between the highway and the road to Altkirch is not watched 
by a vedette, the captain does not make any change, because 
it would take 9 men for a vedette-post and because he knows 
that another troop will establish a post at the farm-yard about 
200 yards east of Lingnau. He personally verifies the correct- 
ness of Lieutenant R 's statement, and of the villagers, 

that the bed of the former Lake Lingnau will not bear the 
weight of a horse, but can be crossed only by single footmen, 
led by a guide. After taking but a few steps the ground gives 
way under his horse's feet. Therefore the meadow insures 
against an attack from that direction. But it seems unfortu- 
nate that the squadron's position can be seen from the hills 
along the Queetz-Neuendorf road. It must seem very desir- 
able to prevent hostile patrols from obtaining a view from that 
direction, and the little wooded knoll south of Number 116 
seems to be a good place for a post to prevent the approach 
of hostile troopers. But the post would have to be quite strong ; 
it would not be advisable to have less than 12 men on account 
of its isolation. The captain is all the more averse to establish- 
ing such a post because its line of retreat, which would have to 
be either via Neuendorf or past the south end of Lingnau Lake 
bed, might easily be cut off. He decides to chance it and not 
send anyone to the exposed point. But the troop on the right 



224 Studies in Appi<ih;d Tactics. 

is requested to keep hostile patrols away from the former south 
shore as far as possible. 

The captain sends word to the picket on the highway that 
it must not build any fire. In other respects he makes no 
changes in Lieutenant R 's dispositions, who with the re- 
mainder of his platoon forms the exterior guard at the village 
entrance. 

At 7.40 p. m. Troop A arrives at Lingnau from Neuendorf. 
Its captain reports to the captain of Troop B that no change 
had been noticed in the hostile position; that Kossen, Schon- 
weise, Klingerswalde, Battatron, and Knopen are not occupied 
by the enemy ; that he had left an officer with a platoon at the 
Guttstadt railway station, who is to keep touch with the enemy 
and observe the roads to Schwuben and Wolken; that he re- 
cently had seen hostile patrols near Glottau and Queetz; and 
that he had informed the sergeant of Troop B on the highway 
between Neuendorf and Lingnau of these details. 

The sun set at 7. id p. m. (central European time). Twi- 
light fell as the squadron located itself in Lingnau. At 8.30 
p. m., by which time it was possible to see only a few paces 
away, lively small-arms fire is heard towards Neuendorf and 
the flash of shots can be seen. The call to arms is sounded at 
Lingnau and, as the men hasten to their places along the edge 
of the village, hostile skirmishers appear out of the darkness 
on and alongside the road and are promptly fired upon. 

What has happened? 

Sergeant O , commanding the picket at the bridge on 

the highway, after Lieutenant R left him, and after he had 

looked about and posted two men dismounted at the bridge, 
divided his picket in the following way: 

Double sentry-post and reliefs 6 men. 

For messenger and patrol duty 3 men. 

Horse-holders 3 men. 



Cavalry Outposts. , 225 

He designated a slight elevation about 100 yards northwest 
of the bridge as the place to be occupied as dismounted skir- 
mishers by the 4 men forming the reliefs of the double sentry- 
post, in case of hostile attack. Then, in accordance with Lieu- 
tenant R 's orders, he sent one trooper to Troop A at Neu- 
endorf and two others to the picket of Troop C on the Lingnau- 
Altkirch road to assure mutual understanding and become 
familiar with the ground along the railway before dark. As the 
sergeant has no map, his instructions concerning the ground and 
the enemy must be limited to a short statement of what he 
has learned on the subject, especially the direction where the 
enemy is. Then he turned his attention to the 10 horses, which 
he placed in a little depression near the road and just back of the 
position to be used for firing. As any injuries the horses may 
have sustained could not be detected in the dark, and it would be 
difficult to shift the saddles then, he hastened the necessary ar- 
rangements and had the horses watered by threes and fours in 
the ravine on the highway. The reliefs of the double sentry- 
posts assist in this. A couple of loose horse-shoes were tightened, 
an inflamed tendon was wrapped in a wet bandage, and a bruise 
was treated according to directions. The overcoats were put 
on and the pockets filled with cartridges, and, if there were any 
oats left in the nose-bags, the horses were fed by threes. The 
sergeant must not only superintend, but must here and there 
assist. He had not the time to sharply reconnoiter for the 
enemy, or to carefully orient himself, any more than to estimate 
and determine the distance to various points. His work was 
interrupted by the passing of Troop A and the receiving of 
information from its captain, as well as by blocking the road 
at the bridge with the two wagons that came from Lingnau. 

Immediately after the return of the patrol and messenger 
he wanted to have their horses attended to; but Captain 

E 's information about hostile patrols having appeared 

from Queetz and Glottau induced him to send two troopers 



226 Studies in Applied Tactics. 

to the farm lying about i,ooo yards south of Neuendorf to 
look about there. They returned very soon at a rapid gait 
and reported that south of Neuendorf they had encountered 
hostile patrols. Fortunately the most important work with 
the horses — the shifting of saddles and watering — had been 
finished. But three horses were unbridled and were eating 
from their nose-bags. The sergeant gave the order, ' ' Skirmish- 
ers to your post!" and rushed there himself. Behind him the 
three horse-holders, assisted by the members of the patrol, 
were busy bridling the horses. The sergeant's eyes were fixed 
on the enemy. He saw horsemen appear at Neuendorf and 
dismount; he promptly opened fire on them. Then he called 
to the members of the patrol that two of them should promptly 
join him with their rifles. In the meantime the enemy, who 
had been able to approach alongside of the road under cover 
to about 300 yards, opened fire. The led horses had become 
restless when the picket's firing began. They threatened to 
stampede when several shots were fired from the grove south 
of the highway and one of the horses was wounded. The enemy 
at this point partly enfiladed the position of the eight men who 
were firing. The sergeant therefore abandoned the position 
and gave the order, "Run to your horses and mount!" On 
account of the approaching darkness and the enemy's bullets, 
the order was carried out in some confusion. Only a part of 
the men succeeded in mounting, and they fled in a northwest- 
erly direction, followed by riderless horses that had escaped 
their holders. 

The episode terminated in a few minutes, so that the hos- 
tile skirmishers soon thereafter appeared in front of Lingnau. 

It was some time before the lively fusillade from the vil- 
lage could be stopped, notwithstanding the officers' soon dis- 
covering that only a few shots were fired in return; and an 
hour passed before Lingnau and Scharnick, which also had been 



Cavalry Outposts. 227 

alarmed, again became quiet and the picket at the bridge had 
been re-established. 

Apparently a strong hostile patrol had caused the alarm. 
The actual damage sustained was slight. One man and one 
horse of the picket had been wounded, and one horse killed. 
Unfortunately, it was quite likely that the enemy obtained 
valuable information about the regiment from the calls to 
arms and the lively fire from Lingnau. 

If the fictitious account of this sudden attack on a small 
scale seems plausible, if it is actually possible to so easily and 
completely drive in a picket, if it offers so little protection that 
a hostile patrol can, almost without opposition, come near the 
quarters of the main body and alarm the latter, then there is 
something that must be remedied. 

The arrangements made for the occupation and defense 
of Lingnau, according to the theoretical test just described, 
have proven satisfactory. On account of the definite instruc- 
tions that in case of alarm the village was to be defended ex- 
clusively by fire action and that nobody should mount, it may 
be confidently assumed that the arrangements would have 
sufficed in case of attack by complete troops. The reader 
surely will appreciate the sanity of these arrangements if he 
pictures to himself what would have been the state of affairs in 
Lingnau if the squadron after the alarm had tried to mount as 
rapidly as possible, if the attack had not been made by a 
patrol, but by a couple of troops. The most complete state of 
readiness, depriving men and horses of all rest, would not have 
been able to prevent great confusion. Almost the same dis- 
order would have been produced by a sudden attack on a 
bivouac west of the village and would have forced the troops 
to a retreat across country in the dark. 

It is self-evident that the main body should not be forced 
under arms by every enterprise of an intrepid hostile patrol- 
leader. 



228 Studies in Applied Tactics. 

We shall thoroughly investigate matters and see whether 

Sergeant O or his superiors are to blame and whether a 

more careful observance of regulations could prevent the re- 
currence of such a mishap. Re-establishing the picket-post 
on the highway, after the hostile patrol has been driven away 
by bullets from Lingnau, will probably take place under the 
protection of a line of skirmishers which will advance as far as 
Neuendorf and not be withdrawn until the picket has been 
established and instructed by the captain in person. Very 
likely the captain largely increases its strength, assigning an 
entire platoon under an officer to this duty. 

We usually take special pains to cover a well after a child 
has fallen into it. He would order the picket commander con- 
stantly to keep patrols out in front, especially towards Glottau, 
and on the road to Guttstadt to keep up communication with 
the platoon of Troop A at the railway station. Possibly the 
squadron and regimental commanders will approve of these 
new arrangements, at the same time not concealing their dis- 
approval that there was not a larger picket under an officer at 
such an important point from the beginning. 

The remainder of the night may pass quietly and the un- 
lucky captain may resolve in the future to place a large picket 
under an officer on every highway and important road. Will 
this be a surety that the unwelcome incident will not be re- 
peated? Would it have been avoided if a platoon under an 
officer had been in the place of Sergeant O and 12 troopers? 

Both questions can be answered in the negative after very 
little reflection. The result might have been equally unfortu- 
nate if the hostile mounted detachment sent against Lingnau 
had consisted of 20 to 30 men, or if a body of 10 to 12 troopers 
encountered a small picket of the German outposts, 

A smaller force of hostile troopers might have been less 
likely to attack the bridge on the highway, and in so far an 
increased strength of the picket would have insured greater 



Cavalry Outposts. 229 

security. But the fire of a small number of skirmishers was 
sufficient to make the post untenable as soon as the horses 
came under fire. It would have been hopeless to post a pla- 
toon on every road leading towards the enemy and use up half 
the regiment on outpost. The actual cause of the damage 
did not lie in a mistaken estimate of strength. It would be 
driving out the devil through Beelzebub were we to make the 
protecting force so strong that but little remained to be pro- 
tected. Were there no way to overcome the difficulty, the 
colonel doubtless would have done better to forego the advan- 
tages of the Scharnick-Lingnau position and to have occupied 
the safe quarters on the left of the Passarge. Even a bivouac 
near Lingnau with horses saddled and bridled would have re- 
quired the same large force for the outpost as the occupied 
and defensible village. 

A second question is, whether the colonel possibly did not 
make a mistake when he ordered that Troop A should return 
to Lingnau from Neuendorf. Had the troop remained at Neu- 
endorf, the picket at the bridge surely would not have been 
surprised. But in what condition was this troop at Neuendorf? 
In the saddle since 4 a. m. and reconnoitering by means of 
numerous patrols riding rapidly in all directions, it has exerted 
itself more than any other part of the regiment, and by means 

of detachments (Lieutenant B to Heilsberg, Sergeant K 

to Wormditt, connecting-posts at Liebstadt, Gr. Hermenau, 
and Pittehnen) has given up a considerable number of its 
men. During the afternoon other patrols were sent out, for 
the troop had to continue the reconnaissance around the hos- 
tile flank and remain responsible that touch is kept with the 
enemy in the whole district north of Wolken. It probably did 
not reach Neuendorf with more than 40 or 50 men. If it is 
to spend the night there, rest and recuperation will be out of 
the question. It will be impossible to unsaddle at this exposed 
point in front of the outpost, and while one-half of the men 



230 Studies in Applied Tactics. 

will be required for fatiguing guard duty, the remainder must 
remain with the horses, which it may be impossible even to 
feed and water. Nothing could be expected of the troop the 
following day. If the troop at Neuendorf affords the regiment 
greater security from attack on the Neuendorf-Guttstadt high- 
way, it itself is the more exposed to one and its strength 
would be totally exhausted. 

If the regiment were on the left of the Passarge, a recon- 
naissance troop also would have to remain between the Pas- 
sarge and the Alle. But this one would be able to select some 
retired, easily defended place in the woods or near an isolated 
farm-yard. We would not, for the sake of following the model 
which requires that a reconnaissance troop be out in front, 
leave a troop a thousand yards in front of the outpost and, 
by confusing the objects of the two, make a protecting detach- 
ment out of the reconnaissance troop. 

We doubtless have become convinced that the colonel made 
no mistake in his order§ to Troop A. 

The arrangements for protection made by the colonel and 
his immediate subordinates but little resemble those described 
in the German Field Service Regulations as normal formations. 
According to the latter, the outpost-troops, located in advance 
of the main body, are the foundation of outpost service — send- 
ing out pickets and vedettes. The progressive decrease in size 
of the detachments to the front, as with infantry, is intended 
to provide security by a buffer-like elasticity. In the present 
case this system was impracticable. It would have been neces- 
sary to send out at least three outpost- troops : one each towards 
Altkirch, Neuendorf, and Queetz; and in addition to have 
strong protecting bodies nearer Scharnick and Lingnau and 
in these villages themselves. If, in addition, there were recon- 
naissance troops beyond this outpost, probably not more than 
one-fourth of the regiment would have been able to rest — an 
arrangement that would be condemned by any sensible man. 



Cavai^ry Outposts. 231 

Even under normal conditions — i. e.,m a cavalry division — the 
system of the Field Service Regulations would seldom be used. 

As long as a cavalry division is in front of an army, its 
place of shelter for the night will offer a broad front, or flank, 
or both, to the enem)^ When the brigades of a cavalry divi- 
sion are located side by side, only the middle one will be able 
to get along with a single outpost-troop. The flank brigades 
in addition will probably have to employ one or more troops 
as a protection for flank and rear. If the quartering of troops 
is to accomplish its purpose, we must not crowd entire regiments 
or brigades into single villages. Requirements of space and for- 
age are very great for mounted troops. Let us imagine a cav- 
alry brigade (2 regiments) in place of one regiment, and assign 
it Waltersmiihl, Warlack, Scharnick, Lingnau, Wolfsdorf, and 
Kleinefeld. Six or seven troops, about one-fourth of the 
whole force, would be required to provide for protection after 
the manner prescribed in the Field Service Regulations. 
And if Zaun-see and the bed of Lingnau-lake were not available 
as obstacles, an eighth troop might be required. If ' ' detached " 
or reconnaissance troops are added, we see that such an arrange- 
ment would be applicable only during short maneuvers and not 
during a campaign. The disproportion existing between space 
required for quarters and fighting strength of cavalry calls for 
economical "housekeeping." This is what was decided upon 
in the ist Cavalry. All of the outpost troops except Troop H, 
whose duties we are still to examine, are quartered with the 
main body, so as to afford part of their men and horses some 
rest and refreshment as well as have the men help in the de- 
fense of the quarters. 

The objection that outpost-troops should not be with the 
main body might be obviated by not calling them by this name, 
but simply instructing certain troops to provide the protect- 
ing bodies. Then the latter, on account of the small size of 
the main body, would take the place of outpost-troops. But 



232 Studies in Applied Tactics. 

in this event the regimental and squadron commanders would 
dispense with the intelligence and experience of the captains, 
the efifectual assistance obtainable within a troop, and the op- 
portunity the troop might have to do additional reconnoiter- 
ing. Such an arrangement would help matters theoretically, 
but not practically. 

The arrangements made by our regimental commander 
and his immediate subordinates are based on the solicitude to 
avoid scattering and prematurely exhausting the strength of 
the command; on the urgent necessity to let the greater part 
rest after the exertions of the day, so as not to be obliged to 
report on the morrow, as did the German cavalry on August 
15, 1870, that the used-up condition of the horses would pre- 
vent a charge; and finally, on the conviction that the defense 
of strongly held localities is the best protection against night 
attacks. But if we agree with these officers, the question arises 
whether they would not have done well to send the pickets 
farther to the frontf so as to enlarge the protecting circle, in- 
crease the distance of the troops in quarters from the outpost, 
and increase the time and space necessary in a hostile attack- 
ing force to reach the place where the troops are quartered. 

However desirable at a first glance the increased distance 
might seem, it would not materially remedy the evil. The 
location of outposts primarily depends on the conformation 
of the ground. 

The use of the bed of Lingnau-lake as an obstacle in itself 
prohibited placing the picket on the Lingnau-Neuendorf high- 
way any farther forward; and the ravine across the road sim- 
plified the picket's duties. It would have been necessary to 
place the picket in rear of this ravine even if the latter had been 
nearer Lingnau. But a shortening of the line of outposts 
also is in conformity with economy of men. Even if the ravine 
had not existed, it is doubtful if it would have been well to 
push the picket farther forward. 



Cavalry Outposts. 233 

If twelve men at the ravine were not a matcli for the hos- 
tile patrol, twice the number would not have answered the 
purpose nearer Neuendorf. But had the picket been placed 
at Neuendorf, it would have been necessary to push forward 
the pickets of Troop C and thus make use of more men. The 
farther forward the pickets were placed, the easier could they 
be driven in. Notwithstanding their being increased in strength, 
they would not have increased the security of the troops covered. 

The cause of the mishap at the bridge on the highway is 
no more to be found in the colonel's and squadron commander's 
arrangements than in the smallness of the picket. Perhaps the 
captain made a mistake not to send out a patrol beyond the 
picket, as he must have realized that the latter was not strong 
enough to do so. However, the fate of the picket would have 
been changed but little by sending a patrol towards Glottau. 
At the most it would have replaced the two troopers sent for- 
ward by the sergeant, who could do nothing but report the 
approach of the hostile patrol; unless, perchance, by venturing 
farther forward, it had been driven aside. It was of no conse- 
quence whether the report was received by the sergeant a few 
minutes sooner or later. And it was only a question of minutes, 
for in the darkness the enemy could not be recognized until quite 
near. Therefore, the captain's omission did not cause the 
picket's mishap. Was the conduct of the sergeant and his 
men the cause? 

We cannot accuse the sergeant of violating any provisions 
of the Field Service Regulations. On the contrary, we may 
justly claim that he displayed skill and discretion at his post. 
There is only one thing he did not do : he did not make provi- 
sion to derive the utmost advantage from his fire-arms. He 
did not estimate or pace the distances towards the enemy so 
that every man might use the correct elevation. 

Such precaution might have been of advantage with suf- 
ficient light to see the sights. 

—16— 



234 Studies in Applied Tactics. 

A court-martial trying the case justly would have to take 
into consideration the work necessary with the horses that re- 
quired the sergeant's time and attention. The court also would 
consider that in view of the near approach of darkness, after 
which these arrangements would have lost their value, they 
very properly had to give way to the care of the horses, for 
which purpose the remaining daylight had to be utilized. 

Upon the appearance of the enemy the sergeant promptly 
did all he could. He quickly brought every available rifle into 
the firing-line, so that he was able to open fire before the enemy. 
He could confidently omit sending any message to the captain. 
The firing gave the alarm. It would have taken time, would 
have interfered with observing the enemy, and would have 
diminished the small number of rifles by one. 

The bullets of the alert picket presumably would have 
quickly driven away any hostile patrol by chance coming as 

far as Neuendorf, and Sergeant O surely would have been 

commended for his sensible and determined action. But ap- 
parently the hostile patrol attacked pursuant to a previously 
arranged plan. Dismounting at Neuendorf and enveloping 
the picket from the south indicates this. 

How should the picket have acted under such an attack? 
The sergeant had received no special instructions for such case. 
It would be impossible to provide for all possible contingencies. 
Reason and memory would fail, and surely some unforeseen 
factor would enter that would upset the most careful instruc- 
tions. The picket knows that it is to protect the main body 
against surprise and enable the latter to prepare for action. 
This is and must be sufficient to act as a guide. At the same 
time the one giving the order as well as the one ordered must 
understand that it is not the province of outposts to indefinitely 
maintain themselves against an attack by superior numbers. 
Every part of the outpost that is seriously attacked eventu- 
ally miist retreat. It is simply a question of when and how 



Cavalry Outposts. 235 

the retreat will begin. But tactical instructions as well as 
individual orders often omit a consideration of this point which 
pertains to outpost service. 

Who would censure Sergeant O for deciding to retreat 

when he became aware of the enemy's superiority and of the 
flanking movement as shown by the enemy's bullets enfilading 
his line and reaching his horses. If anything, he gave the order 
to mount too late, rather than too early. To begin an engage- 
ment at all with the enemy dismounted and only a few hundred 
yards away was in itself a very questionable proceeding, because 
the line of retreat lay across an open field. In such a situation 
the command to mount lifts the latch and opens the door to 
confusion. The very best men might lose their nerve if, after 
hastily firing for a few minutes, they have to run back, followed 
by bullets, to mount restless and excited horses ; and the best 
of horsemen will not be able to control the herd-instinct of his 
horse, which will impel it to follow the other stampeding horses. 

Therefore, the conclusion of my description cannot be 
charged with exaggeration. Even by day the ending would 
have been the same. Darkness at least interfered with the 
enemy's aim. Daylight would have increased the casualties. 
The longer the picket remained under fire the worse became 
its plight. The wounding of a single horse-holder might result 
in the escape of all the led horses. The procedure, sometimes 
advocated theoretically, of firing a few well-aimed shots, then 
quickly mounting, and getting away, might prove very danger- 
ous, when opposed to hostile fire, if the led horses are not per- 
fectly sheltered and if the retreat is not covered in such a way 
that the retreating horsemen cannot be overtaken by hostile 
bullets. 

What was gained by the troopers' succeeding, notwithstand- 
ing all difficulties, in mounting and, turning their backs on the 
enemy, quickly disappearing in the darkness. Did the picket 
accomplish its object? 



236 Studies in Applied Tactics. 

The few shots that it fired at the enemy surely did little 
damage. Imagine yourself in the place of the dismounted 
troopers, whose leader from the beginning of the skirmish must 
divide his attention between the enemy and the led horses and 
must anxiously watch that he will not give the command to 
mount half a minute too late. What can we expect of his fire- 
control ? Will his men use the correct elevation and aim care- 
fully? Their scattering fire will simply act as a signal. A 
few shots fired in the air would have done equally well. It 
is expected that the picket not only will check a patrol, but also 
a larger detachment. But here a few hostile troopers — less 
than are in the picket — are able to clear the way in a very 
short time. 

If we examine the other parts of the so-called line of pro- 
tection that envelops the regiment, we shall find that in but 
few places a sudden attack would have fared any worse. The 
lack of defensive and protecting power in the picket does not 
seem to have been an ^exception, but the rule. Likewise, where 
a main body has obtained protection behind a natural obstacle, 
outposts as a rule are sent out beyond the obstacle. The pick- 
ets of such outposts are in the same situation as Sergeant O 

at lyingnau, and every "detached" or reconnaissance troop 
camping by itself is expected to protect itself by such pickets, 
which, however, are such unreliable protectors. 

We have already noted that a prolonged resistance not 
only made mounting the horses very dangerous, but also might 
have caused the loss of the led horses. The stronger the picket, 
the greater the troop's danger. It will be very seldom that a 
place for the horses, protected from all directions, can be found 
in the immediate vicinity of the place for defense. How far 
away is it permissible to keep the horses? Even 200 or 100 
yards are sufficient to withdraw them from the picket com- 
mander's care. But the skirmishers must have them close to 
the firing-line if they are to be able to begin firing promptly. 



Cavalry Outposts. 237 

In case of sudden attack, they must not be required to run 
several hundred yards to get into position ; and yet their services 
cannot be spared in providing and caring for the horses. 

Would it have been permissible for the sergeant to send his 
horses back to the troop to be rid of them? 

From one-fourth to one-half of the men are needed as 
horse-holders if the led horses are to be easily moved about, 
which is necessary in case it is doubtful if the horses can remain 
where the men dismounted. Thus 3 or 4 men would be needed 
as horse-holders, reducing the total number of men available 
as skirmishers to 9 or 8. But what would the captaiu say if 
in such cases the picket's horses invariably were brought back 
to the troop, to be again called for as soon as the hostile patrols 
disappeared? This plan could only be followed by day and 
over short distances, and would produce imbearable annoyance 
among the outposts. 

We come to the conclusion that the sergeant has incurred 
no blame, and that neither a strengthening of the picket nor 
having it commanded by an officer would have positively 
averted the mishap. Had the picket commander foreseen 
the disastrous results of his order to mount, he might have 
decided to abandon the horses to their fate and stand fast 
with his 8 or 9 men to save his reputation and honor. But 
what would be the consequences if every hostile patrol could 
produce such a dilemma with only a few shots? 

That optimism brings but poor consolation which would 
have us believe that such a surprise would seldom happen and 
that our bullets are as unpleasant for the hostile patrol as 
theirs are for us. Do we not demand of our troopers that 
they take advantage of every means to guess the enemy's in- 
tentions? Has not the world lived to see the examples of 
the American troopers and of the Boers, whose achievements 
largely consisted of such surprises. What right have we to 
assume that our future opponents will be lacking in similar 
enterprise and skill? 



238 Studies in Applied Tactics. 

It is precisely against sudden attacks that protecting 
bodies are to guard and, if they are not able to do this, then 
the whole outpost service is a delusion and a snare. Although 
the garrison of Lingnau occupied the edge of the village in 
time, it was a question of minutes. Who knows if it would 
have succeeded had everyone but the guards been asleep. If 
the pickets are capable of no more than of giving the alarm by 
firing, there is nothing for the cavalry to do but to camp at a 
distance from the enemy or behind an obstacle. Then Colonel 

A 's decision to spend the night in Scharnick and Lingnau 

was a venture which placed the night's rest so urgently needed 
for the morrow's efficiency in the hands of a few venturesome 
hostile patrols. 

We hope that the blue patrols will not be inferior to the 
enemy in boldness and cunning. At Gr. Buchwalde and Miin- 
sterberg, at Schuwben and Lower Kapkeim, they will attempt 
to see beyond the screen of hostile outposts — wherever woods 
and twilight will enable them to approach unobserved. Why 
should not one or the other of them attempt a surprise, like 
the enemy at Lingnau, to alarm the main body and obtain 
reliable information about his position? 

The patrol would venture much and gain little. A few 
shots fired at an outpost* do not disturb the hostile main body. 
No call to arms awakens the men from their sleep. Even the 
attacked picket is not endangered. It continues firing and, if 
necessary, falls back until the next subdivision of the outposts 
comes to its assistance. The intrepid cavalry patrol might con- 
gratulate itself if it escapes without serious loss. It has seen 
and heard but little more than before. 

Lack of success was not due to superior efficiency of the 
enemy, but to his having infantry on outpost which cannot be 
harmed by a little skirmish firing and does not have to look 
out for led horses. 



*Infantry outpost in this case. 



Cavalry Outposts. 239 

The reader has long ago guessed at what I am aiming. 

If cavalry wishes to secure peace and quiet in its bivouacs 
and cantonments, if it wishes to be protected from sudden 
attack and the annoyance of hostile patrols, if it wishes to be 
able in an important case to halt for a night near the enemy, it 
must model its service of security after that of the infantry. 

' ' Fire-arms should be the principal means of resistance in 
all parts of the outposts."* This is the main doctrine of the 
German Field Service Regulations concerning cavalry outposts, 
and in harmony with this is the provision that vedettes as a 
rule will be dismounted, f But there is no intimation what 
shall be done with the horses that now, when their rapid feet 
can be spared and the rider leaves the saddle, are everywhere 
in the way and interfere with the effective and prolonged use 
of fire-arms. The paragraphs dealing with cavalry outposts 
take for granted that the horses remain with the riders : ' ' Pick- 
ets and vedettes will not unsaddle. " . . . "In exceptional 
cases men detailed to watch the enemy remain mounted." 
. . . "The picket commander regulates the rest of horses and 
men, the unsaddling, watering, and feeding. "J 

It would be exceptional to depart from these rules. But 
we have become convinced that as a rule horses interfere with 
and are an impediment to the proper performance of picket 
duty. Energetic commanders have taken great pains and end- 
less care in trying to drill their horses so that they could be left 
with very few men during dismounted fire action. Their efforts 
have failed. Raising horses in the cultivated lands of Europe 
and keeping them in farm and barrack stables seems to make 
it impossible to train them as is done by the Boers in South 
Africa, on the pampas and prairies of America, and in the 
Arabian deserts. But even if success should follow continued 



*See par. 199, F. S. R. 
tSee par. 195, F. S. R 
JSee par. 199, F. S. R. 



240 Studies in AppIvIEd Tactics. 

effort, very little would be gained for the service of security. 
We could not prevent tlie horses of the pickets being reached 
by hostile bullets, and they could never be quietly led back 
by a few men when under fire. 

The only remedy is to separate the dismounted men from 
their horses, so that the service of security of cavalry may 
acquire the benefits of infantry. 

Of course there are some objections to this measure. If 
a trooper is separated from his horse, we relieve him of the re- 
sponsibility for the horse, which will not be cared for by a 
strangre as it would by its own rider. The horse is no ma- 
chine. Its peculiarities, its pains and sorrows are known to and 
will be respected by him only who is to ride and make use of 
its strength. And the man whose horse is taken from him 
also loses control of his horse-equipments, pack and saber. 
The interior economy of a troop is made more difficult the 
moment there is any deviation from the principle that every 
man once and for all belongs to his horse, that only both to- 
gether represent a cavalryman. This principle has obtained 
with all nations of riders and was adopted in the service regu- 
lations and customs of modern armies, where, so far, it has been 
almost unqualifiedly recognized. The trooper who was armed 
only with saber or lance, and possibly with a pistol, when he 
dismounted, so to speak, had to keep one foot in the stirrup ; 
for only in the saddle was he ready for action. 

As until quite recently only a part of European cavalry 
was armed with rifles or carbines, we find that almost every- 
where cavalry pickets and vedettes had to mount as soon as 
the enemy approached ; for the latter, too, only fought mounted. 

But to-day we no longer find any cavalryman without a 
good long-range magazine fire-arm. The dismounted trooper 
is no longer defenseless. The campaigns in America and South 
Africa have plainly demonstrated his fighting power with the 
rifle. This has been clearly recognized in Europe. In the 



Cavalry Outposts. 241 

armies of continental Europe great stress is laid on increased 
use of fire-arms by cavalry, especially in outpost service. But 
our cavalry has not yet derived the full benefit of this powerful 
weapon. We still hesitate to have our cavalry act on foot as 
extensively as it might. Everywhere we see remnants of in- 
herited customs and rules that interfere with the general use 
of powder and ball. 

The surprise at Lingnau has not fully demonstrated all 
of the disadvantages due to keeping the led horses with the 
pickets. There was continuous movement and noise at the 
picket from the moment it arrived at its post. Any hostile 
scout soon must have been able to discover the location and 
strength of the picket from the shifting of saddles, feeding and 
watering of horses, and departure and return of messengers 
and patrols. A surprise is the more easily planned and ex- 
ecuted because work with the horses absorbs the men's atten- 
tion. The horses' pawing, neighing, and snorting resounds far 
into the night and interferes with hearing sounds from a distance. 
The stronger the picket the louder the noise produced. As 
shifting of saddles, feeding, and watering can be attended to 
for but about one-fourth of the horses at a time, and takes about 
half an hour for each party, a long time is required to complete 
this work; and the horses must again be fed and watered be- 
fore sunrise. There is always something to be attended to with 
horses, if greater damage is to be avoided. The men detailed as 
horse-holders cannot attend to their duties all night long; but, 
as a rule, only the reliefs of the double sentry-post and occa- 
sionally a messenger are available to relieve and assist them. 
There is hardly a man who will find time to sleep. Tired and 
sleepy men will be posted as sentries, and equally tired ones 
will have to look out for the horses. Guard duty will suffer 
under the continuous mental and physical strain and disturb- 
ances, where bright eyes and keen ears are so urgently needed. 



242 Studies in Applied Tactics. 

And at dawn an exhausted man will mount an equally exhausted 
horse. 

Now let us imagine a picket whose horses have been left 
with the troop. Nothing will prevent the leader and his men 
from giving their entire attention to guard duty from the first 
and continuing to do so to the end. The sentries can easily 
be concealed — in case of necessity, a bush, a slight depression 
in the ground, or a roadside ditch will answer. While the 
leader from an elevation is scanning the surrounding country, 
his men, without being interrupted by other work, can prepare 
the place for defense and estimate distances. In a short time 
everyone becomes familiar with the locality, and arrangements 
for the night are quickly made. In place of haste, noise, and 
confusion, we have order and quiet. It will be difficult for 
hostile patrols to discover the location of the picket or discover 
its strength. Their long-range fire, which might prove dan- 
gerous for led horses, will be harmless. If they carelessly 
come too near, they ar^ more likely to be hit by the deliberate 
fire of the alert sentries or the picket than by the hasty firing 
of men called away from their horses. It also will be more 
difficult for the enemy to attack the concealed and poorly- 
reconnoitered picket unexpectedly, than would be the case with 
a group of restless led horses seen at a long distance. Should 
the enemy nevertheless proceed to the attack, he will be met 
by well-aimed fire, and that not only for a few seconds or 
minutes. For, in place of the anxiety about the led horses 
ordinarily in the leader's mind, and which constantly made 
him remember that under no consideration must he be too late 
in giving the command to mount, he simply need endeavor 
to hold his post as long as possible. His picket will be able 
to offer a prolonged and obstinate resistance. There is no 
longer any danger from surprise. The enemy must develop 
a superiority of force and execute his flanking movements be- 
yond rifle range and with a loss of time. If the picket is finally 



Cavalry Outposts. 243 

forced to retreat, its resistance is not yet ended. Its next halt 
to fire forces the enemy to halt again and make new arrange- 
ments. A knowledge of the ground also will insure advantages 
for the picket over the assailant. 

;. ' It is only under these conditions that the picket com- 
mander can see to it that the troops in rear of him are not 
surprised. It is only now that he can insure them the neces- 
sary time to get ready for action. 

The psychological element plays an important and decisive 
part in every branch of warfare ; therefore it demands its rights 
also in outpost service. The most courageous patrol-leader, 
the man who in an attack does not know the meaning of fear, 
may become timorous and vacillating if, on outpost duty, he 
does not know whether he is to stay and fight or to mount and 
ride away. 

But there is no longer any room for doubt if the horses are 
taken away. A knowledge of what is expected of him will 
cause even the less resolute man to follow the right path. 
During the course of a protracted campaign a cavalryman will 
often be on outpost, and the feeling of depression and lack of 
confidence he there encounters must act unfavorably on his 
morale and shake his confidence in his leaders. He is similarly 
affected by the nervousness that often enough prevails in the 
main body the moment firing is heard, when everyone knows 
how little dependence can be placed in the outposts. 

The moment it is decided to withdraw the horses from the 
advance part of the outposts, these anxieties disappear and 
are transformed into their opposites. The duties devolving on 
the individual trooper on outpost increase his confidence in 
his fire-arm and in his own power. The cavalry sentry who 
heretofore had to fear that an alarm might be caused by any 
shot fired, now may cheerfully fire on every venturesome foe 
that comes within reach ; knowing as he does that a few shots 



244 Studies in Appi^ied Tactics. 

no longer will cause any commotion,* But the enemy who 
several times has felt the effect of well-aimed bullets will stay 
farther away and see less. As there will be fewer opportunities 
for successful surprises, there will be fewer occasions when the 
night's rest will be disturbed. At times it may be an advantage 
to have the pickets mistaken for infantry and thus deceive the 
enemy as to the real state of affairs. We learned this to our 
sorrow when German patrols on August 15, 1870, reported the 
existence of French infantry pickets on the Yron, north of 
Mars-la-Tour, when for a fact they consisted of dismounted 
cavalry. This report helped to confirm the German generals 
in the erroneous impression that the French Army of the Rhine 
was retreating from Metz towards Verdun. 

So far duty with a cavalry picket kept the men constantly 
occupied. Those not on post or on patrol duty were busy with 
the horses. If the latter are taken away, the men can obtain 
some rest and the following morning will be fairly ready for 
duty on rested and fefl horses. 

If 12 troopers seemed too few for the picket at Lingnau, 
this number might be sufficient if only 2 of them retained 
their horses for messenger duty. Then 10 men with rifles in 
their hands, camping in the defensive position, will be con- 
stantly available for fire-action. The vedettes of 3 men each 
can be reduced to double sentry-posts as in the infantry — quite 
an appreciable saving of men. Actual patrol duty — the recon- 
noitering undertaken to increase the degree of security — will 
continue to be the province of the outpost troops (supports). 
Patrolling necessary within the outpost can be done by men 
on foot. This also will increase the amount of protection and 
saves men. Mounted men are not suited for this duty at night 
off the roads in diversified country. 

We remember the misgivings that deterred the commander 
of Troop B from placing a picket on Queetz-Neuendorf road 

*But see par. 130, F. S. R. 



Cavalry Outposts. 245 

although it was very desirable to prevent hostile patrols from 
getting a view of the region about Lingnau. A mounted picket 
stationed there was in too exposed a position. 

But there would seem to be no objection to sending a few 
dismounted men with a guide across the meadow to the grove 
south of Number 116, as in case of necessity they can return 
the same way. Bullets from their rifles would, as long as it 
is light — i. e., as long as the view is to be denied — keep the 
enemy at a respectable distance. Separating the horses from 
the men here also insures greater efficiency in command and 
facilitates adjusting means to an end. 

The swampy meadow now becomes an obstacle for the 
enemy alone, and not for our own men. 

According to the principle of the German Field Service 
Regulations that "the arrangements and instructions should 
be regulated by the special circumstances of each case,"* there 
is no doubt but that the regulations permit the proposed 
changes. But it is not included in the teachings of these regu- 
lations, which offer no inducement or means for applying it. 
We therefore fear that without additions to the regulations 
the proposed change will seldom be adopted, possibly not at 
all until we have paid dearly for experience in the field. 

The evils with which such a change burden the interior 
economy of an outpost troop are fully ofifset by the extraordi- 
nary advantages to be derived from it. Arrangements will be 
possible whereby these evils can be modified, possibly by de- 
tailing the care-takers for the horses that have been left behind 
from the same squad or platoon. If an outpost troop has 25 
men on picket dut}'', only about one-third of the men left be- 
hind will have to care for an extra horse. Thus the men would 
not be overworked. The slight inconvenience that each man 
separated from his horse must also give up his pack can be 
overcome. The overcoat, canteen, and mess kit can be taken 

*See par. 128, F. S. R 



246 Studies in Applied Tactics. 

along, the same as the extra cartridges. Of course there can 
be no cooking at the picket. Even the infantryman some- 
times is separated from his pack without disadvantage. 
The troop officers will have more to do looking after horses, 
packs, and arms, but this will be counterbalanced by the in- 
creased fitness of the rested horses. The trained cavalry horse 
is an expensive article and hard to replace. Especially those 
armies that make war against an enemy superior in cavalry 
are called upon to make extra efforts to preserve and care for 
the horse. 

The proposed change will not only benefit the horses on 
outpost, but the entire cavalry. For, more frequently than 
not, even when conditions might have required a bivouac in 
snow or rain with horses saddled, the increased protection will 
admit of placing the horses under cover, or at least protecting 
them against the wind and unsaddling within inclosures. 

Let us briefly summarize the benefits to be expected from 
the proposed change f 

The stationary detachments of the advanced part of out- 
posts, and directly concerned with the service of protection — 
the pickets, Cossack posts, and vedettes — as a rule, perform 
their duty dismounted. Their horses, sabers, and packs re- 
main with the outpost troop. The picket commander may 
retain his horse if it will lighten his duties. Such mounted 
messengers as may be necessary will be with each picket. 
Reconnoitering towards the enemy is, as a rule, the duty of 
the outpost troops (supports). Each vedette, as a rule, will 
consist of 2 men. If we wish to insure it greater power of 
resistance, or avoid having the reliefs travel long distances, 
it is changed into a group consisting of a leader and 6 men 
(the vedette and its reliefs). The messengers, who also can 
be used as visiting-patrols and for short reconnaissances, will 
mount whenever the picket prepared for action and will take 



Cavalry Outposts. 247 

charge of the commander's horse. They will then act as a 
combat-patrol.* 

The purpose of the attack of the hostile patrol on Lingnau 
calls attention to another point that so far has hardly been 
mentioned. Of course the sudden attack could not have been 
made with the idea of obtaining any material tactical advant- 
age. It was simply hoped and expected that the patrol would 
find out the location of the ist Cavalry, touch with which had 
been lost. Presumably it would have attained this object, 
even if driven back by the picket on the highway, if at the 
same time every trumpeter in Lingnau and Scharnick had 
sounded "to arms." Not the eye, but the ear of the hostile 
patrol-leader would have recognized the situation, and long 
before midnight they would have had the desired information 
at Miinsterberg. The trumpet-calls also would have alarmed 
all detachments sent out from the regiment and possibly have 
induced them to take all manner of entirely unnecessary meas- 
ures. The example, the same as experience in war, shows the 
disadvantage of giving warning by signals, that, resounding 
through the night, betray more than by day. The German 
troops are drilled in still alarm, which on an occasion like this, 
where so many men are awake, can be given almost as quickly 
as the alarm by trumpet, and causing less unnecessary excite- 
ment. It should be habitually used with the outposts and ad- 
vance cavalry, and it would have been no mistake if Colonel 

A had ordered that the calls of "to horse" and "to arms" 

should never be sounded except by his express order. 

"We can examine the case in hand to see what improve- 
ments will result from the application of the above principles. 
A satisfactory solution and criticism of an outpost-problem 
is possible only on the terrain; but for our purpose a few ex- 

*They remain mounted, as far as practicable, and on the flanks, 
conveying information required by signals previously agreed upon. (See 
par. 821, Cavalry Drill Regulations.) 



248 Studies in Applied Tactics. 

planatory remarks about the map will answer. Knoll 143 
affords an extended view in all directions. We can see Neuen- 
dorf, the Guttstadt railway station and church-tower, Altkirch, 
Schmolain Woods, Regerteln, Sommerfeld, Lauterwalde, and 
Petersdorf. In the immediate foreground we see Beiswalde 
and its cross-roads, the road to Altkirch and the railway — of 
the latter only a short distance is hidden by the woods along 
the road to Altkirch. We can also see the Scharnick-Regerteln 
highway and the creek between it and the Lingnau-Beiswalde 
road. The creek forms an obstacle for horsemen because the 
meadows are wet and marshy. The remaining cultivated land 
and meadows as far as Beiswalde and east of Lingnau can be 
crossed by men on foot or on horseback, while the large meadow 
east of the railway and north of the road to Altkirch cannot 
be crossed by mounted men. The two groves on this road 
consist of tall firs without undergrowth. The small buildings 
near the Lingnau-Beiswalde road are huts and sheds belong- 
ing to peat-diggers. . 

Describe the outpost established by Troop C, First 
Cavalry. 

Knoll 143 is by far the best point for a picket. Even by 
night the road to Beiswalde can be well watched from that 
point. The knoll affords an excellent position from which to 
fire in case of attack. But another post will be required on 
the road to Altkirch, as otherwise the railway and the two 
groves would greatly facilitate a stealthy approach and sur- 
prise by the enemy. 

A suitable arrangement would be as follows: 

The troop will post a picket of i officer, i non-commis- 
sioned officer, and 20 men, including 2 mounted messengers, 
at Knoll 143, which will be charged with the protection of the 
entire space from the road to Altkirch to the creek, where the 
next troop will join with its outpost. The picket commander 



Cavalry Outposts. 249 

places a Cossack post (i non-commissioned officer and 6 men) 
in the grove on the road to Altkirch, close to the railway cross- 
ing, to watch the road and railway and observe the region to- 
wards Beiswalde. 

The picket would be posted on the southern slope of Knoll 
143, with a vedette (2 men) on the knoll itself. Communica- 
tion is established with the outpost on the left by means of 
mounted messengers and they are informed that the section 
between the road to Beiswalde and the creek will be watched 
by dismounted patrols. The messengers' horses will find pro- 
tection at night in the small building just southwest of the knoll. 
The officer after having inspected the terrain, especially along 
the road to Altkirch, can send his horse back to Lingnau. The 
troop at regular intervals will send out mounted patrols to the 
front. 

There is no doubt but that the picket will afford good pro- 
tection for the squadron at Lingnau. Neither the Cossack post 
nor the picket itself can be readily dispersed. Every hostile 
detachment will be detained for some time. And if the pro- 
tecting bodies must retreat before superior numbers, the latter 
will be prevented from rapidly advancing by being repeatedly 
fired upon. 

To prevent the retreating bodies coming into the line of 
fire of the outpost troops (supports), they would best move to- 
wards a flank of the latter. Therefore the picket would retreat 
in a westerly direction and the Cossack post through the south- 
ern grove. 

As we have seen, a mounted picket would have been forced 
to retreat much more promptly. The enemy might reach 
the village with the picket. Caution would dictate that the 
mounted picket would be pushed farther towards Beiswalde, 
and at least 12 mounted men would have to be posted in the 
road to Altkirch. The picket itself could not consist of less 
than 20 men, of which from 5 to 7 would have to act as horse- 

—17— 



250 Studies in Applied Tactics. 

holders and 2 as messengers. Notwithstanding the increased 
number: 32 men instead of 20, and 32 horses instead of 2, 
protection is less assured, and every troop commander knows 
what it will mean the next day if 30 of his horses have been 
with the pickets the night before or not. 

Another example may be taken from the duties assigned 
Troop H, which will more nearly come under regulation forma- 
tions than was the case with the others. 

The lieutenant-colonel had issued the following orders 
(see page 216): 

"Troop H, of which one platoon will remain at Kallisten 
under the immediate orders of the colonel, will form a section 
of the outpost extending from that of the ist Squadron at the 
south end of the former Lingnau-see, past the north end of 
Zaun-see, to the left of Troop F's section, and will permanently 
observe the Guttstadt-Kallisten road. The captain will ride 
ahead to his position and at the north end of Zaun-see will 
report to me what ke intends doing. The troops may draw on 
Komalmen and Warlack for supplies." 

The captain knows that Troop F's section is to extend 
from west of Scharnick B about 900 yards south along the 
creek, and that the bed of Lingnau-lake is guarded by men of 
the I St Squadron. He also knows that, for the present. Troop 
D is at Rosengarth as reconnaissance troop. If the latter goes 
to Scharnick for the night, it will still be responsible for keep- 
ing touch with the enemy. 

The troop commander orders one of his officers to take a 
detachment and attend to securing supplies from Komalmen 
and Warlack. He ordered the commander of the 2d platoon 
to ride with it to Height 138 near Queetz (R. G.)* and thence 
to cover the march of the regiment towards the southeast. 
The captain with several men rode around Zaun-see and met 
the lieutenant-colonel at the north end at 6.25 p. m. During 

*Ritter-Gut, knight's manor. 



Cavalry Outposts. 251 

his rapid ride he obtained only a general idea of the coun- 
try whose hilly nature interfered with obtaining a good view. 
From Knoll 141 there is a view to be had in all directions. 
The large village of Queetz is visible, but only a small part of 
the Queetz-Ankendorf highway east of the latter village is 
visible. To the southeast Knoll 138 near Queetz (R. G.) and 
the rise of ground on the Queetz-Neuendorf road limit the 
view. Apparently only the low-lying parts of the small strips 
of meadow between Zaun-see and the former Lingnau-see are 
impassable for horsemen. But the creek flowing towards 
Scharnick from Zaun-see partly has steep banks and again is 
bordered by swampy meadows, so that horsemen are entirely 
unable to cross it and footmen can do so only in a few places. 
The farm at the southern end of Knoll 141 has a large en- 
closure with several barns and stables. 

The other farm-houses past which the captain rode are 
small and poorly built. 

What arrangements wiix the Captain of Troop H 
make to carry out his orders? 

The reader is not expected to rack his brains over this. 
The problem is quite simple. The solutions will be very similar 
— viz., a line of protection between Zaun-see and the former 
Lingnau-see and a picket on the highway near the north end of 
Zaun-see. There is no need to go into details. 

From a number of about equally good arrangements I 
select the following: 

Officer. N. C. O. Privates. 
Picket, No. i, on the Scharnick- Komal- 

men highway, near the north end of 

Zaun-see - i 12 

Picket, No. 2, at the southern one of the 

two farm-yards near the southeast 

end of Zaun-see i i 15 

Cossack post, No. 3, on the Scharnick- 

Queetz road near the farm-yard at 

the south end of former Lingnau-see -16 

Total _ I 3 33 



252 Studii^s in Appued Tactics, 

After deducting the platoon at Kallisten, in addition to 
the above, there will be in the troop about i ofl&cer and 40 men. 

Opinions will differ as to where and how the remainder of 
the troop shall be located. 

It should not be too far from the highway, because a night 
attack would confine itself to the best roads. But there also are 
roads leading directly from the hostile position via Queetz to 
Scharnick. The troop must also be ready to oppose the enemy 
between Zaun-see and former Lingnau-see. Therefore we must 
look for a place for the troop in the vicinity of Knoll 141. 
There we can choose between bivouacking in the open or can- 
toning in the large farm-yard at the south end of the knoll. It 
will not be difficult for the captain to decide, when he considers 
what he must do to defeat a hostile attack.' He can have no 
doubt but that this must be done with his fire-arms. How 
many men would be available for the firing-line if he decided 
to bivouac? There would be 37 horses from the pickets in the 
bivouac in addition "to the 40 of the troop itself. If the horses 
were to be sent back to Scharnick, not more than 20 men would 
be left for the firing-line. But if the captain decides to occupy 
the farm-yard, he can have the horses tied in barns and stables, 
leaving them in charge of a small number of men, and have 
considerably more men for the firing-line ; either to advance to 
the assistance of his pickets or to have them fall back on his 
own position. 

In a few minutes he would be able to reinforce the picket 
on the highway, for the road can be very effectually swept by 
fiire from the north end of Zaun-see. How long would it have 
taken him to brmg order out of the confusion of his picket-line 
in a bivouac, and get a few skirmishers on the firing-line. He 
would not have to devote his attention to the enemy, but to 
his frightened tangle of horses and men ; while a cantonment in 
the farm-yard would not cause any delay in meeting the enemy. 
No matter where he bivouacked, hostile patrols could discover 



^Cavalry Outposts. 253 

his location. But neither eye nor field-glass would be able to 
discover what is within the farm-yard. 

If the captain understands that his troop is to be looked 
upon as a body of cavalry that is to fight on foot with horses 
to remain stationary, he will not hesitate to take advantage of 
the protecting walls of the estate. And he will not be tempted 
to think that under certain conditions he ought to mount. 
Such action simply would lead to half measures and weaken 
the defense, which alone can save the main body from surprise. 
He and his men must not think of their mounts until the enemy 
has been defeated. The more rifles that are brought into the 
firing-line the quicker will this be accomplished. 

A guard with a double sentry will protect the troop. A 
lookout should be placed in observation on Knoll 141 or in a 
dormer window. 

On account of the nearness of the troop, the pickets will 
not have any mounted messengers ; only the officer command- 
ing picket No. 2 will be permitted to keep a horse with his 
picket. He will constantly have a dismounted patrol (patroU- 
ing-post) of 3 men on Knoll 138 near Queetz (R. G.) to observe 
Queetz and the Guttstadt-Heiligenthal highway, and to drive 
back hostile patrols. From time to time the captain will send 
small mounted patrols to Heiligenthal-Ankendorf and to Queetz, 
possibly even farther, to keep up communication with Troop 
F or the detachment left behind by that troop. 

If the pickets are forced to retire before superior numbers, 
they will fall back firing : No. i towards Scharnick, keeping 
west of the highway to continually flank this, and not to mask 
the fire from Scharnick. Picket No. 2 will hold a position on 
the heights of the eastern shore of Zaun- see; the Cossack post 
will remain on the Queetz-Scharnick road. Picket No. i will 
barricade the bridge on the highway at the north end of Zaun- 
see with wagons obtained from Warlack. 



254 Studies in Applied Tactics. 

In estimating the strength of the covering detachments, 
it was taken into consideration that picket No. i would need a 
double sentry-post and a few men as patrols, and that picket 
No. 2, aside from the permanent patrol of 3 men at Knoll 138, 
would be able to get along with a double sentry-post. Our 
system is even better adapted to the normal situation of the 
troop at Zaun-see than to the unusual one at Lingnau, where 
part of the outpost troop was quartered with the main body 
of the squadron. In the present case the protecting bodies 
would have to be very negligent if a surprise should succeed 
here. And in that event this negligence would be to blame, 
and not the system. But if we were to think of the pickets — 
possibly strengthened — with their horses present, there need be 
no neglect of duty to enable a reckless hostile troop to break 
through the outposts at some point and seriously disturb the 
regiment's rest at night. 

On account of the advanced position of his command, the 
colonel considered it necessary to protect himself also towards 
the west. A careful investigation will show that besides the 
guards and sentries in Scharnick, there will be needed a picket 
of I non-commissioned officer and 12 men at the intersection 
of the Scharnick-Regerteln and the Wolfsdorf-L,ingnau high- 
ways, and a Cossack post of i non-commissioned officer and 
6 men south of Scharnick. 

The following, therefore, would be the force used in the 
service of security — i. e., pickets and Cossack posts: 

Officers. N. C. O. Men. Horses. 

ist Squadron ._ 1 3 38 4 

2d and 3d Squadrons i 5 51 i 

Total 2 8 89 5 

This would be only about 8 per cent of the whole force — 
a very low figure, taking into consideration the proximity 
of the enemy and the necessity for outposts all around the 
regiment. 



Cavalry Outposts. 255 

If the horses were to remain with the pickets, from 30 to 
40 additional men would have been needed to retain the same 
number of men in the firing-line ; and yet there would not have 
been the same security as is produced by the smaller number 
without horses. Instead of 5 horses, there would have been 
from 130 to 140 saddled and bridled in the open during the 
night. 

A glance at the detached bodies, the reconnoitering detach- 
ments, and detachments necessary to keep up connection with 
the army corps will show how desirable it is to save the reg- 
iment this expenditure of strength. 

There is a platoon at the Guttstadt railway station, another 
at Altkirch, and a third at Regerteln. Troop G, even if it goes 
to Scharnick for the night, must leave a platoon or several large 
patrols out in front. A platoon is divided between Kallisten 
and Sackstein. There are connecting posts at Wolfsdorf, Pit- 
tehnen, and Liebstadt ; strong patrols have been sent via Gutt- 
stadt towards Heilsberg and Wormditt, and an officer with 
several men has gone to corps headquarters at Mohrungen. 
Altogether, these detachments may amount to about two 
troops, whose horses will largely remain saddled and in motion. 

The more enterprising the regimental commander is, and 
the more he aims to accomplish, the more gladly will he take 
advantage of every means to avoid unnecessary expenditure of 
strength, and the more welcome will be a regulation of the daily 
recurring outpost service, which will not only save a number of 
men in the pickets, but also will assure the main body quiet 
nights, rest, and recuperation. 

Detached Bodies. 
We shall more readily find out whether the above named 
detached bodies are necessary and judicious, whether their 
strength has been correctly determined, and what is the nature 
of their duties, by examining these duties in detail. 



256 Studies in Applied Tactics. 

Lieutenant J has been sent to Altkirch with a platoon 

of Troop D (3 non-commissioned officers and 28 men). He is 
ordered to watch the Guttstadt-Sommerfeld road, the cross- 
ings of the Alle below Kossen, particularly the two bridges at 
Schmolainen, and the roads to Liewenberg, Sperlings, and 
Launau in front of the outpost. The platoon is to remain at 
Altkirch during the night, and is under the immediate orders 
of the squadron commander (see page 215 ). Lieutenant 
J knows that Troop A will march to Neuendorf as recon- 
naissance troop and probably will spend the night at Lingnau, 
but that at the same time it will be responsible for reconnais- 
sance towards the enemy on the front of Wolken-Kossen. He 
also is familiar with the orders of the platoon of Troop B that 
is going to Regerteln. The simultaneous departure of both 
these platoons and the detachments bound for Lingnau, and 
their traveling over the same road via Komalmen, enabled the 
officers to discuss and agree on a plan of action. 

Lieutenant J rsent a lance corporal and i private along 

to Regerteln; they are to find out the location of the platoon 
at this place and then report to him at Altkirch. Two men of 
the platoon of Troop E accompany Lieutenant J to Alt- 
kirch for a similar purpose. He sent a non-commissioned 
officer and i man to Troop A at Neuendorf with orders to 
inform the captain of the platoon's orders and to request infor- 
mation about the troop and the enemy. The non-commis- 
sioned officer is not to leave Troop A until it is decided whether 
the troop will remain in Neuendorf or not. Then he is to follow 
the road leading from Neuendorf to the west exit of Altkirch 
and reconnoiter the country along this road, particularly the 
water-course, the meadow land, and the bridge. 

At the north end of Zaun-see, Lieutenant J — ■ — , with the 
other officers bound for Lingnau, went via Knoll 141 to the 
road leading to Lingnau. He learned that the platoon of Troop 
B intended posting a picket half way between Lingnau and 



Cavalry Outposts. 257 

Neuendorf, while the platoon of Troop C intended remaining 
at Knoll 143 and sending forward a Cossack post on the road 
to Altkirch as far as the railway. The horses of these pickets 
were to be sent back to their respective troops at Lingnau. 

Lieutenant J , with a point moving far ahead of his platoon, 

continues his ride from Lingnau to Altkirch, on a stretch of 
road that can be seen from the heights along the Guttstadt- 
Sommerfeld highway. At 6.45 p. m. he arrived at the western 
exit of Altkirch and views the surrounding country from Knoll 
118. The point, which has trotted ahead to the eastern exit, 
reports that nothing can be seen of the enemy. Through indi- 
vidual troopers it has been ascertained that the low ground 
extending from the former Lingnau-see towards Altkirch can 
be crossed by horsemen on the bridges only. The village 
president, who has been called up, reports that early in the 
morning a hostile patrol coming from Schmolainen rode through 
the village and went towards Sommerf eld ; and that during the 
forenoon a few more hostile troopers rode through the village. 
He knows nothing more about the enemy. Upon inquiry he 
states that at present the Alle is an impassable obstacle for 
footmen and mounted men, being everywhere over 9 feet deep ; 
that the wooden bridges at Schmolainen are intended for light 
teams and are in good condition; that the bridge north of the 
Schmolainen forester's house ("Schmolainen F." on map) is 
a foot-bridge ; and that while the bridges at Zechern and Laun- 
au also are of wood, they are adapted for heavy teams. Wich- 
ertshof Forest (Wichertshofer Forst), as well as Schmolainen 
Woods (Schmolainen Wald), consists almost entirely of fir-trees. 
The latter is village property, the trees being of various sizes 
and with heavy undergrowth. The meadows west of Win- 
denhof and the drainage ditches running thence to the Alle, 
as well as the creek east of the highway, flowing southeast, 
are obstacles hard to overcome by cavalrymen. 



258 Studie;s in Applied Tactics. 

Lieutenant J- examines the country in every direc- 
tion without discovering anything suspicious. 

What are Lieutenant J 's arrangements and 

INTENTIONS? 

Naturally, Lieutenant J would think of his plans 

during the ride. If he has not had any experience in war, 
he may think his problem not a difficult one. A recollection 
of field exercises and maneuvers he has attended will serve as 
a foundation for his plans. In the above-named peace-train- 
ing near garrisons the end would be attained by stationing the 
platoon at Altkirch and sending out patrols, radiating in the 
directions indicated to him. Possibly the officer also debated 
whether it would not be practicable to send these patrols ahead 
at an increased gait so he might the more promptly receive 
their reports. But the horses have had a hard day. They 
would have gained but little headway, and a gallop would have 
consumed too much g>f the strength they will need during the 
night and early next morning. In thinking over the instruc- 
tions to be given the patrols, he would remember that it would 
be necessary accurately to tell these where they or their mes- 
sages would be able to find the platoon. It is true that the 
squadron commander's orders designate Altkirch as the sta- 
tion of the platoon, and accordingly in time of peace there 
would be but little objection to the platoon commander's mak- 
ing arrangements with that in view as soon as he arrived at the 
north end of Zaun-see. Even should the platoon encounter the 
enemy before reaching its destination, the provisions of the 
Field Service Regulations will protect him from bodily harm, 
and his patrols likewise will not get hurt by the harmless 

maneuver-enemy. In spite of all this. Lieutenant J would 

be able to reach the vicinity of Altkirch and wait for his patrols. 

In time of war it is doubtful if he would be able to reach 
Altkirch, and still more so whether he could stay there. 



CavaIvRY Outposts. 259 

The officer therefore concluded to delay sending out pa- 
trols until after arriving at Altkirch and finding out how mat- 
ters stood there. 

This moment has arrived and the patrols can be sent out 
as soon as he has decided where to locate the platoon. 

But even an officer experienced in war now would encoun- 
ter difficulties calling for h^s entire skill. Shall he stay at the 
western exit of the villager' All the roads coming from the 
enemy unite here, and the messenger route to the rear is well 
protected. Knoll 118 affords a good view limited only by the 
village close in front. But at night no view can be had from 
the knoll, and hostile detachments will be enabled to approach 
under cover of the village. A sentry-post at the eastern exit 
will not prevent this, for there are roads leading to the village 
also from the south and the north. The sentry-post would be 
nearly 900 yards from the platoon, would with its reliefs re- 
quire 6 men, and would not make it possible to do without 
another double sentry-post at the western exit of the village. 
Thus the platoon would have to use 12 of its 28 men for its 
own protection. Besides, the officer would want to keep the 
Guttstadt-Sommerf eld highway under his personal observation. 

A location at the eastern exit of Altkirch seems more ad- 
vantageous and in time of peace could be selected without delay ; 
especially as in all probability the platoon could be quartered 
in buildings. Here a double sentry-post would provide the 
necessary protection and the highway will be so near that 
nothing on it will escape the notice of the vigilant officer. 
In spite of this he has his doubts. He remembers a number 
of instances in military history where small bodies of cavalry 
were surprised, mainly because they were located within in- 
closures. Even by day sentry-posts had not always prevented 
such surprises. He remembers the case of Count Zeppelin at 
the beginning of the Franco-Prussian War and the sad experi- 
ences of the English in South Africa. The danger is greater 



26o Studii?s in Applied Tactics. 

in hostile territory, but it also exists here. If Lieutenant J 

and his platoon belonged to the enemy, and had he from the 
heights near Gronau observed a detachment of cavalry reach 
Altkirch and send out patrols from the east end of the village, 
thus disclosing the location of the detachment, would he not 
think it practicable to surprise the detachment? Might not 
the enterprise bring him glory and honor and be of considerable 
advantage to his general? There certainly would be some 
prisoners captured. Scattering the hostile detachment would 
clear the way as far as the hostile outposts, would disturb the 
rest of the latter, and prevent reconnaissance — an advanta- 
geous and sometimes quite bloodless achievement. 

The village is much too large to enable the platoon to 
watch all avenues of approach, and in the darkness the enemys' 
attack would almostjmmediately follow his discovery and the 
call to arms. The sound of approaching horses would not 
justify opening fire, for friends might be approaching instead 
of an enemy. There would be no certainty except close at 
hand. 

The small farm-yard, about 200 yards north of the east- 
ern exit of the village is a better place. But the village is so 
near that it would have to be kept under observation. And 
the farm-yard easily might be surrounded if the enemy should 
discover that the platoon went there. 

It would seem that one of the small depressions in the open 
would be a more suitable place. It is true that such a place, 
too, might not escape the enemy's notice, and in hostile territory 
there would be danger from the inhabitants of the village. 

We might expect the officer to choose the expedient of 
remaining under the cover of Altkirch until dark and not take 
up the position for the night until then. This position must not 
be too far away from the roads uniting at Altkirch ; and it will 
become known to the inhabitants of the village. Any careless 
deed or word might do harm even in friendly territory. There 



Cavalry Outposts. 261 

are others besides prudent men in the village. Communication 
to the rear and with your own patrols is not absolutely certain 
in such a retired place. Is it not possible that some horsemen 
will miss the way across country? Nevertheless, in some cases 
it is a practicable scheme, especially on the score of safety, and 
will prevent hostile scouts from discovering the place by day. 

Let us suppose that the officer, after leaving a non-com- 
missioned officer and i man'on Knoll 118, decides for the pres- 
ent to remain at the eastern entrance of Altkirch, covered 
by houses and trees —at a point where the village street to the 
rear can be plainly seen — and after dark, go to a swale about 
450 yards north of the village near the wind-mill alongside 
the highway. He does not select a position south of the vil- 
lage, because movements there are hampered by ditches and 
marsh)^ meadows, while north of the village even outside of 
the village, a horseman can easily reach Knoll 118 and the 
road to Lingnau. The selection may not be entirely satis- 
factory to the officer, but in case of necessity the lesser evil 
must be chosen. 

Not until now, when every man knows where the platoon 
can be found at night, may the patrols be sent out. 

Three directions are to be considered: via Peterswalde- 
Zechern towards Sperlings and Launau, via Schmolainen to- 
wards Liewenberg, and towards Kossen-Guttstadt. 

It is true that Kossen lies within the district of Troop A, 
but as neither it nor Guttstadt are permanently occupied, 
but are only kept under observation, this direction must not 
be neglected. In addition, the southern bridge across the Alle 
near Schmolainen should watched. 

Such of my readers as have worked out the details of 

Lieutenant J 's problem, including the details of patrol 

duty, or who may still undertake it, will find that it is a hard 
nut to crack. 



262 Studies in Applied Tactics. 

The patrol sent via Zechern must reconnoiter the vicinity 
of Sperlings and Launau and is expected to watch the bridges 
across the Alle at both these places. This might be accom- 
plished if the main body of the patrol remained at Zechern or 
Peterswalde and sent single troopers to Sperlings and Launau, 
who could be relieved at intervals. 

At least 3 men would be necessary as main body, 4 for 
reconnaissance, and 2 for messenger duty. Thus i non-com- 
missioned officer and 9 men would be the least number per- 
missible, and their orders would be about as follows: "You 
will ride via Peterswalde to Zechern, reconnoiter the vicinity 
of Sperlings and Launau, and permanently observe the bridges 
across the Alle at both these places, as well as the roads lead- 
ing thence via Peterswalde towards Altkirch. You will remain 
out all night and report to me where you take station. Hostile 
patrols are to be defeated, if possible; prisoners are wanted. 
You will retreat to this point before superior numbers." 

Notwithstanding the comparatively large size of the patrol, 
which might be called a detached post or picket, a great deal 
is expected of it. Its orders are comprehensive; only at rare 
intervals will its members, with reins over the arm, be able to 
sit down and rest awhile. Sleep is entirely out of the question 
and feeding almost equally so. 

The patrol sent via Schmolainen towards Liewenberg can 
be smaller. It is simply to find out if the place is occupied by 
the enemy or what is known of him there. But it is undesir- 
able to send less than 4 men if any messages are expected from 
it. It is 7 miles to Liewenberg and, both as a precautionary 
measure and to save the horses, the patrol would best proceed 
at an ordinary gait. 

Then, too, the people at Schmolainen and the foresters 
along the highway must be questioned. The patrol will hardly 
reach Liewenberg before 9 p. m. or return before midnight. 
Is it safe to leave the bridge across the Alle east of Schmolainen 



Cavalry Outposts. 263 

unguarded in the meantime and after the patrol's return? The 
patrol during its ride to Liewenberg easily might be forced aside, 
and there is also a possibility of hostile parties approaching 
from Sternberg and Stolzhagen via O. F.* Wichertshof. A 
guard must be left at the bridge, and it would be folly to expect 
2 or 3 men to perform this duty from 8 p. m. until morning. 
They would fall asleep in spite of the greatest devotion to duty, 
and a sleeping guard is worse than none. A double sentry and 
its reliefs are necessary; i. e., a leader and 6 men. In case of 
necessity they also can be required to watch the southern bridge 
across the Alle, as the only road over it leads past Schmolainen. 
Of course the post is exposed to a surprise by a hostile patrol 
coming from Schmolainen woods or Guttstadt. Before es- 
tablishing itself at the eastern edge of Schmolainen, two of its 
men can ride to O. F. Wichertshof to reconnoiter the road to 
that point and get information of the enemy. 

Then, two or three times during the night a patrol should 
be sent to Guttstadt and Kossen and to keep up communica- 
tion with Troop A. Six men are necessary for this purpose. 

This is about what might be Lieutenant J 's first project 

of what is desirable. In figuring up he finds as follows: 

N. C. O. Men. 

To be sent to Zechern i 9 

To be sent to Liewenberg — 4 

To be sent to Schmolainen i 6 

To be sent to Kossen -Guttstadt - 6 

Total 2 25 

Only 4 men of this number, the second and third reliefs 
of the patrol for Guttstadt, will be with the platoon, which thus 
will consist of i non-commissioned officer and 7 men. Of this 
small remnant there are, at present, i non-commissioned officer 
and I man at Regerteln, 2 men at Neuendorf, and 2 men at 
Knoll 118. The project is impracticable. During maneuvers 

*Ober Forsterei, head forester's house. 



264 Studie;s in Applied Tactics. 

or field exercises a remedy could easily be found. In such a 
case I non-commissioned officer and 3 men would be sent to 
Zechern, 2 men to Liewenberg, i non-commissioned officer and 
4 men to Schmolainen, and 4 men to Kossen-Guttstadt. Thus 
there would remain with the platoon 2 non-commissioned offi- 
cers and 17 men; it could post a double sentry (6 men, with 
reliefs), and the officer would retain i non-commissioned officer 
and 9 men to use as he thought best. But such scantiness will 
not do in war. Nowhere would there be any assurance of an 
orderly attentive performance of duty. 

If the non-commissioned officer near Zechern stations 
himself south of Dittchen Krug and barricades the bridge across 
the AUe west of Sperlings with a couple of wagons, a double 
sentry-post may be able to protect the remainder of the men 
and watch the bridge. It will also be possible to watch the 
Launau-Freymarkt road. But, after the day's exertions, the 
men on sentry duty will not be able to perform their trying 
duty for more than two hours. If they are not then relieved, 
they cease to be of any use, even if they should manage to keep 
on their feet. If the detachment consists of 9 men, four pass- 
ably alert eyes and ears now assume the duties and, after two 
hours more, a third relief, while the non-commissioned officer 
has three men left to use as messengers or for patrol duty to- 
wards Launau or Sperlings. Four or five rifles are at all times 
ready to fire a few shots to check hostile detachments or defeat 
a patrol. 

The trouble is that the power of resistance is too weak. 
For there is nothing gained by running away from every little 
patrol and reporting its presence to regimental headquarters. 
If there is nothing following tbe patrol, they don't want to be 
aroused at Lingnau or Scharnick. But the thing is to discover 
larger bodies in time. How can 4 men at Zechern or 2 at Liew- 
enberg or 4 at Schmolainen solve the problem? 



Cavalry Outposts. 265 

If they did not quit their post on the approach of every 
hostile patrol, but concealed themselves to allow such patrols 
to pass, so as to get a glimpse behind the latter, we could not 
hope for reports. For during the night messengers cannot 
gallop across country, and the beaten track is blocked by the 
enemy who has passed. 

The convenient peace expedient of reducing the number 
of men of individual detachments cannot be used in time of 
war. We must look for other means. 

The ofl&cer is right in thinking of having stationary posts 
at Zechern and Schmolainen. An occupation of the bridges 
across the Alle would insure a degree of safety not otherwise 
attainable. But if there are not enough men to establish 
such posts, then the question arises whether patrols will not 
answer. One of these would have to ride via Peterswalde, 
Zechern, and Sperlings to Launau and return via Dittchen 
Krug. It must consist at least of a leader and 3 men if it 
is to be able to continue its work after sending back a messen- 
ger. A second patrol, sent via Schmolainen to Liewenberg, 
examining the bridge north of F. Schmolainen and returning 
the same way, could not be any smaller than the first. In 
addition, two patrols of 3 men each would be needed, one 
going to O. F. Wichertshof — and possibly returning across the 
bridge at Kossen, the other via Guttstadt-Neuendorf. That 
will take 2 non-commissioned officers or lance corporals and 12 
men. After deducting 6 men for a double sentry, the platoon 
will have i non-commissioned officer and 10 men left. 

The two patrols last named may be expected back after 
i^ hours, and shortly thereafter other men must be sent out 
in the same direction. Possibly this time only 4 men will be 
sent, of whom 2 will go as far as Schmolainen to watch the 
bridge across the Alle until midnight, while the other 2 will 
watch and listen for two hours at Weidenhof. At midnight 
these must be relieved, and at 2 a. m. the 6 men first sent out 

—18— 



266 Studies in Applied Tactics. 

will again go on duty. The two curtailed reliefs take 8 of 
the ID remaining men of the platoon. 

The patrols to Launau and Liewenberg have long distances 
to go; the one 15 miles, the other 17 miles. The first may re- 
turn by midnight, the other by i or 2 a. m. At this time it 
will seem most important to the ofificer that reconnaissance be 
continued beyond the Alle, but he has only tired men and horses 
left, who either have been on patrol duty or on sentry-post 
half the night. 

If the duty assigned the platoon is to be carried out by 
patrols, fresh and capable reliefs must be sent out before the 
return of the first ones. Otherwise the roads and bridges will 
remain unobserved for hours. 

The reliefs would have to leave for Launau and Uewen- 
berg as early as 11 a. m. But the commander will be able to 
provide them only in case he omits the reconnaissance towards 
Kossen and Guttstadt, and only occasionally sends 2 men to 
Schmolainen. In thjs case there would be 18 men on the road 
most of the night and only 13 with the platoon, 6 of the latter 
being necessary for a double sentry-post, and 4 would form the 
reliefs of the patrol sent to Schmolainen. 

It would be self-deception in the platoon commander to 
expect better results from such an arrangement than from the 
preceding estimate based on maneuvers which he had to reject 
as being unsatisfactory. The small patrols would have to 
give way before every hostile patrol, the same as the small 
stationary posts. Whatever may be following such hostile 
patrols will remain undiscovered. The men cannot even listen 
in the saddle. The creaking of leather, rattling of iron, breath- 
ing of horses drown all distant sounds. The entire force is al- 
most constantly in motion, and if there is any break in the com- 
plicated apparatus, if one of the patrols remains out too long, 
other men must be sent out who have hardlv dismounted. 



Cavalry Outposts. 267 

The squadron commander's purpose in sending Lieutenant 

J to Altkirch seems to fail on account of the distances to 

be covered. Apparently he has overestimated the capacity of 
a single platoon. For an instant the young officer regrets not 
to have asked for a larger force before leaving Heiligenthal. 
But he quickly becomes consoled. He mentally hears his com- 
mander's answer: "Do the best you can, the remaining troops 
must rest," and is glad that he raised no objection. He will 
do the best he can. He again begins to consider. Was it in- 
evitable that his platoon would not suffice for effective sentry 
duty on the Alle; that small posts would be useless; and that 
repeatedly covering the roads by small patrols would not an- 
swer? Then it might be permissible to carry out only the prin- 
cipal part of his instructions. 

The platoon can furnish a picket at Schmolainen and send 
patrols every two hours towards Peterswalde and Kossen, re- 
spectively. In this way it would keep its horses in fairly good 
shape and be able to send two patrols of three or four men each 
to Liewenberg and Launau. At least the two nearest bridges 
over the Alle would be permanently guarded and the principal 
part of the orders would be carried out. 

But this solution does not completely satisfy Lieutenant 

J 's ambition and sense of duty. He pictures to himself 

the possibility of a hostile expedition coming within his reach ; 
for example, that hostile troops of cavalry were to advance 
that evening via Peterswalde towards Altkirch. In this event, 
of what service would his platoon be to the regiment? Should 
the enemy happen to meet one of the patrols sent out every 
two hours, he would closely follow it to Altkirch, where he would 
be able quickly to overcome the resistance of the platoon in the 
open and arrive shortly after it at Lingnau. The sole use of 
the platoon would have been the gain of a few minutes for 
preparation by the troops in Lingnau in addition to what they 
would otherwise have had. 



268 Studies in Applied Tactics. 

Was such an expenditure of strength necessary for the sake 
of such a sHght return? Is not the main body sufficiently pro- 
tected against surprise by its outposts, whose horses are not 
with them? The officer follows up this idea. The regimental 
commander must have had something else in mind than a 
second line of outposts in front of the first. The latter must 
answer to prevent surprise. The detached bodies are to serve 
another purpose. They are to assure the colonel freedom of 
action, so that he can oppose his own enterprise to the enemy's 
and not be limited to the defensive. If he gets timely infor- 
mation of the enemy's advance, it will be for him to choose 
between receiving the enemy with dismounted fire action, 
avoiding him, or meeting him in counter-attack. No one is 
more easily surprised than he who expects to find the enemy 
asleep. 

Although detached bodies doubtless increase the security 
of the main body from surprise and from annoyance by patrols, 
this alone would not warrant the attendant expenditure of 
strength. Half the force, if with the outposts, would do vastly 
more good for protection than far to the front, where these 
small bodies are exposed to the danger of being destroyed or of 
becoming useless by being pushed aside. They are not in- 
tended to form a barrier, but to act as eyes, ears, and feelers. 

Lieutenant J , to whom this becomes clear after con- 
siderable thought, may finally ask himself why he was not 
ordered to find the enemy. If, instead of remaining at Alt- 
kirch, he were allowed to continue his ride, and, going via 
Schmolainen towards L-iewenberg, he should discover the enemy 
there, while a flank patrol found I^aunau and Sperlings unoc- 
cupied, the colonel could have word of this shortly after mid- 
night, and the platoon, remaining in the vicinity of Sperlings, 
might continue in observation of the enemy. This positive 
result would be more valuable than the exhausting waiting and 



CavaivRy Outposts. 269 

watching at Altkirch with its doubtful subdivision into small 
posts and patrols. 

But should the courageously advancing platoon miss the 
road on which the enemy is approaching? Suppose that the 
enemy, coming via O. F. Wichertshof, arrives at Schmolainen 

while Lieutenant J trots to Liewenberg, or that the enemy, 

advancing via Peterswalde, pushes aside the flanking patrol. 
The colonel does not want to know whether Liewenberg or any 
other point is occupied by the enemy, but he wants to have his 
feelers on all roads over which the enemy might approach. 

It is not to be denied that active reconnaissance is also 
desired towards Liewenberg. But, as a rule, explorations by 
night attain results only in time of peace, when no bullets are 
flying and camp-fires can be seen afar off. A few shots that 
blaze up somewhere in the darkness, a few riders whose horses' 
hoof beats are heard, do not clear up the situation; it is not 
until dawn brightens the eastern sky that exploring tours are 

worth while. The thing for Lieutenant J to do until then 

is to detect hostile movements in his territory as soon as pos- 
sible; and to report such so promptly that the regimental com- 
mander may be able to assemble his troops before the enemy 
arrives in the vicinity of Lingnau. 

None of the projects that the lieutenant's ingenuity so far 
has devised will answer this purpose. With tenacious self- 
control he again thinks the matter over. As he has become 
satisfied that his platoon can accomplish but little if he strictly 
confines himself to the letter of his instructions, it may be pos- 
sible to accomplish more if, keeping only the ultimate object in 
mind, he tries to follow the spirit instead of the letter of these 
instructions. Could not better advantage be taken of the 
opportunities offered along this part of the Alle by carrying 
out the instructions if the platoon were posted elsewhere than 
at Altkirch? Should the squadron commander chance to come 
that way, would he not approve an intelligent suggestion by 



270 Studies in Applied Tactics. 

his subordinate for a change of location? To ask the question 
is to answer it affirmatively. The more the assurance prevails 
in an army that independent action will be acknowledged if it 
furthers the object, the better will it be for the common good. 

The squadron commander had to decide by the map, and 
at the first glance Altkirch, where all the roads within the pla- 
toon's district came together, seemed to him the most suitable 
station. Should he hear of the difficulties caused by this part 
of his orders, he surely would offer no objection to a suitable 
change. We can learn from this that commanders of such 
detachments should be allowed a certain discretion in the choice 
of the station of their commands, and that it would have been 
well if the place had not been so specifically named in the orders. 

Being satisfied in his own mind that it is permissible for 

him to deviate from his superior's orders, lyieutenant J 's 

previous careful considerations now quickly help him to a deci- 
sion. He will have the platoon stay at Schmolainen, sending 
I non-commissioned officer and 12 men to Zechern. 

The following arrangements are planned for Schmolainen : 
the two bridges over the Alle will be barricaded, the southern 
one as securely as possible, the northern one in such a way as 
to leave an opening through which single horsemen can pass. 
A dismounted double sentry-post will be established to guard 
the latter bridge. The platoon itself will be located at the 
southern exit of the village. A single sentry, dismounted, will 
be posted near it on the small knoll, whence the northern and 
western exits of the village and the short stretches of roads as 
far as the forest can be seen. Both these exits are barricaded 
with wagons, leaving only small passageways. 

The detachment intended for Zechern accompanies the 
platoon as far as Schmolainen, having a patrol go from Altkirch 
to the Schmolainen-Peterswalde road, where it is again to join 
the detachment. Thus the non-commissioned officer learns by 
personal observation where the platoon will be located and can 



Cavalry Outposts. 271 

point out the messenger-route to his men. The lieutenant will 
direct him to ride carefully and as much hidden as possible, 
going alongside of the roads and not through Peters walde, but 
along Zechern woods in which he can conceal himself at any 
moment from hostile view. Only a couple of troopers can be 
sent through Peterswalde, especially to find out what the in- 
habitants know of the enemy. It is important to question the 
inhabitants of Zechern and Dittchen Krug and, if possible, 
obtain information inXaunau and Sperlings by means of volun- 
tary messengers. Advantage can be taken of such in friendly 
territory, but cautiously, for the messengers must be reliable 
persons and must not disclose anything about us. The non- 
commissioned officer is advised to barricade the bridge across 
the AUe at Zechern in such a way that removing the obstacles 
would take some time and make some noise. The officer thinks 
that the detachment might find a good location for itself north- 
east of Zechern, close by the bridge, with a single or double 
sentry-post as guard. If the non-commissioned officer has a 
few boards placed across the small creek running alongside into 
the Alle, dismounted patrols would have to go only a short dis- 
tance to the vicinity of Dittchen Krug to control the road lead- 
ing to Launau. But, warned by his own experience, Lieuten- 
ant J does not positively designate the place, but authorizes 

the non-commissioned officer to decide according to circum- 
stances. He impresses on the latter that the detachment must 
hold its ground against small hostile detachments; that the 
approach of larger detachments should be detected and re- 
ported; that prisoners are very much wanted; and that the 
discovery of the first hostile patrol must be reported, because 
so far the enemy has not been seen in the vicinity of Sperlings 
and Launau. Messages are to be sent to Schmolainen, but 
messengers must be instructed to go to Lingnau in case they 
should not find the platoon at Schmolainen or if they are 
forced out of the way. As the detachment consists of 12 men, 



272 Studies in Applied Tactics. 

the instructions can be carried out, particularly if the non- 
commissioned officer can depend on his own watchfulness. If 
the detachment is stationed close to the bridge, a single sentry- 
post will suffice, for the horse-holders also are awake. Two 
men are sufficient to constantly watch the highway at Dittchen 
Krug. This would leave 8 or 9 rifles ready for action at Zech- 
ern bridge, for the non-commissioned officer also would use 
his rifle. The detachment would obtain supplies from Zechern. 

Lieutenant J would have 2 non-commissioned officers 

and 16 men at Schmolainen. Nine men are needed as sentries 
and their reliefs. The remainder will be sufficient for a recon- 
naissance to Kossen and a renewal of communication with 
Troop A as well as inquiry at O. F. Wichertsdorf. In addition 
a stealthy patrol on foot can go across the Alle from time to 
time and observe the highway. 

Lieutenant J sends a report of his arrangements to 

the squadron commander and requests that the outpost troops 
watch the Guttstadt-Sommerfeld highway and send their pa- 
trols as far as Kossen and Schmolainen. The foot-bridge north 
of F. Schmolainen is made impassable by countrymen under 
supervision of a non-commissioned officer. 

Lieutenant J 's arbitrary action was not of great 

moment — he simply advanced his position a little over a mile 
from Altkirch — and yet, much was gained by it. Even now 
the platoon's location has some weak points, but it is reason- 
ably certain that a hostile advance would be detected by the 
time it reached the Alle and be checked for awhile. A report 
of this would be sent more rapidly over known roads than the 
enemy would be able to advance; and the regimental com- 
mander would receive it as promptly as would be possible 
under existing circumstances. In place of a division into a 
number of small groups and patrols which could not be super- 
vised, we have a division into two groups having some power 
of resistance. It is doubtful if every one of the numerous patrol 



Cavalry Outposts. 273 

and post commanders, that would have been needed under the 
other arrangement, would have been equal to the occasion. 
Now the lieutenant need intrust only the most circumspect 
and reliable non-commissioned officer with an independent 
task of any consequence. Instead of continuous movement 
and disquiet, we have rest and quiet. Whereas at Altkirch it 
was almost impossible to conceal the position of the platoon 
from the view of hostile scouts, the platoon can now withdraw 
from view into Schmolainen Woods, and cannot be easily de- 
tected either at Schmolainen or Zechern. Although the men 
may not be able to get much sleep, the horses will not be worn 
out by morning. Food and the replenishing of nose-bags are 
assured. 

No matter how thoroughly convinced we may be of the 

wisdom of Lieutenant J 's final conclusions, they form but 

a slight basis for other cases. Every new case presents new 
difficulties. This at once becomes evident if we think of Lieu- 
tenant L 's task, who is sent to Regerteln with 25 men of 

Troop E to watch the Altkirch-Arnsdorf-Wormditt highway 
and the roads leading to Gronau, Freymarkt, Arnsdorf, and 
Dittrichsdorf . It is true that in one of the farm -yards of Regert- 
eln he will find a suitable location for his platoon, and one more 

easily defended than that of Lieutenant J at Schmolainen ; 

but his district is so extensive, the number of roads to watch is 
so great, and they diverge so much from each other that he 
must have recourse to other means. He cannot take advantage 
of an obstacle like the Alle River, to seize the enemy's avenues 
of approach with one or two groups. There probably will be 
nothing left for him to do but to keep up a system of patrols 
in his district from a station at Regerteln. Whoever will take 
the trouble to examine just how this service can be performed 
will become convinced that notwithstanding the most careful 
and economical arrangement and greatest self-denial, but little 
can be done, and that the following morning horses and men 



274 Studies in Applied Tactics. 

will be worn out and unable to further exert themselves. When 
we consider that the troopers can see and hear but little in the 
darkness, that they and their messages will be deflected if 
hostile patrols are met, that they will be late in recognizing 
and reporting large hostile bodies, and that they will be un- 
able to check such bodies, the advantage that the lieutenant- 
colonel hopes for in sending the detachment to Regerteln be- 
comes very doubtful. 

Putting ourselves in the place of L,ieutenant J at 

Schmolainen, we realized his mental labor and did not arrive 
at a satisfactory solution until we ventured to change his in- 
structions on the supposition that the squadron commander, 
if he chanced to be present, would approve of the liberal con- 
struction, the departure from the letter of instructions, and 
the advance of the platoon to a point beyond Altkirch. Lieu- 
tenant h at Regerteln would in vain look for a similar 

alternative. He hardly would improve matters were he to 
advance to near Sommerfeld, or even beyond that point. He 
would not be spared the fatiguing and largely purposeless pa- 
trolling in various directions during the night; and it would 
be more difficult to protect the station of the platoon. And yet 
there is a way that would better serve the purpose for which 
this detachment was made and be in harmony with the occupa- 
tion of Schmolainen and Zechern by Lieutenant J . If the 

officer could decide to advance to Freymarkt, occupying one 
of the farm-yards outside the village and near the road, and 
place a picket under a non-commissioned officer at Mawern, 
every advance of the enemy by night would be quickly detected 
and checked. The road would be barred for hostile patrols 
and messengers, and a connecting-post would be formed for 

the messages of Lieutenant B , who was sent towards Keils- 

berg. Only the roads leading northwest from Regerteln would 
remain unobserved. But on these nothing need be feared ex- 
cept the troop which was defeated at Pittehnen on the morning 



Cavalry Outposts. 275 

of May 5th, and the outposts of the regiment would afford ample 
protection against it, especially if the outpost troop at Scharnick 
sends a picket to Arnsdorf for the night. 

But it is not to be expected that Lieutenant h will so 

radically change his instructions. Even if he had sufficient 
discernment to see the advantages of an advance to Freymarkt, 
he would hesitate to recommend it to his lieutenant-colonel. 
He would have to base his recommendations on general princi- 
ples, and not on local conditions which his superior could not 
perceive. No matter how respectful the form might be, the 
recommendation would convey criticism. Do the lieutenant- 
colonel's arrangements deserve censure? The regimental com- 
mander's orders were: "In front of the outposts, the roads to 
Freymarkt and Wormditt and the Guttstadt-Kallisten highway 
must be carefully watched." It must be admitted that send- 
ing a platoon to Regerteln, where the roads from Gronau, Frey- 
markt, and Wormditt come together, seems to comply with the 
orders in a formal way and conforms to peace practice. It is 
true that the lieutenant-colonel listened to the orders given the 
commander of the i st Squadron and knows that the latter is to 
watch the bridges over the Alle below Kossen as well as the roads 
to Liewenberg, Sperlings, and Launau. But he hardly could 
anticipate that this would result in the permanent occupation 
of the bridges at Schmolainen and of Zechern. In discussing 
their plans before leaving Heiligenthal, the commander of the 
ist Squadron certainly only stated that he would send a platoon 
to Altkirch. Thus a platoon sent to Freymarkt would have 
been considerably beyond the sphere of the regiment, and its 
communication with Scharnick could not have been considered 
safe. Therefore no blame attaches to the lieutenant-colonel's 
action. 

We must look higher for the cause of the neglect. Al- 
though the regimental commander was justified in ridding him- 
self of the details of the service of security, still, the fundamental 



276 Studies in Applied Tactics. 

instructions for the observation of the country and roads north 
of the place of cantonment should have emanated from him. 
We see that he retained control of the two reconnaissance troops 
sent respectively to Neuendorf and Rosengarth. Only he sur- 
veyed the entire situation. Co-operation among the different 
parts of the regiment in the area of reconnaissance could be 
attained only if his orders read: "The ist Squadron will take 
charge of reconnaissance towards Stolzhagen-Heilsberg, and 
will send detachments of observation to the crossings of the 
Alle below Kossen, particularly to Schmolainen and Zechern. 
The 2d and 3d Squadrons will reconnoiter to the north and 
northwest, and will occupy Freymarkt with a detached post, 
commanded by an officer." 

The lesson we learn from the theoretical examination of 
a supposititious individual case probably would come to the 
colonel only with war experience, where after a few days' trial 
he becomes satisfied that his horses are being worn out by the 
patrolling at night, and that this work is of but little value. 
But we must not too severely criticise his mistake. Our regula- 
tions lay such stress on the value of supplementing arrange- 
ments for protection by patrolling, they so greatly emphasize 
the necessity of also sending out cavalry patrols by night, they 
so lighten the duty of such patrols in peace maneuvers by be- 
littling the effect of hostile fire, that we cannot wonder at the 
strong hold that peace training has. We are so accustomed to 
the appearance of hostile patrols within our reach that we con- 
sider it unavoidable, and underestimate the resulting damage — 
do not try to avoid it — and simply try to do the same with 
reference to the enemy. In time of peace 3 men at Freymarkt 
and 3 men at Zechern accomplish as much as 10 or 20 men, 
and their messages frequently pass unmolested through the 
opposing troops. Of course, under such favorable conditions 
a very small number of troopers would be able to carry on 
patrolling by night at Altkirch or Regerteln. Their tired horses 



Cavalry Outposts. 277 

would remain with the train the following day. We do hear 
complaints even at maneuvers of the large number of horses 
that have to fall out, but the evil is the more readily endured 
during the short period of autumn maneuvers because, as a 
rule, a disproportionately large force of cavalry is available, 
and the easy marches back to garrison, and the rest enjoyed 
there, usually mend the damage. 

Moreover, it is probable that placing the platoons of Lieu- 
tenants J and Iv but a few thousand yards in front of 

the outposts was due to the expectation that they would add 
to the security of the regiment in its cantonments. A firm 
belief in the protecting power of the outposts was lacking. 
The platoons at Guttstadt railway-station, Altkirch, and Re- 
gerte.ln, respectively, in a certain measure form a second line 
of outposts catching the first impetus of hostile enterprises. 

The increased power of resistance of outposts when rid of 
their horses make such subconscious cautionary measures un- 
necessary. We arrive at the conclusion that the one error is 
contained within the other. The increased reliability of the 
outposts extends the activity of the reconnoitering bodies, which 
now unhesitatingly may be sent to important distant points. 

They will better answer the purpose of security than 
mounted patrolling by night, and the rapid wearing out of 
trained horses will be checked. 

The comparatively sure night's rest for our detachments 
at Schmolainen, Zechern, and Freymarkt will make them ser- 
viceable for reconnaissance work at daybreak, while keeping 
on the road at night would use up their strength. They would 
have to be relieved in the morning and would reduce the fight- 
ing strength of the troops. 

It is self-evident that, as a rule, the horses of reconnoiter- 
ing bodies cannot be placed in stables or barns ; that they can be 
fed, watered and have saddles shifted singly, only, so that the 
detachment may be able to quickly mount and get away. 



278 Studies in Appi^ied Tactics. 

Modern Methods of Forwarding Information and Orders. 

Our attention has been repeatedly called to the necessity 
of quickly and safely forwarding to higher authority the infor- 
mation gathered by the cavalry, for the most brilliant results 
in reconnaissance are of no value if they are not reported in 
time. But we also recognize the difficulties to be overcome in 
accomplishing this object. It was not until near 5 p. m. that 

Colonel A heard what his reconnaissance troops and patrols 

learned about the enemy by 3 or 4 p. m., and his important 
report on the infantry outposts at Schwuben-Wilhelmsthal will 
hardly reach corps headquarters at Mohrungen before 8 p. m. 
And it probably will be 8 or 9 p. m. before a report can be sent 
that will show that the regiment actually is cantoned at Lingnau 
and Scharnick and what the situation until evening is with 
reference to the enemy. It is true that connecting-posts have 
been established at Wolfsdorf and Pittehnen as a precautionary 
measure, and from Liehstadt there even is telegraphic com- 
munication, but it will be II p. m. or midnight before they learn 
at corps headquarters how things are at the extreme front. 
Were we in hostile territory and unable to make use of the 
telegraph from Liebstadt, the information would be delayed 
I J or 2 hours more. A knowledge of whatever may happen at 
Guttstadt during the night or early in the morning, no matter 
how important it may be for the commanding general, would 
not reach Mohrungen until after headquarters had departed. 

The same unfavorable conditions obtain with reference to 
information or orders intended for the ist Cavalry. What- 
ever cannot be sent from Mohrungen before midnight probably 

will not reach it on time. For Colonel A will want to get 

up earlier than the enemy, and, when he and his men have 
mounted, a messenger probably would not overtake him until 
it would be too late to change the direction of march. 



Cavalry Outposts. 279 

But why resort to mounted messengers? They were used 
as long ago as the days of Alexander, Xerxes, and the Pharaohs. 

Why does not Colonel A make use of the inventions of 

modern times, the field telegraph, heliograph, night lamp,* 
signal flag, wireless telegraphy, or bicycle? 

Let us see what use the colonel could have made of these. 

Visual signals were out of the question from the beginning. 
Science has devised ingenious and very portable field signal 
apparatus useful even in our latitude under our cloudy skies 
and at night. It is even hoped to utiHze it in connection with 
officer's patrols and reconnaissance troops. But even if Colo- 
nel A had had such apparatus, it is evident that a compli- 
cated and extensive system of signal stations would have been 
necessary. While under favorable conditions communication 
can be had over a distance of 30 milesf with the signal lamp, it is 
necessary that there be no intervening obstacle to the trans- 
mission of the rays of light. Sender and receiver must be able 
to see each other. As Gr. Hermenau could not be seen even 

from the church tower of Mohrungen, Colonel A would have 

needed three stations for this short distance if he had been in 
hostile territory and unable to make use of the railway tele- 
graph. It is true that in our case the first signal station 
could have been established at Gr. Hermenau. Continuing the 
march, the Teufelsberg would have been the place for the second 
station if Gr. Hermenau could be seen from it. As the reg- 
iment advanced via Pittehnen, a third station would have been 
necessary at Wuchsnig and a fourth at Klditten. 

During the afternoon, after it had been decided to advance 
to Scharnick and Lingnau, a fifth station could have been shifted 

♦Acetylene lanterns are used by our Signal Corps. For an inter- 
esting description of these and of "Field Equipment of Signal Troops" 
in general, see Major G. O. Squier's pamphlet of the Infantry and Cavalry 
School on this subject. — Translator. 

t" Heliograph messages have been sent over distances of i8o miles." 
— Squier's "Field Equipment of Signal Troops." 



28o Studies in Applied Tactics, 

from Kleinefeld to Wolfsdorf and a sixth from Waltersmiihl to 
lyingnau, to establish communication with the cantonment. 
The observation station at Teufelsberg had to be abandoned 
during the forenoon on account of hostile patrols, and it is 
likely a station at Wuchsnig would have shared the same fate. 
This would have interrupted signal communication and it is 
doubtful if it would have been resumed again. Stations using 
heliograph or lantern within reach of hostile patrols are the 
more exposed because the light rays from mirror or lamp betray 
their location from far off. To protect them from surprise, a 
force would have been necessary that could not have been 
spared by the regiment. If they are to be combined with con- 
necting-posts, they would have to be located near good roads, 
where it probably would have been difficult to find good view- 
points. 

It would have been difficult to carry enough illuminating 
material on the saddle to last more than a few hours, which 
therefore would have been the length of time during which sig- 
nalling could have been carried on in case there were no sun- 
light. The Morse code is used in signalling. The receiving 
station reads letters and words from the longer or shorter inter- 
ruptions of rays of light. The signalmen must have a thorough 
knowledge of the code to avoid mistakes. We know how easily 
in time of peace errors and mutilations creep into telegrams 
that would be fatal in time of war. How much greater will be 
the danger if the message must be repeated by four or five sta- 
tions, and how much time would be consumed by this? Besides, 
it is quite possible that a message sent, for example, from the 
heights near Kleinefeld to Lingnau will be read by the enemy. 
Remember that the rays of light can be seen 30 miles.* 

*In the late war in Manchuria the Japanese practically used only 
the field telephone and telegraph as a means of communication, and with 
most excellent results. Had the inhabitants been hostile or the Russian 
cavalry more enterprising, some other method of communication might 
have been necessary. — Translator 



Cavalry Outposts. 281 

It takes too long to explore a signal route, and the ap- 
paratus is too uncertain, complicated, and dangerous for use 
under such conditions without also having a system of con- 
necting-posts alongside. But if the latter had to be estab- 
lished, Colonel A could not assume the responsibility of 

making further detachments to establish a signal line, using 
lamp or heliograph. 

Still less could signal flags have been used, for on a clear 
day they could be seen only from i^ to 2 miles. '•= 

Visual communication was excluded, as well as the carrier 
pigeon, which can be used only in familiar territory. What 
use could be made of wireless telegraphy? The apparatus of 
this newest of implements has been recently so much improved 
that its transportation is no longer difficult.! In Part I. I re- 
ferred to the danger of the enemy's intercepting wireless mes- 
sages. This danger seems to have been removed. It is be- 
lieved that a remedy has been found by changing the pitch of 
the electric waves. Only an instrument of the same pitch as 
the sending station can receive the message, and it is possible 
that the enemy will not pitch his instruments the same as our 
own. This would be a great step in advance. In addition to 
this, an understanding of the message might be prevented or 
made more difficult by sending it in cipher. 

But there are other difficulties that have not been removed. 
During an approaching thunder-storm communication fre- 
quently is interrupted and becomes dangerous. But, above 
all, messages dispatched at the same time interfere with each 

*It is not known how large these flags are, but our 4-foot flags on 
a 12-foot staff' can be read plainly as far as 7 miles on a clear day. (See 
page 19, Squier's "Field Equipment of Signal Troops.") — Translator. 

fSets now under construction for our Army, and to be transported 
on pack-mules, "aim to still further reduce the weight of the complete 
equipment, which will be contained in one small pack-chest, made like a 
trunk, * * the weight being about 140 pounds, not including the 
small portable battery." (See page 14, Squier's "Field Equipment of 
Signal Troops.") — Translator. 
—19— 



282 Studies in Applied Tactics. 

other. If the electric waves of one instrument encounter those 
of another (of the same pitch) both messages become unintel- 
ligible. The waves spread themselves over a distance of more 
than 60 miles.* If wireless telegraphy is to be used, its use 
must be restricted to a few stations and fixed hours. It there- 
fore can be used, for the present, only between higher com- 
manders. If patrols should be permitted to use it, we should 
open the door to endless confusion. Cavalry far in advance, 
and having reached the vicinity of the enemy, probably would 
make the best use of wireless telegraphy by disturbing the 
enemy's system in case it could not read his messages. 

A wireless telegraph station must have a wire projecting 
upwards several hundred yards, f carried by a balloon or kite. 
A kite can be used only in case the wind is favorable. Using 
a light wagon with the apparatus, the station becomes movable 
and along roads can even follow cavalry. But what cavalry 
leader would want to set up such a conspicuous standard or 
carry it about with him announcing from afar to every hostile 
scout, "Look, here I am"? And it would be foolish to try to 
deceive the enemy in this way. 

Therefore, aside from other circumstances that would thus 
far limit the usefulness of wireless telegraphy for general appli- 
cation in an army, cavalry in the vicinity of the enemy would 
be able to use this means of communication only at night. 
Our regimental commander certainly would have left a wagon 

*As the distances to which wireless messages may be sent depend 
mainly on the power of the transmitting station, these distances easily 
may be vastly increased. At Fort Leavenworth, in 1906, wireless mes- 
sages were received from ships in the Gulf of Mexico. In July, 1908, a 
wireless message was received at San Diego from our fleet 3,000 miles 
away. 

fThe elevation of the wire in part regulates the distance to which 
messages can be sent. For short distances the elevation need not be as 
great as above stated. Major Squier discovered that a vigorous growing 
tree, preferably well covered with leaves, formed excellent receiving 
antennae. A nail being driven into the tree some distance from the 
ground, the nail is connected through a small pocket electrolytic receiver 
with an iron pin driven in the ground. — Translator. 



Cavalry Outposts. 283 

with wireless telegraph apparatus with the baggage train, the 
same as wagons with canvas pontoons; for movements across 
country, whose direction, duration, objective, and rapidity no 
one can foresee, and which may also result in unfavorable en- 
counters with the enemy, must not be hampered with teams. 
Thus, as there would have been no receiving station, there would 
have been no use taking along apparatus for patrols, aside from 
the fact that the kites of the latter could be carried along only 
on wheels, and that it might have been impossible to fly the 
kites when wishing to telegraph. Wireless telegraphy in part 
is still a thing of the future, and for the present is not suitable 
for the use of small bodies of cavalry.* 

Communication by telegraph wire is more valuable and 
has been more thoroughly tried. 

The fitting out of cavalry with instruments and wire is in- 
tended more to enable a rapid repair of existing lines than con- 
struction of new ones, and must be so considered; for only a 
small amount of material is carried along and the building of 
a new line would take too much time and would separate the 
workmen and tools from the troops. 

If the line is to fulfil the desired object, it must remain in 
operation until the departure of the command from its canton- 
ment or bivouac; and who can tell whether or where the wagons 
with the batteries, instruments, and personnel will be again 
found, if the latter is obliged to take up again the wire strung 
the preceding day or night? 

An)rway, the cavalry of European armies is equipped so 
that it can construct considerable distances of new line, and 
devices have been invented that make it possible to construct 
lines in a short time. Two different kinds of apparatus are 
used in Germany: the light field telegraph, and the patrol 

*This was sent to press in August, 1904. Since then considerable 
progress has been made in the perfection of wireless telegraphy, as is 
shown by Major Squier's already mentioned pamphlet. — Translator. 



284 Studies in Applied Tactics. 

apparatus. The former makes it possible to use the ordinary- 
Morse tape record* and forms a reliable means of communica- 
tion. Insulated wire is used with this. According to the 
latest regulations, each (German) cavalry regiment (600 sabers) 
carries along such an apparatus and the prescribed amount of 
wire: about 12 miles of wire, and 400 yards of cable for use in 
water; also about 18 miles of plain patrol-wire. All this is 
carried on a two-horse wagon. The patrol apparatus is ar- 
ranged only for telephone, microphone, or buzzer service. 

A thin uninsulated wire is used for the line. Each (Ger- 
man) cavalry regiment has two such apparatuses and all told 
about 4 or 5 miles of wire carried on horses and in charge of a 
telegraph-patrol (4 non-commissioned officers and 4 men). 

A (German) cavalry division (2 brigades of 2 regiments 
each) has additional instruments and telegraph-wire in the 
tool-wagon of its detachment of pioneers. 

The ist Cavalry (belonging to the blue army) had no unus- 
sual means of communication by wireless telegraphy with it.f 
The regiment could not have carried along any wagons neces- 
sary for wireless or other telegraphy. They would have ham- 

*The signals are received on a strip of paper and are recorded in ink. 

tin our Army organization there is no provision for permanent 
signal work in a regiment of cavalry other than the requirement that two 
men in each troop shall be instructed in signalling. If any men and ap- 
paratus of the permanent establishment were to be with a regiment, they 
would have to be detached from the mounted company of the signal 
corps belonging to a cavalry division, or from the company belonging to 
an infantry division. 

Major Squier, in the pamphlet already quoted, says: "It is believed 
that two of the present cavalry buzzers (one set) should be issued to 
every company of infantry and every troop of cavalry in our service, 
for use in their own interior intercommunication, in addition to all other 
methods of information furnished them from the outside by signal troops. 
* * * Thi« instrument is especially adapted for rapid field-lines, such 
as used iii service with the cavalry screen or with outposts, etc., where 
light field-buzzer wire, laid directly on the ground, may be used." This 
wire is partly insulated and weighs 5 pounds per i-mile coil. This 
wire is "paid out or recovered from a hand or breast reel, carried by a 
mounted man." — Translator. 



Cavalry Outposts. 285 

pered to movements, would have necessitated various measures 
for their protection, and would have been lost in case of an 
engagement. It would hardly be permissible to let such wagons 
immediately follow a cavalry brigade. The regiment was forced 
to limit its impedimenta to the smallest possible amount. Nei- 
ther telegraph, pontoon, nor ammunition wagons could be 
tolerated, possibly not even an ambulance, although ambu- 
lances are protected by the Geneva convention. 

Therefore the field telegraph was not at the disposal of the 
regimental commander up to 5 p. m. When at Heiligenthal 
he decided where to pass the night. 

The wagons were with the baggage train at Mohrungen 
and did not receive his orders until 8 p. m. They could not 
be expected at Liebstadt before 11 p. m. Should a line then 
be constructed to Lingnau? Under favorable conditions, it 
takes about f hour per mile to construct semi-permanent lines; 
at night it would take longer. The distance is eleven miles. 
It would be at least 7 or 8 a. m. on May 6th before communica- 
tion could be estabUshed with Lingnau. The regiment would 
depart not later than 3 a. m. Were it to continue its advance 
this day as on May 5th, no one would suggest building the tele- 
graph line, unless there were a certainty on May 5th of the direc- 
tion in which the line-construction would be continued on May 
6th, and that there was no possibility of accomplishing the 
same object by repairing an existing line. The latter contin- 
gency would occur, for example, in continuing the march be- 
yond Guttstadt. In this event it would have been better to 
re-establish the railway telegraph line via Wormditt than to 
erect a semi-permanent field line. 

But on May 5th our regimental commander already could 
foresee that it would not be a question of continuing the advance 
on May 6th, the encounter of the two armies being imminent. 
Therefore it is proper to inquire if it would not be advantageous 
to erect a semi-permanent line over part of the distance. It is 



286 Studies in Applied Tactics. 

by no means advisable to construct the line all the way to 
Lingnau, for, as the regiment cannot tie itself to this, it would 
be the prey of every hostile patrol. 

But west of the Passarge the line would be somewhat pro- 
tected. It might be constructed as far as Pittehnen with the 
hope that on the morning of May 6th it might be possible to 
continue the work. This would be a help to the regimental 
messenger service on the 6th. But we cannot expect great 
results from this measure. It would be 3 a. m. May 6th before 
the line would be ready from Liebstadt to Pittehnen and the 
distance saved would be only about 4 miles, which could be 
traversed by a mounted messenger in from 20 to 30 minutes. 
Neither would this enable us to dispense with the connecting- 
post at Pittehnen. Communication by wire too easily might 
be interrupted, the terminal station would require protection 
from hostile patrols, and telegrams received must be forwarded 
to the regiment. 

In hostile territory'it probably would be necessary to repair 
the Mohrungen-Iyiebstadt line before there would be any use 
in building the extension beyond the latter point ; and undoubt- 
edly the regimental commander would have begun such repairs 
during the morning of May 5th. This would have been a gain, 
and this is really the proper sphere of activity for the cavalry 
telegraph detachment. 

The commander always will endeavor to construct or 
repair telegraph lines from the rear, so as to make the line con- 
tinuous. Isolated or detached lines are of no value if they do 
not connect with the main lines. This also is an argument 
against carrying along the wheel transportation of field tele- 
graph lines with the fighting part of the cavalry. Had Colonel 

A on the morning of May 5th been prevented from having 

his baggage train precede the ist Army Corps and been obliged 
to have it join that of the ist Division, he presumably would 



Cavalry Outposts. 287 

have had his telegraph and pontoon wagons go with the combat 
train as far as Mohrungen. 

But it is unlikely that he would have taken them along 
any farther, on account of the unsettled condition of the situa- 
tion. He might even have left behind the light ammunition 
wagons assigned to his regiment. It would have been suffi- 
cient if the troopers had taken extra ammunition in their 
saddle-bags. 

As already stated, every (German) cavalry regiment has 
a patrol equipment in addition to the light field telegraph equip- 
ment, and thus each brigade has four patrol equipments and 
about 9 miles of wire, carried and operated by two telegraph 
patrols. Only one of these patrols is permanently organized in 
each (German) cavalry division (of 3 brigades). The remain- 
ing ones are formed only in case of necessity, until which time 
the apparatus is carried on the telegraph wagons. This is a 
wise provision, as otherwise too many non-commissioned offi- 
cers would be permanently withdrawn from the ranks. It is 
of considerable importance whether a cavalry regiment has 
four non-commissioned officers more or less available for duty 
at the front. Service with the regiment and fighting the enemy 
naturally takes precedence over techincal work of auxiliary 
branches. 

The comprehensive task in this instance assigned a single 
regiment (blue) on one flank of the army, doubtless induced 
the colonel not to form a telegraph detachment. The men 
composing it, and loaded with instruments and wire, either 
marching at the end of the column or behind a troop formed 
in line, and available neither for attack nor for reconnaissance 
duty, would have been a constant eyesore to the colonel. 

But assuming that a detachment of 8 men had been formed 
— carrying 5 miles of light wire — of what use would the wire 
have been? 



288 Studies in Applied Tactics. 

There would not have been enough wire to establish com- 
munication with Kallisten, or even with Sackstein. The prox- 
imity of the enemy would have precluded laying a wire to com- 
municate with the troop at Rosengarth, aside from the fact that 
it also was too distant and that no one could tell how long the 
troop would remain there. For similar reasons communication 
could not have been established with Altkirch or Regerteln. 
It was not worth the labor and risk to lay a wire to any of the 
detached bodies. At the most it would have shortened the 
messenger route along one line by about half an hour ; the con- 
struction of the line might have been observed, and its opera- 
tion interfered with by any hostile patrol, and would have 
required the employment of 8 men and 8 horses ; and it must 
be remembered that communication by this means is not abso- 
lutely assured, as it depends on the ear. The trouble of re- 
covering the wire next day, and the possible necessity of pro- 
tecting the party engaged in this work, may interfere with the 
regular work of the regiment, and increases the misgivings 
against using it in the foremost line. 

The regimental commander might have directed the tele- 
graph detachment for the present to lay the light wire from 
Liebstadt to Pittehnen, which might have been completed by 
about 9 p. m., and take it up again after the field telegraph 
had been completed over this distance — a procedure that would 
have been dearly paid for by the loss of 4 able non-commis- 
sioned officers and 8 horses from the ranks of the regiment. 

The German cavalry is but scantily fitted out with cyclists, 
having but 3 for 600 sabers; but this is as it should be. Al- 
though the bicycle is well suited to the delivery of messages 
and orders on fairly good roads and over level country, and 
largely saves horses with large bodies of troops, it is not able to 
follow cavalry across all kinds of country in all kinds of weather. 
Supposing the ist Cavalry to have had 6 cyclists, these would 
have been able to accompany the regiment about as far as Alt 



Cavalry Outposts. 289 

Bolitten on May 5th. It would have been necessary to leave 
them there temporarily, and the regimental commander, upon 
deciding to advance via Elditten towards Waltersmiihl, would 
have been unable to give them further instructions. And it is 
doubtful if the colonel, under the strained conditions when he 
was expecting to encounter the enemy, would have thought of 
the cyclists or have been willing to send a trooper back after 
them. If he chanced to think of them again at Heiligenthal 
at 5 p. m., he probably would have shrugged his shoulders and 
left them to their fate. A single experience like this would 
induce him in the future to leave the cyclists with the baggage 
train — possibly 2 with the train proper and 4 with the pon- 
toon and telegraph wagons. To unite cyclists with mount- 
ed troops would result in a separation as soon as beaten paths 
are left behind, and then their services would become illusory, 
while they might be very useful with the train, particularly 
when late in the day it becomes a question of resuming connec- 
tion with the troops. 

The regimental stafif officer sent to corps headquarters at 
Mohrungen certainly would have sent several cyclists via Lieb- 
stadt to Lingnau shortly after 8 p. m., intrusting them with 
current orders from corps headquarters and everything else 
worth knowing. They could be at Lingnau by 11 p. m., and 
the regimental commander's latest reports then could reach 
corps headquarters, via the Liebstadt telegraph station, by i 
a. m. Were there no telegraphic communication between 
Liebstadt and Mohrungen, the returning cyclist still could arrive 
at Mohrungen by 3 or 4 a. m., and the time might be reduced 
by using the remaining cyclists as relays. 

The improvements of science apparently have made a use- 
ful means of the bicycle for messenger work of an army, includ- 
ing cavalry, if cyclists are not precipitately and prematurely 
taken into a region where they cannot follow the cavalry and 
thus lose touch with it. The bicycle is useless in unfavorable 



290 Studies in Applied Tactics. 

weather, over bad roads, or in a mountainous district. It 
ceases to be a rapid means of communication and leaves a 
burden. 

Far more useful than the bicycle, propelled by the feeble 
strength of man, is the automobile, whose construction has 
reached a high degree of perfection in recent years. The 
automobile is but slightly affected by wind and weather, and 
over passably hard ground it can climb grades that would be 
prohibitive to a cyclist. In places where the latter would 
have to carry or push his wheel, the automobile is still able to 
proceed at a rapid rate. 

If word is received at Mohrungen by 8 p. m. that the ist 
Cavalry has reached Ivingnau, an officer from corps headquar- 
ters could reach the latter place shortly after 9 p. m. on an auto- 
mobile, to consult with the colonel and bring him orders. And, 
if necessary, the same machine could pass over the road once 
or twice more during the night. The rapidity and safety of 
this means of communteation during field operations is equalled 
by neither wireless telegraphy nor visual signals. Only where 
mountains, wide rivers, or inlets of the sea separate bodies of 
troops, will it be occasionally possible to obtain better results 
with wireless telegraphy or visual signalling. 

Of course this presupposes that there is no lack of gasoline, 
which is the best fuel, and of which about -^\ gallon will be 
required per mile on ordinary roads. Therefore there should 
be no trouble in carrying along a sufficient quantity. 

The motor-cycle is still more convenient and movable 
than the automobile ; almost being equal to the latter in speed 
and more readily overcoming terrain difficulties. A skilled 
rider can get along on a foot-path and the lightness of the 
machine (weighing only about 120 pounds) enables the rider 
to carry it over marshy or otherwise unfavorable ground.* 



*They carry from i to li gallons gasoline, on which they can make 
from 100 to 125 miles. — Translator. 



Cavalry Outposts. 291 

The time thus lost can be regained by increased speed over 
better parts of the road. 

While it might have been impossible for a heavy four- 
wheeled automobile to follow the cavalry everywhere, there 
is no doubt but what motor-cycles could have followed. 

If the cavalry had been equipped with several such ma- 
chines, it would have been able to communicate several times 
with corps headquarters during May 5th. At corps headquar- 
ters they would have understood the situation on the Alle by 
6 p. m. 

Of course automobiles and motor-cycles are exposed to the 
attacks of hostile patrols; but no more so than a mounted mes- 
senger. On the contrary, their great speed decreases the chance 
of hostile marksmen hitting them, and the enemy will hardly 
oppose them with cold steel. 

In the future the automobile and motor-cycle must form 
the basis for communication between army headquarters and 
the advance cavalry. In all probability they will make the 
cavalry telegraph unnecessary and will eJBFect an appreciable 
saving in men and horses to the cavalry. Detached bodies and 
reconnaissance troops will be more easily and rapidly kept in 
communication with the cavalry commander by means of motor 
cycles than in any other way. On level roads, under certain con- 
ditions, they even may undertake independent tours of explora- 
tion. It is quite possible that two motor-cyclists sent out from 
Heiligenthal at 5 p. m. might have reported in Lingnau by 7 
or 8 p. m. whether or not Liewenberg was occupied by the 
enemy, and what is known of him in that vicinity. Then news 
of this might reach Mohrungen by 9 p. m. In such an under- 
taking the only question is whether or not the game is worth 
the candle. 

While in Part I. I was obliged to call attention to the extra- 
ordinary difficulties that strategical patrols would encounter 
in forwarding their messages, I must not omit now to point out 



292 Studies in Appi^ied Tactics. 

that unexpectedly their value would be greatly enhanced if it 
were possible to assign several motor-cycles to each one of 
them. In closely settled countries, where, by making slight 
detours, it is possible to travel great distances on paved high- 
ways, it is possible to travel from 175 to 250 miles in a day on 
a motor-cycle. With their assistance a patrol reconnoitering 
the flank of a hostile army might be able to give the commander- 
in-chief an insight into the situation that never could have been 
possible with mounted messengers alone. If by force of cir- 
cumstances the motor-cycles become separated from a patrol, 
the latter will be in no worse state than heretofore. But the 
speed of these cycles in many cases might enable the cyclists 
to rejoin their patrols by a roundabout way, thus getting out 
of reach of hostile fire-arms if their own will not open the way. 



THE ARMY CORPS ON THE MARCH. 
Arrangements for the March. 

Although the reader from now on will accompany the ist 
Army Corps during its march of May 5th, still his thoughts 
will not altogether forsake the ist Cavalry, which has had his 
attention so far. It is rather to be hoped that the services 
rendered the corps by the cavalry will appear in their correct 
light; and the reader will have an opportunity of viewing the 
measures taken by the cavalry leaders from a different stand- 
point. 

On May 4th the ist Army Corps was halted in such a way, 
near the line of march, that the ist Division occupied the space 
between Drenken and Saalfeld, while the last troops of the 2d 
Division were quartered in Gerswalde. For purposes of in- 
struction we shall not make the conditions too favorable under 
which the march is to be continued on May 5th, and for this 
reason shall change the situation as given in Part I. by assum- 
ing that the organized militia is not along the railway from 
Maldeuten through Pr. Holland to Miihlhausen, but has been 
withdrawn to the line Riesenburg-Christburg-Elbing. The 
army corps is marching on one road. In this region full of 
lakes and devoid of roads it is impracticable to form several 
columns for the march to Mohrungen. The van guard of the 
ist Division is ordered to leave Barten at 6 a. m. The baggage 
trains of corps headquarters and of the ist Division immedi- 
ately follow the ist Division; then comes the 2d Division. 

The ist Division is ordered to arrange for the protection 
of the left flank of the column until the 2d Division can assume 
this duty. The two division commanders are to arrange the 
details. 

293 



294 Studies in Appued Tactics. 

Before the commander of the ist Division was able to 
issue his orders, the corps commander ordered that Major 

D , with Troops A, B, and E, 3d Cavalry, be under his 

immediate orders and should leave Drenken on reconnaissance 
via Pfeilings towards Miinsterberg-Jonkendorf. The corps 
commander also gave notice that the ist Cavalry would ad- 
vance via Gr. Hermenau. 

The ist Division* is in cantonment as follows on May 4th: 

Headquarters, i st Division Saalfeld . 

Headquarters, ist Brigade Gr. Arnsdorf. 

1st Infantry, J Gr. Arnsdorf, Figaiken, Drenken; 
2d Infantry, C Ploszen, Barten, Posorten; 
3d Infantry, ) Terpen, Gergehnen. 

Headquarters, 2d Brigade Biindtken. 

4th Iiifantry, ^ Ankern, Lopittken; 
5th Infantry, > Sadlauken, Biindtken; 
6th Infantry, J Kuppen, Saalfeld. 

Troops A and B, 3d Cavalry 

Gr. Arnsdorf, Figaiken, Drenken, Ploszen, and Posorten. 

The following men of Troop C are permanently detailed 
as mounted messengers:! 

At Division Headquarters 8 men. 

2 Brigade Headquarters 8 men. 

6 Regimental Headquarters 12 men. 

Baggage Train 12 men. 



40 men 

The remainder of Troop C is at Lopittken and Ankern. 

Headquarters, ist Brigade Field Artillery Saalfeld. 

ist Field Artillery Barten, Woritten, Biindtken, Kuppen. 

3d Field Artillery, whose 2d battalion is composed of heavy how- 
itzers Saalfeld. 

I st Battalion Engineers Woritten. 

Co. A Signal Corps, "j 

3 Field Hospitals, >■ Saalfeld . 

Division Bridge Train, j 

*To adhere more nearly to the number of troops of the text, it is 
assumed that the 3d Brigade of the ist Division, 2 squadrons of cavalry, 
and a field hospital are detached; the 2d Division having its 3 brigades 
present. — Translator. 

tThese probably would be taken from the mounted orderlies as- 
signed to infantry regiments under par. 25, F. S. R. 



The Corps on the March. 295 

The baggage train is with the regiments; the ammunition 
column is parked in rear of the division. 

Food and forage have been replenished from the supply 
column that arrived May 4th at Saalfeld. 

The officers detailed to receive orders have assembled at 
division headquarters. 

What orders does the Commanding General of the 
First Division issue on the evening of may 4TH?* 

The ability continually to keep in mind the entire situation 
plays an important part in the successful conduct of the art of 
war. Thus the commanding general of the ist Division should 
mentally view the picture that the entire ist Army Corps will 
present on the road to-morrow, f I am the more willing to sketch 
the outlines of this picture because the greater part of the 
realities of war and the retardation due to long columns of 
troops as well as trains is not seen or felt in time of peace. 
When the head of the ist Division reaches Gr. Bestendorf, the 
tail of this column of troops would be near Woritten. The 
divisional trains, possibly including cattle on the hoof, would 
extend back to near Saalfeld. In rear of this would come the 
2d Division and its trains extending back nearly to Finken- 
stein, followed by a battalion of heavy artillery if one be with 
the corps. If the baggage trains had not been with their re- 
spective commands on May 4th, but had been in rear of the 
troops of the entire army corps, they would on May 5th begin 
their march from Weinsdorf when the head of the corps had 
reached Mohrungen, its destination for the day. Thus these 



*The reader must not be worried because only the general map is 
available to show the country in the vicinity of Saalfeld ; this often would 
happen in time of war. 

fNo effort was made to figure road-spaces from our own Field Service 
Regulations, because it was thought those given by the author would 
answer the purpose, even with the substitution of our own Army organi- 
zations, as the total number of troops considered is about the same as 
in the author's example. — Translator. 



296 Studies in Appi^ied Tactics. 

trains would be about i8 miles in rear and could not reach the 
leading troops for 6 hours with rations and baggage. As a 
rule, it would take even longer than this, as the march usually 
suffers from delays, and any halt of the troops checks all the 
trains. 

In rear of the trains of the 2d Division would follow addi- 
tional reserves of ammunition, stores, equipment, and food 
supplies of the army corps. Such an immense train could not 
march in an unbroken column, but would be subdivided into 
smaller trains or groups ; and communication with magazines in 
rear of the army interferes with the movement of these groups. 
Thus great gaps between them are unavoidable. If it is as- 
sumed that the army corps has advanced via Marienwerder and 
Riesenburg, on May 4th its trains will still cover the road as far 
as Marienwerder. On May 5 th the last loaded columns may 
reach Riesenburg, while empty wagons on this and subsequent 
days will be loading new supplies at Marienwerder or Riesenburg 
with the object of carrying them after the corps.* 

The commanding general of the ist Division does not need 
to figure out road-spaces ; the living reality is before him. He 
does not need a pair of dividers to determine the end of his 
long-drawn-out command, which is forcibly brought to mind 
in his orders and in his anxiety to replenish supplies. 

He therefore fully understands the need of the corps com- 
mander's order to protect the left flank. In fact, the order was 
superfluous, for he would have attended to the protection of 
the flank of his own accord. It is fortunate that the army 
corps' line of communications lies so far to the south. It would 
be more difficult to protect if it extended through Christburg 
to Marienburg. 

It is known that the ist Cavalry is reconnoitering towards 
the front and the left flank, and the distance of the hostile col- 

*The length of an army corps, with all its auxiliary troops and 
trains, is 35 miles. (See par. 233, F. S. R.) — Translator. 



Thk Corps on the March. 297 

umns on May 5th makes an encounter with large hostile bodies 
unlikely on this day, but we must be prepared for the appear- 
ance of hostile cavalry. It has already been learned^at corps 
and division headquarters that telegraphic communication 
with Briickendorf, Guttstadt, and Wormditt was interrupted 
this evening (page 10) ; but we cannot tell whether the ist Cav- 
alry will be able to drive back the hostile advance parties or 
whether it will not be forced to give way before superior num- 
bers of hostile cavalry. The latter would not be able long to 
delay the advance of the army corps and would hardly be able 
to cover the distance quickly enough to threaten the flank of 
the ist Division as early as the forenoon of May 5th. But its 
patrols might appear on the Overland Canal (Oberlandische 
Kanal) early in the morning, and should they discover the army 
corps en rotde, they would make the utmost effort to send this 
information back. Matters might shape themselves very dif- 
ferently with the cavalry than I have pictured. Strong bodies 
of hostile cavalry might reach the Passarge early on May 5th 
and forward by automobile the news received by messenger 
arriving on exhausted steed. In this way the hostile com- 
mander-in-chief might obtain it the same afternoon or evening. 
The reader will remember the hostile patrol sent out via 
Heilsbergand Wormditt, (pages 157-9), which, on the supposi- 
tion that the Maldeuten-Pr. Holland railway is not guarded, 
might reach Gr. Arnsdorf by 10 a. m., May 5th. We saw that 
under existing circumstances its report would arrive at head- 
quarters too late. But it would be very different if the hostile 
cavalry gains the upper hand on the Passarge. Therefore the 
commanding general of the ist Army Corps has every reason 
to protect himself against hostile patrols. He knows only too 
well what it would mean for him if on the evening of May 5th 
he received a message making it certain that on the morning of 
this day a long column marched from Seeburg or Wartenburg 
—20— 



298 Studies in Applied Tactics. 

towards Guttstadt or possibly from Seeburg towards Allenstein. 
In discussing the information a hostile patrol might ob- 
tain south of the Overland Canal concerning the march of the 
ist Army Corps (see page 159), I pointed out that this presup- 
posed criminal carelessness on the part of the blue forces. We 
see that the commander-in-chief at Saalfeld is not laying him- 
self open to such a charge. The commanding general himself 
orders the protection of the flank and thereby shows what value 
he places on the arrangement, although there can be no real 
danger in this quarter on May 5th. 

I wonder if all my readers considered it necessary to include 
a provision for a flank guard for the district west of the over- 
land canal in their draft of field orders of the ist Division the 
evening of May 4th; and whether they would have done so 
without the hint contained in Part I.? 

The omission could easily be explained. 
In the endeavor to place field service on a firm foundation, 
and to off'er practicaUrules even to the inexperienced, our regu- 
lations have revived a number of customs concerning subdivi- 
sion of columns and protection on the march that had yellowed 
with age and had been abandoned. Large bodies of independ- 
ent cavalry escaped similar regulations because they were un- 
known before the last great epoch of war and in whose case 
therefore reference could not be had to cherished memories 
and recollections. The Field Service Regulations dispose of 
this subject with one short sentence, although the cavalry in 
advance of an army is exposed to far greater dangers than the 
infantry: "Independent cavalry chooses its formation and the 
means for security and information according to the nature of 
the task in hand."* 

In Part I. I praised this scantiness as a piece of good for- 
tune because it developed ingenuity and deliberation, while 
the stately array of paragraphs devised for the guidance of com- 

*See par. 68, F. S. R. 



The Corps on the March. 299 

manders of infantry and of the combined arms hamper inde- 
pendent action and give rise to the error that everything will 
be all right if the letter of the regulations has been fulfilled. 
Notwithstanding the most detailed instructions concerning the 
service of security and information — as can be seen by examin- 
ing the paragraphs on this subject — there is hardly a reference 
to the necessity for preventing hostile reconnaissance. The 
deficiency is strangely contrasted by the emphasis that is laid 
on reconnoitering the enemy, and the value that higher com- 
manders place on early and reliable information about the 
enemy. The enemy will be equally anxious to obtain reliable 
information about our movements. 

Our cavalry leaders, our mounted patrols, naturally will 
be forced to fight with bodies of hostile cavalry of various sizes. 
They will but seldom be able to carry out their reconnaissance 
or send back messages without fighting. In acting thus they 
will at the same time be warding off hostile reconnaissance. 
But the careful instructions with which our regulations fence 
in and guide the action of our troop leaders where arrangements 
for marching and the service of security are concerned, together 
with the baleful experience in our peace maneuvers, where hos- 
tile scouts are visible everywhere along the edge of woods and 
top of hills (within reach of our fire-arms), counting every gun 
and flag, creates the impression that this must be so. Other- 
wise, would not the regulations insist that such patrols must be 
kept at a distance, and call attention to the dangers arising 
from this unchecked activity? 

Therefore, in the present case (it not being a flank march), 
who would blame the commander of the ist Division if he did 
not lay too much stress on the corps commander's orders to pro- 
tect the left flank, and contented himself with inadequate meas- 
ures, rather indicating his willingness to comply with orders 
than an appreciation of the importance of the subject? 

After this cogitation there will no longer be any doubt that 



300 Studies in Applied Tactics. 

a flank guard will already be needed west of the Overland Canal 
— the best place probably being along the Miswalde-Maldeuten 
railway. The line of railway easily can be watched, and if hos- 
tile patrols find infantry there, this would look more like a 
railway guard than an effort to protect the flank of a marching 
column. The division commander will not assign this duty to 
the advance guard. The commander of the advance guard 
could not superintend the duty and would have to send back 
the necessary troops. Therefore I shall assume that two bat- 
talions of the 4th Infantry, as left flank guard under the im- 
mediate orders of the division commander, receive orders to 
occupy the railway from Miswalde to Riippertswalde to prevent 
hostile cavalry from obtaining information of the march of the 
Army Corps. The two battalions will remain there until fur- 
ther orders. The division commander will make arrangements 
with the commander of the 2d Division concerning the relief 
of the two battalions. And an effort will be made to get to- 
gether a railway train which will be able to carry these battal- 
ions to Mohrungen in the afternoon. It is likely that at least 
8 troopers must be attached to these two battalions notwith- 
standing the fact that there is but httle divisional cavalry avail- 
able on May 5th. The flank guard must make use of the cy- 
clists belonging to the battalions* and the railway telegraph for 
sending messages. 

The division commander would best assign to the advance 
guard commander the duty of protecting the flanks east of the 
Overland Canal. At the beginning of the march this region is 
situated ahead of the point. An independent flank guard would 
not be able to fully co-operate with the advance guard. It 
would require the continued attention of the division com- 
mander who thus in a way would assume general control of 
the advance guard. Though naturally this division commander 
has the right to request that the protection of the flank east- 

*The Germans have two cyclists in each infantry battalion. 



The Corps on the March. 301 

ward of the Overland Canal, incident to the forward movement 
of the advance guard, be continued until further orders. Ac- 
cordingly, when the advance party reaches the vicinity of 
Mohrungen, the flank guard will resemble a thin outpost line 
extending from Miswalde via Ober-Samrodt, Steinsdorf, and 
Rollnau to Neuhof. 

Of course this is contrary to the method frequently adopted 
in time of peace of having the flank guard on a parallel road 
keep up with the reserve of the advance guard or with the head 
of the main body. But it is evident at a glance that in the 
latter way only a very imperfect protection can be assured. 

Even if an enterprising hostile patrol commander should 
discover the gradual advance of troops via Samrodt and Steins- 
dorf, this would not afford him or his superior, receiving the 
report, a safe basis for assuming that the army corps was ad- 
vancing. Of course the information that on May 5th blue 
infantry was discovered at the bridge of Riippertswalde or at 
Steinsdorf would be of importance to the hostile general. This, 
with additional information, for example, that in the after- 
noon fire had been received from blue infantry at Pfeilings or 
Himmelforth, and the action of the cavalry, might produce a 
fairly correct impression at hostile headquarters of the true 
situation. A knowledge of this creates a desire to do more in 
the blue army to keep the enemy in ignorance. Patrols are 
more easily deceived in time of war, where deadly bullets de- 
mand that a respectful distance be maintained, than in time 
of peace. They very seldom correctly estimate the enemy's 
strength; often battalions and regiments are reported, where 
there actually are but small detachments. If it is important 
to oppose the enemy's efforts to locate our flank — and this is 
always desirable — small bodies of infantry can assist in this by 
marching some distance from the flank and parallel with it. 
In the present case, the advance of the organized militia early 
on May 5th from Christburg-Elbing towards Pr. Holland might 



302 Studii;s in Applied Tactics. 

help mislead hostile reconnoitering cavalry. The same end 
could be attained by one or two battalions of infantry with a 
platoon of cavalry on May 4th and 5th marching from Christ - 
burg towards Liebstadt with companies divided among the 
main roads. It would insure greater protection to the flank 
of the army and form a welcome support for the cavalry in 
front. It would not be necessary to have the detachment 
absent in the coming battle. 

Of course any action causing a detachment to depart so 
far from the line of march would have to be ordered from army 
or corps headquarters, though a masterly division commander 
need not hesitate to assume the responsibility. 

The discussion of the protection of the left flank has dealt 
with and disposed of the part of the division commander's task 
that would have been out of the ordinary routine. 

My readers' orders will differ somewhat concerning the 
flank guard, but I think it very likely that otherwise they will 
be very much alike, because the Field Service Regulations give 
such plain instructions. 

The following draft is offered as an example and a basis 
for discussion: 

Headquarters, 1st Division, ist Army Corps, 

Field Orders, Saalfeld, 4 May '04, p. m. 

No. . 

I. (Information of the enemy.) 
Troops. The 1st Corps will continue its march 

to-morrow on the highway towards 
(o) Advance Guard: Mohrungen. 

Comdg. Gen. ist Brig. The 2d Corps to our right is marching 

1st Inf. via Liebemuhl; the heads of its col- 

2d Inf. umns are to reach Locke N to-morrow. 

Tr. C, 3d Cav. The 1st Cavalry will leave Maldeuten 

ist Bn. 1st F. E. at 5 a. m. to-morrow, going via 

Co. A, Engrs. Mohrungen and Gr. Hermenau. It 

istF. Hosp. will reconnoiter to our front and left 

flank. 



The Corps on the; March. 



303 



(6) Main Body (in order of 
march) : 

3d Inf. 

2d Bn. I St F. A. 

Hq. & ist Bn. 4th Inf. 

3d F. A. 

5th Inf. 

6th Inf. 2. 

1st Bn. Engrs. (less i Co.) 

2d F. Hosp. 3. 

3d F. Hosp. 

Amn. Q)l. 

Div. Br. Train, 
(c) Left Flank Guard. 

Lieut.-Col. N . 

2d & 3d Bns. 4th Inf. 

8 men Tr. C, 3d Cav. 



Major D , with Troops A. B. and E, 

3d Cavalry, will leave DrEnken at 5 
a. m. to-morrow, and will reconnoiter 
via Pfeilings towards MUNSTER- 
BERG-JONKENDORF. He is Under the 
direct orders of the corps commander. 
This division will march at the head o f 

the corps 
(o) The van guard will leave DrEnken 

at 6 a. m. to-morrow. 
(b) The main body of the division will 
follow the advance guard at 1,000 
yards. The troops off the high- 
way will join the column at SEE- 
GERTSWALDE, avoiding detours, 
(c) [Orders for the protection of the 
flank by the 2d and 3d Battalions, 
4th Infantry, west of the Over- 
land Canal.] 

4. The baggage trains, with that of corps 

headquarters in the lead, will join the 
troops on the Saalfeld-MohrungEN 
highway, following immediately in 
rear of the divisional bridge train. 

5. I shall be with the advance guard. 

By command of Maj.-Gen. U •: 

C R , 

Chief of Staff 

There will not be much trouble composing such an order. 
It was written off-hand by following regulations and did not 
take as long as many of the messages from patrols in these 
pages. With the exception of the flank guard, the situation 
of the division is so normal that it would require some termerity 
to deviate from any one of the printed rules in composing the 
order. These rules are so specific that a candidate for a com- 
mission from a military academy can be expected to compose 
a flawless order for a division. Let us see if the lessening of 
mental effort and the uniformity of arrangement are of practical 
value and what purpose the convenient marginal reference 
serves. 

In the first place, the manner of issuing orders calls for 
some remarks. 



304 Studii;s in Applied Tactics. 

Whoever has dictated an order or taken one from dictation 
has encountered the strange provision requiring the distribu- 
tion of troops to be written in the margin. There is no space 
in the adjutant's memorandum-book for marginal writing; the 
distribution of troops must be written on some blank page and 
later it may be difficult to tell to what order it belongs. It is 
a form suited for printing and for the office desk, but not for 
dictation. It would be better to include the distribution of 
troops with other matter in the body of the order. 

Let us for a moment put ourselves in the place of the ad- 
jutant-general, ist Brigade, who has just written out the fore- 
going order. It is after 1 1 p. m. The order contains important 
instructions for his superior and assigns cavalry, artillery, en- 
gineers, and a field hospital to his command, at the same time 
taking away one of his regiments of infantry. (We are assum- 
ing that a different assignment of troops existed for May 4th.) 
At division headquarters the location of each troop and battery 
presumably was not knpwn, as the villages surely were assigned 
to larger units (brigades and regiments) and presumably the 
officers assembled to receive orders could not give complete 
information on the subject. For at division headquarters there 
surely were only assembled the adjutants-general of the infantry 
and artillery brigades, the squadron adjutant, an engineer offi- 
cer, and an officer from the field hospitals. It is unlikely that 
the adjutant- general of the artillery will be able to say definitely 
where the different battalion headquarters and the individual 
batteries are located. 

But the commanding general of the ist Brigade, who has 
been detailed as advance guard commander, must assemble 
the officers at Gr. Arnsdorf to receive orders for the troops 
placed under his command, and it is the duty of his adjut- 
ant-general to order them there, or, if practicable, bring them 
with him. The squadron adjutant is going back anyway and it 
may be possible to take the engineer officer along too. But he 



The Corps on thk March. 305 

must look up the adjutant of the ist Battalion, ist Field Artil- 
lery. The latter may be at his regimental headquarters at Kup- 
pen, receiving orders. It is over 3^ miles to Arnsdorf. It will 
be past midnight when the officers arrive there for orders. The 
brigade commander, who has been awakened, will require some 
time to think about his instructions, and it will be at least i a. m. 
before the advance-guard order is dictated. It then goes to the 
next lower commanders. They also will require time for reflec- 
tion, and it will be 3 a. m. before the troops, the companies, and 
batteries at Ploszen, Biindtken, Barten, and Saalfeld know 
what they are to do in the morning. 

The ist Field Hospital must leave at 5 a. m. The adjutant- 
general can save an officer of the field hospital a trip to Arnsdorf 
to receive orders if he, in anticipation of his brigade command- 
er's approval, tells said officer that the field hospital should 
arrive at Barten at 6 a. m. He also might send a similar order 
to the ist Battalion, ist Field Artillery. The brigade com- 
mander would still be able to assign the battaHon to its proper 
place in the column in the morning. There are no difficulties 
involved in the arrangements for the infantry and cavalry, 
quartered as they are in the neighboring villages of Lopittken 
and Ankern. But the problem is not always so easily disposed 
of; the adjutant-general, or officer representing him, would not 
always feel authorized to anticipate the commander's intentions. 
The division commander sometimes can obviate such amplifica- 
tions by announcing a place of assembly for the troops assigned 
to the advance guard, leaving its commander simply to issue 
the orders for security and information. 

But the obstacle here touched upon would seldom be en- 
countered during a campaign. It is not advisable frequently 
to change the commxand and composition of the advance guard ; 
the interests of the service would suffer thereby. As a rule, the 
assignment of troops holds for an indefinite period, and only the 
adjutant or aide of the advance guard commander would report 



3o6 Studies in Applied Tactics. 

for orders at division headquarters, and these would then be is- 
sued from the advance-guard commander's quarters to the 
troops under his command. Experience in the field has shown 
the wisdom of having the same troops permanently detailed for 
advance-guard duty, and no experienced commander will change 
this custom without necessity. The provision of the Field 
Service Regulation specifying that the strength and composi- 
tion of the advance guard will depend on "the object of the 
march, the nature of the country, and the strength of the force 
it is covering,"* must be interpreted in a general way. The 
nature of the theater of war, the force of cavalry ahead of the 
army and its situation with reference to the enemy, the char- 
acter of the enemy, and the intentions of the commander-in 
chief are to be taken into consideration, and not minor details 
of daily occurrence. 

The attending results will be the best criterion of the scope 
and utility of the arrangements made by the foregoing order 
from division headquarters. Let us assume that measures taken 
by the commander and the adjutant-general of the ist Brig- 
ade have assured the timely assembly at Barten and Drenken 
of the troops belonging to the advance guard. There the com- 
mander of the advance guard will issue his orders for the march. 
At 5.30 a. m., May 5th, he arrives at the highway north of Dren- 
ken, where the troops are already assembling. Soon after, the 
division commander also arrives and gives the advance-guard 
commander the following additional instructions: 

"The 2d and 3d Battalions 4th Infantry have occupied the 
railway from Miswalde to Riippertswalde as a protection against 
hostile cavalry, and will remain there until relieved by the 2d 
Division. They probably will be sent to Mohrungen by rail 
this afternoon. 

"The advance guard will protect the left flank east of the 
Overland Canal. Measures will be taken to protect not only 

*See par. 96, F. S. R. 



The Corps on the March. 307 

the main body of the division against hostile reconnaissance, 
but also the remainder of the corps." 

In addition the division commander tells the general of 
the information received during the night at corps headquar- 
ters (pages 10, 23 and 93). The gist of this is that hostile de- 
tachments reached Wormditt, Guttstadt, and Briickendorf yes- 
terday evening; but that early this morning telegraphic com- 
munication still existed with Liebstadt and Horn. The divis- 
ion commander then goes to Barten, where the corps com- 
mander wishes to see him. 

The commanders of separate organizations are assembled 
at Drenken. 

What instructions does the Commanding General op 
THE First Brigade (advance-guard commander) issue at 
5.40 A. M.? 

The order of march of the advance guard depends on the 
arrangements made for the protection of the flank. The avail- 
able cavalry cannot be used for this purpose. It is evident that 
infantry must be used. Were it simply a question of protecting 
the flank of the advance guard alone, small flanking detach- 
ments would suffice, marching on a line with the reserve. Or 
small detachments (platoons, for instance) might be sent out 
from the van guard on roads branching off from the line of 
march, which, halting at suitable points, could join the reserve 
on receiving orders to do so. The first scheme is seldom prac- 
ticable, and here not at all, because protection is ordered for 
the entire length of the marching army corps. But there are 
also objections to the second plan. It would be diflicult to 
make arrangements assuring the co-operation of such small 
detachments even during the march of the advance guard to 
Mohrungen; later the advance guard commander would lose 
track of them altogether. 

The protection of the flank to the north must be turned 



3o8 Studies in Applied Tactics. 

over to a single body of troops whose commander will be re- 
sponsible for the details. The distance under consideration — 
from the Overland Canal to the Mohrungen-Pr. Holland high- 
way — is 7^ miles, so the advance-guard commander considers 
two battalions necessary. 

A flank guard is also necessary south of the line of march, 
because we know that hostile parties arrived at Briickendorf 
yesterday and could appear early to-day at Gottswalde and 
Venedien. The line of march of the 2d Army Corps is too 
distant to justify our omitting the protection of the right flank. 
But the general thinks that for the present two companies will 
be sufficient, which, marching from Gr. Wilmsdorf via Venedien 
to Kl. Gottswalde, will be able to keep hostile patrols at a dis- 
tance. But he admits to himself that the remainder of the 
battalion may have to be sent as a reinforcement, possibly 
marching from Gr. Bestendorf via Wolla and Kuhdiebs to 
Paradies. 

He intends assigning two battalions to the van guard not- 
withstanding the ample flank guards. There is quite a broad 
extent of territory to the front that may call for various detach- 
ments, particularly as the cavalry is reduced in numbers, and, 
after reaching Mohrungen there presumably will be considerable 
for the vanguard to do. 



The Corps on the March. 309 

In view of these considerations he orders as follows:* 

Advance Guard Drenken, 

Orders. 5 May 04, 5-40 a. m. 

1. (Information of the enemy). 

2. Distribution of troops: 

Advance-guard cavalry: Troop C, 3d Cav. 
Van guard: Lieutenant-Colonel J 

1st and 2d Bns. ist Inf. 

I n. c. o. and 10 troopers. 

Co. A, Engrs. 
Reserve (in order of march): 

Col. I St Inf. 

3d Bn. I St Inf. 

ist Bn. 1st F. A. 

Cos. A and B, 2d Inf. 

1st F. Hosp. 
Left Flank Guard : Colonel K . 

2d and 3d Bns. 2d Inf. 

S troopers. 
Right Flank Guard : Major M . 

Cos. C. and D., 2d Inf. 

4 troopers. 

3. The advance-guard cavalry will depart at once, provisionally ad- 

vancing as far as the edge of the woods between Gr. Besten- 
dorf and Mohrungen, and reconnoitering via Mohrungen to- 
wards Locken, Briickendorf, and Liebstadt, and will establish 
communication with the ist Cavalry, which is advancing via 

Gr. Hermenau, and with Major D , advancing via Pfeilings 

towards Miinchenberg-Jonkendorf. 

4. The van guard will depart at 6 a. m. via Maldeuten towards Mohrungen. 
The reserve will follow at a distance of 1,000 yards. 

*The order is given in the body of the text in the form presented 
by the author. It has the "distribution of troops" embodied as par. 2, 
in accordance with his views. 

The order is herewith given in the form prescribed by our instruc- 
tions, "Field Orders," by Major E. Swift: 

Advance Guard, ist Division, ist Army Corps, 
Field Orders, Drenken, 5 May 04, 5-40 a. m. 

No. . 

I. (Information of the enemy.) 
Troops. Our army corps will continue its march 

towards Mohrungen to-day. The 2d 
(a) Advance Cavalry : Corps will march on our right via 

Captain C . Liebemuhl ; the head of its columns 

Tr C, 3d Cav. are expected to reach Locken. 

The 1st Cavalry and Major D with 

3 troops 3d Cavalry are in our front. 



3IO Studies in Applied Tactics. 

5. The left flank guard, to protect the march of the army corps against 

hostile cavalry, will take position along the line of Freywalde- 
Steinshof-RoUnau and to the Mohrungen-Pr. Holland high- 
way south of Wiese. Colonel K will receive special in- 
structions from me. The left flank guard will leave via Mal- 
deuten in advance of the van guard. 

6. The right flank guard at first will march via Gr. Wilmsdorf and Ven- 

edien to Kl. Gottswalde. It will leave immediately after the 

left flank guard. Major M at once will report to me for 

orders. 

7. The baggage train will join the corps headquarters train immediately 

after the division has marched past; the highway will be kept 
clear of teams until then. 

8. I shall be with the van guard. 

The order is copied by the adjutants. 

The form of this order also strictly conforms to the pro- 
visions of the Field Service Regulations. There are no unusual 
conditions, any more than with the order from division head- 

(6) Vanguard: The advance guard will march along 

Lieut. -Col. J . 2. the highway via Maldeuten towards 

ist & 2d Bns. ist Inf. Mohrungen. 

I n. c. o. & 10 men Ti;, C. 

Co. A, ist Bn. Engrs. 3. (a) The advance cavalry will depart at 

once, provisionally advancing as 

(c) Reserve (in order of march) : far as the edge of the woods be- 

Col. ist Inf. & Staff. tween Gr. Bestendorf and 
3d Bn. ist Inf. Mohrungen and reconnoitering 
ist Bn. istF. A. via Mohrungen towards Lock- 
Cos. A & B, 2d Inf. en, Bruckendorf, and LiEb- 
ist F. Hosp. STADT, and will establish commu- 
nication with the ist Cavalry, 

(d) Left Flank Guard : which is advancing via Gr. Her- 

Col. K and Staff. menau, and with Major D , 

2d & 3d Bns., 2d Inf. who is advancing via Pfeilings 

8 men Tr. C. towards MunchEnberg- 

Jonkendorf. 
(6) The van guard will depart at 6 a. m. 

(e) Right Flank Guard : (c) The reserve will follow at 1,000 

Major M . yards. 

Cos. C & D, 2d Inf. (d) The left flank guard, to protect the 

4 men Tr. C. march of the army corps against 

hostile cavalry, will take position 
along the line of FrEywalde- 
Steinshof-Roulnau and to the 
Mohrungen-Pr. Holland high- 
way south of Wiese. Colonel 
K will receive special instruc- 



The Corps on the March. 311 

quarters. On the contrary, the protection of the flanks is 
always the duty of the advance guard and does not form an 
exception to the rule. 

And yet I am inclined to believe that the work of some of 
my readers will be quite dififerent. 

Those that considered it necessary, as I have, to send two 
battalions as flank guard to the north and at least two com- 
panies for similar purposes to the south, surely will have 
some misgivings concerning the weakness of the reserve in 
infantry. If two more companies should be sent from Gr. 
Bestendorf via Kuhdiebs, the reserve would consist of only a 
battalion of infantry in addition to the artillery (and field hos- 
pital). The matter might be remedied by having but one of 
the battalions of infantry in the van guard and the other in the 
reserve, or at least have the company of engineers with the 
reserve. But the farther forward the engineers are the more 
promptly can necessary repairs be made to the road, and it 
is not co nsidered advisable to have less infantry in the van 

tions from the advance-guard 
commander. 
The left flank guard will leave via 
MaIvDEuten in advance of the 
van guard, 
(e) The right flank guard at first will 
march via Gr. WiIvMSdorf and 
Venedien to Kl. Gottswalde. 
It will leave immediately after 
the left flank guard. 

Major M at once will report 

to the advance-guard commander 
for orders. 

4. The baggage train will join the corps 

headquarters train immediately after 
the division has marched past; the 
highway will be kept clear of teams 
until then. 

5. The advance-guard commander will be 

with the vanguard. 

By command of Brig-Gen. A : 

B C- , 

r> • J u ^1 .. Adjt.-Gen. 

^-opied by the adjutants of separate organizations. 



312 Studies in Applied Tactics. 

guard. As soon as the extensive territory in front of the line 
of march is insufficiently controlled by the reduced van guard, 
or as soon as the column approaches Mohrungen, the van 
guard would have to be reinforced, which would result in loss 
of time. It is impossible to economize in the strength of the 
flank guards. Be it satisfactory or not, we have to content 
ourselves with the proposed arrangement. Were we to have 
but two companies in the van guard, one subdivision would 
have to be omitted in the formation^= and the reserve to a cer- 
tain measure would assume the role of support. This simply 
would change the form, and not the substance. 

We encounter a difficulty, notwithstanding the simple 
situation, which makes us doubt the completeness of the divi- 
sion order; the question may arise, whether the addition of 
artillery to the advance guard was not the cause of the trouble. 
The advance-guard commander would be less hampered in his 
arrangements if he had no artillery. For he must have at least 
a battalion of infantr^^ with the artillery; and this assignment 
of artillery is the very thing left to the discretion of higher 
authority. But if we remember that the advance guard might 
encounter hostile cavalry and horse artillery in the vicinity of 
Mohrungen, we shall not question the suitability of the arrange- 
ment. This is just what might have happened and it would 
have been undesirable to have had the march of the army corps 
interrupted by the necessity of bringing forward artillery from 
the main body of the division. But without artillery support 
the infantry of the advance guard might have suffered serious 
and unnecessary losses in advancing against the hostile artil- 
lery. It is for just such a case that artillery is very desirable 
with the advance guard. It can be more readily spared in 
advancing to battle because it is preferable not to bring the 
artillery battalions into action successively. We must also 

* Presumably referring to the necessary omission of an intermediate 
body between advance party and support, as authorized for large van 
guards by the German Field Service Regulations. — Translator. 



The Corps on the March. 313 

remember that the distribution of troops is not changed daily, 
and that the advance guard will perform its duties better the 
more lasting the assignment of troops is and the more the com- 
manders and troops get acquainted with each other. Besides, 
the necessity of providing quarters and suppUes argues in favor 
of mingling the different arms of the service. If there is no 
artillery with the advance guard, there may be vacant stables 
and barns and surplus oats with it, whereas there may be a 
scarcity of these for the artillery with the main body. 

There is another point in the general's arrangements that 
attracts our attention. He has formed advance-guard cavalry 
of his remaining cavalry. This is in accord with the regulations 
which state than an advance guard will be divided into reserve, 
van guard, and advance-guard cavalry.* Although the greater 
part of the divisional cavalry is not with the advance guard, 
the regulations do not admit of any different arrangement, f 
The inspector whose duty in time of peace it might be to pass 
upon the arrangements would have to take exception if the 
advance-guard commander had assigned the remainder of his 
cavalry to the van guard. In time of war he (the inspector) 
probably would have overlooked it, being convinced that the 
arrangement was judicious. It is only advisable to form the 
remaining cavalry into an independent group if it is not kept 
with the van guard, but sent ahead. The advance-guard com- 
mander realized this and ordered it for the present to go as far 
as the edge of the woods east of Gr. Bestendorf . But he thereby 
increases the difficulties of communication with the flank guards 
while he is marching through the woods and deprives himself 
of the ability to send out patrols for hasty reconnaissance or for 
the capture of hostile troopers. The ist Cavalry and Major 

*In our Regulations the advance-guard cavalry is grouped with the 
van guard. (See par. loo, F. S. R.) But in the model for orders for an 
advance guard this cavalry, called advanced cavalry, is grouped sep- 
arately. (See page 39, Swift's "Field Orders," etc.) — Translator. 

fBut see par. 102, F. S. R. 
—21— 



314 Studies in Applied Tactics. 

D are on the way towards Mohrungen and the region be- 
yond. Therefore a few sharp eyes will suffice at Mohrungen. 
The remainder of the troop is not needed there, but with the in- 
fantry protecting the flanks, where the assistance of the horses' 
speed would be greatly missed. 

The advance-guard commander's order adheres closely 
— all too closely — to the printed instructions. Further obey- 
ing the regulations, he has ordered the advance-guard cavalry 
to restore communication with the ist Cavalry and Major 

D .* If the division or corps commander should inquire 

how matters stood with the foremost cavalry, the advance- 
guard commander would be safe ; he has given the necessary 
orders to his cavalry. It would not be his fault if insufficient 
information were received or if it came too late. 

Would it be the fault of the advance-guard cavalry? 

We shall look for the answer by asking: 

What arrangements are made by the Comm.\nder of 

THE ADVANCE-GUAR1;> CAVALRY TO RESUME AND RETAIN COM- 
MUNICATION WITH THE DETACHED CAVALRY? 

It is not a question of a short forenoon of a maneuver day, 
but of a long day and the night following, and possibly beyond 
that. Every message will take i or 2 men, none of whom 
will again be sent to the front. For, if communication is to be 
reliable, it must be carried back to the higher commanders; and 
the messages have long distances to travel. At least 15 to 20 
men should be sent in each direction! and an officer should be 
in command. A non-commissioned officer cannot be expected 
to have the coup d'ceil and military judgment necessary for 
the duty. 

If these connecting bodies should succeed in overtaking 
the ist Cavalry and Major D what would be accomplished 

*The van guard furnishes "patrols to communicate with independ- 
ent cavalry, etc." (See par. 100, F. S. R.) — Translator. 

fThat is, after the ist Cavalry and Major D . — Translator. 



The Corps on the March. 315 

thereby? It would be very difficult for the colonel and the 
major to give the officers of Troop C complete and lasting in- 
sight into the situation, and their plans, and without this the 
reports of these officers would be of little value; the incom- 
pleteness of the same would cause confusion instead of clear- 
ness. These connecting bodies can assist in lightening and 
helping with the transmission of information if their own reports 
are intrusted to the care of mounted messengers of the ist 
Cavalry and of Major D . Nobody would think of rec- 
ommending sending back duplicate messages from the different 
stations. 

The task would be equally different should such communi- 
cation be limited to discovering and reporting on the location 
of our advanced bodies of cavalry, and would require the same 
number of men. Every separation of the bodies of cavalry, 
every change of route, on their part, would have to be reported, 
and the advance-guard commander would remain in the dark 
concerning the object and reason for such movements notwith- 
standing the costly mechanism employed. 

The commander of Troop C cannot think of sending out 
such large detachments. Resignedly he will send 3 men in 
each of the directions, so as not to violate his instructions. 
He will deplore the useless details for it is impossible for the 
men to comply with their instructions. They Avill tire out their 
horses, and probably will not be seen again for several days. 

The greater the demand, the greater the deed. Certainly! 
But impossible tasks are worse than an injudicious sparing of 
troops. Impracticable orders shake the confidence, and the 
sluggish make believe compliance with them is avenged when a 
difficult object presents itself that could be attained by exer- 
tion to the utmost. The orders given the captain of Troop C 
would even then have contained an impossible feature if he had 
received them the preceding evening so that he could have had 
the connecting bodies join Colonel A and Major D . 



3i6 Studies in Applied Tactics. 

In another place we saw that it is wrong on principle to 
expect communication to be maintained from rear to front. 
Why devote time and strength to wearily search for and follow 
the trail of the bodies in front when these can so easily keep up 
communication? Besides, experience shows that efficient com- 
munication can exist only between commanders. Only the 
commander of the cavalry sent ahead can correctly judge the 
situation, only his messages are of any value; he alone must be 
responsible that the commander-in-chief gets timely notice of 
everything important and constantly knows where his cavalry 
is. The cavalry commander should never be allowed to justify 
himself by saying that according to regulations the advance 
guard of the army corps is responsible that communication be 
maintained with the cavalry in front. 

Neither can we claim that we here have to deal with an 
exceptional case, that as a rule the division commander would 
retain control of all his divisional cavalry, and that he would 
not be lacking in troopers to keep up communication. Dur- 
ing the march dire necessity will force every saber to the 
front that can possibly be spared in the army. Every troop 
absent from the front will reduce our own and strengthen hos- 
tile chances for success. No army is so well provided with 
cavalry that it could afford to leave a number of troops of cav- 
alry with each army corps who would not be needed for recon- 
naissance or in battle against hostile cavalry, and who, march- 
ing along with the infantry and acting as mounted messengers, 
could wait for the rare opportunities of taking part in regular 
battle. It is true that while the cavalry divisions are clearing 
up in front, the army corps must be able to reconnoiter for 
themselves and cannot do entirely without cavalry. The as- 
signment of 450 sabers to a (German) division, or, rather, of 
900 sabers to an army corps (2 divisions), seems to comply with 
this requirement; of course, assuming that the troopers are 
mounted on perfectly serviceable and trained horses. But this 



Thk Corps on the March. 317 

amount is too great for service with the infantry and artillery 
columns en route and with outposts. If this cavalry were to 
be systematically excluded from the more extended service of 
information, valuable resources would be idle. At times it 
even would be advisable for the army commander temporarily 
to attach a part of the divisional cavalry to the larger bodies 
of cavalry ; and it is a question if the commanding general, of 
the ist Army Corps, would not have done well to have placed 

Major D under the orders of the commander of the ist 

Cavalry on May 5th. In this event it is quite possible that the 
operations on the Passarge would have taken even a more fa- 
vorable turn. But it was a mistake to hold back the cavalry 
of the army corps at the beginning, an error that in a way was 

remedied by Colonel A 's discernment and request made to 

corps headquarters. The reader will understand my object in 
composing the defective order first issued from corps headquar- 
ters on May 5th. It was expected that from the course of 
events and personal judgment the reader would discover the 
correct principle, which without this means might not have 
been brought out so clearly. 

Even if on May 4th a cavalry brigade had been at Maldeu- 
ten, it would have been a mistake not to give it the assistance 
of the divisional cavalry. Who could tell what obstacles might 
be encountered on the Passarge? In a fight with a hostile cav- 
alry brigade the three additional troops might have turned the 
scales. 

The commanding general of the ist Army Corps apparently 
was of the opinion that the divisional cavalry could not with- 
out detriment be separated from the infantry and from the con- 
trol of its division commander. He did recognize the justice 
of Colonel A 's request to turn over the reconnaissance to- 
wards Miinchenberg-Jonkendorf to the divisional cavalry, but 
his preconceived ideas interfered with a thoroughly satisfactory 
measure. Now, after careful consideration, we must be satisfied 



3i8 Studies in Applied Tactics. 

that there was no good reason for keeping the divisional cavalry 
of the second division tied to the columns of infantry. At least 
a part of it might have found ample occupation; and some 
could have been spared to help the advance guard of the ist 
Division. Even when each division marches on a separate 
road, it may be advisable to unite the cavalry of the whole 
corps. But entire units of cavalry never belong in the middle 
of a column of an army corps marching on one road. The tem- 
porary separation of such cavalry from the control of the divi- 
sion commander is of small importance, considering that often 
there are greater deviations from the regular ordre de bataille 
in marching columns. 

In discussing cavalry service with army corps we cannot 
neglect the squadrons of mounted orderlies. We had assumed 
that the following men had been detailed from Troop A: divi- 
sion headquarters, 8 men; each brigade headquarters, 4 men; 
each infantry regiment, 2 men; baggage trains, 12 men; 40 
men all told. The detail was a liberal one; we could have 
done with less. It means a great reduction in strength for the 
troop. The "mounted orderly squadrons" owe their existence 
to the desire to save the cavalry from this depletion incident to 
orderly duty.''- 

Strictly speaking, their purpose is to increase the number 
of staff orderlies and headquarter guards, whose strength has 
been recognized as ^being inadequate for orderly duty on the 
march, in camp, and in battle. The simplest remedy would 
have been to increase the mounted headquarters guard of each 
army corps by about 50 troopers. These men require trained 
horses, which have to^be furnished by the cavalry on mobiliza- 

*Our 20 mounted orderlies per regiment of infantry (see par. 25, 
F. S. R.) are intended to accomplish the same purpose. — Translator. 



The Corps on the March. 319 

tion. An increase of 60 horses in the cavalry of an army corps 
in time of peace would have accomplished the purpose.* 



At 6 a. m. the vanguard of the ist Division departed; the 
reserve following at 1,000 yards. Two companies of the ist 
Battalion, ist Infantry, march 550 yards ahead of the support 
of the advance guard (as an intermediate body) ; and in front 
of these are the infantry advance party and cavalry point. 
The remainder of Troop C, as ordered, has trotted ahead through 
Gr. Bestendorf. 

The advance guard commander is surprised to find the 
baggage train of the ist Cavalry in front of the entire advance 
guard of the army corps. The division commander who hears 
of this is unable to refrain from criticising this arrangement to 
his chief of staff, as he feels the train should follow the ist Divi- 
sion. But, not to interfere with the march, he decides to let it 

*But the one who originated the scheme was concerned that these 
men should be trained in their special duties in time of peace, and this 
seemed to be possible only by forming a separate organization. The plan 
was conceived of assigning a "mounted orderly squadron" [In strength 
such a squadron would nearly correspond to one of our cavalry "troops." 
— Translator.] to each division of infantry; and such an organization will 
be found with most divisions under the title of "squadron of mounted 
chasseurs," armed only with sword and revolver. 

This is an expensive body of selected men and horses, in number far 
exceeding the demand for orderlies in a division. It is, therefore, fair to 
expect that the chasseur squadron will take the place of at least an equal 
number of cavalry in an infantry division. 

Our example offers an opportunity to test the correctness of this 
idea, if we assume that we have a chasseur squadron in place of Troop 
C with the ist Division. 

No changes would be necessary in the distribution. Let us as- 
sume that during the march to Gr. Bestendorf the advance-guard com- 
mander learns that hostile patrols have been seen near Konigsdorf and 
Wiese. He knows how important it is to prevent the enemy's obtaining 
any view of the movements of the army corps. Therefore, under his in- 
structions, an olScer and 20 chasseurs are sent from Obuchshofchen to 
drive away the hostile patrols. Upon reaching Neuhof the officer notices 
hostile troopers on Knoll 148, near the Neuhof-Wiese road. The knoll 
is so much higher than intervening elevations that the highway between 
the woods and Mohrungen surely can be seen from it. 

What will the officer do? 

Apparently the valley extending north from the west end of Neuhof 



320 Studies in Applied Tactics. 

alone as far as Mohrungen. The advance guard commander 
wishes to send an officer to the Maldeuten railway station to 
inquire for messages and see if he can come in telegraphic com- 
munication with the I St Cavalry and Major D , but learns 

from the division commander that corps headquarters has al- 
ready taken the necessary steps in this particular. Several 
cyclists of the 3d Infantry had been sent to the station and 
would forward to the van guard any information received. 

Upon inquiry the division commander further stated that 
corps headquarters had established telegraphic communication 
with the 2d Army Corps from Saalfeld via Liebemiihl and that 
the cavalry of the 2d Corps would reach Liebemiihl about 7 a. m. 
It therefore might be assumed that hostile reconnaissance could 
not take place via Tharden and Liebemiihl. 

At 8.30 a. m. when the van guard reached Gr. Bestendorf, 

will enable' the chasseurs to advance under cover, and they may reach 
the south edge of the woods near Knoll 148. In the meantime the com- 
mander has discovered that a strong patrol is on the knoll, 6 or 8 men of 
it being dismounted. He* can't do anything else but charge them. How 
many chasseurs will be hit by the enemy's fire during the 650 yards' ad- 
vance? Or what can he hope to gain if 15 or 20 horsemen, armed with 
lances, ride to meet him? How much easier would 20 dragoons (of his 
army) attain their object. Their lances or the fire of 12 of their carbines 
would much more readily force the hostile patrol to retreat. 

Take another case: After reaching Mohrungen, the van guard is 
sent to Georgenthal upon word being received that hostile cavalry is riding 
from Herzogswalde towards Gr. Hermenau. The captain and 50 men of 
the chasseur-squadron hasten on ahead of the van guard. Arriving at 
Georgenthal, the captain sees a hostile body of cavalry (about 1 20 men) 
about a mile ahead of him, while the infantry of the van guard has just 
reached Pfarrsfeldchen. Dragoons would be able to dismount and force 
the enemy to halt by their dismounted fire ; the chasseurs are denied this 
means of defence. There would be nothing for them to do but get out 
of the way. 

Take a third case : A patrol of 8 chasseurs has been sent to Herzogs- 
walde. Returning, it encounters a hostile patrol near Gr. Hermenau. 
Three men of the latter dismount at the railway bridge and with their 
fire command the road to Narien mill, as well as the highway east of Gr. 
Hermenau. The chasseurs have important information, but only by a 
wide detour can they get it to Mohrungen. Dragoons, uhlans, cuiras- 
siers, and hussars would have cleared the shortest way for themselves 
with their carbines. 

War will offer many similar opportunities. The chasseur is at a 



The Corps on the March. 321 
the advance guard commander learned that Lieutenant C 's 



patrol found Briickendorf occupied by the enemy at 4 a. m., 
and that during the night and early in the morning hostile 
patrols had been seen at Wormditt as well as between the 

Passarge and Narien-see; also that Major D encountered 

hostile dragoons near Pfeilings. The general knows that the 
ist Cavalry is advancing via Gr. Hermenau towards Herzogs- 

walde, and Major D towards Briickendorf, but considers 

it advisable to send out the remaining two companies of the 
3d Battahon, ist Infantry, via Wolla-Kuhdiebs towards Paradies 
as already planned. He is uneasy on account of receiving no 
news whatever from Eckersdorf. At about 10 a. m. the van 
guard arrives at Mohrungen. Troop C, 3d Cavalry, halts east 
of the town, the two companies in advance of the support are 
nearing the southeast exit. In the meantime the corps corn- 
disadvantage on patrol or messenger duty, outpost or escort of train when 
opposed to the better armed enemy, who will act all the bolder the safer 
he knows himself to be from bullet, and arme blanche. The chasseur 
does not replace the dragoon. The cavalry will best gain relief by an 
increase of its numbers. 

Should the hostile patrol not discover the marching column of the 
army corps, the absence of lance and carbine, and the presence of steel 
helmet and yellow top-boot, will betray the chasseur and positively in- 
form the enemy of the presence of infantry 

Better service may be expected at headquarters from the well- 
trained individual chasseur than from the average cavalryman tempora- 
rily detailed for such duty, although the efficiency of the latter has so far 
always proved satisfactory. But aside from the fact that too much must 
not be expected of mounted orderlies in action, would their efficiency be 
diminished by their being armed with lance and carbine? Naturally, a 
good hunting-knife would have to take the place of the broadsword. 

Thoughts on the seriousness of war have unintentionally brought 
us to the question of arms and equipment. It cannot be denied that 
arms and clothing are of tactical importance, and although this book may 
not be the place to discuss the matter, still, no one will be surprised if the 
desire makes itself felt that military judgment and activity should not be 
obstructed by this sort of defects. They would become manifest in the 
first days of a future campaign and force the conviction that no mounted 
man should be defectively armed and that his dress must not interfere 
with the use of his weapons or give the enemy any advantage over him. 

(The foregoing — translated from the original — contains, as will be 
seen, a description of a German organization, and discussion of the same, 
that is foreign to our own. — -Translator.) 



322 Studies in Applikd Tactics, 

mander, who is with the reserve of the advance guard, has 
received vague information by wire from Liebetadt of an engage- 
ment of the ist Cavalry at Pittehnen, and orders the commander 
of the ist Division promptly to send a battalion to Gr. Her- 
menau to at once occupy the defile there and act as a support 
for the ist Cavalry. The advance guard is to continue its 
march to Pfeilings, but the main body is provisionally to remain 
at Mohrungen. 

Troop E, 3d Cavalry, en route to Briickendorf to join 
Major D , has trotted past the marching column and re- 
cently passed Mohrungen. Major D has reported that, 

aside from a large patrol which was retreating, he has seen 
nothing of the enemy as far as Gubitten. 

One company of the left flank guard is at Freywalde, one 
on the Alt-Kelken-Gr. Sambrodt road, one on the Alt-Kelken- 
Hagenau road, one at Steinsdorf, and two more at Rollnau. 
The remaining two are^ to take up a position in the district 
between the Neuhof-Weise road and the Georgenthal mill. 

Nothing has-been seen of the enemy excepting a patrol at 
Hagenau. 

What arrangements are made by the commanding 
General of the First Division? 

The simplest thing to do would be to transmit the instruc- 
tions to the advance-guard commander. But the division 
commander fully understands the situation with the advance 
guard and can see that its commander is able to send nothing 
but the ist Battalion, ist Infantry, now in the van guard, to 
Gr. Hermenau ; for, aside from the artillery, there is only a bat- 
talion of infantry in the reserve. Neither can the required 
force be taken from the main body of the division, the head of 
whose column is now^about 2,000 yards east of Gr. Bestendorf ; 
it would arrive at the designated point nearly an hour after 
the van guard could. There is nothing else to do but to send 
a battalion from the latter and to form the advance guard anew. 



TiiK Corps on thic March. 323 

For it will not do to let only the 2d and 3d Battalions, ist In- 
fantry, and artillery march to Pfeilings as advance guard. 

Therefore, the division commander gives the following 
order to the advance-guard commander : 

"The division is ordered at once to send a battalion of 
infantry to Gr. Hermenau to occupy the defile at that point 
and act as a support for the ist Cavalry. 

"The ist Battalion, ist Infantry, is available for this duty. 
Issue the necessary orders to have this done. The two com- 
panies marching through Mohrungen for the present can halt 
at the eastern exit of the town and later follow their battalion. 
The advance guard will be reinforced by the 3d Infantry and 
will advance to Pfeilings. The main body of the division pro- 
visionally will follow to Mohrungen. But I shall retain the 
last two companies 'of the regiment at the head of the main 
body until further orders, so that there may be some infantry 
in front of the 2d Battalion, ist Field Artillery." 

The measures to be taken by the advance-guard commander 
are very simple. He will form the new van guard of the 2d and 
3d Battalions, ist Infantry, Troop C, 3d Cavalry, and Company 
A, ist Battalion Engineers; but will have the ist Battalion, 
ist Field Artillery, and the ist Field Hospital halt at the side 
of the highway to follow the 3d Infantry. It would cause some 
delay to part of the infantry regiment if an effort were made to 
place the artillery between parts of it; and it is desirable to 
avoid such delay, because some time has been lost already by 
the new arrangement of the advance guard. 

We can learn a number of lessons from the episode. 

Who has ever seen so large a percentage of the infantry of 
a division in the advance guard during peace maneuvers? And 
yet the first principle in the matter of instruction is that noth- 
ing should be taught in time of peace that must be discarded in 
time of war. While we are accustomed to make certain con- 
cessions in this respect as far as formal drill is concerned, it was 
expected that all regulations relating to field service would hold 
good. Unfortunately the division commander's appeal to them 



324 Studies in Applied Tactics. 

does not help him out of the dilemma. Whereas he had no 
idea yesterday evening of deviating from the regulations, this 
morning he must do so whether he wishes or not; and he must 
see that it would have been better if he had done so at the begin- 
ning. At the most it might be asked whether it would not 
have been sufficient to take only part of the 3d Infantry, so as 
to keep more nearly to the prescribed proportion. But every 
expert would have decided against this, because a division of 
the regiment would have been a greater evil. But we must 
consider a few additional circumstances before coming to a final 
decision. 

Although no particular danger threatens the ist Army 
Corps on May 5th from any direction, and although no serious en- 
gagement with the enemy is probable on this day, we still might 
get the idea that on account of the corps being on the flank of 
thearmy we here have an unusual case justifying an exceptional- 
ly strong advance guard, and therefore that the general rule as to 
strength of advance ^ards would still hold good for ordinary 
cases. But if we look at the neighboring army corps, advanc- 
ing via lyiebemiihl towards Locken, we see that its advance 
guard must send at least two battalions via Tharden-Porsch- 
ken-Reuszen-Eckersdorf and two more to the south end of 
Eissing-see. In its advance guard, also, two regiments of 
infantry will not be sufficient. The wider the space interven- 
ing between the two lines of march, the more extensive and 
varied will be the duties of the advance guards, and as their 
conposition is not arranged for a few hours as on maneuvers, 
but for days and weeks during which the distances between the 
roads are constantly changing, it will be well to make them so 
strong that their reinforcement from the main body will be 
unnecessary. 

I wish to go into further details concerning another objec- 
tion that might be raised to my train of thoughts. It can be 
justly claimed that in this case we have to deal with the advance 



The Corps on the; March. 325 

guard of the i st Army Corps and not with that of the i st Divi- 
sion; and that therefore a brigade as advance guard would not 
be out of proportion according to the rule laid down in the 
Field Service Regulations. But these regulations themselves 
refute this objection by the following sentence: "In larger 
forces the strength and composition of the advance guard .... 
depends on the size of the leading part of the force." This 
somewhat elastic provision must have reference to the largest 
body usually marching on a single road — i. e., to the army 
corps. It is intended to mean that in an army corps the lead- 
ing division furnishes the advance guard and does so in accord- 
ance with its own strength, and not that of the army corps. 
This regulation is based on experience in war, where now and 
then special advance guards were formed for armies and army 
corps that did not prove satisfactory. For example, in the 
Army of the Elbe in 1866 an advance guard was formed of rifle 
battalions which broke up all troop organizations and suffered 
from lack of supplies because its trains were missing; while in 
1870 an advance guard of the VII. Army Corps formed of a 
brigade of infantry with cavalry and artillery deprived the divi- 
sion commander of the control of half his troops and interfered 
with the corps commander's freedom of action. 

The Field Service Regulations aim at preventing a recur- 
rence of such an evil without thereby attempting to dispose of 
the question of army advance guards, concerning which the 
commander-in-chief can best decide. It is simply intended to 
prevent any army or army corps from organizing a peculiar 
advance guard of its own. Experience has condemned such 
an arrangement as injudicious, and if the leading division of an 
army corps marching on one road on principle looks out for the 
service of security and information, the requirement is best met. 
It goes without saying that the division following may have to 
see to the protection of its own flanks. Even a corps advance 
guard would not relieve it from this duty. 



326 Studieis in Applied Tactics. 

Theoretically, therefore, there is no foundation for the last 
named objection, for, according to the wording of the Field 
Service Regulations, the strength of the advance guard of an 
army corps should be governed by the strength of the leading 
part — i. e., the leading division; but in reality the objection 
is authorized. As a rule, the great length of column of an army 
corps calls for a broader front of advance guard than is neces- 
sary for a division, and this requirement can be met only by 
the use of a larger force. Where in the past a separate advance 
guard was formed for an army corps, its infantry usually con- 
sisted of a brigade. (VII. Army Corps in 1870, York Corps, 
1813.) 

If the divisions are marching beside each other on parallel 
roads, they may be able to get along with a smaller advance 
guard. But in the vast armies of to-day this is seldom the 
case. It is very seldom that several roads will permanently 
be at the disposal of an army corps. Therefore nearly always 
demands will be made.of the advance guard that even during 
the march will call for more than two regiments of infantry. 
During the night's rest additional demands will be made. Our 
example will show how much these demands may increase, and 
it not only is unreasonable, but also injudicious, for days and 
weeks to have the same troops perform outpost duty that have 
charge of the security of the march.* 

During peace maneuvers, where the organizations are 
changed daily, men are spared by forming small advance and 
flank guards and by cutting down the strength of outposts. 
In time of war a weak advance guard would be unable to rotate 
duties among the organizations. The same men who from 
early in the morning until late in the afternoon provide for the 
security of the march, and march a number of miles on bad 

*That is, the author wishes the advance guard to be strong enough 
so the part not in the lead or on duty as flank guards during the day- 
will act as outposts during the night. — Translator. 



The Corps on the ]March. 327 

roads or across country, must go on outpost in the evening, 
and the following morning must resume the wearing duty of 
protecting the march. 

If the leading division of an army corps uses one of its 
brigades as advance guard,* the latter not only is better pre- 
pared to meet unexpected demands, but the advance-guard 
commander, who as a rule also is the brigade commander, can 
prevent a premature expenditure of strength by changing the 
subdivisions at the right time. This would be of especial ad- 
vantage if opposed to superior hostile cavalry, and our own 
cavalry did not control the country to the front. 

And what harm would there be if the division retained 
the same advance guard even if the other division of the corps 
had found a parallel road and were marching on it alongside 
the first one? The division will lose nothing in the way of 
security by so large an advance guard. Is it reasonable to 
think that this would induce the advance-guard commander 
to waste his strength? Whatever less amount now may be 
needed for protection on the march or in camp will be taken 
care of just as well as, or even better than, if it dropped back 
into the main body of the division. 

And as long as the division commander marches with the 
advance guard, as now is customary, there is no danger that 
the advance guard will escape and lead the division into dif- 
ferent paths from those intended by the division commander. 
On the contrary, with so large a part of his force present, there 
is more ground for the superior commander's presence with the 
advance guard than with a smaller amount. The distances 
betw^een the parts of the enlarged advance guard can be regu- 
lated according to circumstances, the same as before. The 
commander can extend the parts as much to the front, or draw 
them as close together, as he sees fit. 

*In the German Army there are two brigades of infantry in a division- 



328 Studii^s in Applied Tactics. 

Let us examine in detail the assignment of troops in the 
ist Division that we think would answer. 

The advance guard should consist of the entire ist Brigade, 
what is left of Troop C, Company A, Engineers, and a field hos- 
pital. Concerning artillery, the question arises whether it would 
not be permissible to assign the entire ist Field Artillery to the 
advance guard. I do not hesitate to answer in the affirmative 
if there is any artillery at all necessary or authorized with it. 
During a march through extensive forests or mountainous 
country, where artillery could not be used, or would hinder 
the free use of infantry, or where it would be exposed to hostile 
attack, a battalion of artillery would be as unsuited for the 
advance guard as would a regiment. But why should the 
regimental organization be destroyed for weeks where the 
assistance of guns would be advantageous in an advance-guard 
action, and there is sufficient infantry available to support the 
guns? Three batteries more or less may exert a decisive influ- 
ence in an advance-guatd engagement; but if it should be in- 
tended to open an engagement with the entire artillery brigade, 
a regiment of artillery is as easilv kept back as a battalion. 
There is no harm in separating the two regiments of artillery 
in the column. The brigade organization of artillery is of no 
importance until in battle. During the march the brigade 
commander surely is with the division staff. 

Then the main body of the division would consist of the 
2d Brigade, the 3d Field Artillery, the remaining engineers 
and field hospitals, the ammunition column, and the divisional 
bridge train. 

If we erase from the mind the figures with which to a cer- 
tain extent we are burdened by inheritance, nothing question- 
able or imm.aterial mil be found in the distribution just de- 
scribed. On the contrary, it frees us from a cumbersome, 
artificial model which is contrary to the principle calling for 
the preservation of tactical organizations. It assures every 



The Corps on the March. 329 

commander the permanent control of the entire force intended 
for his command by the ordre de hataille. During protracted 
marches there is not only a question of field orders to be con- 
sidered, but also such as refer to the daily interior economy of 
troops. How can the commanding general of the i st Brigade be 
held responsible for the fighting and marching efiiciency of his 
entire brigade if, while advance-guard commander, he has one 
of his regiments removed from his control? How can he keep 
in harmony and close touch with his command if for weeks he 
fails to see half of it and is not expected to concern himself 
about it? Only 1,000 yards in rear of him marches one of his 
regiments which is becoming estranged from him, which is not 
learning to know its brigade commander, and yet is expected 
to be under his command as soon as the time for battle arrives. 

It is the same with the commander of the dismembered 
regiment of artillery, who, tied to one of the battalions during 
the march, feels a responsibility for the welfare of the other 
one ; and feels like a fifth wheel with the battalion where he is, 
as it has its own commander. Neither has the commander of 
the ist Infantry a pleasant time. The brigade and advance- 
guard commander must himself deal with the battalions. 

To avoid misunderstandings, he must ignore the regiment- 
al commander, who considers himself unnecessary and whose 
efforts concerning the interior economy of the regiment en- 
counter obstacles everywhere, because his battalion commanders 
are not responsible to him, but to the brigade commander, for 
the execution of their orders. To give him something to do, 
the advance-guard commander, at least in our example, has 
made him commander of the reserve, where he has only a bat- 
talion of his own regiment. 

How much better results are obtained by the proposed 
arrangement. After considering the pros and cons, we must 
be convinced that such an arrangement is the natural one; 
—22— 



330 Studies in Applied Tactics. 

that it should form the rule, and every other one be considered 
an unwelcome exception. 

I am not in favor of changing the regulations by placing 
another rule in place of the one now existing. But if the com- 
mander of a cavalry division and of every body of independent 
cavalry is given perfect freedom in the apportioning of his 
command, I see no reason why the commander of an infantry 
division should be fettered by definite instructions and figures. 
And he is fettered even if in the instructions the addition of 
"as a rule" seems to justify exceptions. It is the fate of all 
rules to check independent thought. Man is not inclined to 
bother himself if a rule points out a convenient path and re- 
lieves him from responsibility. 



A Temporary Halt. 

Let us further follow the march of the ist Army Corps. 

It is 10.30 a. m. The ist Battalion, ist Infantry, is on 
the march via Georgenthal to Gr. Hermenau. The second and 
third battalions, with the remainder of Troop C and the com- 
pany of engineers, are on the way to Pfeilings. The 3d Infantry 
is approaching the Mohrungen railway station, where the ist 
Battalion, ist Field Artillery, and the field hospital are awaiting 
its arrival. The main body of the division has been ordered 
to leave a distance of 1,200 yards in rear of the 3d Infantry for 
the ist Battalion, ist Field Artillery. 

The commanding general of the ist Corps has gone to the 
Mohrungen railway station and there receiyed a telegram from 
army headquarters stating that the ist Corps probably would 
continue its march from Mohrungen in the direction of Ramten 
and Locken; that the 2d Corps already had been diverted to- 
wards I^anggut and Podleiken; and that the ist Corps should 
provisionally halt at Mohrungen to await definite orders. 

The corps commander informs the commanding general 



The Corps on the March. 331 

of the ist Division, who is in the vicinity, of the contents of 
the telegram, and gives the latter the following orders: 

"The ist Division will halt at Mohrungen. Make the 
necessary arrangements for continuing the march towards 
Ramten and Locken, and particularly look out for the safety 
of the defile between Narien- and Mahrung-see. 

"I shall not continue the march from Mohrungen in less 
than two hours." 

What instructions are given by the Commander of 
the First Division? 

The tactical problem of making arrangements for continu- 
ing and protecting the march through a district in which hostile 
parties have been encountered draws the division commander 
to the front. The care for his main body, whose halt of several 
hours' duration he would like to utilize to provide every pos- 
sible comfort for his troops, impels him to stay at Mohrungen. 

He now has a sufficiently strong advance guard to solve 
the tactical problem, which properly may be turned over to 
the advance-guard commander for solution. In fact, it would 
be wrong for the division commander to interfere with details. 
It therefore seems more important that the division commander 
should remain with the main body for the present. 

Whether and where the troops of the main body possibly 
may form, where they are to halt, where to obtain water, 
whether they shall cook, whether and how Mohrungen and the 
neighboring villages are to furnish food, how to maintain order 
in the town, all this weighs on the division commander; for 
there is no commander of the main body. 

If there were one, would the division commander have any 
doubt as to where he should now be? Would he fail to take 
advantage of the unusually favorable opportunity to person- 
ally examine the ground where his division may have to fight 
to-morrow? His riding with the advance guard during the 
march, where he by no means wishes to meddle with the details 



332 Studies in Applied Tactics. 

of command, serves the purpose of promptly enabling him 
personally to see the enemy and the country. Shall he now 
remain with the main body on account of its interior economy? 
A ride of three-quarters of an hour will bring him to the vicinity 
of Horn. How much more practical and well founded will his 
arrangements be if from an elevation near that village he him- 
self has seen the surrounding country in broad daylight than 
if he must make them based on the map and messages received. 
No great general, no experienced commander, has ever missed 
an opportunity to make a personal inspection. 

Therefore the division commander will not hesitate to obey 
the voice calling him to the front, to the head of his troops. 
Of course he must not expose himself to surprise]jby hostile 
troopers. He takes the remainder of Troop C along. There 
are three other troops ahead of him, and in case of necessity 
he will depend on his swift horse. We shall often find that 
generals need swift horses even if not in the cavalry. After 
the division commander has reported his decision to the corps 
commander, he informs the advance-guard commander of the 
new situation and orders him to start the advance guard to- 
wards Pfeilings and then to join the division commander with 
Troop C for the ride to Horn. 

The main body and baggage train are placed in charge of 
the commanding general of the 2d Brigade. The latter is or- 
dered to halt at Mohrungen, and the division commander still 
has to give him instructions how this shall be done. 

There would be no use in having the entire main body or 
even a part of it form in mass. The troops would have to form 
in marching column again even if the march should be con- 
tinued for a short distance only. The troops will be able to 
rest promptly if all halt in column on the road ; but this must 
not be entirely taken up either by the infantry stacks, artillery^ 
or teams. 



The; Corps on the March. 333 

It is almost always impossible for large bodies of men to 
cook a meal during a halt en route, on account of scarcity of 
wood; and it usually causes the men more exertion than re- 
freshment. In the present case there will be no thought of 
this, because the two hours' intermission would not suffice, and 
with good management the men will have had a good break- 
fast and will have ample food in the haversacks. There is no 
objection to feeding the animals. It would be a mistake not 
to feed the oats that have been brought along, even if they are 
supposed to form an emergency ration. It is also advisable 
to provide water for men and animals, even if there is no sum- 
mer's heat. The obtaining of water cannot be left to the dis- 
cretion of the organizations. They would naturally interfere 
with each other; in running water the animals would muddy 
the water and make it unfit for men. The taking of water 
must be regulated both as to place and time. 

Care must be taken to systematically utilize the resources 
of Mohrungen, Gr. and Kl. Bestendorf, Gr. Wilmsdorf, Obuchs- 
hofchen, and Alt Kelken. They at least can supply water, 
and possibly also bread and oats if the commanding general 
authorizes this, taking into consideration the needs of the 2d 
Division, which is following. 

The division commander would have to order all these 
things if he did not delegate them to the commanding general, 
2d Brigade. Anyway, he must send for the brigade commander 
and must give him general instructions as to what is to be done, 
because the latter is not familiar with his new dutiess. How 
different it would be if the brigade commander for some time 
had been in command of the main body by virtue of the dis- 
tribution of troops ! In this event he would have been at the 
head of the main body and the only thing necessary would have 
been an order (from the division commander): "The main 
body will halt for two hours along the road when the head of 
its column reaches Mohrungen." The execution of this order 



334 Studies in Applied Tactics. 

would not be difficult for the commander, who from experience 
already knows the needs of the main body composed of all 
branches of the service and who has a full knowledge of the 
situation. 

I can find no objection to permanently having a com- 
mander designated for the main body, and in practice have 
come across no case where such action could have been 
detrimental. 

The objection can hardly be taken seriously that the com- 
mander of the main body might abuse his authority and leave 
the column without cause or authority. He would rather be 
be able to prevent such action on the part of subordinate com- 
manders; for example, a too zealous artilleryman. But this 
arrangement results in the great advantage that in the main 
body there will be a commander responsible for order and pro- 
tection of the column. The eye of the division commander, 
who is with the advance guard, does not reach back to the 
main body; only exceptionally will he be able to do the right 
thing. 

Every movement of a large body of men causes friction 
that can be more easily removed by a commander of the whole 
force on the spot. Only an inexperienced commander will feel 
certain that the written orders for the march will control the 
troops as if these were led on a string and be sufficient to meet 
all obstacles without having anyone present to see that the 
orders are carried out, or able to interfere and make any abso- 
lutely necessary changes or arrangements against the enemy. 
The Field Service Regulations state that it may be advisable 
to have small bodies of infantry march between fractions of a 
long column of artillery. Is this to be done solely when ar- 
ranged for the preceding day in the distribution of troops for 
the march ? Is it not possible that the utility of such an ar- 
rangement may become evident only after the march has begun? 
In such event must permission always be obtained from the 



The Corps on the March. 335 

division commander, who is far in advance, or is it to be done 
by a friendly agreement between the infantry general and the 
artillery colonel, who by rights have no authority to change 
the order of march? Are not the division commander's orders, 
addressed to the main body, more likely to be thoroughly car- 
ried out if they are addressed to its commander than to its 
component parts? 

The astonishing custom of not designating a commander 
for the main body of a division — a custom, and not a regula- 
tion — is a relic of the time when the division commander as a 
rule remained with the main body, an historical tradition that 
has saved itself from the past and makes life more difficult 
for us. If the division commander happens to be with the 
main body, its commander appointed by the former will not 
be an obstacle in his way. We have gradually learned that 
on the march the proper place of the commander-in-chief is 
very far forward if he hopes to direct his troops according to 
his own ideas and insight. We simply have failed to draw 
correct inferences from this. 

We might be inclined to believe that the first few days' 
march in a campaign would remedy the error, if for no other 
reason than because the prescribed rests en route cannot be 
properly carried out without a responsible commander present 
with the main body. This supposition is not altogether cor- 
rect. In time of war halts of large bodies of troops on the 
march will as far as possible be omitted. Let us look at our 
example. According to regulations, there shall be a short halt 
soon after beginning a day's march.* For the ist Division 
en route to Mohrungen this time would have arrived when the 
van guard had reached Seegertswalde or Maldeuten. But at 
this moment a large part of the main body of the ist Division — ■ 
the infantry at Saalfeld and Kuppen, the field hospitals, and 
the divisional bridge train — would not yet have begun the 

♦See par. 234, F. S. R. 



336 Studies in AppIvIEd Tactics. 

march. The 2d Division, in front of which the ammunition 
column and baggage trains of the ist Division still must take 
place, to a large extent would still be in its quarters. But if 
the 2d Division later wishes to take advantage of the prsecribed 
halt, possibly when the head of its column has reached Woritten, 
the distance of 100 yards it is to maintain from the ist Division 
will presumably be increased to i ,000 yards. The division will 
hardly have resumed its march when the ist Division would 
again halt. Its van guard, after marching 8 or 10 miles, has 
completed the greater part of its day's march. The time has 
come for it and the leading part of the ist Division to have the 
long halt of half an hour or an hour. This will force the 2d 
Division to make a correspondingly long halt after its leading 
troops have marched about 5 miles and the rearmost ones 
about 2 or 2 ^ miles. The latter, after this long halt, will still 
have to march 12 or 13 miles if they are to reach Gr. Besten- 
dorf to-day. Only a small part of the command would derive 
benefit from the halt, and this would be impaired by the un- 
avoidable interruptions of the march. 

Theoretically the time for rest could be regulated by mass- 
ing of the troops ; but there is not always room alongside the 
road to thus form the troops, and, in addition, it takes time and 
strength. 

In some armies a remedy is sought by designating a fixed 
time for halts. It is hoped that checks and delays will be 
avoided by specifying a certain hour when, without further 
orders, everything on the road will halt. 

It is self-evident that but little will be gained by this. 
For example, if in our case 10 a. m. were announced as the time 
for the one hour's halt to begin for the entire corps, matters 
would stand almost exactly as above described. The head of 
the ist Division would be near the end of its march, and the tail 
of the 2d Division would have but recently begun its march. 
But the commander very seldom can tell whether the situation 



The Corps on the; March. 337 

at any particular time will be favorable for a halt, and it is more 
hazardous and troublesome to make any change in an order 
issued on the subject beforehand than to issue one on the march. 
An order to halt issued to the leading subdivision of troops 
will promptly bring the whole column to a halt, as such an order 
quickly travels along the entire line. 

Then there is the regulation that "there should be a halt 
of ten minutes every hour."* The requirements of constantly 
changing conditions in an actual march conflict with any such 
mechanical regulation. The march of a long column following 
this rule will be subject to checks and interruptions ; though in 
some cases it would cause considerable hardship to omit the 
customary halts prescribed by regulations. 

It is therefore to be recommended that in the movement 
of unusually large columns all the troops make a halt before 
joining the column on the main road, and after that continue 
without halting unless the length of march, intensity of heat, 
or other unfavorable conditions force a halt. The unfavor- 
able influence exerted on operations by long columns makes 
it desirable to thoroughly investigate the subject. 

At 10 a. m., when the van guard of the ist Division reaches 
Mohrungen, the tail of the 2d Division is still near Weinsdorf . 
Even if there is no long halt, and no interruption whatever of 
the march, the last troops of the army corps will require 5 or 
6 hours to reach Gr. Bestendorf. If an engagement should 
take place near Mohrungen — as might be the case under a 
different "general situation" — these troops would not be able 
to take part until about 5 p. m., after a march of nearly 22 
miles. The ammunition column and battalion of heavy artil- 
lery would not reach the battlefield until sunset. But in such 
case the situation of the ist Corps would not be a particularly 
unfavorable one; in most cases, where an army corps marches 
on a single road, conditions would be less favorable. If from 

*Par. 234, F. S. R. 



338 Studies in Applied Tactics. 

this we realize that when the head of an army corps encounters 
the enemy late in the day it will seldom happen that the corps 
can develop its full strength on the same day, means must be 
adopted to shorten the length of the column. Undoubtedly 
the best expedient is to use additional roads — at least, the 
infantry should, and in so doing must not hesitate to march 
considerably farther. But where, as in our case, only one road 
is available, the column can be more crowded. The width of the 
the highways will permit the infantry to march on a broader 
front than column of squads. It is probable that on the fine 
road from Saalfeld to Mohrungen the artillery could march in 
double-section column, two carriages alongside each other, 
and the greater part of the train in the same way. Thus the 
different units as well as the entire corps would be able to de- 
ploy for action more quickly, and the day's march would be 
shortened. 

It is quite likely that many of you with a shake of the 
head, as I have often done, have compared the narrow front 
of our marching columns with the broad space beside them 
used occasionally only by mounted officers or possibly without 
authority by led horses. 

Of course a space is desirable alongside the marching col- 
umn to enable a rapid transmission of messages and orders. 
But this does not require half the width of the road — a narrow 
strip will do if it only is kept clear — in time of peace. In time 
of war the messenger or adjutant often will make his way along- 
side the road. In time of war, too, no farmers' teams or vSpec- 
tators' carriages will meet the column and be entitled to room. 
It is therefore not necessary to be too insistent on a small front 
for the troops. In times past, under Frederick the Great and 
Napoleon, columns marched in a much broader front, at times 
leaving the road for the exclusive use of teams. The infantry 
marched in the fields alongside. Of course this called for great 
exertions, but these were in part repaid by an earlier arrival at 



The Corps on the March. 339 

their destination. During 1866 and 1870 we ourselves seldom 
used a column of squads on the march. On account of the 
importance of the subject, in every case it should be carefully 
considered whether a shorter march formation cannot be adopt- 
ed. Careful commanders can forestall any delay at specially 
narrow places by diverting the infantry to side roads or across 
open fields. Measured on the road from Drenken to Gerswalde, 
the space in which the ist Army Corps camped on May 4th is 
only about half as long as the marching column. This may 
be considered a mistake on the assumption that the march 
would be less irksome if the troops were not crowded so much 
in quarters. This is theoretically correct. If the quarters are 
spread out over the same space as the column of route, all the 
troops can start at the same hour and simultaneously arrive at 
their destination if their new quarters again correspond in length 
to that of the army corps. But the war conditions, the situa- 
tion, the number and size of villages on the line of march, will but 
seldom permit this. In our case the Finkenstein Forest neces- 
sitated a closing in of the troops on May 4th unless we wished 
to leave part of them behind between Riesenburg and Finken- 
stein; for the point, arriving at Finkenstein on May 3d, could 
go much farther than Barten and Drenken on the 4th. But 
it would be contrary to the requirements of the situation to 
leave the tail of the column in the vicinity of Saalfeld and 
Woritten to again occupy quarters along a length of road cor- 
responding to the length of the marching column. The 2d 
Division quartered at Mohrungen (on May 5th) can be utilized 
early on May 6th either at Gr. Hermenau or at Eckersdorf and 
Reuszen ; it can even give timely assistance at Locken. Where- 
as troops quartered at Woritten and Saalfeld could not be 
counted upon for assistance on May 6th. And, besides, the 
depth of quarters would increase the difficulty of drawing upon 
the supply columns in rear. Therefore in most cases the crowd- 
ing of troops in cantonment districts cannot be avoided; at 
least not as long as the army corps must march closed up as 
much as possible. 



QUARTERS AND COMBINED OUTPOSTS. 
SheI/Ter and Subsistence. 

The commander of the ist Division at 11.30 a.m. arrived 
at Knoll 145 northeast of Kranthau, where he was able to obtain 
an extended view of the country. Nothing is to be seen of the 
enemy as far as Reichau, the vicinity east of Willnau (Height 
160), or towards Gubitten. The inhabitants of Kranthau know 
only of a hostile detachment of 12 to 15 troopers which passed 
through Kranthau to Pfeilings between 6 and 7 a. m., remained 
there some time, and about 8 a. m. trotted back to Uie Tomlack 
Forest via Horn railway station (H. St. Horn). 

But the division commander noticed a large hostile patrol 
near Eckersdorf and sent the main body of his troop after it, 
retaining only 10 troopers with himself. The enemy promptly 
withdrew towards Ramten; the troop remained at Eckersdorf. 
The country people claim a while ago to have heard a faint 
sound of rifle-firing from the east. 

At 12 o'clock, noon, the van guard (2d Battalion, ist In- 
fantry, and Company A, ist Battalion Engineers) arrived at 
Horn railway station and sent a platoon to Horn and another 
to Kl. Luzeinen. 

Riding back, the division commander at 12.30 p. m. finds 
the reserve of the advance guard (3d BattaUon, ist Infantry, 
the 3d Infantry, the battalion of artillery, and the field hos- 
pital) at Pfeilings and learns that two companies of the 3d In- 
fantry are posted at Himmelforth, two companies of the 3d 
Battalion, ist Infantry, are at Paradies, and the other two at 
Venedien. At the same time he receives the following, carried 
by a cyclist: 

34^ 



Combined Outposts. 341 

Headquarters, i st Army Corps, Mohrungen, 
Field Orders 5 May 04, 11-30 a. m. 

No. 

1. Word has just been received from the ist Cavalry that it dis- 
persed a hostile troop of cavalry at Pittehnen. The district along the 
PiTTEHNEN-GuTTSTADT road seems to be free from the enemy. Five 
(5) hostile troops were seen near Heiligenthal at 8 a. m. to-day. 

2. The ist Army Corps will discontinue its march for to-day. The 
ist Division will be cantoned in HimmELFOrth, Pfeilings, Horn, and 
Kranthau; the 2d Division at Mohrungen, Neuhop, Kl. and Gr. Bes- 
tendorf, Wolla, Kuhdiebs, and Paradies. 

The ist Division may call in the troops employed by it in protecting 
the flank of the marching column. A railway train is ready at Miswaldb 
to bring the two battalions west of the Overland Canal to Mohrungen 
The battalion at Gr. Hermenau will remain there and will be under the 
corps commander's immediate orders. The main body of the ist Divi- 
sion has been ordered to continue its march to Himmelforth at 1 2-45 p. m. 

3. Officers will report for orders at Mohrungen at 7 p. m. to-day 

By command, etc. 

At 12.45 p. m., after the division commander read this 
order, two men of Troop A, 3d Cavalry, delivered the follow- 
ing message to him : 

Near Sooben, 
5 May, 11-40 a. m. 
To the Chief of Staff, ist Army Corps: 

After 9 a. m. to-day, I found the Bruckendorf railway station occu- 
pied by the enemy and attacked him dismounted, but could not dislodge 
him He had at least 200 men in the firing-line. I could not tell whether 
cavalry alone or cavalry and infantry were opposed to me, as the uni- 
forms are very much alike. My casualites were 3 dead and 1 4 wounded ; 
the latter are in Bruckendorf. I shall attempt to cross the Passarge at 
Kloben or Kallisten with Troops A and B and reconnoiter towards Miins- 
terberg-Jonkendorf. I have ordered Troop E to watch the enemy at 
Bruckendorf and prevent his reconnoitering towards Mohrungen. 

D 

Major. 

The message is in an unsealed envelope. The two troopers 
state that the engagement at Bruckendorf lasted over an hour; 
and that they met Troop E at Gubitten, its captain reading 
the message. 

What arrangements does the Commander of the 
First Division make at 12.45 p. m.? 

There will be no difficulty finding shelter for the division, 
although it might be a little crowded. Naturally the command- 



342 Studies in Applied Tactics. 

ing general's orders would not prohibit a slight extension of the 
cantonment district, providing that no place is occupied that 
has been assigned to the 2d Division. Although we are not yet 
certain how matters are at the front, whether there is not some 
hostile cavalry at Ramten or Locken, and whether or not the 
enemy is still at Briiekcndorf, there is no reason for delaying 
the troops in their occupation of quarters. Should hostile 
cavalry actually appear west of the Passarge to-day, the ad- 
vance guard would drive it back. There is no reason for 
shortening the period of rest on this account; such anxiety 
would be unmilitary. Not counting detours, the advance 
guard has marched over 15^ miles and has been astir since 5 
a. m. The main body will not reach Himmelforth before 2 
p. m.; and an hour and a half more will be necessary before 
all its units reach their quarters. It will be 5 p. m. before the 
baggage train joins the advance guard. It will be later in the 
evening before the 2d and 3d Battalions, 2d Infantry (now at 
the edge of the woods Joetween Freywalde and Neuhof), and 
the two battalions of the 4th Infantry (which are to be 
brought up by train from Miswalde) will join the division. 

It is evident that notwithstanding the very early arrival 
at the destination and the prompt orders of the corps com- 
mander, it will be late before the entire division can rest. And 
it will be instructive to cast a glance at the 2d Division, the head 
of whose column will be only a short distance past Saalfeld. 
By the time this reaches Gr. Bestendorf it will be 5 o'clock, 
and its last wagons, following the battalion of heavy artillery, 
will not reach the quarters before 7p.m. The rations consumed 
from the baggage train must be replaced during the night from 
the supply columns.* 

Although but few villages are available, the division com- 
mander would not think of having part of his men bivouac. 
The poorest shelter under roof, as a rule, is preferable to biv- 

*See par. 382, F. S. R. 



Combined Outposts. 343 

ouacking,* at least in European countries; and our grand 
maneuvers serve to remind us that a great many men and 
animals can be sheltered in a small space. And subsistence 
can be better arranged for in quarters than in bivouac. It 
is manifest that food supplies will be requisitioned from the 
villages without waiting for the baggage trains ;t no division 
order is necessary for this. The method of supply should be 
regulated; and the very first days of a campaign afford such 
practical lessons in this that it seems unnecessary to theoreti- 
cally discuss the subject. But it is well to remember that there 
is no danger of want as long as cattle can be obtained in the 
country. It is claimed that freshly killed meat is unpalat- 
able or hurtful. I^arge bodies of troops in Europe and distant 
countries for weeks and months have subsisted on freshly 
killed cattle without bad results. 

Keen hunger and good cooking help to overcome its pecul- 
iar taste. In the same way, thoroughly baked fresh bread may 
be eaten as soon as baked. We also prefer freshly- baked to 
stale bread in ordinary life. Besides, freshly baked bread very 
readily spoils if loaded on wagons. Bad water is more harm- 
ful than fresh beef or bread. Both troop commanders and 
surgeons must carefully investigate its quality. 

Food supplies will be requisioned not only in the villages 
where the troops are quartered, but also in neighboring ones, 
in so far as they are not assigned to other bodies of troops. 
Therefore there is no danger of being short of meat. Flour 
must be obtained, so each man may have a liberal supply of 
bread the following morning, and bread must be baked in all 
the ovens. Sometimes the number of ovens is quite limited. 
In addition, the soldier's meat-can must help out with cooking 
facilities. 



*See pars. 593-4, F- S. R. 
fSee pars. 373-4, F. S. R. 



344 Studies in Applied Tactics. 

It will be more difficult to provide for the large number of 
animals in the division than for the men. The barns will be 
far from full, only a couple of months before harvest -time. As 
a rule, there will be especially a scarcity of oats. So it will be 
necessary to use other varieties of forage, which shows how 
important it is to accustom animals to them in time of peace 
and familiarize the keepers with the precautions to be taken in 
their use. 

If we assume that May 5th is not the first day of the cam- 
paign, and that the troops already are used to camp life, the 
division commander may confine himself to the following short 
order at i p. m. : 

Headquarters, ist Division, ist Army Corps, 

Pfeilings, 5 May, i p. m. 
Field Orders 
No. . 

1. The ist Army Corps will remain near Mohrungen; the 2d 
Division in Mohrungen, Guldenboden, Paradies, Kuhdiebs, Gr. 
Bestendorf, and to the north. 

Corps headquarters: Mohrungen. 

2. The ist Division will be cantoned as follows; Advance guard: 
Reussen, Schwenkendorf, Horn, Kranthau, Kx. Luzeinen. Main 
body: Himmelforth, Pfeilings, Gr. Gottswalde. Division bridge 
train: SittehnEn. Division headquarters: Himmelforth. 

Regimental headquarters and the 2d Battalion, ist Field Artillery, 
will join the advance guard. 

3. Information is expected soon concerning the situation at Ramten 
and Locken; likewise concerning the position of Troop E, 3d Cavalry. 
The defile between Mahrung- and Eissing-sEE must be constantly 
watched. 

4. The baggage trains and ammunition column will be brought to 
Himmelforth, where the former will be at the disposition of the com- 
manders of the advance guard and main body. 

5 Officers will report for orders at Himmelforth at 9 p. m. 
By command, etc. 

A verbal order to the adjutants will be sufficient to bring 
in the detached troops and to have the battalion of ist Infantry 
stay at Gr. Hermenau. The chief surgeon of the division will 
be ordered to care for the wounded of Troops A and B at Briick- 
endorf. The division commander cautions him that if the 
enemy is seen there, the latter must not be allowed to obtain 



Combined Outposts. 345 

any information. The surgeons sent out are to be instructed 
concerning their conduct and that their supplies must be taken 
along in farm wagons. The lettering on Army transportation 
might give the enemy valuable information. 

The baggage train of the ist Battalion, ist Infantry, is sent 
to Gr. Hermenau. The chief of staff endeavors to have tele- 
graphic communication restored between Horn railway station 
and Mohrungen, possibly also with Ziegenberg, and will not 
neglect to obtain information from the inhabitants concernmg 
the enemy and the country, particularly concerning the nature 
of the Passarge and its bridges, the meadow lands and roads. 
Provisions, cattle, bread and forage will be obtained from Eck- 
ersdorf and Willnau. It is impracticable to wait with drawmg 
supplies from neighboring villages until it is ascertained whether 
or not the villages in which troops are quartered have a sufficient 
supply. Any surplus can be loaded in the regimental wagons 
or the supply column following. The cyclists of the main body, 
in charge of an officer, are particularly adapted for this duty. 
At least one-half of those belonging to the main body will be 
available. The advance guard will need its cyclists with the 

outposts. 

Prolonged marches will induce the commanders of the 
advance guard and main body to have part of the cyclists at 
the head of their respective columns for use in case of necessity. 
The order contains no instructions concerning outposts. 
The service of security and information always is the province 
of the advance guard. 

In establishing the cantonment we again see the advantage 
of having the main body under the command of the command- 
ing general of the 2d Brigade. 

It is not necessary for the division commander to bother 
himself about the different parts of the main body; the brigade 
commander, who otherwise would have nothing to do but go 
to his quarters, can relieve him of this office. 

—23— 



346 Studies in Applied Tactics. 

Although there is no tactical reason for assigning the 2d 
Battalion, ist Field Artillery, to the advance guard, it seems 
advisable on the score of obtaining good accommodations, and 
on May 6th this assignment will be retained if the division com- 
mander has become convinced to-day that he will need the 
entire ist Brigade in the advance guard. 

The division order does not contain any information about 
the enemy. This will often happen in war, when the com- 
manders concerned can receive verbal information on the sub- 
ject. A repetition of this in the order here would simply be a 
concession to the model. 

The order, with necessary additions, particularly concern- 
ing the cyclists, will be sent to the main body. 

But, on account of the strained situation and the proximity 
of the enemy, the division commander cannot yet look up his 
quarters. He considers it necessary first to listen to the ad- 
vance-guard commander's orders, and then again to go into 
the territory in front of 4iis position. 

Security and Information 

The advance-guard commander's orders will conclude the 
day's work of the ist Army Corps, which we have followed in 
spirit, and will be the capstone of the structure portrayed in 
Part II. of this study. 

I would recommend that such readers as wish to solve this 
problem for themselves unreservedly try their own skill at it, 
without consulting Field Service Regulations or any other text- 
book. It surely would be impracticable to consult a book in 
time of war. 

What arrangements will the advance-guard Com- 
mander OF the First Division make about i p. m., May 

5TH? 

(There are 30 men of Troop C under its captain at Eckers- 
dorf ; 10 men are with the van guard at Horn railway station.) 



Combined Outposts. 347 

The problem can be solved in a variety of ways, and any 
arrangements would be suitable that secure the division against 
surprise. It is desired that hostile patrols be kept at a distance, 
and that the advance guard find a place which will furnish sup- 
plies and force as few men as possible to bivouac. And finally, 
everything must be done in the way of reconnaissance that the 
means at hand will possibly permit. 

Towards the east the nature of the ground favors protec- 
tion. Occupying the defile between Narien- and Mahrung-see 
secures protection from surprise as well as from hostile recon- 
naissance in this direction, and can be effected with a small 
force. There is wider scope in arranging for protection towards 
the southeast and south. It would do to have protection de- 
pend on the infantry occupying the villages of Reuszen, Schwen- 
kendorf, and Horn. It is probable that pickets posted on the 
roads leading towards the enemy and companies in alarm- 
quarters* at the village entrances would give sufficient protec- 
tion. It is true that in this case there would be no regularly 
detailed outposts responsible for protection, which seems a 
doubtful proceeding in view of the nearness of the enemy ; and 
a surprise might involve villages in which artillery is quartered. 
This must be avoided as much as possible. Besides, the hamlet 
of Schwenkendorf on the main road would have to be over- 
crowded with troops and the entire advance guard would have 
to be in a high state of readiness, which would interfere with 
recuperation. 

Therefore it seems more advantageous to have a force of 
infantry march 3^ miles farther — to Eckersdorf — and intrust 
it with outpost duty in the section between Gehl-see and Mahr- 
ung-see. This will increase the area available for quartering 
troops, will make it safe to collect supplies in the large village 

*In this case troops would be crowded into a smaller space than if 
in ordinary quarters; the men would remain dressed, with arms at their 
sides, and a light burning in each house, with a man on guard. 



348 Studies in Applied Tactics. 

of Eckersdorf , and will support reconnaissance towards Ramten 
and Locken. The infantry in Reussen can undertake outpost 
duty towards the south. 

The following order might result from these reflections 
after hearing the regimental commander's suggestions concern- 
ing the distribution of battalions and batteries: 

Advance Guard, ist Division, ist Army Corps, 

Pfeiungs, 5 May, i p. m. 
Field Orders 
No. . 

1. The ist Cavalry dispersed a hostile troop of cavalry near PiT- 
TEHNEN, and located five other troops near Heiligenthal. Bruckendorf 

was in possession of the enemy this morning. Major D attacked 

there with Troops A and B, 3d Cavalry, but could not dislodge the enemy; 
he then advanced via Kloben and Kallisten. Troop E, 3d Cavalry, has 
advanced via Gubitten to Briickendorf with orders to watch the latter 
place. 

The 2d Army Corps will not march to Locken, but has been deflected 
from LiEbemuhl to Langgut and Podleiken. 

The main body of the division will remain in Pfeilings, Himmel- 
FORTH, and Gr. Gottswalde; division headquarters at Himmelforth. 

2. (c) Thereserveoftjje advance guard will take quarters as follows: 

Regimental Headquarters and ^ 
1st Battalion, 1st Field Artillery, / tt „ 
Company A, Engineers, ^ 

Field Hospitals, J 

2d Battalion, 2d Infantry, ) o i. 1 j _t 
Battery E, ist Field Artillery, [ Schwenkendorf. 
Regimental Headquarters, 3d Battalion, ) 
2d Infantry, 3d Battalion, ist Infantry [ -q 
(from Venedien and Paradies), ) ^^ussen. 

Battery D, ist Field Artillery, 
Headquarters Advance Guard, Horn. 
(b) Outposts: 

Southern Section, Colonel O : 

Regimental Headquarters and 

2d and 3d Battalions, 3d Infantry, and 

Remainder of Troop C, 3d Cavalry, 

now at Eckersdorf, extending from Mahrung- to Gehl-see. 
Reserve : Eckersdorf. 

Reconnaissance to be conducted via Kammersdorf and Locken. 
Prompt report is expected concerning the situation at Ramten and Locken. 
The defile between Mahrung- and Eissing-see is to be constantly watched. 
An attempt will be made to obtain touch with Troop E, 3d Cavalry, 
via Magergut, and report of its location to be promptly reported to these 
headquarters. 



Combined Outposts. 349 

Northern Section, Lieutenant-Colonel P ' 

2d Battalion, ist Infantry, 
I St Battalion, 3d Infantry, 
10 men Troop C, 3d Cavalry, 
Battery F, ist Field Artillery, 

in the defile between Mahning- and Narien-see. 
Reserve: Kranthau. 

Reconnaissance to be carried on towards the Passarge. A strong 
patrol of cyclists will be sent to Kallisten. Prompt report is expected 
concerning the location of Troop E, 3d Cavalry. 

(c) The regimental commander 2d Infantry at Reussen will arrange 
for outposts towards the south, conferring with the cantonment com- 
mandant* of Gr. Gottswalde on this subject. 

(d) The various cantonment commandants will be responsible for 
the interior and exterior guards of their respective villages. (In Horn 
the colonel ist Artillery will be cantonment commandant.) 

3. Officers will report for orders at Horn at 10 p. m. 
By command, etc. 

After inquiry among the adjutants, all cyclists of the ad- 
vance-guard reserve are ordered up to the outpost sections. 

Many an order worded quite differently from the above 
will answer the purpose; mine will serve as a basis for some 
additional remarks. 

In the first place, I wish to explain two of the measures 
that call for remarks. 

A battery has been assigned to the northern section of 
outposts. In this way Kranthau can be used for sheltering 
the horses. Horn certainly is a large village, but when you 
count the animals belonging to the headquarters, train, and 
artillery, it will be quite a relief to have horses of one battery 
less to care for. Besides— and this is the most important rea- 
son for detaching the battery— a few guns posted on the height 
near Kranthau will command the road to Willnau and in cer- 
tain cases might do good service there during the afternoon or 
early next morning. 

This outpost section has the ist Battalion, 3d Infantry, 
while the other two battalions are in the southern section. On 

*Similar to our officer of the day. 



350 Studies in Applied Tactics. 

paper such objectionable separation easily could be avoided, 
but it often is otherwise in actual life. 

It might seem profitable to many of my readers to con- 
sider the 

ARRANGEMENTS MADE BY THE OUTPOST COMMANDERS AND 
THEIR SUBORDINATES. 

although these present no special difficulties. 



About a battalion will be required as supports and pickets 
in the southern section: a support of two companies at the 
southern exit of Eckersdorf, the other in Katzendorf. Pickets 
from the former will be stationed on the highway and the 
roads leading south from Eckersdorf, and from the latter at 
the Katzendorf-Gehlfeld and Katzendorf-Draglitz cross-roads; 
while the reserve, which will occupy alarm-quarters in Eckers- 
dorf close behind the support, will see to the guarding of the vil- 
lage and will send a detachment to the small farm-yard nearly 
a mile east of Eckersdorf (near the letter / of the word "Eckers- 
dorf"). Only the small remnant of Troop C is available for re- 
connaissance. We therefore must do without mounted orderlies 
at the supports and reserves; this can easily be done, because 
there is a cyclist with each company. It is hoped that a suffi- 
cient number will be on hand to admit of sending a patrol of 
cyclists via Magergut to Brtickendorf, to relieve Troop C from 
the necessity of establishing communication with Troop E. 
In the evening the patrol could be established at Ramten as 
a detached post to observe the ground between Mahrung- and 
Eissing-see. 

It cannot be foreseen when Troop C will return from recon- 
naissance from Kammersdorf. Quarters will be provided for 
it at the northern exit of Eckersdorf. Unless unusual circum- 
stances should detain it at the front, such as would demand 
and warrant the sacrifice, the troop should be able to have un- 



Combined Outposts. 351 

broken rest during the night. The prospect of this justifies 
the troop commander to act energetically the remainder of the 
afternoon. He has come less than 20 miles to-day, measured 
along the road. He accompanies the division commander in 
the ride from Mohrungen to Kranthau and was able to obtain 
a profound insight into the military situation. It cannot have 
escaped him that the unexpected change of direction of the 2d 
Army Corps to all appearances has disarranged the reconnais- 
sance service. His ambition urges him to help matters along. 
The wording of the orders he received from the outpost com- 
mander is not of much importance. No matter how much the 
prospect of safe quarters might tempt a cautious troop com- 
mander to occupy these early, who knows if the campaign will 
again offer a similar opportunity of important service and bril- 
iant action. The training of the young cavalry commander, his 
habit of self-dependence and initiative, enable him to grasp 
the full scope of the situation and realize the value of definite 
information concerning the conditions east of Kudipper Forest 
(Kudipper Forst). 

There is a large group of hostile troopers in his front. It 
is therefore unlikely that small patrols will be able to get through, 
or that their messages will come back in time. In addition, 
he is anxious to see with his owa eyes. Therefore he concludes 
to depart with all of his men that still have serviceable horses; 
a decision that is more easily arrived at on account of the cyclist 
patrol advancing to Ramten and Magergut. He chooses the 
route via Kammersdorf to Windtken, where he is less likely 
to encounter superior numbers of the enemy than on the prin- 
cipal road to Stenkienen. By keeping his men together he 
increases the chances of overcoming hostile resistance and of 
taking prisoners or intercepting hostile messages. It will be 
all the better if he can water and feed before starting. 

It is 6 miles to Labens-see. Therefore he may be able to 
get a view of the vicinity of Windtken and Stenkienen and still 



352 Studies in Applied Tactics. 

get back to Eckersdorf before dark. It would be more difficult 
for the captain of a "chasseur squadron" to come to this deci- 
sion. The latter lacks the proper weapons. A very few hostile 
carbines would be able to bar the way forwards or backwards. 

A battalion also will be used as supports and pickets in the 
northern section; two companies having their support at Kl. 
Luzeinen, and two more at the farm buildings about 650 yards 
south of the railway on the Kl. Luzeinen-Schwoiken road. 
The front is less than a mile in extent, but the neighboring 
Tomlack Woods facilitate the enemy's approach to such a degree 
that a strong line of outposts seems advisable. 

As both supports are at farm buildings, a number of con- 
veniences will be forthcoming. If hostile infantry should be 
discovered on the Passarge, it might be advisable to have two 
other companies bivouac at Zimek-see as an immediate reserve. 

The regular reserve will occupy alarm quarters in Kran- 
thau with a lookout on Ridge 145. Two mounted orderlies 
are assigned to each support. The six other troopers can take 
quarters with the reserve of the outpost after having investi- 
gated the situation at Briickendorf. 

We shall not go into the details of duty with the outposts. 
This could be discussed to advantage only on the ground itself- 
Besides, this duty is so carefully taught in the German Army 
that the discussion of a case by means of a map may be omitted. 
War would quickly strip off anything pedantic from peace 
training. 

Of course there are disadvantages connected with the 
stripping process, as every commander learns who is confronted 
by the enemy. A realization that certain laboriously learned 
and practiced things are not suitable in war and must be changed 
easily leads to a general discarding of regulations, and thus 
much that is necessary and good is thrust aside with superfluous 
and harmful matter. As the regulations necessarily are encum- 
bered with defects inherent in all human efforts, it is right to 



CoMBiNKD Outposts. 353 

attempt ridding them of any useless burdens, and the longer 
peace lasts, the more energetically this should be done. 

For example, is it worth while to devote time to examin- 
ing-posts, as is done in the German Army? 

To ease up on most of the double sentry-posts, all persons 
wishing to pass the chain of sentries are to be sent to the ex- 
amining-post, whence they are to be taken to the picket. In 
time of peace the instructions are memorized, but not carried 
out, because traffic must not be interfered with during maneu- 
vers. In time of war the provision would be inapplicable 
wherever there is no continuous chain of sentries. In addition, 
it seems questionable to send people elsewhere who come from 
the direction of the enemy. Instead of going in the direction 
indicated, they might go back, which could not be prevented 
at night. The sentry-post would have accomplished the oppo- 
site of what was intended. At least in hostile territory the 
news as to the location of our sentries would quickly spread. 
Would it not be more effective and simple to order that all 
persons coming from without the lines should be arrested and 
that no one be allowed to pass beyond them? Such a regula- 
tion could be carried out, for there will be pickets or groups in 
charge of non-commissioned officers on all roads, and besides, 
in time of war traffic carried on by the inhabitants would be 
very slight. 

But this matter is of small importance compared with the 
complicated and clumsy provisions that formerly oppressed 
us, and yet in their day were considered necessary and useful; 
viz., those that held the outpost commander responsible for 
the location and instruction of every individual picket and 
sentry -post; that required every sentry to learn certain com- 
plicated formulae to be used in the examination of patrols, 
country people, flags of truce, and deserters; and that endan- 
gered the life of every officer who did not know the countersign. 



354 Studies in Applied Tactics. 

Any peace training having for its guiding principle the 
provisions of the German Field Service Regulations specify- 
ing that rules cannot be formtilated that will fit all outposts, but 
that in every individual case the composition, relation of command, 
and details of the service must be regulated by existing^ conditions,* 
will prove satisfactory in the face of the enemy. 

If we take a general glance at the outposts on the after- 
noon of May 5th, we shall see a screen stretched from Reussen 
through Katzendorf and Eckersdorf affording ample protec- 
tion against hostile enterprises likely to be undertaken during 
the remainder of the day or during the night. Presumably 
the outpost'commander on his tour of inspection would no- 
where find double sentry-posts without their reliefs close at 
hand. This^surely would be the best arrangement on the 
march. It does not require any more men, saves the reliefs 
from going long distances, makes use of the intelligence and 
authority^offnon-commissioned officers, and strengthens the 
advanced firing-line. 

There "seems to be nothing lacking for the safety of the 
reserve of the advance guard or of the main body of the divi- 
sion, Nobody^need become excited if a few shots are fired at 
the outposts. In rear of the latter everything would be made 
ready for action without confusion or precipitation, should the 
enemy advance, even if the advanced cavalry should be late 
in giving notice, or entirely fail to do so. And yet the orders 
of the advance-guard and outpost commanders violate certain 
provisions of the (German) regulations. They state, with refer- 
ence to the outpost commander's orders, that these nmst always 
indicate what action the outposts must take in case they are 
attacked.! They invariably must afford the main body time 
to prepare for action. J But they should invariably be told 

*See par. 129, F. S. R. 
fSee par. 145, F. S. R. 
JSee par. 125, F. S. R 



Combined Outposts. 355 

whether after this they are to fall back or continue in posiiton 
until troops from the main body have joined them.* And the 
advance-guard commander is required to indicate to each 
subordinate what action the latter shall take in case the enemy 
attacks. 

It is quite likely that some of my readers who have worked 
out the duties of the advance-guard and outpost commanders, 
failed to comply with these requirements, as was the case with 
rae, and it is worth while to consider how these omissions might 
be rectified. 

What orders should the advance guard and outpost 
Commanders issue with reference to action of the out- 
posts IN case of attack by the enemy? 

I should very much like to see my readers' solutions to the 
foregoing problem, for I must confess that I cannot find a 
satisfactory one myself. 

It is no trick to formally comply with the requirement. 
How easily could. the following be added to the advance-guard 
orders: "In case the enemy attacks, the outposts will hold 
their ground until the arrival of the reserve of the advance 
guard." And who has not seen the following in an outpost 
order: "In case the enemy attacks, the line of supports will 
be held." These are forms agreed upon — be they good or 
bad — because the problem insists upon a decision. But will 
this answer the purpose ? Can such instructions fit the manifold 
possibilities? Does the advance-guard commander know be- 
forehand that he will be able to come to the assistance of the out- 
posts with his reserve? Does he know in advance what will be 
the division or corps commander's intentions? Should the sec- 
tion between Mahrung- and Narien-see be defended to the ut- 
most even if the enemy already should have captured Eckers- 
dorf ? Or should Eckersdorf be defended if the enemy advancea 

*See par. 139, F. S. R. 



356 Studies in Applied Tactics. 

in overwhelming numbers from Reussen towards Schwenken- 
dorf ? Naturally not. The advance-guard commander as well 
as the outpost commanders in case of a hostile attack will make 
their arrangements and issue orders in accordance with the 
requirements of the situation, and as would be their duty in 
an engagement. But none of them can order in advance what 
shall be done in an individual case, for none of them knows 
what the enemy will do, and as a rule none of them has seen 
the terrain in question. Orders for engagements issued in 
advance can only be disturbing elements and interfere with 
individual action. If we carefully go over the situation pre- 
sented to the advance-guard and the outpost commanders 
on May 5th we must come to the conclusion that it will be best 
for them not to give their subordinates binding rules of action. 
Then vigorous opposition will everywhere be offered to the 
enemy, which will insure the main body ample time for prepara- 
tion and ward off hostile skirmishers, but which need not be 
prolonged at a loss contrary to one's designs. The superior 
commanders are on the ground and will do their duty. 

The outposts will perform their duty if they guard the main 
body against surprise. We can confidently intrust their com- 
manders with the manner of doing this and where and how long 
they are to fight. It seems to me that here the excellent Ger- 
man regulations have become untrue to their own sound princi- 
ples. Omitting the element of compulsion would not deprive 
any superior commander of the ability to give the outposts or 
parts of the same more definite instructions in particular cases. 



The scarcity of cavalry gives a peculiar appearance to the 
outposts as a whole. In peace maneuvers the training of troops, 
as a rule, calls for an engagement every day. Therefore the 
opposing parties must be posted near each other. There is no 
room left between them for extended movements and enter- 
prises by the cavalry. Possibly with the exception of the first 



Combined Outposts. 357 

maneuver day, the cavalry remains as near the infantry as 
would happen in war only just before a battle. And, as only 
a few complete cavalry divisions can be formed annually, the 
infantry has a much larger force of cavalry attached to it than 
in time of war. It follows that outposts, too, receive an unusu- 
ally large quota of cavalry, which in some instances produces 
an erroneous impression as to the part that will regularly be 
taken by cavalry in outpost duty. Until within the past few 
years this presentation of peace-time received official recogni- 
tion, and to this day the old method has not entirely disap- 
peared of having a long line of cavalry outposts in front of the 
infantry as a means of protection during the day, and withdraw- 
ing it at night. The erroneous impression that sufficient cav- 
alry would be available for this duty has not yet been entirely 
removed ; a duty which in time of war would use up the corps 
cavalry in a few days. But the conviction will gain ground 
that the protection of a force of all arms both by day and night 
is the business of the infantry. 

In our example we even see how a large part of the corps 
cavalry is sent far to the front to assist the large bodies of cav- 
alry, while only a minimum amount, not enough even to supply 
mounted orderlies for the outposts, remains with the infantry. 
This is not an exceptional case, for army headquarters always 
will endeavor to assemble the mass of the cavalry at the deci- 
sive point. Corps cavalry always will have to help on one wing 
of the army, and particularly directly in front of the array. 
This should not be overlooked in peace maneuvers. To pre- 
vent infantry becoming accustomed to situations not true to 
war conditions, the unavoidable excess of cavalry at maneuvers 
should be used to reinforce the large reconnoitering bodies and 
afford it the opportunity of performing outpost duty of inde- 
pendent cavalry on a remote flank where there is no infantry. 

Infantry can easily do without the protection afforded by 
stationary cavalry. Even if this is lacking, the infantry sup- 



358 Studies in Applied Tactics. 

ports may do their cooking undisturbed, because they are 
always ready for action. 

Where formerly cavalry pickets and vedettes were posted, 
the infantry nevertheless had to be prepared for sudden attack 
because the scattered bodies of horsemen only too easily could 
be thrust aside or penetrated. Corps cavalry is much better 
employed if it devotes itself continuously to reconnaissance. 
We see from our example that, even shortly before a battle, it 
must not always look for its place in the line of infantry 
outposts. 

On the evening of May 5th the three troops commanded 

by Major D presumably will be reunited at Briickendorf 

and spend the night there, while officer's patrols will remain in 
the vicinity of Pupkeim and Ballingen, and resume their recon- 

noitering before dawn. Major D is justified in deciding 

to remain in advance of the infantry outposts by reason of the 
knowledge he has obtained of hostile outposts, the duty to 
keep touch with them, the advanced position of the ist Cav- 
alry, and the protection afforded him by the Passarge at Briick- 
endorf. Major D found out in the morning how difficult 

it was to overcome the obstacle presented by the Passarge 
with an enemy on the opposite bank. He will not voluntarily 
give up the bridges again. It is to be hoped that after learn- 
ing of the engagement at Briickendorf, Troop E remembered 
to obtain a liberal supply of ammunition from the infantry 
ammunition- wagons; a few extra clips will be cheerfully carried 
by each trooper in his saddle-bags, notwithstanding the extra 
weight.* 

Arrangements for quartering the cavalry could be made 
at Briickendorf in a similar manner to what was done at Schar- 
nick and Lingnau. Protection can be more easily attained on 
account of the Passarge. A dismounted picket should be 
posted at the railway station on the right bank to act as a pro- 

♦German cavalry carry but 45 rounds per man. 



Combined Outposts. 359 

tection to patrols going and messengers returning, as well as 
to the advance of the troops on May 6th. The planks of the 
foot-bridge at Alt Kockendorf will be removed and hidden on 
the left bank. An attempt will be made to restore telegraphic 
communication with Horn railway station. There will be no 
difficulty in obtaining supplies, although, of course, the troop 
wagons cannot be brought up. 

The three attitudes in which the cavalry is shown with 
reference to the infantry in the night positions of May 5th-6th 
may be taken as characteristic ones. In the north, at the outer 
flank of the army, an independent body of cavalry is a day's 
march in advance and by its position and far-reaching recon- 
naissance protecting the main body of the nearest troops of 
the ist Army Corps from surprise, so that the troops at Gr. Her- 
menau and Mohrungen will require nothing but exterior guards. 
Farther south, in front of the middle of the army corps, three 
troops of corps cavalry are holding a defile, but without making 
regular outposts unnecessary between Narien- and Mahrung- 
^ee. In the southern section the infantry must almost entirely 
depend on itself, and must supplement the reconnaissance and 
messenger service of the few remaining troopers by cyclists. 

It certainly is instructive to pass from the details we have 
described to these characteristics of the situation as a whole. 
But we must remember that the peculiar nature of the group- 
ings is the result of a natural course of events and the peculiarity 
of the terrain. They do not, for example, represent three forms 
of the service of security and information arbitrarily crowded 
by me into the narrow limits of an evening's doings within a 
restricted area. Any intelligent person will see that there are 
numerous other forms that would have been applicable, and 
that every case requires its own arrangements. 



CONCI.USION. 

The first section of Part II. was devoted to the arrange- 
ments of independent cavalry seeking to pass the night far in 
advance of the army and near the enemy. As there was a lack 
both of war experience and peace training to draw upon, tenta- 
tive measures and careful deliberation had to be employed to 
arrive at a satisfactory conclusion. It is believed that con- 
siderable information can be drawn from this work; among 
other things, that, even where natural obstacles do not protect 
troops, there are many advantages in placing troops in quarters 
over having them in bivouacs. We further saw with what diffi- 
culties pickets must contend that keep their horses with them; 
and we saw the inadequate results and dangers of mounted 
patrolling by night. An examination of modern inventions 
intended to expedite the transmission of information and or- 
ders showed that we must not place our hopes too high, and 
that for the present the automobile and motor-cycle are the 
most promising auxiliaries. 

In the second section we considered the arrangement of 
troops and the protection of the march of an army corps which 
had to look out for hostile cavalry on its front and flanks. 
Important questions relating to the distribution of troops and 
order of march were discussed, and great stress was laid on the 
importance of preventing hostile reconnaissance. The discus- 
sion of the depth of columns afforded an insight into the de- 
pendence of higher commanders on time and space and the 
obstacles placed in the way of their plans by the necessity of 
bringing up supplies. 

The third section of Part II. dealt with the army corps' 
halt for the night and the posting of outposts of infantry and 
cavalry. The scarcity of cavalry was very noticeable both on 
the march and on outpost. At the same time we realized that 
service of security for large bodies of troops can be carried on 

360 



CoMBiNKD Outposts. 361 

by the infantry, even if the latter has but a small number of 
troopers left at its disposal, and that this is no reason for keep- 
ing back the corps cavalry. 

If we may hope that our mutual labor has improved our 
judgment and helped to clear up important questions in the 
military service; if we may assume that thereby a sound found- 
ation has been laid for further study on the subjects of battles 
and operations, still our foremost aim would be to incite mental 
activity, develop ability, and strengthen the conviction that 
the true art of war is progressive nad must not be hampered by 
fetters. 



—24— 



Form of message blank and envelope used at the Army 
Service Schools, Fort I^eavenworth, and proposed for the re- 
vision of F. S. R. 

This blank has a margin on the left for binding. The 
back is ruled in squares and provided with scales for use in 
making simple sketches explanatory of the message. 

It is issued by the Signal Corps in blocks of 40 with 
duplicating sheets. 



U. S. ARMY FIELD MESSAGE 



No. 



Sent by Time Rec'd by Time Check 



Communicated by 
Buzzer, 'Phone, Tele- 
erach. Wireless, Lan- 
tern, Helio, Flag. Cy- 
clist, Foot Messenger, 
mounted Messenger. 
(Underscore means used) 



From 



At .. 
Date 



[Those spaces for Signal Operators only] 
[Name of sending detachment] 

[Location of sending detachment] 
Hour No.. 



To. 



Received. 



— S ins. — 



U. S. ARMY FIELD MESSAGE 



TO 



No. 



(For Signal Operators only) 



When Sent 

Bate of Si>eed 

When and by Whom Rec'd 

THIS ENVELOPE WILL BE RETURNED TO BEARER. 



.Name of Messenger. 



— 5J4 ins. — 



Oerman Names and Abbreviations Found on the Maps, 
and English Equivalents. 



GERMAN. 


ENGLISH. 


Allensteiner Buchwald 


AUenstein beech woods 


Alt 


Old 


Alte Schanze 


Old intrenchment 


B. (Berg) 


Hill, mountain 


Bge. (Berge) 


Hills, mountains 


Bhf. (Bahnhof) 


Railway station 


Brauerei 


Brewery 


Bruch 


Marsh, moor 


Bruecke 


Bridge 


Cap. (Capelle) 


Chapel 


Die 


The 


Dt. (Deutsche) 


German 


Ehem. (Ehemalig, Ehemalige, Ehe- 

maliger) 
F. (Foersterei) 


Former 


Forester's house 


Fl. (Fluss) 


Stream, river 


Fliess 


Small stream 


Floss Gr. (Graben) 


Timber runway 


Forst 
Fuhrt 


Forest (cared for) 

Ford '^ 


Grosse Bruch 


Large marsh 


Hasen B. (Berg) 


Rabbit hill '" 


Heide 


Moor 


H. P. (Halte Platz) 


Stopping-place 


H. St. (Halte Stelle) 


Station (railway) 


Kl. (Klein) , 


Small, lesser 


Lust Insel 


Pleasure island 


M. (Muehle) 


Mill 


Muehlen T. (Teich) 


Mill pond 


Neu 


New 


Neue T. (Teich) 


New pond 


od. (oder) 


Or 


O. F (Ober Foersterei) 


Senior forester's house 


Pr. (Preusisch) 


Prussian 


R. G. (Ritter Gut) 
S. (See) ) 
See 5 


Knight's manor 


Lake 


Schweden Schanze 


Swedish intrenchment 


Steiniger Grund 

Stift 

T. (Teich) 


Rocky ground 


Religious institution 
Pond 


Thai 
Tomlacker Wald 


Valley 
Tomlack woods 


Unter 


Lower 


U. F. (Unter Foersterei) 


Tinder-forester's house 


Vorst 


Forest (Old German, very seldom 




used) 


W. (Wald) 


Woods 


Weichsel 


(Meadows) Grass fields 


Wiesen 


Vistula 


Zgl. (Ziegelei) 


Brickyard 


Zu 


To, at 



OCl 30 



LIBRARY OF CONGRESS 




